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Today's Daf Yomi

October 15, 2021 | 讟壮 讘诪专讞砖讜谉 转砖驻状讘

Masechet Rosh Hashanah is dedicated anonymously in honor of Rabbanit Michelle Farber whose dedication to learning and teaching the daf continues to inspire so many people around the world.

This month's shiurim are dedicated by Tamara Katz in memory of her maternal grandparents, Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig whose yahrzeits are both this month.

A month of shiurim are sponsored for a refuah shleima for Noam Eliezer ben Yael Chaya v'Aytan Yehoshua.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Kessler, Wolkenfeld and Grossman families in loving memory of Mia Rose bat Matan Yehoshua v鈥 Elana Malka. "讛 谞转谉 讜讛 诇拽讞. 讬讛讬 砖诐 讛 诪讘讜专讱"

  • This month's shiurim are sponsored by Shoshana Shur for the refuah shleima of Meira Bat Zelda Zahava.

Rosh Hashanah 6

Today’s daf is sponsored by Penny Gershman in memory of Shaindl Statman Stein. Shaindl started learning daf yomi this cycle and unfortunately passed away this week.聽

Why does the braita bring a verse to introduce the idea that if one does not bring the animal in a prescribed time, the person has committed a sin, however, the animal is not disqualified from being sacrificed. Isn’t this learned out from other places? This appears both by a firstborn and Ben Azai learned it from the verse in pigul – that only there it is disqualified by not if one missed the time. The firstborn could be specifically there, but based on the question from pigul, the Gemara suggests emending the text to excluding one’s wife from being held responsible. In what case is one’s wife held responsible for her husband’s actions? From where is this derived? Near the verse about the vows regarding one who does not bring one’s vows in time, there is an additional verse in Devarim 23:24 relating to keeping one’s vows. A braita states that there is a positive commandment, as well as a negative commandment in this verse and that the court can force one to fulfill this obligation. It also derives that it not only refers to vows but to other obligations as well. Several questions are raised on this braita, each one asking about a different aspect of the drashot as to why is the drasha needed if the same idea is derived from a different verse. The answer given is that each one is coming to relate to a different case – one where the person said they would bring a sacrifice but never designated and the other when one designated but did not bring it to the Temple. This is questioned because no such case exists that one would say without designating by a nedava offering, as a Mishna is brought to explain the differences between a neder and a nedava. This is answered as well. Rava brings a number of halakhot about the prohibition of delaying and each time a difficulty is raised against him from a braita and is resolved. In one of the braitot it mentions a case where a year could pass without all three holidays passing – how can this be? Several possibilities are brought based on different opinions in other related debates. Is one who inherits liable for delaying? Is a woman liable? In Rosh Hashanah 5b, a braita was brought discussing the age limit for a firstborn animal. From when is that counted – from birth or from the 8th day when it is able to be brought as a sacrifice?

诪讚讘谉 注讝讗讬 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 讘谉 注讝讗讬 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讜

as this halakha is derived from that which ben Azzai said, as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it, it shall be piggul鈥 (Leviticus 7:18).

诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讗讞专 诇砖诇诪讜 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讗祝 诪讗讞专 谞讚专讜 讘讘诇 讬专爪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜转讜 讗讜转讜 讘诇讗 讬专爪讛 讜讗讬谉 诪讗讞专 谞讚专讜 讘诇讗 讬专爪讛

For what purpose does the verse state the word 鈥渋t鈥? Since elsewhere it states: 鈥淲hen you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), I might have interpreted from this verse that even one who is late in paying his vow is included in: It shall not be accepted. Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t.鈥 It, an offering disqualified by improper intention [piggul], is included in the halakha of: 鈥淚t shall not be accepted,鈥 but the animal of one who is late in paying his vow is not included in the halakha of: 鈥淚t shall not be accepted.鈥

讗诇讗 讘讱 讞讟讗 讜诇讗 讘讗砖转讱 讞讟讗

The Gemara rejects what was said above; rather, the explanation of the verse is as follows. The phrase: 鈥淎nd it would be sin in you鈥 comes to teach that there would be a sin in you, but there would not be a sin in your wife.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗讬 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讬谉 讗砖转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 诪转讛 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 诪讘拽砖讬谉 诪诪谞讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗诐 讗讬谉 诇讱 诇砖诇诐 诇诪讛 讬拽讞 诪砖讻讘讱 诪转讞转讬讱 讗讬诪讗 讘讛讗讬 注讜谉 讚讘诇 转讗讞专 谞诪讬 讗砖转讜 诪转讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

