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Today's Daf Yomi

December 16, 2020 | 讗壮 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讗

Masechet Pesachim is sponsored by Sivya Twersky in honor of her daughter, Shoshana Baker, her grandson's upcoming Bar Mitzvah ,and in memory of her father, Harav Pesach Zachariah Halevi ben Reuven and Leah Z'late Z'L. He lived Torah and emunah by example to congregational and biological families. His yahrzeit falls within this masechet.

The Daf Yomi women of Neve Daniel are proud to dedicate a month of learning in honor of all the women learning Torah in the world and in honor of completing our first year of learning together. Thank you to Hadran and to the Rabbaniot Michelle, Chamotal, Tanya, Sally, Michal, Chayuta and Meirav that lead us in our in depth learning. Yishar Cochachen!

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

Pesachim 25

Today’s daf is sponsored by Binny Shalev in memory of his mother, Nechi Shudovsky, Nacha Dvora bat Sarah Gitel v’Yossef z”l.

The gemara brings a question against Abaye who holds that one will get lashes for benefitting from diverse kinds聽 even if used in an atypical manner. The question is raised from a braita that sets up a kal vachomer and diverse kinds are viewed as lenient – if Abaye was correct, it would be a stringency. Abaye answers the question. When does the prohibition to benefit from diverse kinds kick in – from planting, once they take root or only when they grow? One can use anything for medicinal purposes even if it forbidden to benefit from, if it is a life threatening situation, except for items used for idol worship. From where is this derived? There are three things that one must be willing to die for, rather than transgress – idol worship, murder and forbidden sexual relations. From where are these derived? Abaye and Rava disagree regarding a case where one benefits because one is forced to. The gemara describes four different possible scenarios (one can/cannot prevent it and one is intending/not intending to benefit) and determines that only in one of those scenarios do they disagree. How do their opinions correspond to the famous debate between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding an act that one does without intent?

诪讛 诇注专诇讛 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讛 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讞诪抓 讘驻住讞 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讜讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛


The Gemara rejects this inference: What comparison can be made to orla, which is more stringent than meat in milk, as it never had a time when it was fit? Can you say the same with regard to meat in milk, which had a time when it was fit? Unlike orla fruits, which were prohibited from the beginning of their existence, both meat and milk were permitted on their own before they were cooked together. Therefore, the Gemara brings other proofs: Let leavened bread on Passover prove that this issue is not a factor, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.


诪讛 诇讞诪抓 讘驻住讞 砖讻谉 注谞讜砖 讻专转 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讗讬谞讜 注谞讜砖 讻专转 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜 砖讗讬谉 注谞讜砖 讻专转 讜讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛


The Gemara rejects this: What comparison can be made to leavened bread on Passover, which is a stringent prohibition, as one who eats it is punished with karet? Can you say the same with regard to one who eats meat in milk, who is not punished with karet? The Gemara answers: Let the case of diverse kinds planted in the vineyard prove that this is not relevant, as one who violates that prohibition is not punished with karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the resulting mixtures.


讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 谞讬驻专讜讱 诪讛 诇讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 讗驻讬诇讜 砖诇讗 讻讚专讱 讛谞讗转谉


The Gemara returns to the issue of Abaye鈥檚 statement with regard to the unique stringency of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard: And if it is so that one is flogged for deriving benefit from diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, even if one derives benefit from them in an unusual manner, we can challenge this last proof: How can one compare meat in milk to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, one is flogged even if he derives benefit from them in an unusual manner?


讜讗讘讬讬 转讗诪专 讘诪讗讬 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜 讗讟讜 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讗讻讬诇讛 讻转讬讘讛 讘讬讛


And how would Abaye respond to this question? When one draws this challenge to its logical conclusion with the phrase: Can you say, and explains in detail how the prohibition of meat in milk differs from that of diverse kinds in a vineyard, with regard to what difference would the challenge be raised? You may say that with regard to meat in milk one is flogged only for deriving benefit in the usual manner, as opposed to the halakha with regard to diverse kinds, according to which one is flogged even for deriving benefit in an unusual manner. However, is that to say that the term eating is written in the Torah with regard to meat in milk? The basis for this halakha with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard is the lack of the term eating in the verse; however, the prohibition of meat in milk is also missing that term. Therefore, there are no grounds for this challenge: If the lack of the word eating leads to the conclusion that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner, logically that punishment should apply to both diverse kinds and meat in milk.


