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Today's Daf Yomi

August 7, 2015 | 讻状讘 讘讗讘 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Nedarim 75

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讘讬谉 砖注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专

is it taught in the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami? The Gemara explains that support for Rabbi Ami鈥檚 opinion is found in that which is taught in the baraita, as Rabbi Akiva mentions the following distinction: Whether he performed levirate betrothal or whether he did not perform levirate betrothal. This indicates that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 statement is referring to a yevama with whom he performed levirate betrothal.

讗讬 谞诪讬 诪专讬砖讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪砖谞讻谞住讛 诇专砖讜转讜 谞讙诪专讛 诇讜 讜讗讬 讚诇讗 拽讚讬砖 诪讗讬 谞讙诪专讛 诇讜 转驻砖讜讟 诪讬谞讬讛 讻砖注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专

Alternatively, support can be derived from the first clause of the baraita, which teaches: Once she enters his jurisdiction, she is fully under his authority. If the baraita is referring to a situation where he did not betroth her in levirate betrothal, in what sense is she fully under his authority? Deduce from it that the situation is one in which he has performed levirate betrothal.

诪讗讬 讜讻砖讗专 讚讘专讬诐 讻谉 谞讚专讬诐 讚拽转谞讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗讬 讗转讛 诪讜讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 住拽讬诇讛 讻谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛

The Gemara then asks with regard to the baraita itself. What is the meaning of the phrase: And just as in other matters there is no such distinction, so too with regard to vows, that Rabbi Akiva teaches in the baraita? Rava said: This is what Rabbi Akiva is teaching: Do you not concede that one is not liable to be punished with stoning for adulterous relations with a yevama as he would be if she were a betrothed young woman? The status of the relationship is inferior to proper marriage, as one who engages in sexual intercourse with a yevama does not incur the death penalty. Accordingly, the authority of the yavam with regard to vows is also inferior.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讗讬谉 讬讘诪讛 讙诪讜专讛 诇讗讬砖讛 讻砖诐 砖讗专讜住讛 讙诪讜专讛 诇讗讬砖讛

Rav Ashi said: The mishna (74a) is also precisely formulated to indicate this, as it teaches: A yevama is not her husband鈥檚 full-fledged wife in the same manner that a betrothed woman is her husband鈥檚 full-fledged wife.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讻诇 讛谞讚专讬诐 砖转讚讜专讬 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讛谉 拽讬讬诪讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专 诪讜驻专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诐 讛驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 诇讗 讬驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专

MISHNA: One who says to his wife: All vows that you will vow from now until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. However, if he states that all vows that she will take until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer said: They are nullified, while the Rabbis say: They are not nullified. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: If one can nullify vows that have reached the status of a prohibition, i.e., that have already taken effect, shall he not be able to nullify vows that have not reached the status of a prohibition?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗转 砖讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛拽诐 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛驻专 诇讗 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛拽诐 诇讗 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛驻专

The Rabbis said to him in response: The verse states: 鈥淓very vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). This teaches: That which has reached the status of eligibility for ratification, i.e., a vow that she has already taken, has reached the status of eligibility for nullification. However, a vow that has not reached the status of eligibility for ratification has not reached the status of eligibility for nullification either, and it cannot be nullified.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讬讞诇 讞诇讬谉 讜讘讟诇讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讞诇讬谉 讻诇诇 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Eliezer, do the vows that the husband nullifies in advance take effect momentarily and are then canceled immediately after? Or perhaps they do not take effect at all. The Gemara inquires: In what case is there a difference between these possibilities?

讻讙讜谉 讚讗转驻讬住 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬谉 谞讚专讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞诇讬谉 讛讜讬讗 转驻讬住讜转讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 讞诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讬讻讗 诪砖砖讗

The Gemara answers: There is a difference in a case where another person associated his own vow with this vow. If someone else heard her vow and declared his vow to be like hers, the status of his vow depends on this question. If you say that such vows take effect, then the association of the other person鈥檚 vow takes effect. If you say that such vows do not take effect at all, then the vow of the other person has no substance, as the vow with which he associated it never existed.

诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诐 讛驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 诇讗 讬驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 讞诇讬谉

What, then, is Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion? Come and hear the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said: If one can nullify vows that have reached the status of a prohibition, shall he not nullify vows that have not reached the status of a prohibition? Learn from it that such vows do not take effect at all, as they are described as not having reached the status of a prohibition.

诪讬 拽转谞讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讘讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 拽转谞讬 注讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讘讗讜

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Does the mishna teach using the words: That do not reach the status of a prohibition? It teaches: That have not reached the status of a prohibition, which could mean that they have not yet reached the status of a prohibition, but they may take effect, momentarily, when she actually takes the vow.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讬驻专 谞讚专讬 注爪诪讜 诪砖谞讚专 诪讬驻专 谞讚专讬 注爪诪讜 注讚 砖诇讗 讬讚讜专 诪拽讜诐 砖诪驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 诪砖转讚讜专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 注讚 砖诇讗 转讚讜专

Come and hear a baraita from the Tosefta (Nedarim 6:5): Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And just as in a situation where he cannot nullify his own vows once he has vowed, he can nullify his own vows before he vows by stipulating beforehand that the vows he takes should not take effect, all the more so in a situation where he can nullify his wife鈥檚 vows even after she vows, is it not logical that he should be able to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows before she vows?

