Today's Daf Yomi
January 15, 2023 | כ״ב בטבת תשפ״ג
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
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Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.
Nedarim 82
Today’s daf is sponsored by Shaindy Kurzmann in loving memory of her mother A”H, Rivkah bat HaRav Simcha Bunim, on her 24th yahrzeit. “With deep appreciation for her encouragement to always keep learning.”
Rava asks Rav Nachman if, according to the rabbis, a vow to refrain from sexual relations is considered an affliction of the soul or something that affects the relationship between the husband and wife. Rav Nachman tries to answer it from a Mishna that appears later in our chapter, but Rava rejects the proof based on Rav Huna’s assertion that the rest of the chapter is all Rabbi Yosi’s opinion. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that if a woman forbids herself from someone in particular the husband can nullify the vow. Two difficulties are raised against this from cases in our Mishna which seem very similar, yet the husband can nullify them. An answer is brought but is rejected. In the end, the answer is that the Mishna is Rabbi Yosi’s opinion and Levi held by the rabbis. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about a case where a woman vowed not to eat two loaves and refraining from eating one was considered affliction for her, but the other was not. One says that he nullifies the entire vow and the other says he only nullifies the one that was considered affliction.
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יפר חלקו ומשמשתו ותהא נטולה מן היהודים ואי אמרת נדר ענוי נפש הוי אמאי תהא נטולה מן היהודים שמע מינה דברים שבינו לבינה הויין
her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the part of the vow that affects him, so that she will be permitted to him, and she may engage in intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her, she is forbidden to everyone. And if you say that this is a vow of affliction, why should she be removed from all other Jews? Wasn’t it already established that when a husband nullifies a vow of affliction for his wife, he nullifies it not only with respect to himself but with respect to others as well? Rather, learn from here that such vows are under the category of matters that adversely affect the relationship between him and her, and therefore he can nullify it only with respect to himself.
לרבנן תבעי לך משום דנטולה אני מן היהודים רבי יוסי קתני לה דאמר רב הונא כוליה פירקין רבי יוסי היא ממאי כיון דקתני רבי יוסי אומר אין אלו נדרי עינוי נפש למה ליה תו למיתנא הרי זה יפר דברי רבי יוסי שמע מינה מכאן ואילך רבי יוסי היא
The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, you still have the dilemma, because the mishna dealing with a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, was taught by Rabbi Yosei. As Rav Huna said: Our entire chapter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. From where do we know this? Since the mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that these are not vows of affliction, why does it need to teach further, at the end of the mishna: He can nullify the vow; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei? Learn from this that from this point forward, the rest of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Accordingly, this mishna teaches us only the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, not that of the Rabbis.
אמר שמואל משמיה דלוי כל נדרים בעל מפר לאשתו חוץ מן הנאתי על פלוני שאינו מפר אבל הנאת פלוני עלי מפר
§ Shmuel said in the name of Levi: A husband can nullify all vows of affliction for his wife, except for the vow: Benefit from me is konam for so-and-so, which he cannot nullify, as it is entirely between her and another person. But if she says: Benefit derived from so-and-so is konam for me, he can nullify the vow, as it considered a vow of affliction, since she might one day need that person and be unable to avail herself of his services due to her vow.
תנן פירות מדינה זו עלי יביא לה ממדינה אחרת אמר רב יוסף דקאמרה שתביא
The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned in the mishna: If she said: The produce of this country is konam for me, he cannot nullify the vow, as it does not involve affliction, since he can still bring her produce from another country. This vow is similar to a vow by which she prohibits herself from deriving benefit from another person. Why, then, does Shmuel say that the husband cannot nullify it? Rav Yosef said: The mishna is referring to a woman who said in her vow: That you bring. In other words, she did not prohibit herself from deriving benefit from the produce of that country entirely, but only from the produce that her husband himself would bring her. She may still enjoy that produce if it is brought to her by someone else or if she brings it for herself.
תא שמע פירות חנוני זה עלי אין יכול להפר הכא נמי דקא אמרה שתביא אתה
The Gemara raises another objection from the next clause of the mishna: Come and hear: If the woman took a vow saying: The produce of this storekeeper is konam for me, her husband cannot nullify the vow. But didn’t Shmuel say that if a woman prohibits herself from benefiting from a certain person, her husband can nullify the vow? The Gemara answers: Here too, the mishna is referring to a case where she said in her vow: The produce that you bring from this storekeeper is konam for me.
