Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

January 18, 2023 | 讻状讛 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

Nedarim 85

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Emma Rinberg in honor of the 70th birthday of her husband Richard. 鈥淢ay Hashem bless you with good health and happiness for many years to come to enjoy our family – learning, teaching and inspiring us.鈥
Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Laura Shechter in memory of her dear friend Daniel Maurice Ulmer, Moshe ben Shmuel and Sarah, on the occasion of his 3rd yahrzeit. 鈥淒aniel, your light lives on in the hearts of those who knew and loved you.鈥澛
Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Leah Herzog in loving memory of her father, Dr. Rudolf Frisch, Reuven Abiya ben Mordechai v’Leah, on his 30th yahrzeit. 鈥淗e was a brilliant man of pristine integrity who encouraged intellectual curiosity. Daddy, I miss you and love you. Yehi zichro baruch.鈥

In trying to resolve the apparent contradiction between two lines in the Mishna, Rav Hoshaya suggests that each line reflects a different tannaitic opinion (found in a different source) regarding whether or not the benefit received from giving a gift to a Kohen/Levite can be considered to have financial value. However, the Gemara explains that the root of the debate in the other source is not about whether the benefit is considered to have financial value or not. First, the debate is explained differently, however, that interpretation is rejected as well. But finally, the debate is explained differently. Rava then answers the apparent contradiction in the Mishna in a different manner. If a woman forbids anything she produces to a particular individual, the husband cannot nullify that vow as it is neither affliction nor relating to his relationship with her. But if she vows that he will not benefit from anything she produces, there is a debate about whether he does not need to nullify, as she has committed in the marriage that he receives her produce, or he can nullify because what she produces beyond the basics is her own, or he can nullify now in case they later divorce. Shmuel holds by the last opinion. A contradiction is raised as this seems to imply one can sanctify something that does not yet exist and that contradicts a ruling of Shmuel elsewhere. A possible answer is suggested but immediately rejected. Rav Yosef brings an answer but Abaye rejects it. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua brings a different answer.

讚专讘讬 住讘专 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诪诪讜谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉

That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value, and therefore a thief must pay the full value of the untithed produce. The owner has monetary rights in the priestly and Levitical gifts, by virtue of the fact that he may give his teruma and tithes to the priest and Levite of his choice. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, meaning that the owner of the produce has no monetary rights whatsoever in the teruma and tithes included in the untithed produce.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘诪转谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, as everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. Rather, here they disagree with regard to whether priestly and Levitical gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as if they have already been separated, meaning the dispute is whether the untithed produce is categorized as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, or as a non-sacred category in and of itself. If they are not seen as having already been separated, the thief must restore everything he took. But if they are regarded as having already been separated, then the thief returns only the non-sacred portion of the produce, as the priestly and Levitical gifts did not belong to the owner.

讜讗讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诪讛 诇讬 讛讜专诪讜 诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 讛讜专诪讜

The Gemara counters this argument: But if the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, what is the difference to me if the gifts have already been separated, and what is the difference to me if they have not yet been separated? Either way, the owner of the produce has no monetary rights in the portions of teruma and tithes contained in the untithed produce.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讙谞讘 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬讙谞讜讘 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬砖讛讬 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛

Rather, one must explain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The Sages penalized the thief so that he would not steal again by requiring him to repay the full value of what he stole, despite the fact that the owner of the untithed produce has no monetary rights in the teruma and tithes included in it. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the Sages penalized the owner of the produce, awarding him only the value of the non-sacred portion of the produce, so that in the future he would not delay with his untithed produce, but rather separate its teruma and tithes as soon as the produce is harvested. Had he set aside and distributed the gifts promptly they would not have been stolen.

