In trying to resolve the apparent contradiction between two lines in the Mishna, Rav Hoshaya suggests that each line reflects a different tannaitic opinion (found in a different source) regarding whether or not the benefit received from giving a gift to a Kohen/Levite can be considered to have financial value. However, the Gemara explains that the root of the debate in the other source is not about whether the benefit is considered to have financial value or not. First, the debate is explained differently, however, that interpretation is rejected as well. But finally, the debate is explained differently. Rava then answers the apparent contradiction in the Mishna in a different manner. If a woman forbids anything she produces to a particular individual, the husband cannot nullify that vow as it is neither affliction nor relating to his relationship with her. But if she vows that he will not benefit from anything she produces, there is a debate about whether he does not need to nullify, as she has committed in the marriage that he receives her produce, or he can nullify because what she produces beyond the basics is her own, or he can nullify now in case they later divorce. Shmuel holds by the last opinion. A contradiction is raised as this seems to imply one can sanctify something that does not yet exist and that contradicts a ruling of Shmuel elsewhere. A possible answer is suggested but immediately rejected. Rav Yosef brings an answer but Abaye rejects it. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua brings a different answer.
Nedarim 85
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This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Chaim Avraham HaKohen ben Alter Gershon HaKohen.
Nedarim 85
דְּרַבִּי סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה מָמוֹן, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן?
That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value, and therefore a thief must pay the full value of the untithed produce. The owner has monetary rights in the priestly and Levitical gifts, by virtue of the fact that he may give his teruma and tithes to the priest and Levite of his choice. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, meaning that the owner of the produce has no monetary rights whatsoever in the teruma and tithes included in the untithed produce.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן. אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַתָּנוֹת שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, as everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. Rather, here they disagree with regard to whether priestly and Levitical gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as if they have already been separated, meaning the dispute is whether the untithed produce is categorized as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, or as a non-sacred category in and of itself. If they are not seen as having already been separated, the thief must restore everything he took. But if they are regarded as having already been separated, then the thief returns only the non-sacred portion of the produce, as the priestly and Levitical gifts did not belong to the owner.
וְאִי טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן — מָה לִי הוּרְמוּ, מָה לִי לֹא הוּרְמוּ?
The Gemara counters this argument: But if the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, what is the difference to me if the gifts have already been separated, and what is the difference to me if they have not yet been separated? Either way, the owner of the produce has no monetary rights in the portions of teruma and tithes contained in the untithed produce.
אֶלָּא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְרַבִּי: קַנְסוּהּ רַבָּנַן לְגַנָּב כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִיגְנוֹב. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: קַנְסוּהּ רַבָּנַן לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִישַׁהֵי לְטִיבְלֵיהּ.
Rather, one must explain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The Sages penalized the thief so that he would not steal again by requiring him to repay the full value of what he stole, despite the fact that the owner of the untithed produce has no monetary rights in the teruma and tithes included in it. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the Sages penalized the owner of the produce, awarding him only the value of the non-sacred portion of the produce, so that in the future he would not delay with his untithed produce, but rather separate its teruma and tithes as soon as the produce is harvested. Had he set aside and distributed the gifts promptly they would not have been stolen.
רָבָא אָמַר: שָׁאנֵי תְּרוּמָה, דְּהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּיִטְּלוּ עַל כׇּרְחוֹ — מִשּׁוּם דִּתְרוּמָה לָא חַזְיָא אֶלָּא לְכֹהֲנִים, וְכֵיוָן דְּקָא אָתֵי לְמֵיסְרָא עֲלַיְיהוּ, שַׁוְּיָא עַפְרָא בְּעָלְמָא.
Rava said that there is another way to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the mishna: As stated, the second case, where the person prohibits specific priests and Levites from benefiting from him, indicates that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. However, teruma is different, as this is the reason that priests can take teruma from him against his will in a case where one prohibited all priests from deriving benefit from him: Because teruma is fit only for priests, and since he came to render it prohibited to them, he made it, for him, like mere dust. If this teruma, which certainly cannot be eaten by Israelites, is now forbidden to priests as well, the owner has effectively removed it from his own possession. Therefore, the priests do not derive any benefit from him if they take it.