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗砖转讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬诇讬讛 诪讛 [讛讜讗] 讚诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉 讗祝 讗砖转讜 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉 诇讗 讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗 讜讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗

The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not referring to where his wife鈥檚 vows are similar to his own in that just as his vows, which were nullified in advance, do not take effect at all, so too the vows of his wife do not take effect at all when nullified in advance? The Gemara rejects this: No, this case of his nullifying his own vows prior to taking them is as it is, and that case of his nullifying her vows prior to her taking them is as it is; the similarity between the two cases is sufficient for an a fortiori inference, but they are not similar in all respects.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讛 诪拽讜讛 砖诪注诇讛 讗转 讛讟诪讗讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗讬谉 诪爪讬诇 注诇 讛讟讛讜专讬诐 诪诇讬讟诪讗 讗讚诐 砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛讟诪讗讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 砖诇讗 讬爪讬诇 注诇 讛讟讛讜专讬谉 诪诇讬讟诪讗

Come and hear a baraita: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: Your a fortiori inference is flawed, as can be seen from this example: And just as with regard to a ritual bath, which elevates the impure from their ritual impurity when they immerse in it but does not save the pure from becoming impure if they come into contact with impurity after immersion, so too, with regard to a person, who does not elevate the impure from their impurity, e.g., when a person swallows a ritually impure object and then immerses in a ritual bath, the object remains impure, is it not logical that he should not save pure items from becoming impure? When one who has swallowed a ritually pure object comes into contact with impurity, the object he has swallowed should also become impure. This is not the case, as a swallowed object does not become impure when the person who swallowed it does. Therefore the a fortiori argument is flawed, and one cannot derive from the ability to change a status, like the husband鈥檚 ability to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows or the ability of the ritual bath to render something ritually pure, that that the source of the change can also prevent a change of status or preserve that status.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉

However, learn from this baraita that, according to Rabbi Eliezer, vows nullified by the husband from the outset do not take effect at all, as the Rabbis鈥 objection presumes that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the vows do not take effect at all. Their argument is based on the analogy between preemptive nullification and preemptive prevention of impurity. Preemptive prevention of impurity is understood to be saving an item from ever becoming impure and analogously, preemptive nullification is understood to be preventing a vow from ever taking effect.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Nedarim 75

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 75

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讘讬谉 砖注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专

is it taught in the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami? The Gemara explains that support for Rabbi Ami鈥檚 opinion is found in that which is taught in the baraita, as Rabbi Akiva mentions the following distinction: Whether he performed levirate betrothal or whether he did not perform levirate betrothal. This indicates that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 statement is referring to a yevama with whom he performed levirate betrothal.

讗讬 谞诪讬 诪专讬砖讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪砖谞讻谞住讛 诇专砖讜转讜 谞讙诪专讛 诇讜 讜讗讬 讚诇讗 拽讚讬砖 诪讗讬 谞讙诪专讛 诇讜 转驻砖讜讟 诪讬谞讬讛 讻砖注砖讛 讘讛 诪讗诪专

Alternatively, support can be derived from the first clause of the baraita, which teaches: Once she enters his jurisdiction, she is fully under his authority. If the baraita is referring to a situation where he did not betroth her in levirate betrothal, in what sense is she fully under his authority? Deduce from it that the situation is one in which he has performed levirate betrothal.

诪讗讬 讜讻砖讗专 讚讘专讬诐 讻谉 谞讚专讬诐 讚拽转谞讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗讬 讗转讛 诪讜讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 住拽讬诇讛 讻谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛

The Gemara then asks with regard to the baraita itself. What is the meaning of the phrase: And just as in other matters there is no such distinction, so too with regard to vows, that Rabbi Akiva teaches in the baraita? Rava said: This is what Rabbi Akiva is teaching: Do you not concede that one is not liable to be punished with stoning for adulterous relations with a yevama as he would be if she were a betrothed young woman? The status of the relationship is inferior to proper marriage, as one who engages in sexual intercourse with a yevama does not incur the death penalty. Accordingly, the authority of the yavam with regard to vows is also inferior.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讗讬谉 讬讘诪讛 讙诪讜专讛 诇讗讬砖讛 讻砖诐 砖讗专讜住讛 讙诪讜专讛 诇讗讬砖讛

Rav Ashi said: The mishna (74a) is also precisely formulated to indicate this, as it teaches: A yevama is not her husband鈥檚 full-fledged wife in the same manner that a betrothed woman is her husband鈥檚 full-fledged wife.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讻诇 讛谞讚专讬诐 砖转讚讜专讬 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讛谉 拽讬讬诪讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专 诪讜驻专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诐 讛驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 诇讗 讬驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专

