Pesachim 63

לימא קסברי אחרים אינה לשחיטה אלא בסוף וכדרבא דאמר רבא עדיין היא מחלוקת

The Gemara asks: Let us say that Aḥerim hold that slaughter is not legally significant until the end, meaning that the slaughter is considered to take place only at the end of the rite and not during the time it takes to perform the act of slaughter, in accordance with the opinion of Rava in a different context. As Rava said: It is still a dispute, meaning that the disagreement whether one is held accountable only for his first expression or also for the conclusion of his statement applies even when it is one’s clear intention that the status he wishes to confer should apply only at a particular time, e.g., if one says that an animal should be consecrated as a burnt-offering until midday and from then on as a peace-offering (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The opinion of Rabbi Meir, referred to here as Aḥerim, is that one is held accountable only for his first expression.

הילכך הקדים מולין לערלים מולין חיילי ערלים לא חיילי הקדים ערלים למולין ערלים חיילי מולין לא חיילי

Therefore, based on these two assumptions, if one put the circumcised people before the uncircumcised people, his statement with regard to circumcised people applies but his statement with regard to uncircumcised people does not apply. If the slaughter is legally considered to take effect in a single instant, and if one said that his intention is for circumcised people at that moment, his statement takes effect. In the reverse case, if one put the uncircumcised people before the circumcised people, his statement with regard to uncircumcised people applies, but his statement with regard to circumcised people does not apply.

אמר רבה לא לעולם קסברי אחרים ישנה לשחיטה מתחלה ועד סוף והכא במאי עסקינן כגון שגמר בלבו לתרווייהו בין למולין בין לערלים והוציא בפיו לערלים ולא הספיק לומר למולין עד שנגמרה שחיטה בערלים ובהא פליגי דרבי מאיר סבר לא בעינן פיו ולבו שוים ורבנן סברי בעינן פיו ולבו שוים

Rabba said: No, we should not say this. Actually, Aḥerim hold that slaughter is legally significant from beginning to end, and with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one decided in his mind to slaughter the offering for both of them, both circumcised and uncircumcised people, and he verbally expressed his intention with the phrase: For uncircumcised people, but did not have a chance to say: For circumcised people, before the slaughter was already finished as he was saying: For uncircumcised people. And it is with regard to this point that they disagree: Rabbi Meir, who is Aḥerim, holds that we do not require that one’s mouth and heart be the same; what is legally significant is his verbal expression. Since he said: For uncircumcised people, he has disqualified the offering. And the Rabbis hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same. Since he wanted to express his intent for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, he has not disqualified the offering.

וקסבר רבי מאיר לא בעינן פיו ולבו שוין ורמינהו המתכוין לומר תרומה ואמר מעשר מעשר ואמר תרומה או שאיני נכנס לבית זה ואמר לזה שאיני נהנה לזה ואמר לזה לא אמר כלום עד שיהו פיו ולבו שוין

The Gemara expresses surprise: But does Rabbi Meir hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same? The Gemara raises a contradiction based on a mishna in tractate Terumot that states: With regard to one who intended to say that the produce he has designated should be teruma, but he mistakenly said the word tithe; or he intended to say tithe but mistakenly said teruma; or he intended to vow: I will not enter this house, but mistakenly said: That house, i.e., he mistakenly referred to a different house; or he intended to vow: I will not derive benefit from this person, but he said: From that person, i.e., he mistakenly referred to someone else; he has not said anything until his mouth and heart are the same. This is an unattributed mishna, and unattributed mishnayot are presumed to be authored by Rabbi Meir.

אלא אמר אביי רישא דאמר סימן ראשון למולין וסימן שני אף לערלים דבסימן שני נמי פתיכי ביה מולין סיפא דאמר סימן ראשון לערלים סימן שני למולים דבסימן ראשון הא לא פתיכי ביה מולין

Rather, Abaye said the following explanation: We are dealing with a case where the person expressed two different intentions within the act of slaughter itself, as valid slaughter involves cutting most of both the windpipe and the esophagus of the animal. The first clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for circumcised people and the second organ even for uncircumcised people, so that in the second organ even circumcised people are included. Consequently, he had circumcised people in mind at each stage of the slaughtering. The latter clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for uncircumcised people and the second organ for circumcised people, so that in the first organ circumcised people are not included, and his intent during that stage is solely for uncircumcised people.