מַתְנִי׳ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה עַל פִּי אַבָּא״, וְ״עַל פִּי אָבִיךָ״, וְ״עַל פִּי אָחִי״, וְ״עַל פִּי אָחִיךָ״ — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. ״שֶׁאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה עַל פִּיךָ״ — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר.
MISHNA: If a woman said: I will not produce anything for my father, as that is konam for me, or: For your father, or: For my brother, or: For your brother, her husband cannot nullify such vows, as they do not fall under the category of vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her. By contrast, if she said: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יוֹתֵר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ.
Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא יְגָרְשֶׁנָּה וּתְהִי אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו.
Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri also says that he should nullify the vow, but for a different reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him forever, i.e., he will be unable to remarry her, lest he come to benefit from her labor.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי. לְמֵימְרָא דְּקָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם? וּרְמִינְהִי: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ מַעֲשֵׂה יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ —
GEMARA: Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel maintains that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? According to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, her vow is valid with respect to things she will do after her divorce, even though at present she is not divorced and she has not yet produced anything. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Ketubot 58b): If one consecrates his wife’s earnings,
הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת. וְהַמּוֹתָר — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֶקְדֵּשׁ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר. אַלְמָא אֵין אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם.
she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. And with regard to the surplus earnings, i.e., if she produced more than she needs for her sustenance, Rabbi Meir says the surplus becomes consecrated property, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says that it is non-sacred. And Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar. Apparently, Shmuel’s opinion is that a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore a man cannot consecrate earnings that his wife will produce only in the future.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: כִּי קָאָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי — עַל הַעֲדָפָה הוּא דְּקָאָמַר.
And if you would say that when Shmuel is saying that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri he was saying only that the halakha is such with regard to the surplus, there is a difficulty. One might say that since Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, he apparently maintains that a woman’s surplus earnings belong to her husband, and therefore she cannot render them forbidden to him through a vow, and it is only with respect to this point that Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. If this is the case, there is no contradiction between his ruling here and his ruling in Ketubot that the halakha with regard to one who consecrates his wife’s earnings is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar.
לֵימָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי בְּהַעֲדָפָה. אִי נָמֵי: הֲלָכָה כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא. אִי נָמֵי: (אֵין) הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!
But if so, let Shmuel clearly say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who also maintains that the surplus belongs to the husband. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who asserts that the surplus belongs to the wife.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: שָׁאנֵי קוּנָּמוֹת, הוֹאִיל וְאָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו, אוֹסֵר נָמֵי דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם עָלָיו.
Rather, Rav Yosef said that the apparent contradiction between Shmuel’s rulings can be resolved in the following manner: Although one cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different; since a person can prohibit to himself another’s produce by means of a konam, even though one cannot consecrate another’s produce to the Temple, he can also prohibit to himself an entity that has not yet come into the world. With regard to consecration, however, a person cannot dedicate to the Temple treasury something that is not currently in his possession, and he cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet entered the world, either.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: בִּשְׁלָמָא אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹתָיו עַל חֲבֵירוֹ. אֶלָּא יֶאֱסוֹר דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם עַל חֲבֵירוֹ, שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל חֲבֵירוֹ!
Abaye said to him: This is no proof at all. Granted, a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself, since a person can prohibit his own produce to another. But does it follow that he can also prohibit an entity that has not yet come into the world to another person, seeing that a person cannot prohibit another’s produce to that other person, as he has jurisdiction neither over the produce nor over the person to whom he wishes to prohibit it? Yet in the mishna here the woman prohibits her future earnings, which do not yet exist, to another person, i.e., her husband.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַי לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶן״, דְּיָדַיִם הָא אִיתַנְהוּ בָּעוֹלָם.
Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here the mishna is dealing with a woman who says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them. Therefore, the case does not involve the issue of an entity that has not yet come into the world, as her hands are already in the world.
וְכִי אָמְרָה הָכִי — קָדְשָׁה? וְהָא מְשַׁעְבְּדָן יְדַיהּ לְבַעַל! דְּאָמְרָה: לְכִי מִגָּרְשָׁה. הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת לָא מִגָּרְשָׁה, וּמִמַּאי דְּכִי אַמְרַהּ הָכִי מַהְנְיָא?
The Gemara challenges this interpretation: And if she said her vow like this, are they consecrated and forbidden? But aren’t her hands pledged to her husband, to do the work she is obligated to perform for him? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a woman who said: The vow will take effect when I become divorced. The Gemara raises a difficulty: She is not divorced now in any event, and from where is it learned that when she says her vow like this, the vow is effective? How is it learned that she can consecrate something in such a manner that it will become consecrated only in the future?
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Raanana, Israel
Nedarim 85
ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ Χ‘ΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨: ΧΧΦΉΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ²Χ ΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΧΦΉΧ, ΧΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ ΧΦΌΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦΈΧ Χ‘ΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨: ΧΧΦΉΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ²Χ ΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΦΈΧΦΌ ΧΦΈΧΧΦΉΧ?
That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value, and therefore a thief must pay the full value of the untithed produce. The owner has monetary rights in the priestly and Levitical gifts, by virtue of the fact that he may give his teruma and tithes to the priest and Levite of his choice. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, meaning that the owner of the produce has no monetary rights whatsoever in the teruma and tithes included in the untithed produce.
ΧΦΈΧ, ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦΌΦ΅Χ Χ’ΦΈΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ²Χ ΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΦΈΧΦΌ ΧΦΈΧΧΦΉΧ. ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦ·ΧͺΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΉΧͺ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΉΧ ΧΧΦΌΧ¨Φ°ΧΧΦΌ Χ§ΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΧ€ΦΌΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ.
The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, as everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. Rather, here they disagree with regard to whether priestly and Levitical gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as if they have already been separated, meaning the dispute is whether the untithed produce is categorized as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, or as a non-sacred category in and of itself. If they are not seen as having already been separated, the thief must restore everything he took. But if they are regarded as having already been separated, then the thief returns only the non-sacred portion of the produce, as the priestly and Levitical gifts did not belong to the owner.
ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ²Χ ΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΦΈΧΦΌ ΧΦΈΧΧΦΉΧ β ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΌΧ¨Φ°ΧΧΦΌ, ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΉΧ ΧΧΦΌΧ¨Φ°ΧΧΦΌ?
The Gemara counters this argument: But if the benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, what is the difference to me if the gifts have already been separated, and what is the difference to me if they have not yet been separated? Either way, the owner of the produce has no monetary rights in the portions of teruma and tithes contained in the untithed produce.
ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ, ΧΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΧ ΧΦΌ ΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ: Χ§Φ·Χ Φ°Χ‘ΧΦΌΧΦΌ Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦΈΧ Φ·Χ ΧΦ°ΧΦ·Χ ΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΧΦ°Χ ΧΦΉΧ. ΧΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ ΧΦΌΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦΈΧ Χ‘ΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨: Χ§Φ·Χ Φ°Χ‘ΧΦΌΧΦΌ Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦΈΧ Φ·Χ ΧΦ°ΧΦ·Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΦ·ΧΦ΄Χͺ, ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΧ©ΧΦ·ΧΦ΅Χ ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄ΧΧΦ°ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦΌ.
Rather, one must explain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The Sages penalized the thief so that he would not steal again by requiring him to repay the full value of what he stole, despite the fact that the owner of the untithed produce has no monetary rights in the teruma and tithes included in it. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the Sages penalized the owner of the produce, awarding him only the value of the non-sacred portion of the produce, so that in the future he would not delay with his untithed produce, but rather separate its teruma and tithes as soon as the produce is harvested. Had he set aside and distributed the gifts promptly they would not have been stolen.