讜讗讬讚讱 讚拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 住讘专 诇讛讻讬 拽讗 讙诪专 诪谞讘讬诇讛 诪讛 谞讘讬诇讛 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讛 讗祝 讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜


The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who raised this objection, holds that for this reason Isi ben Yehuda derives this aspect of the prohibition from the case of an animal carcass. Just as with regard to an animal carcass one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner, as the verse that prohibits it uses the term eating, so too, with regard to meat in milk, one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner. Despite what is written in the Gemara, the fact that one is flogged only for deriving benefit from the animal in the usual manner is not derived from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal but from tereifa, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to tereifa it is written: 鈥淎nd you shall be holy men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs鈥 (Exodus 22:30). From the fact that one may cast it to the dogs it can be derived that one may derive benefit in any manner other than the usual manner, i.e., eating.


讜讗讘讬讬 诇讛讻讬 诇讗 讻转讘 讗讻讬诇讛 讘讙讜驻讜 诇讜诪专 砖诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖诇讗 讻讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜


And Abaye holds that for this reason it did not write the term eating in the verse itself with regard to the prohibition of meat in milk: In order to say that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner.


讜诇讬驻专讜讱 诪讛 诇讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 注讬拽专谉 谞讗住专讬谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讬转讛 诇讛谉 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 拽讜讚诐 讛砖专砖讛


The Gemara continues. Let Isi ben Yehuda challenge: What comparison can be made to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as the forbidden produce had no time that it was fit because the prohibition came into effect as soon as the produce began to grow? Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said: Apparently, since this question was not asked, that is to say that with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, their roots are forbidden as well, including the seeds and saplings from which the mature plants grow. Therefore, no challenge can be raised, since they had a time when they were fit, before taking root.


诪转讬讘 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讛诪注讘讬专 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讘讻专诐 讗诐 讛讜住讬祝 诪讗转讬诐 讗住讜专 讛讜住讬祝 讗讬谉 诇讗 讛讜住讬祝 诇讗


Rav Shemaya raised an objection based on what was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the seeds growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of their previous size, such that the permitted portion is not two hundred times the forbidden, newly grown portion, then the mixture is prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. The forbidden portion is nullified only if it comprises less than one two-hundredth of the mixture. The Gemara reads precisely: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; if it does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. Apparently, only additional growth is prohibited, and not the seeds themselves.


讗诪专 专讘讗 转专讬 拽专讗讬 讻转讬讘讬 讻转讬讘 讛讝专注 讜讻转讬讘 讛诪诇讗讛 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讝专讜注 诪注讬拽专讜 讘讛砖专砖讛 讝专讜注 讜讘讗 讛讜住讬祝 讗讬谉 诇讗 讛讜住讬祝 诇讗


Rava said: Two verses are written about this halakha, i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions. The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the fullness of the seed which you have sown be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: 鈥淭he seed,鈥 indicating that it is prohibited once it is planted and takes root, and it is written: 鈥淭he fullness,鈥 indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown. How can these two terms be reconciled? If it were planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. If it were planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, such as in a perforated pot, then the following distinction applies: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, it is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讻诇 诪转专驻讗讬谉 讞讜抓 诪注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讚讗讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 谞诪讬 讜讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇 讗讬住讜专讬谉 砖讘转讜专讛 谞诪讬 诇讗


The Gemara discusses another matter pertaining to deriving benefit. Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said with regard to objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit: One may heal oneself with any substance except for wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case in which there is danger to a person鈥檚 life, then it is permitted to use even the wood of an asheira. And if it is a situation where there is no danger, then all the prohibited substances in the Torah also may not be used, as one may not derive benefit from them.


诇注讜诇诐 讚讗讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 诇讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗诐 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱 诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱 讜讗诐 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱 诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱


The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is danger, and even so, one my not derive benefit from the wood of an asheira. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,鈥 why is it stated: 鈥淎nd with all your might鈥 (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your might,鈥 why is it stated: 鈥淲ith all your soul鈥? One of these statements appears to be superfluous.


讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讗诐 讬砖 讗讚诐 砖讙讜驻讜 讞讘讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪诪诪讜谞讜 诇讻讱 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱 讜讬砖 讗讚诐 砖诪诪讜谞讜 讞讘讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪讙讜驻讜 诇讻讱 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱


Rather, it is to tell you that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your soul.鈥 The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God鈥檚 name. And there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your might.鈥 Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase: 鈥淲ith all your might,鈥 to mean: With all your possessions. Apparently, there are circumstances in which a person must be prepared to die rather than be healed with a prohibited substance.


讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讻诇 诪转专驻讗讬谉 讞讜抓 诪注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讙讬诇讜讬 注专讬讜转


When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations


讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐


or bloodshed.


注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讙讬诇讜讬 注专讬讜转 讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讬 讻讗砖专 讬拽讜诐 讗讬砖 注诇 专注讛讜 讜专爪讞讜 谞驻砖 讻谉 讛讚讘专 讛讝讛 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讜爪讞 讗爪诇 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛


That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: 鈥淲ith all your soul and with all your might.鈥 From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: 鈥淏ut you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context?


讛专讬 讝讛 讘讗 诇诇诪讚 讜谞诪爪讗 诇诪讚 诪拽讬砖 专讜爪讞 诇谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 诪讛 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 谞讬转谉 诇讛爪讬诇讛 讘谞驻砖讜 讗祝 专讜爪讞 谞讬转谉 诇讛爪讬诇讜 讘谞驻砖讜 讜谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 诪专讜爪讞 诪讛 专讜爪讞 讬讛专讙 讜讗诇 讬注讘讜专 讗祝 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 转讛专讙 讜讗诇 转注讘讜专


Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist鈥檚 life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer鈥檚 life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.


讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 讻讬 讛讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专讬 讚讜专讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬 讝讬诇 拽讟诇讬讛 诇驻诇谞讬讗 讜讗讬 诇讗 拽讟诇讬谞讗 诇讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讬拽讟诇讜讱 讜诇讗 转讬拽讟讜诇 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚讚诪讗 讚讬讚讱 住讜诪拽 讟驻讬 讚讬诇诪讗 讚诪讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 住讜诪拽 讟驻讬


The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man鈥檚 blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else鈥檚.


诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬谞讗 讚砖讬讬祝 诇讛 诇讘专转讬讛 讘讙讜讛专拽讬 讚注专诇讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 讘砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 砖诇讗 讘砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 诪讬 讗诪讜专


The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 讗讬砖转讗 爪诪讬专转讗 谞诪讬 讻砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚专讱 讛谞讗讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚谞讗


Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter鈥檚 life was not in danger.


讗讬转诪专 讛谞讗讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪讜转专转 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讗住讜专讛


The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one鈥檚 circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.


讗驻砖专 讜拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜拽诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚砖专讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉


The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.


讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗住讜专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诪讜转专 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗诇讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇讗


The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one鈥檚 action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚砖专讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讻讜讜谞讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转讻讜讬谉 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗驻砖专 讗住讜专


Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one鈥檚 intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.


讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.

Masechet Pesachim is sponsored by Sivya Twersky in honor of her daughter, Shoshana Baker, her grandson's upcoming Bar Mitzvah ,and in memory of her father, Harav Pesach Zachariah Halevi ben Reuven and Leah Z'late Z'L. He lived Torah and emunah by example to congregational and biological families. His yahrzeit falls within this masechet.

The Daf Yomi women of Neve Daniel are proud to dedicate a month of learning in honor of all the women learning Torah in the world and in honor of completing our first year of learning together. Thank you to Hadran and to the Rabbaniot Michelle, Chamotal, Tanya, Sally, Michal, Chayuta and Meirav that lead us in our in depth learning. Yishar Cochachen!

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

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Pesachim 25-31 – Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time

This week we will learn if the involuntary benefit from a forbidden item is permitted or forbidden, how we are...
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Pesachim 25: Undesirable Benefits

Milk and meat, as prohibited foods - where does the prohibition against benefit for in, or does it? The comparison...

Pesachim 25

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Pesachim 25

诪讛 诇注专诇讛 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讛 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讞诪抓 讘驻住讞 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讜讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛


The Gemara rejects this inference: What comparison can be made to orla, which is more stringent than meat in milk, as it never had a time when it was fit? Can you say the same with regard to meat in milk, which had a time when it was fit? Unlike orla fruits, which were prohibited from the beginning of their existence, both meat and milk were permitted on their own before they were cooked together. Therefore, the Gemara brings other proofs: Let leavened bread on Passover prove that this issue is not a factor, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.


诪讛 诇讞诪抓 讘驻住讞 砖讻谉 注谞讜砖 讻专转 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讗讬谞讜 注谞讜砖 讻专转 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜 砖讗讬谉 注谞讜砖 讻专转 讜讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛


The Gemara rejects this: What comparison can be made to leavened bread on Passover, which is a stringent prohibition, as one who eats it is punished with karet? Can you say the same with regard to one who eats meat in milk, who is not punished with karet? The Gemara answers: Let the case of diverse kinds planted in the vineyard prove that this is not relevant, as one who violates that prohibition is not punished with karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the resulting mixtures.


讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 谞讬驻专讜讱 诪讛 诇讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 讗驻讬诇讜 砖诇讗 讻讚专讱 讛谞讗转谉


The Gemara returns to the issue of Abaye鈥檚 statement with regard to the unique stringency of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard: And if it is so that one is flogged for deriving benefit from diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, even if one derives benefit from them in an unusual manner, we can challenge this last proof: How can one compare meat in milk to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, one is flogged even if he derives benefit from them in an unusual manner?


讜讗讘讬讬 转讗诪专 讘诪讗讬 转讗诪专 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 砖讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜 讗讟讜 讘讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讗讻讬诇讛 讻转讬讘讛 讘讬讛


And how would Abaye respond to this question? When one draws this challenge to its logical conclusion with the phrase: Can you say, and explains in detail how the prohibition of meat in milk differs from that of diverse kinds in a vineyard, with regard to what difference would the challenge be raised? You may say that with regard to meat in milk one is flogged only for deriving benefit in the usual manner, as opposed to the halakha with regard to diverse kinds, according to which one is flogged even for deriving benefit in an unusual manner. However, is that to say that the term eating is written in the Torah with regard to meat in milk? The basis for this halakha with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard is the lack of the term eating in the verse; however, the prohibition of meat in milk is also missing that term. Therefore, there are no grounds for this challenge: If the lack of the word eating leads to the conclusion that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner, logically that punishment should apply to both diverse kinds and meat in milk.


讜讗讬讚讱 讚拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 住讘专 诇讛讻讬 拽讗 讙诪专 诪谞讘讬诇讛 诪讛 谞讘讬诇讛 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讛 讗祝 讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜


The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who raised this objection, holds that for this reason Isi ben Yehuda derives this aspect of the prohibition from the case of an animal carcass. Just as with regard to an animal carcass one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner, as the verse that prohibits it uses the term eating, so too, with regard to meat in milk, one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner. Despite what is written in the Gemara, the fact that one is flogged only for deriving benefit from the animal in the usual manner is not derived from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal but from tereifa, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to tereifa it is written: 鈥淎nd you shall be holy men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs鈥 (Exodus 22:30). From the fact that one may cast it to the dogs it can be derived that one may derive benefit in any manner other than the usual manner, i.e., eating.


讜讗讘讬讬 诇讛讻讬 诇讗 讻转讘 讗讻讬诇讛 讘讙讜驻讜 诇讜诪专 砖诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖诇讗 讻讚专讱 讛谞讗转讜


And Abaye holds that for this reason it did not write the term eating in the verse itself with regard to the prohibition of meat in milk: In order to say that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner.


讜诇讬驻专讜讱 诪讛 诇讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 注讬拽专谉 谞讗住专讬谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讬转讛 诇讛谉 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 拽讜讚诐 讛砖专砖讛


The Gemara continues. Let Isi ben Yehuda challenge: What comparison can be made to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as the forbidden produce had no time that it was fit because the prohibition came into effect as soon as the produce began to grow? Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said: Apparently, since this question was not asked, that is to say that with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, their roots are forbidden as well, including the seeds and saplings from which the mature plants grow. Therefore, no challenge can be raised, since they had a time when they were fit, before taking root.


诪转讬讘 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讛诪注讘讬专 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讘讻专诐 讗诐 讛讜住讬祝 诪讗转讬诐 讗住讜专 讛讜住讬祝 讗讬谉 诇讗 讛讜住讬祝 诇讗


Rav Shemaya raised an objection based on what was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the seeds growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of their previous size, such that the permitted portion is not two hundred times the forbidden, newly grown portion, then the mixture is prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. The forbidden portion is nullified only if it comprises less than one two-hundredth of the mixture. The Gemara reads precisely: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; if it does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. Apparently, only additional growth is prohibited, and not the seeds themselves.


