Does the debate between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding nullification of a vow that has not yet taken effect also apply to dissolving vows with a chacham? A story is brought of a man who took a vow of this kind and Rav Acha made sure the vow took effect so that it could be dissolved. Two explanations are brought up explaining why he needed the vow to take effect first. Sources are brought to support the second explanation but are each rejected. An alternate version of the second explanation is brought and the same sources are brought to raise a difficulty against it. One is resolved, and the other is not. Originally there were three different claims a woman could make and the rabbis would insist the husband divorce the wife and give her the ketuba money, but over time there were women who lied in order to get the husband to divorce her, and therefore the rabbis stopped believing them. What were these claims? After the rabbis changed their minds, what would they do if a woman made these claims? One of the claims is a woman married to a kohen claims that she was raped. The Gemara asks: if we no longer believe her to insist on divorce, can she continue to eat truma?
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Nedarim 90
וְשַׁרְקֵיהּ טִינָא, וְאַתְיֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן חַכִּים לְמִיעְבַּד כִּי הָא מִילְּתָא אִי לָאו דְּרַב אַחָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא, דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא. דְּקָסָבַר דְּכִי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן וְרַבִּי נָתָן בַּהֲפָרָה — הָכִי נָמֵי פְּלִיגִי בִּשְׁאֵלָה.
And Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna then smeared him with clay to protect him from the elements, as it was now prohibited for him to benefit from the world by wearing clothes. And he then brought him before Rav Ḥisda, to dissolve his vow. Rava said: Who is wise enough to act in this manner, if not Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna, who is a great man? As he holds that just as the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan disagree with regard to nullification, whether it is possible to nullify a vow that has yet to take effect, so too, they disagree with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, whether it is possible to request dissolution of such a vow. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna’s plan was to have the vow go into effect, so that the man could request that it be dissolved.
וְרַב פַּפִּי אָמַר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בַּהֲפָרָה, דְּרַבִּי נָתָן סָבַר: אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְחָפְרָה הַלְּבָנָה״. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בַּעַל מֵיפֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵפֵר מַחְשְׁבוֹת עֲרוּמִים״.
And Rav Pappi said with regard to this issue: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, as it is written: “And the moon shall be confounded [ḥafera]” (Isaiah 24:23). He employs this phrase as an allusion, interpreting the word ḥafera as if it were hafara, nullification, and concludes from here that only a vow that already exists, like the moon, can be nullified. And the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, as it is written: “He nullifies the thoughts of the crafty” (Job 5:12), implying that nullification pertains even to thoughts, to prevent them from going into effect.
אֲבָל בִּשְׁאֵלָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין חָכָם מַתִּיר כְּלוּם אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.
But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees that a halakhic authority cannot dissolve anything unless the vow has already taken effect, as it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that the person himself who took the vow cannot profane his words and dissolve his vow, but a halakhic authority may do so. This, however, applies only if the vow has already gone into effect, as it says: “His word.”
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי, וּלְמִי שֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל הַשֵּׁנִי. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁאָל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, then, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must he request dissolution of his two vows in the above order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.
וּמִי יָדַע אִי הַאי קַמָּא אִי הַאי בָּתְרָא?
The Gemara refutes this argument: And does he know if this vow is first or if that vow is last? The baraita does not specify which vow is first and which is last. Perhaps first and last is referring not to the order in which the two vows were taken, but rather to the order in which they are dissolved, so that if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.
אֶלָּא לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לִכְשֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל נִדְרוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל נִזְרוֹ.
Rather, let us say that a different baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from a particular person, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁאָל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִדְרוֹ אִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִזְרוֹ אִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא! רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.
And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must the two vows be dissolved in that order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that a vow can be nullified only after it has gone into effect. The Rabbis, however, dispute this view.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמַר לִי מָרִימָר, הָכִי אֲמַר אֲבוּךְ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפִּי: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בַּהֲפָרָה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאֵלָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֵפֵר וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.
Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: This is what your father said in the name of Rav Pappi: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, whereas the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees, that he can dissolve the vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. As it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which Ravina expounds as follows:
לְמֵימְרָא דְּלָא הֲוָה בֵּיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה.
That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּלְמִי שֶׁנִּשְׁאָל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל הַשֵּׁנִי. אַמַּאי? אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, וְאִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא!
The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.
מִי יוֹדֵעַ הֵי רִאשׁוֹן וְהֵי שֵׁנִי?
The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second? The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point. Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.
מֵתִיבִי: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה וַהֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לִכְשֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל נִדְרוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל נִזְרוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִדְרוֹ נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, וְאִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִזְרוֹ נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא! תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow. But why must he proceed in this manner? If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect. The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְנוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָה: הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ״, ״שָׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״, וּ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״.
MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands’ will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.
חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא אִשָּׁה נוֹתֶנֶת עֵינֶיהָ בְּאַחֵר וּמְקַלְקֶלֶת עַל בַּעְלָהּ: הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ״ — תָּבִיא רְאָיָה לִדְבָרֶיהָ. ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״ — יַעֲשׂוּ דֶּרֶךְ בַּקָּשָׁה. וּ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ — יָפֵר לְחֶלְקוֹ, וּתְהֵא מְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְהֵא נְטוּלָה מִן הַיְּהוּדִים.
They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.
גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: אָמְרָה לְבַעְלָהּ ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי״, מַהוּ שֶׁתֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה? רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אוֹכֶלֶת, שֶׁלֹּא תּוֹצִיא לַעַז עַל בָּנֶיהָ. רָבָא אָמַר: אֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת, אֶפְשָׁר דְּאָכְלָה חוּלִּין.
GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma? Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband? Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children. If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood. Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.
אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַב שֵׁשֶׁת שֶׁאִם נִתְאַרְמְלָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת. מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם תּוֹצִיא לַעַז עַל בָּנֶיהָ. נִתְאַרְמְלָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה, אָמְרִי: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאִיתְּנִיסָא.
Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma. Why? Isn’t the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children? This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband. Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, בָּדֵיק לַן רָבָא: אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה אוֹ אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה? כֵּיוָן דְּאוֹנֶס לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן כְּרָצוֹן לְגַבֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל דָּמֵי, אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אוֹ דִילְמָא מָצֵי אָמְרָה לֵיהּ: אֲנָא הָא חֲזֵינָא,
§ Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.
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Ottawa, Canada
Minneapolis, MN, United States
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
I began Daf Yomi with the last cycle. I was inspired by the Hadran Siyum in Yerushalayim to continue with this cycle. I have learned Daf Yomi with Rabanit Michelle in over 25 countries on 6 continents ( missing Australia)
Silver Spring, MD, United States
I heard about the syium in January 2020 & I was excited to start learning then the pandemic started. Learning Daf became something to focus on but also something stressful. As the world changed around me & my family I had to adjust my expectations for myself & the world. Daf Yomi & the Hadran podcast has been something I look forward to every day. It gives me a moment of centering & Judaism daily.
Denver, United States
I began learning the daf in January 2022. I initially “flew under the radar,” sharing my journey with my husband and a few close friends. I was apprehensive – who, me? Gemara? Now, 2 years in, I feel changed. The rigor of a daily commitment frames my days. The intellectual engagement enhances my knowledge. And the virtual community of learners has become a new family, weaving a glorious tapestry.
Far Rockaway, United States
Los Angeles, United States
When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!
Jerusalem, Israel
I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.
Ashdod, Israel
Mamaroneck, NY, United States
I decided to learn one masechet, Brachot, but quickly fell in love and never stopped! It has been great, everyone is always asking how it’s going and chering me on, and my students are always making sure I did the day’s daf.
Memphis, Tennessee, United States
I had tried to start after being inspired by the hadran siyum, but did not manage to stick to it. However, just before masechet taanit, our rav wrote a message to the shul WhatsApp encouraging people to start with masechet taanit, so I did! And this time, I’m hooked! I listen to the shiur every day , and am also trying to improve my skills.
Yad Binyamin, Israel
Tel Aviv, Israel
I began learning with Rabbanit Michelle’s wonderful Talmud Skills class on Pesachim, which really enriched my Pesach seder, and I have been learning Daf Yomi off and on over the past year. Because I’m relatively new at this, there is a “chiddush” for me every time I learn, and the knowledge and insights of the group members add so much to my experience. I feel very lucky to be a part of this.
Karmiel, Israel
Nedarim 90
וְשַׁרְקֵיהּ טִינָא, וְאַתְיֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן חַכִּים לְמִיעְבַּד כִּי הָא מִילְּתָא אִי לָאו דְּרַב אַחָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא, דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא. דְּקָסָבַר דְּכִי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן וְרַבִּי נָתָן בַּהֲפָרָה — הָכִי נָמֵי פְּלִיגִי בִּשְׁאֵלָה.
And Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna then smeared him with clay to protect him from the elements, as it was now prohibited for him to benefit from the world by wearing clothes. And he then brought him before Rav Ḥisda, to dissolve his vow. Rava said: Who is wise enough to act in this manner, if not Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna, who is a great man? As he holds that just as the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan disagree with regard to nullification, whether it is possible to nullify a vow that has yet to take effect, so too, they disagree with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, whether it is possible to request dissolution of such a vow. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna’s plan was to have the vow go into effect, so that the man could request that it be dissolved.