MISHNA: One who says to his wife: All vows that you will vow from now until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. However, if he states that all vows that she will take until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer said: They are nullified, while the Rabbis say: They are not nullified. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: If one can nullify vows that have reached the status of a prohibition, i.e., that have already taken effect, shall he not be able to nullify vows that have not reached the status of a prohibition?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗转 砖讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛拽诐 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛驻专 诇讗 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛拽诐 诇讗 讘讗 诇讻诇诇 讛驻专

The Rabbis said to him in response: The verse states: 鈥淓very vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). This teaches: That which has reached the status of eligibility for ratification, i.e., a vow that she has already taken, has reached the status of eligibility for nullification. However, a vow that has not reached the status of eligibility for ratification has not reached the status of eligibility for nullification either, and it cannot be nullified.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讬讞诇 讞诇讬谉 讜讘讟诇讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讞诇讬谉 讻诇诇 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Eliezer, do the vows that the husband nullifies in advance take effect momentarily and are then canceled immediately after? Or perhaps they do not take effect at all. The Gemara inquires: In what case is there a difference between these possibilities?

讻讙讜谉 讚讗转驻讬住 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬谉 谞讚专讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞诇讬谉 讛讜讬讗 转驻讬住讜转讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 讞诇讬谉 诇讗 讗讬讻讗 诪砖砖讗

The Gemara answers: There is a difference in a case where another person associated his own vow with this vow. If someone else heard her vow and declared his vow to be like hers, the status of his vow depends on this question. If you say that such vows take effect, then the association of the other person鈥檚 vow takes effect. If you say that such vows do not take effect at all, then the vow of the other person has no substance, as the vow with which he associated it never existed.

诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诐 讛驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 诇讗 讬驻专 谞讚专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇讻诇诇 讗讬住讜专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 讞诇讬谉

What, then, is Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion? Come and hear the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said: If one can nullify vows that have reached the status of a prohibition, shall he not nullify vows that have not reached the status of a prohibition? Learn from it that such vows do not take effect at all, as they are described as not having reached the status of a prohibition.

诪讬 拽转谞讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讘讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 拽转谞讬 注讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讘讗讜

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Does the mishna teach using the words: That do not reach the status of a prohibition? It teaches: That have not reached the status of a prohibition, which could mean that they have not yet reached the status of a prohibition, but they may take effect, momentarily, when she actually takes the vow.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讬驻专 谞讚专讬 注爪诪讜 诪砖谞讚专 诪讬驻专 谞讚专讬 注爪诪讜 注讚 砖诇讗 讬讚讜专 诪拽讜诐 砖诪驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 诪砖转讚讜专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 注讚 砖诇讗 转讚讜专

Come and hear a baraita from the Tosefta (Nedarim 6:5): Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And just as in a situation where he cannot nullify his own vows once he has vowed, he can nullify his own vows before he vows by stipulating beforehand that the vows he takes should not take effect, all the more so in a situation where he can nullify his wife鈥檚 vows even after she vows, is it not logical that he should be able to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows before she vows?

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗砖转讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬诇讬讛 诪讛 [讛讜讗] 讚诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉 讗祝 讗砖转讜 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉 诇讗 讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗 讜讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗

The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not referring to where his wife鈥檚 vows are similar to his own in that just as his vows, which were nullified in advance, do not take effect at all, so too the vows of his wife do not take effect at all when nullified in advance? The Gemara rejects this: No, this case of his nullifying his own vows prior to taking them is as it is, and that case of his nullifying her vows prior to her taking them is as it is; the similarity between the two cases is sufficient for an a fortiori inference, but they are not similar in all respects.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讛 诪拽讜讛 砖诪注诇讛 讗转 讛讟诪讗讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗讬谉 诪爪讬诇 注诇 讛讟讛讜专讬诐 诪诇讬讟诪讗 讗讚诐 砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛讟诪讗讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 砖诇讗 讬爪讬诇 注诇 讛讟讛讜专讬谉 诪诇讬讟诪讗

Come and hear a baraita: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: Your a fortiori inference is flawed, as can be seen from this example: And just as with regard to a ritual bath, which elevates the impure from their ritual impurity when they immerse in it but does not save the pure from becoming impure if they come into contact with impurity after immersion, so too, with regard to a person, who does not elevate the impure from their impurity, e.g., when a person swallows a ritually impure object and then immerses in a ritual bath, the object remains impure, is it not logical that he should not save pure items from becoming impure? When one who has swallowed a ritually pure object comes into contact with impurity, the object he has swallowed should also become impure. This is not the case, as a swallowed object does not become impure when the person who swallowed it does. Therefore the a fortiori argument is flawed, and one cannot derive from the ability to change a status, like the husband鈥檚 ability to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows or the ability of the ritual bath to render something ritually pure, that that the source of the change can also prevent a change of status or preserve that status.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 讞讬讬诇讬谉

However, learn from this baraita that, according to Rabbi Eliezer, vows nullified by the husband from the outset do not take effect at all, as the Rabbis鈥 objection presumes that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the vows do not take effect at all. Their argument is based on the analogy between preemptive nullification and preemptive prevention of impurity. Preemptive prevention of impurity is understood to be saving an item from ever becoming impure and analogously, preemptive nullification is understood to be preventing a vow from ever taking effect.

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