Pesachim 27

עד שיהא בו כדי להחמיץ ואמר אביי לא שנו אלא שקדם וסילק את האיסור אבל לא קדם וסילק את האיסור אסור אלמא זה וזה גורם אסור

until there is enough of the prohibited leaven to cause the dough to become leavened bread. And Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer taught that when the permitted leaven fell in last, the mixture is permitted only when he first removed the prohibited leaven before the permitted leaven fell into the dough and made it rise. However, if he did not first remove the prohibited leaven, the dough is prohibited even if the permitted leaven fell in last. Apparently, when both this and that cause the dough to become leavened bread, it is prohibited.

וממאי דטעמא דרבי אליעזר כאביי דילמא טעמא דרבי אליעזר משום דאחר אחרון אני בא לא שנא קדם וסילק את האיסור לא שנא לא קדם וסילק את האיסור אבל בבת אחת הכי נמי דשרי

The Gemara rejects this statement: And from where is it apparent that the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is in accordance with Abaye’s explanation? Perhaps the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is due to the following, which Rabbi Eliezer said explicitly: I follow the final element. And it is no different if he first removed the prohibited item and it is no different if he did not first remove the prohibited item. However, if they both fell in at once it should be permitted, because where both this and that cause the dough to become leavened bread Rabbi Eliezer rules that the mixture is permitted.

אלא רבי אליעזר דעצי אשירה דתנן נטל הימנה עצים אסורין בהנאה הסיק בהן את התנור חדש יותץ ישן יוצן

Rather, the reference is to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to wood from an asheira. As we learned in a mishna: If one took wood from an asheira, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. With regard to one who lit an oven with the wood, if it was a new oven, it must be broken. If it was an old oven, it may be cooled.

אפה בו את הפת אסורין בהנאה נתערבה באחרות ואחרות באחרות כולן אסורין בהנאה רבי אליעזר אומר יוליך הנאה לים המלח (אמר) לו אין פדיון לעבודה זרה

If one baked bread with asheira wood as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. If this bread was mixed together with other bread, and that other bread was mixed with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of this bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: He casts the benefit into the Dead Sea [Yam HaMelaḥ]. In other words, one is not required to destroy the entire mixture when the prohibited bread is mixed with a large quantity of other bread. Instead one should designate money equal in value to the value of the original wood from the asheira, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the prohibited wood. The first tanna said to him: Idolatry cannot be monetarily redeemed. Once the bread becomes prohibited, it cannot be redeemed by having its value cast into the Dead Sea. Apparently, the opinion of both Sages, including Rabbi Eliezer, is that when both this permitted object and that prohibited object cause a change to another item, the latter item is prohibited.

אימור דשמעת ליה לרבי אליעזר בעבודה זרה דחמיר איסורה בשאר איסורין שבתורה מי שמעת ליה אלא אם כן אמאן תרמייה ועוד הא תניא בהדיא וכן היה רבי אליעזר אוסר בכל איסורין שבתורה

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna are stringent in this matter with regard to idolatry, whose prohibition is stringent. However, with regard to other prohibitions in the Torah, which are less stringent, did you hear him express this opinion? The Gemara responds to this question: Rather, if it is so that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold the same opinion with regard to other prohibitions, to whom will you attribute this baraita? If it is not Rabbi Eliezer who says this, then who is it? And furthermore, wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: And, similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would prohibit these types of mixtures with regard to all prohibitions in the Torah.

אמר אביי אם תמצא לומר זה וזה גורם אסור רבי היינו רבי אליעזר ואם תמצי לומר זה וזה גורם מותר והכא משום דיש שבח עצים בפת הוא הני קערות וכוסות וצלוחיות אסירי

Abaye said: If you say, based on the previously stated opinions, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when both this and that cause, it is prohibited, then the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as both state that it is prohibited for this same reason. And if you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, and here, where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules that it is prohibited, it is because there is improvement from the wood in the bread itself, then in that case, deriving benefit from any of these earthenware bowls, cups, and flasks that were made in such an oven should also be prohibited, since the improvement from the wood is in them as well. If one were to use such utensils he would be deriving benefit from a prohibited item.