Χ¨ΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨: Χ©ΧΦΈΧΧ Φ΅Χ ΧͺΦΌΦ°Χ¨ΧΦΌΧΦΈΧ, ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΧ ΧΦΌ ΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦ΄ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΧΦΌ Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦΌΧΧ¨Φ°ΧΧΦΉ β ΧΦ΄Χ©ΦΌΧΧΦΌΧ ΧΦΌΦ΄ΧͺΦ°Χ¨ΧΦΌΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°ΧΦΉΧΦ²Χ Φ΄ΧΧ, ΧΦ°ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ§ΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧͺΦ΅Χ ΧΦ°ΧΦ΅ΧΧ‘Φ°Χ¨ΦΈΧ Χ’Φ²ΧΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΧΧΦΌ, Χ©ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ Χ’Φ·Χ€Φ°Χ¨ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ’ΦΈΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ.
Rava said that there is another way to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the mishna: As stated, the second case, where the person prohibits specific priests and Levites from benefiting from him, indicates that the benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. However, teruma is different, as this is the reason that priests can take teruma from him against his will in a case where one prohibited all priests from deriving benefit from him: Because teruma is fit only for priests, and since he came to render it prohibited to them, he made it, for him, like mere dust. If this teruma, which certainly cannot be eaten by Israelites, is now forbidden to priests as well, the owner has effectively removed it from his own possession. Therefore, the priests do not derive any benefit from him if they take it.
ΧΦ·ΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΄ΧΧ³ Χ΄Χ§Φ»ΧΦ½Χ ΦΌΦΈΧ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦ΅ΧΧ Φ΄Χ Χ’ΧΦΉΧ©ΧΦΈΧ Χ’Φ·Χ Χ€ΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΦΈΧΧ΄, ΧΦ°Χ΄Χ’Φ·Χ Χ€ΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧΦ΄ΧΧΦΈΧ΄, ΧΦ°Χ΄Χ’Φ·Χ Χ€ΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧΦ΄ΧΧ΄, ΧΦ°Χ΄Χ’Φ·Χ Χ€ΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧΦ΄ΧΧΦΈΧ΄ β ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΧΦΉ ΧΦΈΧΧΦΉΧ ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ€Φ΅Χ¨. Χ΄Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦ΅ΧΧ Φ΄Χ Χ’ΧΦΉΧ©ΧΦΈΧ Χ’Φ·Χ Χ€ΦΌΦ΄ΧΧΦΈΧ΄ β ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΧΦΉ Χ¦ΦΈΧ¨Φ΄ΧΧΦ° ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ€Φ΅Χ¨.
MISHNA: If a woman said: I will not produce anything for my father, as that is konam for me, or: For your father, or: For my brother, or: For your brother, her husband cannot nullify such vows, as they do not fall under the category of vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her. By contrast, if she said: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.
Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ Χ’Φ²Χ§Φ΄ΧΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ΅Χ¨: ΧΦΈΧ€Φ΅Χ¨, Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧͺΦΌΦ·Χ’Φ²ΧΦ΄ΧΧ£ Χ’ΦΈΧΦΈΧΧ ΧΧΦΉΧͺΦ΅Χ¨ ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧ¨ΦΈΧΧΦΌΧ ΧΧΦΉ.
Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him.
Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦΆΧ Χ ΧΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ΅Χ¨: ΧΦΈΧ€Φ΅Χ¨, Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ¨Φ°Χ©ΧΦΆΧ ΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΧͺΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦ²Χ‘ΧΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ Χ’ΦΈΧΦΈΧΧ.
Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri also says that he should nullify the vow, but for a different reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him forever, i.e., he will be unable to remarry her, lest he come to benefit from her labor.
ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ³ ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ Χ©ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦ΅Χ: ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦΆΧ Χ ΧΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ. ΧΦ°ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦ°Χ¨ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ§ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ Χ©ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦ΅Χ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ·Χ§Φ°ΧΦΌΦ΄ΧΧ©Χ ΧΦΌΦΈΧΦΈΧ¨ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΉΧ ΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ’ΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ? ΧΦΌΧ¨Φ°ΧΦ΄ΧΧ Φ°ΧΦ΄Χ: ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΦ·Χ§Φ°ΧΦΌΦ΄ΧΧ©Χ ΧΦ·Χ’Φ²Χ©ΧΦ΅Χ ΧΦ°ΧΦ΅Χ ΧΦ΄Χ©ΧΦ°ΧͺΦΌΧΦΉ β
GEMARA: Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel maintains that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? According to Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri, her vow is valid with respect to things she will do after her divorce, even though at present she is not divorced and she has not yet produced anything. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Ketubot 58b): If one consecrates his wifeβs earnings,
ΧΦ²Χ¨Φ΅Χ ΧΧΦΉ Χ’ΧΦΉΧ©ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΉΧΦΆΧΦΆΧͺ. ΧΦ°ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΧΦΉΧͺΦΈΧ¨ β Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΦ΅ΧΦ΄ΧΧ¨ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ΅Χ¨: ΧΦΆΧ§Φ°ΧΦΌΦ΅Χ©Χ, Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦ·Χ‘ΦΌΦ·Χ Φ°ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ¨ ΧΧΦΉΧΦ΅Χ¨: ΧΧΦΌΧΦΌΦ΄ΧΧ. ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ Χ©ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΌΧΦ΅Χ: ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦ·Χ‘ΦΌΦ·Χ Φ°ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ¨. ΧΦ·ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ·Χ§Φ°ΧΦΌΦ΄ΧΧ©Χ ΧΦΌΦΈΧΦΈΧ¨ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΉΧ ΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ’ΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ.
she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. And with regard to the surplus earnings, i.e., if she produced more than she needs for her sustenance, Rabbi Meir says the surplus becomes consecrated property, whereas Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan HaSandlar says that it is non-sacred. And Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan HaSandlar. Apparently, Shmuelβs opinion is that a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore a man cannot consecrate earnings that his wife will produce only in the future.
ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧͺΦΌΦ΅ΧΧΦΈΧ: ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ Χ§ΦΈΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦΆΧ Χ ΧΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ β Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦ·Χ’Φ²ΧΦΈΧ€ΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΌΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ§ΦΈΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨.
And if you would say that when Shmuel is saying that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri he was saying only that the halakha is such with regard to the surplus, there is a difficulty. One might say that since Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, he apparently maintains that a womanβs surplus earnings belong to her husband, and therefore she cannot render them forbidden to him through a vow, and it is only with respect to this point that Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri. If this is the case, there is no contradiction between his ruling here and his ruling in Ketubot that the halakha with regard to one who consecrates his wifeβs earnings is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan HaSandlar.
ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦΈΧ: ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ ΧΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦΆΧ Χ ΧΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦ·Χ’Φ²ΧΦΈΧ€ΦΈΧ. ΧΦ΄Χ Χ ΦΈΧΦ΅Χ: ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧͺΦ·Χ ΦΌΦΈΧ Χ§Φ·ΧΦΌΦΈΧ. ΧΦ΄Χ Χ ΦΈΧΦ΅Χ: (ΧΦ΅ΧΧ) ΧΦ²ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ Χ’Φ²Χ§Φ΄ΧΧΦΈΧ!
But if so, let Shmuel clearly say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who also maintains that the surplus belongs to the husband. Alternatively, he could have said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who asserts that the surplus belongs to the wife.
ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ£: Χ©ΧΦΈΧΧ Φ΅Χ Χ§ΧΦΌΧ ΦΌΦΈΧΧΦΉΧͺ, ΧΧΦΉΧΦ΄ΧΧ ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ Χ€ΦΌΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉΧͺ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ Χ’ΦΈΧΦΈΧΧ, ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ Χ ΦΈΧΦ΅Χ ΧΦΌΦΈΧΦΈΧ¨ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΉΧ ΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ’ΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ Χ’ΦΈΧΦΈΧΧ.