ורבי מאיר לטעמיה דאמר מפגלין בחצי מתיר ורבנן לטעמייהו דאמרי אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר:

And Rabbi Meir follows his own line of reasoning, as he says that piggul status can be conferred upon an offering at half of what renders it permitted. In other words, piggul status applies not only when one has a disqualifying intent during the entire act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering both the windpipe and the esophagus, but even if one has the disqualifying intent during half of the act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering one of those two organs. And the Rabbis also follow their regular line of reasoning, as they say that piggul status cannot be conferred at half of what permits it. Since he expressed his intent for both uncircumcised and circumcised people over the course of the entire act of slaughter, the offering is not disqualified.

מתני׳ השוחט את הפסח על החמץ עובר בלא תעשה רבי יהודה אומר אף התמיד רבי שמעון אומר הפסח בארבעה עשר לשמו חייב ושלא לשמו פטור ושאר כל הזבחים בין לשמן ובין שלא לשמן פטור

MISHNA: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread still in his possession violates a negative commandment, as the Torah states: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning” (Exodus 34:25). Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve with leaven in his possession violates the commandment. Rabbi Shimon says: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan for its own purpose with leaven in his possession is liable; but if he slaughtered it for a different purpose he is exempt. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover eve, when owning leaven is prohibited, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is exempt.

ובמועד לשמו פטור שלא לשמו חייב ושאר כל הזבחים בין לשמן בין שלא לשמן חייב חוץ מן החטאת ששחטו שלא לשמה:

And during the festival of Passover, if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for its own purpose he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for its own purpose at an improper time is disqualified, it is not an offering at all and there is no violation of the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.” However, if he slaughtered it for a different purpose and thereby validated the sacrifice as a peace-offering, he is liable for having sacrificed it with leaven in his possession. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover, when it is prohibited to slaughter with leaven in one’s possession, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is liable. This is with the exception of a sin-offering that he slaughtered for a different purpose with leaven in his possession. Unlike other offerings, a sin-offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for a different purpose, and therefore one does not violate the prohibition of “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.”

גמ׳ אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש לעולם אינו חייב עד שיהא החמץ לשוחט או לזורק

GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One is never liable for having violated the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” unless the leavened bread belongs to the one who slaughters the Paschal lamb, or to the one who sprinkles its blood,

או לאחד מבני חבורה ועד שיהא עמו בעזרה רבי יוחנן אמר אף על פי שאין עמו בעזרה במאי קמיפלגי אילימא בעל בסמוך קמיפלגי דרבי שמעון בן לקיש סבר על בסמוך ורבי יוחנן סבר לא בעינן על בסמוך והא איפלגו בה חדא זימנא

or to one of the members of the group; and he is liable only if the leaven is with him in the Temple courtyard itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable even if the leaven is not with him in the Temple courtyard. With regard to what principle do they disagree? If you say that they disagree with regard to whether the expression “with” indicates next to, namely, that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that “with” always indicates next to, and therefore “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” means that the leaven must not be next to the one slaughtering the sacrifice, in the Temple courtyard itself, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the leaven be next to the slaughterer in order to transgress, then this is difficult, because they have already disagreed about this once before.

דתנן השוחט תודה לפנים ולחמה חוץ לחומה לא קדש הלחם

As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who slaughters a thanks-offering inside the Temple courtyard while its bread, namely the forty loaves that are brought together with the offering, is outside the wall, the bread has not become sanctified, as the verse states: “And he shall offer with the thanks-offering unleavened cakes.” (Leviticus 7:12).

מאי חוץ לחומה רבי יוחנן אמר חוץ לחומת בית פאגי אבל חוץ לחומת העזרה קדיש ולא בעינן על בסמוך רבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר אפילו חוץ לחומת עזרה לא קדיש אלמא בעינן על בסמוך

A question was raised with regard to this mishna: What is the meaning of the phrase outside the wall? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It means outside the wall of Beit Pagei, the outermost wall around Jerusalem, but if the bread was merely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, it has been sanctified, as we do not require that the bread, described as “with” the offering, be next to it in order to be sanctified. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagreed and said: Even if the bread was merely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, it has not been sanctified. Apparently, he holds that we require that the bread described as “with” the offering be next to it in order to be sanctified. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish have already disputed this issue, they presumably did not repeat this same dispute in other contexts.