It was necessary to say that the lateness is not imputed to the other members of one鈥檚 household for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yo岣nan said, and some say that it was Rabbi Elazar who said: A person鈥檚 wife dies only because others demand of him money and he does not have means with which to pay, as it is stated about one who commits himself to guarantee a loan: 鈥淚f you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?鈥 (Proverbs 22:27). The verse warns one who takes a loan that incurring debt may result in one losing the very sheets that he sleeps on to his creditor. The Gemara understands this homiletically: Why should you cause God to take away your wife, i.e., she who shares your bed, so that she dies? Consequently, you might say that one鈥檚 wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, in that one fails to fulfill his commitment. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, this sin is imputed to him alone.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讝讜 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 转砖诪讜专 讝讜 诪爪讜转 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讬转 讗讝讛专讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讬注砖讜讱 讻讗砖专 谞讚专转 讝讛 谞讚专 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讗诇讜 讞讟讗讜转 讜讗砖诪讜转 注讜诇讜转 讜砖诇诪讬诐 谞讚讘讛 讻诪砖诪注讜 讗砖专 讚讘专转 讗诇讜 拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 讘驻讬讱 讝讜 爪讚拽讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and do; as you have vowed as a gift to the Lord your God, which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips鈥; this is a positive mitzva. 鈥淵ou shall keep鈥; this is a prohibition, as the phrase 鈥測ou shall keep鈥 is a warning to keep oneself from sinning. 鈥淎nd do鈥; this is an admonition to the court to make you fulfill your vow. 鈥淎s you have vowed鈥; this is referring to a vow-offering. 鈥淭o the Lord your God鈥; this is referring to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, teaching that one must keep his word and bring them. 鈥淎s a gift鈥; this is understood in its literal sense to be referring to a gift-offering. 鈥淲hich you have promised鈥; this is referring to objects consecrated for Temple maintenance. 鈥淲ith your mouth鈥; this is referring to vows of charity, to which one commits himself with his mouth.

讗诪专 诪专 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讝讜 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讜讘讗转 砖诪讛 讜讛讘讗转诐 砖诪讛 谞驻拽讗 转砖诪讜专 讝讜 诪爪讜转 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪诇讗 转讗讞专 诇砖诇诪讜 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara clarifies the details mentioned in this baraita. The Master said: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips鈥; this is a positive mitzva. Why do I need this derivation? Isn鈥檛 the positive mitzva derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offering of your hand, and your vows, and your gift-offerings, and the firstborn of your herd and of your flock鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:5鈥6)? The baraita continues: 鈥淵ou shall keep鈥; this is a prohibition. Why do I need this derivation; this is derived from the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not delay paying it鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22).

讜注砖讬转 讗讝讛专讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讬注砖讜讱 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讬拽专讬讘 讗讜转讜 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 讬拽专讬讘 讗讜转讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讬讻讜诇 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇专爪讜谞讜 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬

鈥淎nd do鈥; this is a warning to the court to make you fulfill your vow. Why do I need this derivation? This rule is derived from the verse: 鈥淗e shall offer it鈥 (Leviticus 1:3), as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淗e shall offer it,鈥 which teaches that he must be forced to bring his offering. One might have thought that he may be forced to bring his offering even against his will. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淚n accordance with his will鈥 (Leviticus 1:3). How so? The court coerces him until he says: I want to bring the offering. Now, since all of these halakhot are already known from other sources, what is the point of this repetition?

讞讚 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讜讞讚 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘

The Gemara answers: One set of verses is referring to a case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, and one set of verses is referring to a case where he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讬讛 诇讚讬讘讜专讬讛 讗讘诇 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘讬 讙讝讗 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗讬转讬讛 爪专讬讻讗

And it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, as had the Torah taught us only about the halakha of the case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he did not keep his word; however, if he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might say that anywhere that it is, it is in the treasure house of the Merciful One, as the world and everything in it belongs to God, and therefore it makes no difference if he delays in bringing it to the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that even when one has not set aside a specific animal he transgresses the prohibition.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘 讚拽讗 诪砖讛讬 诇讬讛 讙讘讬讛 讗讘诇 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讘讜专讗 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讜讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had the Torah taught us only about the case where one set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he is keeping the animal for himself. But if he said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might say that his mere speech is nothing, and there is no transgression provided he has not actually set aside an animal. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讜讛讗 谞讚讘讛 讻转讬讘讗 讜转谞谉 讗讬 讝讛讜 谞讚专 讛讗讜诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讗讬 讝讜 讛讬讗 谞讚讘讛 讛讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 注讜诇讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where one merely said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal? Isn鈥檛 a gift-offering mentioned in the verse, and we learned in a mishna: What is a vow-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering. And what is a gift-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says, concerning a particular animal: I undertake to bring this animal as a burnt-offering.