כי פליגי בתנור וקדירה למאן דאמר זה וזה גורם אסור אסור למאן דאמר זה וזה גורם מותר שרי

When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Sages disagree is in a case where an oven and a pot were formed using prohibited wood. According to the one who says that when both this and that cause it is prohibited, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these as well, since the prohibited item was a contributing factor in the initial formation of the object. However, according to the one who says that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, it is permitted to derive benefit from them. This is because one derives benefit from the prohibited oven and pot only once they have been subsequently heated by permitted wood. Therefore, the influence on the pot of the prohibited item is only one component in the preparation of this food.

איכא דאמרי אפילו למאן דאמר זה וזה גורם מותר קדירה אסורה דהא קבלה בישולא מקמי דניתן עצים דהיתירא

Some say that even according to the one who says that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, the pot made through the use of prohibited wood is prohibited, since it holds the food inside it before the permitted wood is placed in the oven. Therefore, one derives benefit from the prohibited vessel itself without any contribution from a permitted source.

אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תנור שהסיקו בקליפי ערלה או בקשין של כלאי הכרם חדש יותץ ישן יוצן אפה בו את הפת רבי אומר הפת מותרת וחכמים אומרים הפת אסורה והתניא איפכא שמואל איפכא תני

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to an oven that one lit with peels of orla fruit, or with straw of grain that was planted in a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds in a vineyard, if it is a new oven, it must be shattered. If it is an old oven, it may be cooled. If one baked bread in it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The bread is permitted, and the Rabbis say: The bread is prohibited. The Gemara challenges: Wasn’t the reverse taught in the baraita? The Gemara answers: Shmuel teaches the reverse, that it is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who permits one to derive benefit from this bread even in the previously mentioned baraita.

ואיבעית אימא בעלמא קסבר שמואל הלכה כרבי מחבירו ולא מחביריו ובהא אפילו מחביריו וסבר אתנייה איפכא כי היכי דניקום רבנן לאיסורא:

And if you wish, say: Shmuel accepts the original text of the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the one who prohibits deriving benefit from the bread. And generally, Shmuel holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi over his individual colleague who disagrees; however, the halakha does not follow him over several of his colleagues who disagree. And in this particular case, the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi even over his colleagues. And Shmuel holds: I will reverse the two sides presented here, in order to establish the Rabbis’ opinion as a prohibition. Therefore, the conclusion will be to rule that it is prohibited, in accordance with the majority opinion. Although in Shmuel’s version the attributions of the opinions are technically inaccurate, the benefit is that when people see that the Rabbis rule that it is prohibited in this case, they will be inclined to accept their majority opinion, which is the correct halakha.

בישלה על גבי גחלים דברי הכל הפת מותרת: (אמר) רב יהודה אמר שמואל ורבי חייא בר אשי אמר רבי יוחנן חד אמר לא שנו אלא גחלים עוממות אבל גחלים לוחשות אסורין וחד אמר אפילו גחלים לוחשות נמי מותרין

It was taught as part of the previously stated halakha that if one cooked the bread over coals produced from an asheira, everyone agrees that the bread is permitted. The Gemara records a dispute: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said one opinion, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said another opinion. One of them said: They taught this leniency only when one cooks with dim coals, whose heat is merely a remnant of the earlier lighting; however, when one cooks with glowing coals, the bread is prohibited. And one of them said: Even when the coals are glowing, the bread is also permitted.

בשלמא למאן דאמר לוחשות אסורין משום דיש שבח עצים בפת אלא למאן דאמר אפילו לוחשות מותרות פת דאסר דיש שבח עצים בפת לרבי היכי משכחת ליה אמר רב פפא כשאבוקה כנגדו

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that baking with glowing coals renders the bread prohibited, this is because there is improvement from the prohibited wood in the bread. However, according to the one who said that even when baking with glowing coals the bread is permitted, since they are no longer considered to be wood, where do you find the case where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems bread to be prohibited because there is improvement from the prohibited wood in it? Why should there be a difference between glowing coals and actual burning wood? Rav Pappa said: The case is when a flame is directly opposite the bread. When he cooks the bread directly in front of the wood, it is improved directly by the wood. When the coals are merely glowing, there is no direct benefit from the wood.