לא היתה פרנסתו אלא ממנו הרי זה יפר ואי אמרת דקא אמרה שתביא אתה אמאי יפר אלא מדסיפא דלא מייתי בעל הוי רישא דקא מייתא היא
The Gemara questions this resolution: But the continuation of the mishna states: But if the husband can obtain his sustenance only from him, i.e., that particular storekeeper, he can nullify his wife’s vow. And if you say that this is referring to a case where the woman said in her vow: The fruit that you bring from this storekeeper is konam for me, why can the husband nullify her vow? Other people can bring her the fruit on his behalf. Rather, from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna must be dealing with a case where the woman renders all fruit forbidden to herself, even that which the husband does not bring her, the first clause must also refer to a case where the woman renders forbidden even the fruit that she herself brings, and nevertheless the husband cannot nullify the vow. Therefore, the objection raised against Shmuel remains.
אלא רישא אין יכול להפר ודקא מייתא היא
Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous answer and explains the matter as follows: In the first clause the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, and the case is one where she renders forbidden even the fruit that she herself brings.
ומתניתין רבי יוסי היא דאמר רב הונא כוליה פרקין רבי יוסי היא ומאי אין יכול להפר משום עינוי נפש אבל מפר נדרים שבינו לבינה
And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who is more restrictive in his definition of affliction. As Rav Huna said: Our entire chapter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Shmuel, on the other hand, rules in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what does Rabbi Yosei mean when he says that the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vows? He means that he cannot nullify them as vows of affliction, but he can nullify them as vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל נדרה משתי ככרות באחת מתענה ובאחת אין מתענה מתוך שהוא מפר למתענה מפר לשאינו מתענה ורב אסי אמר רבי יוחנן מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה
§ Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In a case where a woman vowed that two loaves are forbidden to her, and if she abstains from one of them she would deprive herself, as it is a fine-quality loaf, and if she abstains from the other one she would not deprive herself, as it is a poor-quality loaf, then, since the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, like any other vow of affliction, he can also nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself. And Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself.
ואיכא דאמרי בעא מיניה רב אסי מרבי יוחנן נדרה משתי ככרות באחת מתענה ובאחת אין מתענה מהו אמר ליה מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה
And some say a different version of this dispute, according to which Rav Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: In a case where a woman vowed not to eat from two loaves of bread, and if she abstains from one of them she would deprive herself, and if she abstains from the other one she would not deprive herself, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself.
איתיביה האשה שנדרה בנזיר והיתה שותה יין ומטמאה למתים
Rav Asi raised an objection against Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following mishna (Nazir 23a): With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and she transgressed her vow and drank wine or became impure by coming into contact with the dead,
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
-
Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.
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Nedarim 82
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
יפר חלקו ומשמשתו ותהא נטולה מן היהודים ואי אמרת נדר ענוי נפש הוי אמאי תהא נטולה מן היהודים שמע מינה דברים שבינו לבינה הויין
her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the part of the vow that affects him, so that she will be permitted to him, and she may engage in intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her, she is forbidden to everyone. And if you say that this is a vow of affliction, why should she be removed from all other Jews? Wasn’t it already established that when a husband nullifies a vow of affliction for his wife, he nullifies it not only with respect to himself but with respect to others as well? Rather, learn from here that such vows are under the category of matters that adversely affect the relationship between him and her, and therefore he can nullify it only with respect to himself.
לרבנן תבעי לך משום דנטולה אני מן היהודים רבי יוסי קתני לה דאמר רב הונא כוליה פירקין רבי יוסי היא ממאי כיון דקתני רבי יוסי אומר אין אלו נדרי עינוי נפש למה ליה תו למיתנא הרי זה יפר דברי רבי יוסי שמע מינה מכאן ואילך רבי יוסי היא
The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, you still have the dilemma, because the mishna dealing with a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, was taught by Rabbi Yosei. As Rav Huna said: Our entire chapter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. From where do we know this? Since the mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that these are not vows of affliction, why does it need to teach further, at the end of the mishna: He can nullify the vow; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei? Learn from this that from this point forward, the rest of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Accordingly, this mishna teaches us only the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, not that of the Rabbis.