讜诪讛 讘讬谉 谞讚专 诇谞讚讘讛 谞讚专 诪转 讗讜 谞讙谞讘 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讜 谞讚讘讛 诪转讛 讗讜 谞讙谞讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讛

And what is the difference between a vow-offering and a gift-offering? With regard to vow-offerings, if the animal died or was stolen, the one who took the vow is obligated to pay restitution for it. He undertook to bring a burnt-offering without specifying the animal, and therefore until he brings that offering he is not absolved of his obligation. With regard to a gift-offering, however, if the animal died or was stolen, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it because he undertook to bring a specific animal, and that is no longer possible. In the case of a gift-offering, then, a specific animal must have already been set aside as an offering.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谞讬 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讛

Rava said: You can find a case of a gift-offering where a specific animal has not yet been set aside; for example, where one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that after I set an animal aside in fulfillment of my vow, I will not be liable to replace it should the animal die or be stolen.

讘驻讬讱 讝讜 爪讚拽讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讜爪讚拽讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注诇讛 诇讗诇转专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讛讗 拽讬讬诪讬 注谞讬讬诐

搂 The baraita stated: 鈥淲ith your mouth鈥; this is referring to vows of charity. Rava said: In the case of vows of charity, one is liable immediately if he is late in distributing the charity that he had promised to give. What is the reason for this halakha? It is that poor people to whom the charity may be given exist in all places, and so the charity can be distributed to them immediately, unlike an offering, which must be brought to the Temple.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注谞讬讬谞讗 讚拽专讘谞讜转 讻转讬讘讗 注讚 讚注讘专讬 注诇讛 砖诇砖讛 专讙诇讬诐 讻拽专讘谞讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚转诇讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讘专讙诇讬诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 讚讛讗 砖讻讬讞讬 注谞讬讬诐

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that charity must be given to the poor without delay. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that since the halakha pertaining to vows of charity is written in the passage dealing with offerings, perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying until three Festivals have passed, as is the halakha with regard to offerings, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not so. Rather, there, with regard to the offerings, the Merciful One made the timing of the transgression dependent upon the time of the Festivals, when one must go on pilgrimage to the Temple. However, here, with regard to charity vows, this is not so because poor people who are ready to accept charity are found in all places.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专 注诇讬讜 专讙诇 讗讞讚 注讜讘专 讘注砖讛

Rava said: Although, according to most opinions one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have elapsed, once even one Festival has passed and he has not sacrificed the offerings that he vowed to bring, he immediately violates a positive mitzva.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘讬 驻驻讬讬住 注诇 讜诇讚 砖诇诪讬诐 砖讬拽专讘 砖诇诪讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 驻驻讬讬住 讗谞讬 诪注讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇谞讜 驻专讛 砖诇 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 讜讗讻诇谞讜讛 讘驻住讞 讜讗讻诇谞讜 讜诇讚讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讞讙

The Gemara raises an objection from the following mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas testified about the offspring of peace-offerings. They said that if the mother animal was consecrated before it conceived or during its pregnancy, the offspring, too, must be sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I testify that we once had a cow that was sacrificed as a peace-offering, and we ate it on Passover [beFesa岣], and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival [be岣g], i.e., on Sukkot.

讘砖诇诪讗 讘驻住讞 诇讗 讗拽专讘讜讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚诪讞讜住专 讝诪谉 讛讜讛 讗诇讗 讜诇讚讛 讘注爪专转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讛讬 诇讛 讜注讘专讬 注诇讬讛 讘注砖讛

The Gemara clarifies the details of this story: Granted, on Passover itself Rabbi Papeyyas and his family did not sacrifice the offspring, as one can say that the animal was lacking the requisite time, i.e., it was less than eight days old, and it is prohibited to sacrifice such a young animal. But how could they delay and not sacrifice the offspring on Shavuot, the first Festival after Passover, if, according to Rava, they would have violates a positive mitzva as soon as the first Festival passed?

讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讻讙讜谉

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: For example, this occurs

砖讛讬讛 讞讜诇讛 讘注爪专转 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讜讗讻诇谞讜 讜诇讚讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讞讙 讚拽转谞讬 讞讙 讛砖讘讜注讜转

in a case where the offspring was sick on Shavuot, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of Sukkot, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of Shavuot. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.

讜讗讬讚讱 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚转谞讬 驻住讞 转谞讬 注爪专转

The Gemara asks: And what does the other amora, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the tanna teaches a halakha concerning Passover using the term Pesa岣, he teaches the halakha concerning Shavuot using the term Atzaret, not the term 岣g. In such a context, the term 岣g is reserved exclusively for Sukkot.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讜 砖诇砖讛 专讙诇讬诐 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讜讬讜诐 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 诪讬转讬讘讬 讗讞讚 讘讻讜专 讜讗讞讚 讻诇 讛拽讚砖讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专

Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following baraita: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year without three Festivals has passed, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 转讬讜讘转讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 砖驻讬专 拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 诪讻讚讬 转谞讗 讗诇讗讜讬 拽讗 诪讛讚专 诇讬转谞讬 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讜讬讜诐 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专

The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the tanna of the baraita is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the tanna of the baraita teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.

讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 诇诪讬拽讘注讬讛 讘诇讗讜 拽讗 诪讛讚专 讘诇讗讜讬 讬转讬专讬 诇讗 拽讗 诪讛讚专

And how does the other amora, Rava, explain the baraita? He understands that the tanna is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.

讙讜驻讗 讗讞讚 讘讻讜专 讜讗讞讚 讻诇 讛拽讚砖讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 讘砖诇诪讗 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and Sukkot. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讚专谉 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讚专谉 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before Shavuot, in which case the year will end before Shavuot the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until Sukkot of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘砖谞讛 诪注讜讘专转 讚转谞讬讗 砖谞讛 转诪讬诪讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪讜谞讛 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讜砖砖讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛 讬讜诐 讻诪谞讬谉 讬诪讜转 讛讞诪讛

The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: 鈥淎nd if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year鈥 (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讜谞讛 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 诪讬讜诐 诇讬讜诐 讜讗诐 谞转注讘专讛 砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇讜 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诇专讘讬 讚讗拽讚砖讛 讘转专 讞讙 讛诪爪讜转 讚讻讬 诪讟讗 砖讬诇讛讬 讗讚专 讘转专讗讛 砖谞讛 诪诇讬讗 专讙诇讬诐 诇讗 诪诇讜 讗诇讗 诇专讘谞谉 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller鈥檚 benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

讻讚转谞讬 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 注爪专转 驻注诪讬诐 讞诪砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖讘注讛 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 砖谞讬讛谉 诪诇讗讬谉 讞诪砖讛 砖谞讬讛谉 讞住专讬谉 砖讘注讛 讗讞讚 诪诇讗 讜讗讞讚 讞住专 砖砖讛

The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: Shavuot sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of Shavuot, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of Shavuot occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after Shavuot, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of Shavuot occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.

讜诪讗谉 转谞讗 讚驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讚专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讗讞专讬诐 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讞专讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 注爪专转 诇注爪专转 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 专讗砖 讛砖谞讛 诇专讗砖 讛砖谞讛 讗诇讗 讗专讘注讛 讬诪讬诐 讘诇讘讚 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 砖谞讛 诪注讜讘专转 讞诪砖讛

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is A岣rim, as it is taught in a baraita: A岣rim say: The difference between Shavuot of one year and Shavuot of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讬讜专砖 诪讛讜 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 讻讬 转讚讜专 谞讚专 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 谞讚专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讘讗转 砖诪讛 讜讛讘讗转诐 砖诪讛 讜讛讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淲hen you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: 鈥淎nd there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:5鈥6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father鈥檚 offerings.

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪注诪讱 驻专讟 诇讬讜专砖

Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi 岣yya taught a baraita that says: The verse states: 鈥淔or the Lord your God will surely require it from you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.