מכלל דרבנן דפליגי עליה שרו אפילו כשאבוקה כנגדו אלא עצים דאיסורא לרבנן היכי משכחת להו אמר רב אמי בר חמא בשרשיפא

The Gemara asks: Does this prove by inference that the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permit one to eat this bread even when the flame is opposite it? But if this is the case, where do you find the case where it is prohibited according to the Rabbis to derive benefit from wood? Rav Ami bar Ḥama said: It is found in the case of a stool made from the wood. Although they hold that it is permitted to derive indirect benefit from the wood, even the Rabbis agree that one may not derive benefit from a stool that is made from the wood itself.

בעא מיניה רמי בר חמא מרב חסדא תנור שהסיקו בעצי הקדש ואפה בו הפת לרבנן דשרו בקמייתא מאי אמר ליה הפת אסורה ומה בין זו לערלה אמר רבא הכי השתא ערלה בטילה במאתים הקדש אפילו באלף לא בטיל

Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to an oven that one kindled with consecrated wood and baked bread in it, according to the Rabbis, who permitted the bread in the first case where it was baked with orla wood, what is the halakha? He said to him: The bread is prohibited. He responded: What is the difference between this bread and bread baked with orla peels? Rava said: How can these cases be compared? Orla is nullified in a mixture of one part in two hundred; it is possible that less than this amount of orla was absorbed by the bread. However, consecrated wood is not nullified even in a mixture of one part in one thousand. Therefore, even when there is only a miniscule amount of the consecrated matter in the bread it is still prohibited.

אלא אמר רבא אי קשיא ליה הא קשיא והלא מעל המסיק וכל היכא דמעל המסיק נפקו להו לחולין

Rather, Rava said: If it was difficult for Rami bar Ḥama, this is what he found difficult: Didn’t the kindler of the fire transgress the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as anyone who unwittingly uses consecrated property for a non-sacred use violates this prohibition? And any case where the kindler of an oven misuses consecrated property by doing so, the wood is transferred to non-sacred status. The wood loses its sanctity when misused, and the one who misused it must donate other wood to the Temple in its place. In that case, the wood used to heat the oven is non-sacred wood and the bread should be permitted.

אמר רב פפא הכא בעצי שלמים עסקינן ואליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר הקדש בשוגג מתחלל במזיד אינו מתחלל

Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with wood which had been set aside for purchasing peace-offerings. This wood, while sanctified, has a lesser status of sanctity and does not become fully consecrated until the blood of the offering has been sprinkled. And this dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: If one unwittingly misused consecrated property, it becomes desecrated and loses its elevated status. However, if one used the object intentionally, it is not desecrated and remains consecrated. Since the act here is intentional, the consecrated wood does not lose its status.

במזיד מאי טעמא לא כיון דלאו בר מעילה הוא לא נפיק לחולין שלמים נמי כיון דלאו בר מעילה נינהו לא נפקא לחולין

The Gemara explains: What is the reason that when one intentionally uses this object it does not lose its status? Since it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as one is liable to bring an offering only for unwitting misuse of consecrated property, it is not transferred to non-sacred status. The same halakha applies to the wood set aside for peace-offerings as well. Since at that stage it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as that applies only after the animal’s blood has been sprinkled, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even if one unwittingly uses this wood, it is not transferred to non-sacred status; rather, it remains prohibited.

וכל היכא דמעל המסיק נפקי לחולין והא תניא כל הנשרפין אפרן מותר חוץ מעצי אשירה ואפר הקדש לעולם אסור

The Gemara asks: And anywhere the kindler of an oven transgresses the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by using consecrated wood, is it transferred to non-sacred status? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to all prohibited items that must be burned, their ashes are permitted after the burning, except for wood from an asheira? And consecrated ash is prohibited forever. Therefore, it is possible that when one kindles an oven with this consecrated wood, although he misuses consecrated property, the ash remains prohibited.