אמר שמואל משמיה דלוי כל נדרים בעל מפר לאשתו חוץ מן הנאתי על פלוני שאינו מפר אבל הנאת פלוני עלי מפר
§ Shmuel said in the name of Levi: A husband can nullify all vows of affliction for his wife, except for the vow: Benefit from me is konam for so-and-so, which he cannot nullify, as it is entirely between her and another person. But if she says: Benefit derived from so-and-so is konam for me, he can nullify the vow, as it considered a vow of affliction, since she might one day need that person and be unable to avail herself of his services due to her vow.
תנן פירות מדינה זו עלי יביא לה ממדינה אחרת אמר רב יוסף דקאמרה שתביא
The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned in the mishna: If she said: The produce of this country is konam for me, he cannot nullify the vow, as it does not involve affliction, since he can still bring her produce from another country. This vow is similar to a vow by which she prohibits herself from deriving benefit from another person. Why, then, does Shmuel say that the husband cannot nullify it? Rav Yosef said: The mishna is referring to a woman who said in her vow: That you bring. In other words, she did not prohibit herself from deriving benefit from the produce of that country entirely, but only from the produce that her husband himself would bring her. She may still enjoy that produce if it is brought to her by someone else or if she brings it for herself.
תא שמע פירות חנוני זה עלי אין יכול להפר הכא נמי דקא אמרה שתביא אתה
The Gemara raises another objection from the next clause of the mishna: Come and hear: If the woman took a vow saying: The produce of this storekeeper is konam for me, her husband cannot nullify the vow. But didn’t Shmuel say that if a woman prohibits herself from benefiting from a certain person, her husband can nullify the vow? The Gemara answers: Here too, the mishna is referring to a case where she said in her vow: The produce that you bring from this storekeeper is konam for me.
לא היתה פרנסתו אלא ממנו הרי זה יפר ואי אמרת דקא אמרה שתביא אתה אמאי יפר אלא מדסיפא דלא מייתי בעל הוי רישא דקא מייתא היא
The Gemara questions this resolution: But the continuation of the mishna states: But if the husband can obtain his sustenance only from him, i.e., that particular storekeeper, he can nullify his wife’s vow. And if you say that this is referring to a case where the woman said in her vow: The fruit that you bring from this storekeeper is konam for me, why can the husband nullify her vow? Other people can bring her the fruit on his behalf. Rather, from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna must be dealing with a case where the woman renders all fruit forbidden to herself, even that which the husband does not bring her, the first clause must also refer to a case where the woman renders forbidden even the fruit that she herself brings, and nevertheless the husband cannot nullify the vow. Therefore, the objection raised against Shmuel remains.
אלא רישא אין יכול להפר ודקא מייתא היא
Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous answer and explains the matter as follows: In the first clause the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, and the case is one where she renders forbidden even the fruit that she herself brings.
ומתניתין רבי יוסי היא דאמר רב הונא כוליה פרקין רבי יוסי היא ומאי אין יכול להפר משום עינוי נפש אבל מפר נדרים שבינו לבינה
And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who is more restrictive in his definition of affliction. As Rav Huna said: Our entire chapter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Shmuel, on the other hand, rules in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what does Rabbi Yosei mean when he says that the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vows? He means that he cannot nullify them as vows of affliction, but he can nullify them as vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל נדרה משתי ככרות באחת מתענה ובאחת אין מתענה מתוך שהוא מפר למתענה מפר לשאינו מתענה ורב אסי אמר רבי יוחנן מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה
§ Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In a case where a woman vowed that two loaves are forbidden to her, and if she abstains from one of them she would deprive herself, as it is a fine-quality loaf, and if she abstains from the other one she would not deprive herself, as it is a poor-quality loaf, then, since the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, like any other vow of affliction, he can also nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself. And Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself.
ואיכא דאמרי בעא מיניה רב אסי מרבי יוחנן נדרה משתי ככרות באחת מתענה ובאחת אין מתענה מהו אמר ליה מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה
And some say a different version of this dispute, according to which Rav Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: In a case where a woman vowed not to eat from two loaves of bread, and if she abstains from one of them she would deprive herself, and if she abstains from the other one she would not deprive herself, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself.
איתיביה האשה שנדרה בנזיר והיתה שותה יין ומטמאה למתים
Rav Asi raised an objection against Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following mishna (Nazir 23a): With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and she transgressed her vow and drank wine or became impure by coming into contact with the dead,