讜讛讗讬 诪注诪讱 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讝讛 诇拽讟 砖讻讞讛 讜驻讗讛 拽专讬 讘讬讛 注诪讱 讜拽专讬 讘讬讛 诪注诪讱

The Gemara asks: But this phrase 鈥渇rom you鈥 is necessary to teach a different halakha, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi 岣yya derived two halakhot from this word. He read into the verse: 鈥淵ou [imakh],鈥 which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: 鈥淔rom you [me鈥檌makh],鈥 with the extra letter mem coming to exclude an heir.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗砖讛 诪讛 讛讬讗 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘讗 讘专讗讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讗 讗讬转讛 讘砖诪讞讛

Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚讛讗 讗讬转讛 讘砖诪讞讛 讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗砖讛 讘注诇讛 诪砖诪讞讛 诇讚讘专讬讜 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽讗诪专

Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn鈥檛 Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira鈥檚 opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讻讜专 诪讗讬诪转讬 诪讜谞讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪砖注讛 砖谞讜诇讚 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诪砖注讛 砖谞专讗讛 诇讛专爪讗讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).

讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讛讗 讘转诐

The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.

Masechet Rosh Hashana 聽is dedicated anonymously in honor of聽Rabbanit Michelle Farber whose dedication to learning and teaching the daf continues to inspire so many people around the world.

This month's shiurim are dedicated by Tamara Katz in memory of her maternal grandparents, Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig whose yahrzeits are both this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Kessler, Wolkenfeld and Grossman families in loving memory of Mia Rose bat Matan Yehoshua v鈥 Elana Malka. "讛 谞转谉 讜讛 诇拽讞. 讬讛讬 砖诐 讛 诪讘讜专讱"

  • This month's shiurim are sponsored by Shoshana Shur for the refuah shleima of Meira Bat Zelda Zahava.

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The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Rosh Hashanah 6

诪讚讘谉 注讝讗讬 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 讘谉 注讝讗讬 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讜

as this halakha is derived from that which ben Azzai said, as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it, it shall be piggul鈥 (Leviticus 7:18).

诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讗讞专 诇砖诇诪讜 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讗祝 诪讗讞专 谞讚专讜 讘讘诇 讬专爪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜转讜 讗讜转讜 讘诇讗 讬专爪讛 讜讗讬谉 诪讗讞专 谞讚专讜 讘诇讗 讬专爪讛

For what purpose does the verse state the word 鈥渋t鈥? Since elsewhere it states: 鈥淲hen you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), I might have interpreted from this verse that even one who is late in paying his vow is included in: It shall not be accepted. Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t.鈥 It, an offering disqualified by improper intention [piggul], is included in the halakha of: 鈥淚t shall not be accepted,鈥 but the animal of one who is late in paying his vow is not included in the halakha of: 鈥淚t shall not be accepted.鈥

讗诇讗 讘讱 讞讟讗 讜诇讗 讘讗砖转讱 讞讟讗

The Gemara rejects what was said above; rather, the explanation of the verse is as follows. The phrase: 鈥淎nd it would be sin in you鈥 comes to teach that there would be a sin in you, but there would not be a sin in your wife.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗讬 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讬谉 讗砖转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 诪转讛 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 诪讘拽砖讬谉 诪诪谞讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗诐 讗讬谉 诇讱 诇砖诇诐 诇诪讛 讬拽讞 诪砖讻讘讱 诪转讞转讬讱 讗讬诪讗 讘讛讗讬 注讜谉 讚讘诇 转讗讞专 谞诪讬 讗砖转讜 诪转讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

It was necessary to say that the lateness is not imputed to the other members of one鈥檚 household for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yo岣nan said, and some say that it was Rabbi Elazar who said: A person鈥檚 wife dies only because others demand of him money and he does not have means with which to pay, as it is stated about one who commits himself to guarantee a loan: 鈥淚f you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?鈥 (Proverbs 22:27). The verse warns one who takes a loan that incurring debt may result in one losing the very sheets that he sleeps on to his creditor. The Gemara understands this homiletically: Why should you cause God to take away your wife, i.e., she who shares your bed, so that she dies? Consequently, you might say that one鈥檚 wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, in that one fails to fulfill his commitment. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, this sin is imputed to him alone.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讝讜 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 转砖诪讜专 讝讜 诪爪讜转 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讬转 讗讝讛专讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讬注砖讜讱 讻讗砖专 谞讚专转 讝讛 谞讚专 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讗诇讜 讞讟讗讜转 讜讗砖诪讜转 注讜诇讜转 讜砖诇诪讬诐 谞讚讘讛 讻诪砖诪注讜 讗砖专 讚讘专转 讗诇讜 拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 讘驻讬讱 讝讜 爪讚拽讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and do; as you have vowed as a gift to the Lord your God, which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips鈥; this is a positive mitzva. 鈥淵ou shall keep鈥; this is a prohibition, as the phrase 鈥測ou shall keep鈥 is a warning to keep oneself from sinning. 鈥淎nd do鈥; this is an admonition to the court to make you fulfill your vow. 鈥淎s you have vowed鈥; this is referring to a vow-offering. 鈥淭o the Lord your God鈥; this is referring to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, teaching that one must keep his word and bring them. 鈥淎s a gift鈥; this is understood in its literal sense to be referring to a gift-offering. 鈥淲hich you have promised鈥; this is referring to objects consecrated for Temple maintenance. 鈥淲ith your mouth鈥; this is referring to vows of charity, to which one commits himself with his mouth.