专讘讗 讗诪专 砖讗谞讬 转专讜诪讛 讚讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讬讟诇讜 注诇 讻专讞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚转专讜诪讛 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讻讛谞讬诐 讜讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 讗转讬 诇诪讬住专讗 注诇讬讬讛讜 砖讜讬讗 注驻专讗 讘注诇诪讗

Rava said that there is another way to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the mishna: As stated, the second case, where the person prohibits specific priests and Levites from benefiting from him, indicates that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. However, teruma is different, as this is the reason that priests can take teruma from him against his will in a case where one prohibited all priests from deriving benefit from him: Because teruma is fit only for priests, and since he came to render it prohibited to them, he made it, for him, like mere dust. If this teruma, which certainly cannot be eaten by Israelites, is now forbidden to priests as well, the owner has effectively removed it from his own possession. Therefore, the priests do not derive any benefit from him if they take it.

诪转谞讬壮 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讗 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讘讬讱 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讞讬 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讞讬讱 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 砖讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛 注诇 驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专

MISHNA: If a woman said: I will not produce anything for my father, as that is konam for me, or: For your father, or: For my brother, or: For your brother, her husband cannot nullify such vows, as they do not fall under the category of vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her. By contrast, if she said: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 讜转讛讬 讗住讜专讛 注诇讬讜

Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri also says that he should nullify the vow, but for a different reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him forever, i.e., he will be unable to remarry her, lest he come to benefit from her labor.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚拽住讘专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 讛诪拽讚讬砖 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜

GEMARA: Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel maintains that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? According to Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, her vow is valid with respect to things she will do after her divorce, even though at present she is not divorced and she has not yet produced anything. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Ketubot 58b): If one consecrates his wife鈥檚 earnings,

讛专讬 讝讜 注讜砖讛 讜讗讜讻诇转 讜讛诪讜转专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讛拽讚砖 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇讬谉 讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. And with regard to the surplus earnings, i.e., if she produced more than she needs for her sustenance, Rabbi Meir says the surplus becomes consecrated property, whereas Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar says that it is non-sacred. And Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar. Apparently, Shmuel鈥檚 opinion is that a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore a man cannot consecrate earnings that his wife will produce only in the future.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 注诇 讛注讚驻讛 讛讜讗 讚拽讗诪专

And if you would say that when Shmuel is saying that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri he was saying only that the halakha is such with regard to the surplus, there is a difficulty. One might say that since Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, he apparently maintains that a woman鈥檚 surplus earnings belong to her husband, and therefore she cannot render them forbidden to him through a vow, and it is only with respect to this point that Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri. If this is the case, there is no contradiction between his ruling here and his ruling in Ketubot that the halakha with regard to one who consecrates his wife鈥檚 earnings is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar.

诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讘讛注讚驻讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讛诇讻讛 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 (讗讬谉) 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

But if so, let Shmuel clearly say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who also maintains that the surplus belongs to the husband. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who asserts that the surplus belongs to the wife.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讗讜住专 谞诪讬 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇讬讜

Rather, Rav Yosef said that the apparent contradiction between Shmuel鈥檚 rulings can be resolved in the following manner: Although one cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different; since a person can prohibit to himself another鈥檚 produce by means of a konam, even though one cannot consecrate another鈥檚 produce to the Temple, he can also prohibit to himself an entity that has not yet come into the world. With regard to consecration, however, a person cannot dedicate to the Temple treasury something that is not currently in his possession, and he cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet entered the world, either.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 砖讛专讬 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讗诇讗 讬讗住讜专 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讛专讬 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜

Abaye said to him: This is no proof at all. Granted, a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself, since a person can prohibit his own produce to another. But does it follow that he can also prohibit an entity that has not yet come into the world to another person, seeing that a person cannot prohibit another鈥檚 produce to that other person, as he has jurisdiction neither over the produce nor over the person to whom he wishes to prohibit it? Yet in the mishna here the woman prohibits her future earnings, which do not yet exist, to another person, i.e., her husband.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛谉 讚讬讚讬诐 讛讗 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讜诇诐

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here the mishna is dealing with a woman who says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them. Therefore, the case does not involve the issue of an entity that has not yet come into the world, as her hands are already in the world.