אלא בהתראת ספק קמיפלגי בהא נמי הא פליגי בה חדא זימנא

Rather, say that they disagree about an uncertain warning. There is a general rule that the courts only administer corporal punishment if the transgressor was warned before he committed the transgression. The question arises as to whether punishments are administered after an uncertain warning, i.e., when it is unclear at the time of the warning whether or not the person being warned will actually transgress. It is possible to explain that this is the basis of the dispute with regard to leaven: If the leaven is outside the Temple courtyard, the one issuing the warning cannot be certain that the person he is warning actually has leaven in his possession at the time of the slaughter. The Gemara suggests that such a warning is considered an uncertain warning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that an uncertain warning is a valid warning while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagrees. However, this is difficult, as they also disagreed about this once before.

דאיתמר שבועה שאוכל ככר זו היום ועבר היום ולא אכלה רבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו אינו לוקה רבי יוחנן אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה ליה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו אבל התראת ספק שמה התראה

As it was stated that if a person said: I take an oath that I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish both said that he is not flogged even though he violated his oath and thereby transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 19:7). However, they disagree about the reason for this law. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is not flogged because it is a prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action, as his transgression was in failing to eat the loaf, and there is a principle that for any prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action one is not flogged; however, an uncertain warning is considered a valid warning.

ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה ליה התראת ספק והתראת ספק לא שמה התראה אבל לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain warning, and an uncertain warning is not considered a warning. For example, if he is warned in the middle of the day that if he does not eat the loaf he will be flogged, the warning is uncertain because even if he does not eat the loaf at that moment he still has time to eat it later. But for a prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action one is flogged. Thus, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish have already disagreed with regard to this issue as well, and there would have been no reason for them to repeat their dispute.

אמרי לעולם בעל בסמוך קא מיפלגי וצריכא דאי איפליגו לענין חמץ הוה אמינא בההוא הוא דקאמר רבי יוחנן דלא בעינן על בסמוך משום דאיסור הוא וכל היכא דאיתיה איתיה

They say in answer to this: Actually, we can explain that they disagree about whether “with” indicates next to, and it is necessary to teach that they disagree about the case involving the leaven in addition to the case of the loaves of the thanks-offering, because the cases are not entirely comparable. As, if they disagreed only with regard to leaven, I would have said that it is only with regard to that case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the slaughterer have the leaven next to him in order to transgress, because it is a prohibition, and wherever it is, it is. On the eve of Passover in the afternoon one is prohibited to possess leaven anywhere.

אבל לענין מקדש לחם לא קדיש אלא בפנים אימא מודה ליה לרבי שמעון בן לקיש דבעינן על בסמוך דאי איתיה גואי קדיש אי לא לא קדיש מידי דהוה אכלי שרת צריכא

However, with regard to sanctification of the bread, it becomes sanctified only inside the Temple courtyard. Consequently, say that in that case Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that we require that the bread described as “with” the offering be next to it. Therefore, if it is inside, it is sanctified; and if not, it is not sanctified. This is just as it is with regard to a vessel used in the Temple service, which sanctifies a meal-offering only when the meal is inside it and not when the meal is outside of it. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that the dispute applies in both cases.

ואי אשמעינן לענין מקדש לחם הוה אמינא בהך קאמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש דבעינן על בסמוך דאי איתיה גואי קדיש אי לא לא קדיש אבל לענין חמץ מודה ליה לרבי יוחנן דלא בעינן על בסמוך דאיסורא הוא וכל היכא דאיתיה איתיה צריכא

And had we been taught the dispute only with regard to sanctification of the bread, I would have said that only in this case did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that we require that the bread described as “with” the sacrifice be next to it, such that if it is inside the Temple courtyard, it is sanctified; and if not, it is not sanctified. But with regard to leavened bread, he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the slaughterer have the leaven next to him in order to transgress, for it is a prohibition and wherever it is, it is. Therefore, it is necessary to say that they argued in both cases.