讗诪专 诪专 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讝讜 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讜讘讗转 砖诪讛 讜讛讘讗转诐 砖诪讛 谞驻拽讗 转砖诪讜专 讝讜 诪爪讜转 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪诇讗 转讗讞专 诇砖诇诪讜 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara clarifies the details mentioned in this baraita. The Master said: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips鈥; this is a positive mitzva. Why do I need this derivation? Isn鈥檛 the positive mitzva derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offering of your hand, and your vows, and your gift-offerings, and the firstborn of your herd and of your flock鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:5鈥6)? The baraita continues: 鈥淵ou shall keep鈥; this is a prohibition. Why do I need this derivation; this is derived from the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not delay paying it鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22).

讜注砖讬转 讗讝讛专讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讬注砖讜讱 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讬拽专讬讘 讗讜转讜 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 讬拽专讬讘 讗讜转讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讬讻讜诇 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇专爪讜谞讜 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬

鈥淎nd do鈥; this is a warning to the court to make you fulfill your vow. Why do I need this derivation? This rule is derived from the verse: 鈥淗e shall offer it鈥 (Leviticus 1:3), as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淗e shall offer it,鈥 which teaches that he must be forced to bring his offering. One might have thought that he may be forced to bring his offering even against his will. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淚n accordance with his will鈥 (Leviticus 1:3). How so? The court coerces him until he says: I want to bring the offering. Now, since all of these halakhot are already known from other sources, what is the point of this repetition?

讞讚 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讜讞讚 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘

The Gemara answers: One set of verses is referring to a case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, and one set of verses is referring to a case where he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讬讛 诇讚讬讘讜专讬讛 讗讘诇 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘讬 讙讝讗 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗讬转讬讛 爪专讬讻讗

And it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, as had the Torah taught us only about the halakha of the case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he did not keep his word; however, if he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might say that anywhere that it is, it is in the treasure house of the Merciful One, as the world and everything in it belongs to God, and therefore it makes no difference if he delays in bringing it to the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that even when one has not set aside a specific animal he transgresses the prohibition.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗驻专讬砖 讜诇讗 讗拽专讬讘 讚拽讗 诪砖讛讬 诇讬讛 讙讘讬讛 讗讘诇 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讘讜专讗 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讜讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had the Torah taught us only about the case where one set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he is keeping the animal for himself. But if he said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might say that his mere speech is nothing, and there is no transgression provided he has not actually set aside an animal. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗 讗驻专讬砖 讜讛讗 谞讚讘讛 讻转讬讘讗 讜转谞谉 讗讬 讝讛讜 谞讚专 讛讗讜诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讗讬 讝讜 讛讬讗 谞讚讘讛 讛讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 注讜诇讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where one merely said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal? Isn鈥檛 a gift-offering mentioned in the verse, and we learned in a mishna: What is a vow-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering. And what is a gift-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says, concerning a particular animal: I undertake to bring this animal as a burnt-offering.

讜诪讛 讘讬谉 谞讚专 诇谞讚讘讛 谞讚专 诪转 讗讜 谞讙谞讘 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讜 谞讚讘讛 诪转讛 讗讜 谞讙谞讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讛

And what is the difference between a vow-offering and a gift-offering? With regard to vow-offerings, if the animal died or was stolen, the one who took the vow is obligated to pay restitution for it. He undertook to bring a burnt-offering without specifying the animal, and therefore until he brings that offering he is not absolved of his obligation. With regard to a gift-offering, however, if the animal died or was stolen, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it because he undertook to bring a specific animal, and that is no longer possible. In the case of a gift-offering, then, a specific animal must have already been set aside as an offering.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谞讬 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讞专讬讜转讛

Rava said: You can find a case of a gift-offering where a specific animal has not yet been set aside; for example, where one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that after I set an animal aside in fulfillment of my vow, I will not be liable to replace it should the animal die or be stolen.