וְרַב פַּפִּי אָמַר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בַּהֲפָרָה, דְּרַבִּי נָתָן סָבַר: אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְחָפְרָה הַלְּבָנָה״. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בַּעַל מֵיפֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵפֵר מַחְשְׁבוֹת עֲרוּמִים״.
And Rav Pappi said with regard to this issue: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, as it is written: “And the moon shall be confounded [ḥafera]” (Isaiah 24:23). He employs this phrase as an allusion, interpreting the word ḥafera as if it were hafara, nullification, and concludes from here that only a vow that already exists, like the moon, can be nullified. And the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, as it is written: “He nullifies the thoughts of the crafty” (Job 5:12), implying that nullification pertains even to thoughts, to prevent them from going into effect.
אֲבָל בִּשְׁאֵלָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין חָכָם מַתִּיר כְּלוּם אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.
But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees that a halakhic authority cannot dissolve anything unless the vow has already taken effect, as it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that the person himself who took the vow cannot profane his words and dissolve his vow, but a halakhic authority may do so. This, however, applies only if the vow has already gone into effect, as it says: “His word.”
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי, וּלְמִי שֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל הַשֵּׁנִי. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁאָל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, then, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must he request dissolution of his two vows in the above order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.
וּמִי יָדַע אִי הַאי קַמָּא אִי הַאי בָּתְרָא?
The Gemara refutes this argument: And does he know if this vow is first or if that vow is last? The baraita does not specify which vow is first and which is last. Perhaps first and last is referring not to the order in which the two vows were taken, but rather to the order in which they are dissolved, so that if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.
אֶלָּא לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לִכְשֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל נִדְרוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל נִזְרוֹ.
Rather, let us say that a different baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from a particular person, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁאָל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִדְרוֹ אִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִזְרוֹ אִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא! רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.
And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must the two vows be dissolved in that order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that a vow can be nullified only after it has gone into effect. The Rabbis, however, dispute this view.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמַר לִי מָרִימָר, הָכִי אֲמַר אֲבוּךְ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפִּי: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בַּהֲפָרָה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאֵלָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֵפֵר וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא חָל נֶדֶר, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.
Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: This is what your father said in the name of Rav Pappi: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, whereas the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees, that he can dissolve the vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. As it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which Ravina expounds as follows:
לְמֵימְרָא דְּלָא הֲוָה בֵּיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה.
That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּלְמִי שֶׁנִּשְׁאָל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל הַשֵּׁנִי. אַמַּאי? אִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, וְאִי בָּעֵי — עַל הַאי נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא!
The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.
מִי יוֹדֵעַ הֵי רִאשׁוֹן וְהֵי שֵׁנִי?
The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second? The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point. Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.
מֵתִיבִי: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה וַהֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לִכְשֶׁאֶשָּׁאֵל עָלָיו״ — נִשְׁאָל עַל נִדְרוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאָל עַל נִזְרוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? אִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִדְרוֹ נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא, וְאִי בָּעֵי — עַל נִזְרוֹ נִיתְּשִׁיל בְּרֵישָׁא! תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow. But why must he proceed in this manner? If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect. The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְנוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָה: הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ״, ״שָׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״, וּ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״.
MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands’ will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.
חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא אִשָּׁה נוֹתֶנֶת עֵינֶיהָ בְּאַחֵר וּמְקַלְקֶלֶת עַל בַּעְלָהּ: הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ״ — תָּבִיא רְאָיָה לִדְבָרֶיהָ. ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״ — יַעֲשׂוּ דֶּרֶךְ בַּקָּשָׁה. וּ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ — יָפֵר לְחֶלְקוֹ, וּתְהֵא מְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְהֵא נְטוּלָה מִן הַיְּהוּדִים.
They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.
גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: אָמְרָה לְבַעְלָהּ ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי״, מַהוּ שֶׁתֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה? רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אוֹכֶלֶת, שֶׁלֹּא תּוֹצִיא לַעַז עַל בָּנֶיהָ. רָבָא אָמַר: אֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת, אֶפְשָׁר דְּאָכְלָה חוּלִּין.
GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma? Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband? Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children. If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood. Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.
אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַב שֵׁשֶׁת שֶׁאִם נִתְאַרְמְלָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת. מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם תּוֹצִיא לַעַז עַל בָּנֶיהָ. נִתְאַרְמְלָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה, אָמְרִי: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאִיתְּנִיסָא.
Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma. Why? Isn’t the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children? This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband. Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, בָּדֵיק לַן רָבָא: אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה אוֹ אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה? כֵּיוָן דְּאוֹנֶס לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן כְּרָצוֹן לְגַבֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל דָּמֵי, אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אוֹ דִילְמָא מָצֵי אָמְרָה לֵיהּ: אֲנָא הָא חֲזֵינָא,
§ Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.