讜讻讬 讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 拽讚砖讛 讜讛讗 诪砖注讘讚谉 讬讚讬讛 诇讘注诇 讚讗诪专讛 诇讻讬 诪讙专砖讛 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 诇讗 诪讙专砖讛 讜诪诪讗讬 讚讻讬 讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诪讛谞讬讗

The Gemara challenges this interpretation: And if she said her vow like this, are they consecrated and forbidden? But aren鈥檛 her hands pledged to her husband, to do the work she is obligated to perform for him? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a woman who said: The vow will take effect when I become divorced. The Gemara raises a difficulty: She is not divorced now in any event, and from where is it learned that when she says her vow like this, the vow is effective? How is it learned that she can consecrate something in such a manner that it will become consecrated only in the future?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

talking talmud_square

Nedarim 85: Swearing Away the Future

A new mishnah - a woman who makes the things she produces off-limits from her father, brother, in-laws... The husband...

Nedarim 85

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 85

讚专讘讬 住讘专 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诪诪讜谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉

That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value, and therefore a thief must pay the full value of the untithed produce. The owner has monetary rights in the priestly and Levitical gifts, by virtue of the fact that he may give his teruma and tithes to the priest and Levite of his choice. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, meaning that the owner of the produce has no monetary rights whatsoever in the teruma and tithes included in the untithed produce.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘诪转谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, as everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. Rather, here they disagree with regard to whether priestly and Levitical gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as if they have already been separated, meaning the dispute is whether the untithed produce is categorized as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, or as a non-sacred category in and of itself. If they are not seen as having already been separated, the thief must restore everything he took. But if they are regarded as having already been separated, then the thief returns only the non-sacred portion of the produce, as the priestly and Levitical gifts did not belong to the owner.

讜讗讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诪讛 诇讬 讛讜专诪讜 诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 讛讜专诪讜

The Gemara counters this argument: But if the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, what is the difference to me if the gifts have already been separated, and what is the difference to me if they have not yet been separated? Either way, the owner of the produce has no monetary rights in the portions of teruma and tithes contained in the untithed produce.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讙谞讘 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬讙谞讜讘 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬砖讛讬 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛

Rather, one must explain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The Sages penalized the thief so that he would not steal again by requiring him to repay the full value of what he stole, despite the fact that the owner of the untithed produce has no monetary rights in the teruma and tithes included in it. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the Sages penalized the owner of the produce, awarding him only the value of the non-sacred portion of the produce, so that in the future he would not delay with his untithed produce, but rather separate its teruma and tithes as soon as the produce is harvested. Had he set aside and distributed the gifts promptly they would not have been stolen.

专讘讗 讗诪专 砖讗谞讬 转专讜诪讛 讚讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讬讟诇讜 注诇 讻专讞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚转专讜诪讛 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讻讛谞讬诐 讜讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 讗转讬 诇诪讬住专讗 注诇讬讬讛讜 砖讜讬讗 注驻专讗 讘注诇诪讗

Rava said that there is another way to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the mishna: As stated, the second case, where the person prohibits specific priests and Levites from benefiting from him, indicates that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. However, teruma is different, as this is the reason that priests can take teruma from him against his will in a case where one prohibited all priests from deriving benefit from him: Because teruma is fit only for priests, and since he came to render it prohibited to them, he made it, for him, like mere dust. If this teruma, which certainly cannot be eaten by Israelites, is now forbidden to priests as well, the owner has effectively removed it from his own possession. Therefore, the priests do not derive any benefit from him if they take it.