讗诪专 专讘讗 转专讬 拽专讗讬 讻转讬讘讬 讻转讬讘 讛讝专注 讜讻转讬讘 讛诪诇讗讛 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讝专讜注 诪注讬拽专讜 讘讛砖专砖讛 讝专讜注 讜讘讗 讛讜住讬祝 讗讬谉 诇讗 讛讜住讬祝 诇讗


Rava said: Two verses are written about this halakha, i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions. The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the fullness of the seed which you have sown be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: 鈥淭he seed,鈥 indicating that it is prohibited once it is planted and takes root, and it is written: 鈥淭he fullness,鈥 indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown. How can these two terms be reconciled? If it were planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. If it were planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, such as in a perforated pot, then the following distinction applies: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, it is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讻诇 诪转专驻讗讬谉 讞讜抓 诪注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讚讗讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 谞诪讬 讜讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇 讗讬住讜专讬谉 砖讘转讜专讛 谞诪讬 诇讗


The Gemara discusses another matter pertaining to deriving benefit. Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said with regard to objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit: One may heal oneself with any substance except for wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case in which there is danger to a person鈥檚 life, then it is permitted to use even the wood of an asheira. And if it is a situation where there is no danger, then all the prohibited substances in the Torah also may not be used, as one may not derive benefit from them.


诇注讜诇诐 讚讗讬讻讗 住讻谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 注爪讬 讗砖讬专讛 诇讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗诐 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱 诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱 讜讗诐 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱 诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱


The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is danger, and even so, one my not derive benefit from the wood of an asheira. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,鈥 why is it stated: 鈥淎nd with all your might鈥 (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your might,鈥 why is it stated: 鈥淲ith all your soul鈥? One of these statements appears to be superfluous.


讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讗诐 讬砖 讗讚诐 砖讙讜驻讜 讞讘讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪诪诪讜谞讜 诇讻讱 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 谞驻砖讱 讜讬砖 讗讚诐 砖诪诪讜谞讜 讞讘讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪讙讜驻讜 诇讻讱 谞讗诪专 讘讻诇 诪讗讚讱


Rather, it is to tell you that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your soul.鈥 The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God鈥檚 name. And there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: 鈥淲ith all your might.鈥 Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase: 鈥淲ith all your might,鈥 to mean: With all your possessions. Apparently, there are circumstances in which a person must be prepared to die rather than be healed with a prohibited substance.


讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讻诇 诪转专驻讗讬谉 讞讜抓 诪注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讙讬诇讜讬 注专讬讜转


When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations


讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐


or bloodshed.


注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讙讬诇讜讬 注专讬讜转 讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讬 讻讗砖专 讬拽讜诐 讗讬砖 注诇 专注讛讜 讜专爪讞讜 谞驻砖 讻谉 讛讚讘专 讛讝讛 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讜爪讞 讗爪诇 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛


That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: 鈥淲ith all your soul and with all your might.鈥 From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: 鈥淏ut you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context?


讛专讬 讝讛 讘讗 诇诇诪讚 讜谞诪爪讗 诇诪讚 诪拽讬砖 专讜爪讞 诇谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 诪讛 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 谞讬转谉 诇讛爪讬诇讛 讘谞驻砖讜 讗祝 专讜爪讞 谞讬转谉 诇讛爪讬诇讜 讘谞驻砖讜 讜谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 诪专讜爪讞 诪讛 专讜爪讞 讬讛专讙 讜讗诇 讬注讘讜专 讗祝 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 转讛专讙 讜讗诇 转注讘讜专


Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist鈥檚 life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer鈥檚 life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.


讜砖驻讬讻讜转 讚诪讬诐 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇谉 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 讻讬 讛讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专讬 讚讜专讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬 讝讬诇 拽讟诇讬讛 诇驻诇谞讬讗 讜讗讬 诇讗 拽讟诇讬谞讗 诇讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讬拽讟诇讜讱 讜诇讗 转讬拽讟讜诇 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚讚诪讗 讚讬讚讱 住讜诪拽 讟驻讬 讚讬诇诪讗 讚诪讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 住讜诪拽 讟驻讬


The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man鈥檚 blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else鈥檚.


诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬谞讗 讚砖讬讬祝 诇讛 诇讘专转讬讛 讘讙讜讛专拽讬 讚注专诇讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 讘砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 砖诇讗 讘砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 诪讬 讗诪讜专


The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 讗讬砖转讗 爪诪讬专转讗 谞诪讬 讻砖注转 讛住讻谞讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚专讱 讛谞讗讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚谞讗


Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter鈥檚 life was not in danger.


讗讬转诪专 讛谞讗讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪讜转专转 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讗住讜专讛


The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one鈥檚 circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.


讗驻砖专 讜拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜拽诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚砖专讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉


The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.


讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗住讜专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诪讜转专 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗诇讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇讗


The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one鈥檚 action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚砖专讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讜拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讻讜讜谞讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗住讜专 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转讻讜讬谉 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗驻砖专 讗住讜专


Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one鈥檚 intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.


讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.

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