Rather, Rav Yosef said that the apparent contradiction between Shmuelβs rulings can be resolved in the following manner: Although one cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different; since a person can prohibit to himself anotherβs produce by means of a konam, even though one cannot consecrate anotherβs produce to the Temple, he can also prohibit to himself an entity that has not yet come into the world. With regard to consecration, however, a person cannot dedicate to the Temple treasury something that is not currently in his possession, and he cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet entered the world, either.
ΧΦ²ΧΦ·Χ¨ ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦΌ ΧΦ·ΧΦΌΦΈΧΦ΅Χ: ΧΦΌΦ΄Χ©ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ Χ€ΦΌΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉΧͺ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ Χ’ΦΈΧΦΈΧΧ, Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦ²Χ¨Φ΅Χ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ Χ€ΦΌΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉΧͺΦΈΧΧ Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ. ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΆΧΦ±Χ‘ΧΦΉΧ¨ ΧΦΌΦΈΧΦΈΧ¨ Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΉΧ ΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ’ΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ, Χ©ΧΦΆΧΦ²Χ¨Φ΅Χ ΧΦ΅ΧΧ ΧΦΈΧΦΈΧ ΧΧΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ Χ€ΦΌΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉΧͺ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ Χ’Φ·Χ ΧΦ²ΧΦ΅ΧΧ¨ΧΦΉ!
Abaye said to him: This is no proof at all. Granted, a person can prohibit anotherβs produce to himself, since a person can prohibit his own produce to another. But does it follow that he can also prohibit an entity that has not yet come into the world to another person, seeing that a person cannot prohibit anotherβs produce to that other person, as he has jurisdiction neither over the produce nor over the person to whom he wishes to prohibit it? Yet in the mishna here the woman prohibits her future earnings, which do not yet exist, to another person, i.e., her husband.
ΧΦΆΧΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ ΧΧΦΌΧ ΦΈΧ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ΅ΧΧΦΌ ΧΦΌΦ°Χ¨Φ·Χ ΧΦ°ΧΧΦΉΧ©ΧΦ»Χ’Φ·: ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΧΦΉΧΦΆΧ¨ΦΆΧͺ Χ΄ΧΦ΄Χ§Φ°ΧΦΌΦ°Χ©ΧΧΦΌ ΧΦΈΧΦ·Χ ΧΦ°Χ’ΧΦΉΧ©ΧΦ΅ΧΧΦΆΧΧ΄, ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧΦ·ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΧͺΦ·Χ Φ°ΧΧΦΌ ΧΦΌΦΈΧ’ΧΦΉΧΦΈΧ.
Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here the mishna is dealing with a woman who says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them. Therefore, the case does not involve the issue of an entity that has not yet come into the world, as her hands are already in the world.
ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦΈΧΦ°Χ¨ΦΈΧ ΧΦΈΧΦ΄Χ β Χ§ΦΈΧΦ°Χ©ΧΦΈΧ? ΧΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ°Χ©ΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ°ΧΦ·ΧΧΦΌ ΧΦ°ΧΦ·Χ’Φ·Χ! ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦΈΧΦ°Χ¨ΦΈΧ: ΧΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦ΄ΧΦΌΦΈΧ¨Φ°Χ©ΧΦΈΧ. ΧΦ·Χ©ΧΦ°ΧͺΦΌΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦΈΧ ΧΦ΄ΧΦΌΦΈΧ¨Φ°Χ©ΧΦΈΧ, ΧΦΌΧΦ΄ΧΦΌΦ·ΧΧ ΧΦΌΦ°ΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦ·ΧΦ°Χ¨Φ·ΧΦΌ ΧΦΈΧΦ΄Χ ΧΦ·ΧΦ°Χ Φ°ΧΦΈΧ?
The Gemara challenges this interpretation: And if she said her vow like this, are they consecrated and forbidden? But arenβt her hands pledged to her husband, to do the work she is obligated to perform for him? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a woman who said: The vow will take effect when I become divorced. The Gemara raises a difficulty: She is not divorced now in any event, and from where is it learned that when she says her vow like this, the vow is effective? How is it learned that she can consecrate something in such a manner that it will become consecrated only in the future?