诪转谞讬壮 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讗 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讘讬讱 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讞讬 讜注诇 驻讬 讗讞讬讱 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 砖讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛 注诇 驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专

MISHNA: If a woman said: I will not produce anything for my father, as that is konam for me, or: For your father, or: For my brother, or: For your brother, her husband cannot nullify such vows, as they do not fall under the category of vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her. By contrast, if she said: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 讜转讛讬 讗住讜专讛 注诇讬讜

Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri also says that he should nullify the vow, but for a different reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him forever, i.e., he will be unable to remarry her, lest he come to benefit from her labor.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚拽住讘专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 讛诪拽讚讬砖 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜

GEMARA: Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel maintains that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? According to Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, her vow is valid with respect to things she will do after her divorce, even though at present she is not divorced and she has not yet produced anything. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Ketubot 58b): If one consecrates his wife鈥檚 earnings,

讛专讬 讝讜 注讜砖讛 讜讗讜讻诇转 讜讛诪讜转专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讛拽讚砖 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇讬谉 讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. And with regard to the surplus earnings, i.e., if she produced more than she needs for her sustenance, Rabbi Meir says the surplus becomes consecrated property, whereas Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar says that it is non-sacred. And Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar. Apparently, Shmuel鈥檚 opinion is that a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore a man cannot consecrate earnings that his wife will produce only in the future.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 注诇 讛注讚驻讛 讛讜讗 讚拽讗诪专

And if you would say that when Shmuel is saying that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri he was saying only that the halakha is such with regard to the surplus, there is a difficulty. One might say that since Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, he apparently maintains that a woman鈥檚 surplus earnings belong to her husband, and therefore she cannot render them forbidden to him through a vow, and it is only with respect to this point that Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri. If this is the case, there is no contradiction between his ruling here and his ruling in Ketubot that the halakha with regard to one who consecrates his wife鈥檚 earnings is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar.

诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讘讛注讚驻讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讛诇讻讛 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 (讗讬谉) 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

But if so, let Shmuel clearly say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who also maintains that the surplus belongs to the husband. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who asserts that the surplus belongs to the wife.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讗讜住专 谞诪讬 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇讬讜

Rather, Rav Yosef said that the apparent contradiction between Shmuel鈥檚 rulings can be resolved in the following manner: Although one cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different; since a person can prohibit to himself another鈥檚 produce by means of a konam, even though one cannot consecrate another鈥檚 produce to the Temple, he can also prohibit to himself an entity that has not yet come into the world. With regard to consecration, however, a person cannot dedicate to the Temple treasury something that is not currently in his possession, and he cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet entered the world, either.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 砖讛专讬 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讗诇讗 讬讗住讜专 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讛专讬 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜

Abaye said to him: This is no proof at all. Granted, a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself, since a person can prohibit his own produce to another. But does it follow that he can also prohibit an entity that has not yet come into the world to another person, seeing that a person cannot prohibit another鈥檚 produce to that other person, as he has jurisdiction neither over the produce nor over the person to whom he wishes to prohibit it? Yet in the mishna here the woman prohibits her future earnings, which do not yet exist, to another person, i.e., her husband.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛谉 讚讬讚讬诐 讛讗 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讜诇诐

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here the mishna is dealing with a woman who says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them. Therefore, the case does not involve the issue of an entity that has not yet come into the world, as her hands are already in the world.

讜讻讬 讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 拽讚砖讛 讜讛讗 诪砖注讘讚谉 讬讚讬讛 诇讘注诇 讚讗诪专讛 诇讻讬 诪讙专砖讛 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 诇讗 诪讙专砖讛 讜诪诪讗讬 讚讻讬 讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诪讛谞讬讗

The Gemara challenges this interpretation: And if she said her vow like this, are they consecrated and forbidden? But aren鈥檛 her hands pledged to her husband, to do the work she is obligated to perform for him? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a woman who said: The vow will take effect when I become divorced. The Gemara raises a difficulty: She is not divorced now in any event, and from where is it learned that when she says her vow like this, the vow is effective? How is it learned that she can consecrate something in such a manner that it will become consecrated only in the future?

Scroll To Top