אמר רמי בר חמא כגון שנפלה דליקה מאיליה בעצי הקדש דליכא אינש דנמעול רב שמעיה אמר באותן שטעונין גניזה דתניא ושמו בנחת ושמו כולו ושמו שלא יפזר:

Rami bar Ḥama said: That baraita is discussing a case where a fire began on its own among consecrated wood and there is no one who misused consecrated property. Since this is the case, even the ash that is left from this wood remains consecrated property and one may not benefit from it. Rav Shemaya said: This baraita is dealing with those types of consecrated ash that require burial, such as the ash removed from the altar. As it was taught in a baraita: “And he shall take up the ash from where the fire has consumed the burnt-offering on the altar, and he shall put it beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). The phrase “And he shall put it” indicates that he must do so gently; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he must place all of it; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he may not scatter the ashes. Apparently, even after the offering has been burned it remains sacred, and one may not derive benefit from it. However, when it was burned it was not subject to misuse of consecrated property, as its burning is a necessary step in the process of sacrificing the offerings.

רבי יהודה אומר אין ביעור וכו׳: תניא אמר רבי יהודה אין ביעור חמץ אלא שריפה והדין נותן ומה נותר שאינו בבל יראה ובל ימצא טעון שריפה חמץ שישנו בבל יראה ובל ימצא לא כל שכן שטעון שריפה

It was taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And a logical derivation leads to this conclusion: Just as that which is left over from an offering after the time period in which it may be eaten, which is not subject to the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, requires burning, so too, with regard to leavened bread, which is more stringent as it is subject to the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, all the more so is it not clear that it requires burning?

אמרו לו כל דין שאתה דן תחלתו להחמיר וסופו להקל אינו דין לא מצא עצים לשורפו יהא יושב ובטל והתורה אמרה תשביתו שאור מבתיכם בכל דבר שאתה יכול להשביתו

The Rabbis said to him: Any logical derivation that you derive whose initial teaching is stringent but whose subsequent consequences are lenient is not a valid logical derivation. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if one did not find wood to burn his leavened bread, must he sit idly and not remove it? And the Torah said: “You shall remove leaven from your houses” (Exodus 12:15), indicating that this must be done in any manner which you can remove it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda’s logical derivation leads to a leniency.

חזר רבי יהודה ודנו דין אחר נותר אסור באכילה וחמץ אסור באכילה מה נותר בשריפה אף חמץ בשריפה

Then Rabbi Yehuda presented a different logical derivation based on the principle of: What do we find with regard to, rather than on an a fortiori inference (Rashash). It is prohibited to eat the leftover of offerings and it is prohibited to eat leavened bread. Based on this similarity, one can conclude that just as the leftover of offerings requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning.

אמרו לו נבילה תוכיח שאסורה באכילה ואינה טעונה שריפה אמר להן הפרש נותר אסור באכילה ובהנאה וחמץ אסור באכילה ובהנאה מה נותר טעון שריפה אף חמץ טעון שריפה

They said to him: The case of an animal carcass can prove that eating the leftover of offerings is not a factor in determining whether or not leavened bread requires burning, as eating an animal carcass is prohibited and it does not require burning. Therefore, there is no clear connection between the prohibition to eat a particular object and a requirement to burn it. He said to them: There is a difference between these cases, as it is explicitly stated that one may benefit from an animal corpse. Therefore, the following comparison can be made: It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning.

אמרו לו שור הנסקל יוכיח שאסור באכילה ובהנאה ואינו טעון שריפה אמר להן הפרש נותר אסור באכילה ובהנאה וענוש כרת וחמץ אסור באכילה ובהנאה וענוש כרת מה נותר בשריפה אף חמץ בשריפה אמרו לו חלבו של שור הנסקל יוכיח שאסור באכילה ובהנאה וענוש כרת ואין טעון שריפה

The Rabbis said to him: The case of an ox that is stoned can prove that this is not a clear factor, as it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from such an ox and it does not require burning. He said to them: There is a difference between leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, as there is an additional factor that is not relevant to the ox. It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and one who does so is punished with karet. And it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread, and one who does so is punished with karet. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning. They said to him: If so, the fats of an ox that is stoned can prove that this too is an insignificant factor, as it is prohibited to eat the fats and derive benefit from them, and one who eats them is punished with karet, and they do not require burning.