בעא מיניה רב אושעיא מרבי אמי אין לו לשוחט ויש לו לאחד מבני חבורה מהו אמר ליה מי כתיב לא תשחט על חמצך לא תשחט על חמץ כתיב

Rav Oshaya asked Rabbi Ami the following question: If the slaughterer does not have leaven in his possession but one of the members of the group does have, what is the halakha? Rabbi Ami said to him: Is it written: You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with your leavened bread, meaning you may not slaughter the Paschal lamb with the leaven of the slaughterer? It is written: “You shall not offer with leavened bread” (Exodus 34:25), meaning you may not slaughter it with anyone’s leaven and not necessarily leaven that belongs to the slaughterer.

אמר ליה אי הכי אפילו לאחד בסוף העולם נמי אמר ליה אמר קרא לא תשחט ולא ילין לא תשחט על חמץ הנך דקיימי עליה משום לא ילין

Rav Oshaya said to Rav Ashi: If so, even if someone at the end of the world has leaven it should also be a violation. Since there is no limitation to this prohibition, it should apply even if the leaven belongs to someone who is not associated in any way with this Paschal lamb. Rav Ashi said to him that the verse says: “You shall not offer,” and the end of the verse states: “Neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning.” The verse equates the two prohibitions, from which the following may be derived: “You shall not offer with leavened bread” applies to those who are governed by the prohibition of “neither shall be left over,” namely, the members of the group that registered for this Paschal lamb. People who are not part of this group are not obligated to ensure that the Paschal lamb does not remain until the morning; similarly, they are not taken into account with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing the offering while in possession of leaven.

אמר רב פפא הילכך כהן המקטיר את החלב עובר בלא תעשה הואיל וישנו בכלל הלנת אמורין

Rav Pappa said: Therefore, based on this reason, the priest who burns the fats of the Paschal lamb transgresses the negative commandment of “You shall not offer” if he has leaven in his possession. Since he is included in the prohibition of leaving over sacrificial parts of the offering, he is also included in the prohibition against sacrificing the offering with leaven, although he is not one of the people who will eat this Paschal lamb.

תניא כוותיה דרב פפא השוחט את הפסח על החמץ עובר בלא תעשה אימתי בזמן שהוא לשוחט או לזורק או לאחד מבני חבורה היה לאחד בסוף העולם אין זקוק לו ואחד השוחט ואחד הזורק ואחד המקטיר חייב אבל המולק את העוף בארבעה עשר אינו עובר בלא כלום

The Gemara points out that it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread in his possession transgresses a negative commandment. When? When the leaven belongs to the slaughterer, or to the one who sprinkles the blood, or to one of the members of the group. If leaven belonged to someone at the end of the world, he is not bound to him, meaning that the slaughterer need not take him into account. And whether he slaughters the animal, or he sprinkles the blood, or he burns the fats, he is liable. But one who pinches the neck of a bird, which is not a Paschal offering but a burnt-offering or sin-offering, if he does so with leaven in his possession on the fourteenth of Nisan, after the prohibition against owning leaven has taken effect, he does not transgress anything.

ורמינהי השוחט את הפסח על החמץ עובר בלא תעשה רבי יהודה אומר אף התמיד אמרו לו לא אמרו אלא בפסח בלבד אימתי בזמן שיש לשוחט או לזורק או לאחד מבני חבורה היה לאחד בסוף העולם אין זקוק לו

The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread in his possession transgresses a negative commandment. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on the eve of Passover with leavened bread in his possession violates the prohibition. They said to him: They stated this prohibition only with regard to the Paschal lamb. When does one transgress the prohibition? When the slaughterer, or the one who sprinkles the blood, or one of the members of the group has leaven in his possession. If someone at the end of the world had leaven, he is not bound to him.

ואחד השוחט ואחד הזורק ואחד המולק ואחד המזה חייב אבל הקומץ את המנחה אינו עובר בלא תעשה המקטיר את האימורין אינו עובר בלא תעשה

The baraita continues: And whether he slaughters the animal, or he sprinkles the blood, or he pinches a bird-offering, or he sprinkles the blood of the bird-offering onto the altar, he is liable. But one who scoops a handful of flour from a meal-offering while in possession of leaven does not transgress a negative commandment, because a meal-offering is not included in the prohibition, which is phrased “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice.” One who burns the sacrificial parts of the Paschal lamb or any other sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan with leaven in his possession does not transgress a negative commandment.