讘驻讬讱 讝讜 爪讚拽讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讜爪讚拽讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注诇讛 诇讗诇转专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讛讗 拽讬讬诪讬 注谞讬讬诐

搂 The baraita stated: 鈥淲ith your mouth鈥; this is referring to vows of charity. Rava said: In the case of vows of charity, one is liable immediately if he is late in distributing the charity that he had promised to give. What is the reason for this halakha? It is that poor people to whom the charity may be given exist in all places, and so the charity can be distributed to them immediately, unlike an offering, which must be brought to the Temple.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注谞讬讬谞讗 讚拽专讘谞讜转 讻转讬讘讗 注讚 讚注讘专讬 注诇讛 砖诇砖讛 专讙诇讬诐 讻拽专讘谞讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚转诇讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讘专讙诇讬诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 讚讛讗 砖讻讬讞讬 注谞讬讬诐

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that charity must be given to the poor without delay. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that since the halakha pertaining to vows of charity is written in the passage dealing with offerings, perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying until three Festivals have passed, as is the halakha with regard to offerings, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not so. Rather, there, with regard to the offerings, the Merciful One made the timing of the transgression dependent upon the time of the Festivals, when one must go on pilgrimage to the Temple. However, here, with regard to charity vows, this is not so because poor people who are ready to accept charity are found in all places.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专 注诇讬讜 专讙诇 讗讞讚 注讜讘专 讘注砖讛

Rava said: Although, according to most opinions one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have elapsed, once even one Festival has passed and he has not sacrificed the offerings that he vowed to bring, he immediately violates a positive mitzva.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘讬 驻驻讬讬住 注诇 讜诇讚 砖诇诪讬诐 砖讬拽专讘 砖诇诪讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 驻驻讬讬住 讗谞讬 诪注讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇谞讜 驻专讛 砖诇 讝讘讞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 讜讗讻诇谞讜讛 讘驻住讞 讜讗讻诇谞讜 讜诇讚讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讞讙

The Gemara raises an objection from the following mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas testified about the offspring of peace-offerings. They said that if the mother animal was consecrated before it conceived or during its pregnancy, the offspring, too, must be sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I testify that we once had a cow that was sacrificed as a peace-offering, and we ate it on Passover [beFesa岣], and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival [be岣g], i.e., on Sukkot.

讘砖诇诪讗 讘驻住讞 诇讗 讗拽专讘讜讛 讗讬诪讜专 讚诪讞讜住专 讝诪谉 讛讜讛 讗诇讗 讜诇讚讛 讘注爪专转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讛讬 诇讛 讜注讘专讬 注诇讬讛 讘注砖讛

The Gemara clarifies the details of this story: Granted, on Passover itself Rabbi Papeyyas and his family did not sacrifice the offspring, as one can say that the animal was lacking the requisite time, i.e., it was less than eight days old, and it is prohibited to sacrifice such a young animal. But how could they delay and not sacrifice the offspring on Shavuot, the first Festival after Passover, if, according to Rava, they would have violates a positive mitzva as soon as the first Festival passed?

讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讻讙讜谉

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: For example, this occurs

砖讛讬讛 讞讜诇讛 讘注爪专转 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讜讗讻诇谞讜 讜诇讚讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讞讙 讚拽转谞讬 讞讙 讛砖讘讜注讜转

in a case where the offspring was sick on Shavuot, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of Sukkot, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of Shavuot. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.

讜讗讬讚讱 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚转谞讬 驻住讞 转谞讬 注爪专转

The Gemara asks: And what does the other amora, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the tanna teaches a halakha concerning Passover using the term Pesa岣, he teaches the halakha concerning Shavuot using the term Atzaret, not the term 岣g. In such a context, the term 岣g is reserved exclusively for Sukkot.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讜 砖诇砖讛 专讙诇讬诐 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讜讬讜诐 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 诪讬转讬讘讬 讗讞讚 讘讻讜专 讜讗讞讚 讻诇 讛拽讚砖讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专

Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following baraita: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year without three Festivals has passed, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 转讬讜讘转讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 砖驻讬专 拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 诪讻讚讬 转谞讗 讗诇讗讜讬 拽讗 诪讛讚专 诇讬转谞讬 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讜讬讜诐 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专

The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the tanna of the baraita is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the tanna of the baraita teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.

讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 诇诪讬拽讘注讬讛 讘诇讗讜 拽讗 诪讛讚专 讘诇讗讜讬 讬转讬专讬 诇讗 拽讗 诪讛讚专

And how does the other amora, Rava, explain the baraita? He understands that the tanna is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.

讙讜驻讗 讗讞讚 讘讻讜专 讜讗讞讚 讻诇 讛拽讚砖讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖注讘专讜 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 注讜讘专 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 讘砖诇诪讗 专讙诇讬诐 讘诇讗 砖谞讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 砖谞讛 讘诇讗 专讙诇讬诐 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and Sukkot. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讚专谉 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讚专谉 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before Shavuot, in which case the year will end before Shavuot the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until Sukkot of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘砖谞讛 诪注讜讘专转 讚转谞讬讗 砖谞讛 转诪讬诪讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪讜谞讛 砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 讜砖砖讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛 讬讜诐 讻诪谞讬谉 讬诪讜转 讛讞诪讛

The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: 鈥淎nd if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year鈥 (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讜谞讛 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 诪讬讜诐 诇讬讜诐 讜讗诐 谞转注讘专讛 砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇讜 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诇专讘讬 讚讗拽讚砖讛 讘转专 讞讙 讛诪爪讜转 讚讻讬 诪讟讗 砖讬诇讛讬 讗讚专 讘转专讗讛 砖谞讛 诪诇讬讗 专讙诇讬诐 诇讗 诪诇讜 讗诇讗 诇专讘谞谉 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller鈥檚 benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

讻讚转谞讬 专讘 砖诪注讬讛 注爪专转 驻注诪讬诐 讞诪砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖讘注讛 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 砖谞讬讛谉 诪诇讗讬谉 讞诪砖讛 砖谞讬讛谉 讞住专讬谉 砖讘注讛 讗讞讚 诪诇讗 讜讗讞讚 讞住专 砖砖讛

The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: Shavuot sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of Shavuot, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of Shavuot occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after Shavuot, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of Shavuot occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.

讜诪讗谉 转谞讗 讚驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讚专讘 砖诪注讬讛 讗讞专讬诐 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讞专讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 注爪专转 诇注爪专转 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 专讗砖 讛砖谞讛 诇专讗砖 讛砖谞讛 讗诇讗 讗专讘注讛 讬诪讬诐 讘诇讘讚 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 砖谞讛 诪注讜讘专转 讞诪砖讛

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is A岣rim, as it is taught in a baraita: A岣rim say: The difference between Shavuot of one year and Shavuot of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讬讜专砖 诪讛讜 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 讻讬 转讚讜专 谞讚专 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 谞讚专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讘讗转 砖诪讛 讜讛讘讗转诐 砖诪讛 讜讛讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淲hen you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: 鈥淎nd there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:5鈥6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father鈥檚 offerings.

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪注诪讱 驻专讟 诇讬讜专砖

Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi 岣yya taught a baraita that says: The verse states: 鈥淔or the Lord your God will surely require it from you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.

讜讛讗讬 诪注诪讱 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讝讛 诇拽讟 砖讻讞讛 讜驻讗讛 拽专讬 讘讬讛 注诪讱 讜拽专讬 讘讬讛 诪注诪讱

The Gemara asks: But this phrase 鈥渇rom you鈥 is necessary to teach a different halakha, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi 岣yya derived two halakhot from this word. He read into the verse: 鈥淵ou [imakh],鈥 which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: 鈥淔rom you [me鈥檌makh],鈥 with the extra letter mem coming to exclude an heir.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗砖讛 诪讛 讛讬讗 讘讘诇 转讗讞专 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘讗 讘专讗讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讗 讗讬转讛 讘砖诪讞讛

Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚讛讗 讗讬转讛 讘砖诪讞讛 讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗砖讛 讘注诇讛 诪砖诪讞讛 诇讚讘专讬讜 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽讗诪专

Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn鈥檛 Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira鈥檚 opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讻讜专 诪讗讬诪转讬 诪讜谞讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪砖注讛 砖谞讜诇讚 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诪砖注讛 砖谞专讗讛 诇讛专爪讗讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).

讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讛讗 讘转诐

The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.

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