Rosh Hashanah 6

מדבן עזאי נפקא דתניא בן עזאי אומר אותו

as this halakha is derived from that which ben Azzai said, as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it, it shall be piggul” (Leviticus 7:18).

מה תלמוד לומר לפי שנאמר לא תאחר לשלמו שומע אני אף מאחר נדרו בבל ירצה תלמוד לומר אותו אותו בלא ירצה ואין מאחר נדרו בלא ירצה

For what purpose does the verse state the word “it”? Since elsewhere it states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), I might have interpreted from this verse that even one who is late in paying his vow is included in: It shall not be accepted. Therefore, the verse states “it.” It, an offering disqualified by improper intention [piggul], is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in paying his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted.”

אלא בך חטא ולא באשתך חטא

The Gemara rejects what was said above; rather, the explanation of the verse is as follows. The phrase: “And it would be sin in you” comes to teach that there would be a sin in you, but there would not be a sin in your wife.

סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואמר רבי יוחנן ואי תימא רבי אלעזר אין אשתו של אדם מתה אלא אם כן מבקשין ממנו ממון ואין לו שנאמר אם אין לך לשלם למה יקח משכבך מתחתיך אימא בהאי עון דבל תאחר נמי אשתו מתה קא משמע לן

It was necessary to say that the lateness is not imputed to the other members of one’s household for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some say that it was Rabbi Elazar who said: A person’s wife dies only because others demand of him money and he does not have means with which to pay, as it is stated about one who commits himself to guarantee a loan: “If you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). The verse warns one who takes a loan that incurring debt may result in one losing the very sheets that he sleeps on to his creditor. The Gemara understands this homiletically: Why should you cause God to take away your wife, i.e., she who shares your bed, so that she dies? Consequently, you might say that one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, in that one fails to fulfill his commitment. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, this sin is imputed to him alone.

תנו רבנן מוצא שפתיך זו מצות עשה תשמור זו מצות לא תעשה ועשית אזהרה לבית דין שיעשוך כאשר נדרת זה נדר לה׳ אלהיך אלו חטאות ואשמות עולות ושלמים נדבה כמשמעו אשר דברת אלו קדשי בדק הבית בפיך זו צדקה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “That which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and do; as you have vowed as a gift to the Lord your God, which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition, as the phrase “you shall keep” is a warning to keep oneself from sinning. “And do”; this is an admonition to the court to make you fulfill your vow. “As you have vowed”; this is referring to a vow-offering. “To the Lord your God”; this is referring to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, teaching that one must keep his word and bring them. “As a gift”; this is understood in its literal sense to be referring to a gift-offering. “Which you have promised”; this is referring to objects consecrated for Temple maintenance. “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity, to which one commits himself with his mouth.

אמר מר מוצא שפתיך זו מצות עשה למה לי מובאת שמה והבאתם שמה נפקא תשמור זו מצות לא תעשה למה לי מלא תאחר לשלמו נפקא

The Gemara clarifies the details mentioned in this baraita. The Master said: “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. Why do I need this derivation? Isn’t the positive mitzva derived from the verse: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offering of your hand, and your vows, and your gift-offerings, and the firstborn of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6)? The baraita continues: “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition. Why do I need this derivation; this is derived from the verse: “You shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22).

ועשית אזהרה לבית דין שיעשוך למה לי מיקריב אותו נפקא דתניא יקריב אותו מלמד שכופין אותו יכול בעל כרחו תלמוד לומר לרצונו הא כיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני

“And do”; this is a warning to the court to make you fulfill your vow. Why do I need this derivation? This rule is derived from the verse: “He shall offer it” (Leviticus 1:3), as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “He shall offer it,” which teaches that he must be forced to bring his offering. One might have thought that he may be forced to bring his offering even against his will. Therefore, the verse states: “In accordance with his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How so? The court coerces him until he says: I want to bring the offering. Now, since all of these halakhot are already known from other sources, what is the point of this repetition?

חד דאמר ולא אפריש וחד אפריש ולא אקריב

The Gemara answers: One set of verses is referring to a case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, and one set of verses is referring to a case where he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן אמר ולא אפריש משום דלא קיימיה לדיבוריה אבל אפריש ולא אקריב אימא כל היכא דאיתיה בי גזא דרחמנא איתיה צריכא

And it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, as had the Torah taught us only about the halakha of the case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he did not keep his word; however, if he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might say that anywhere that it is, it is in the treasure house of the Merciful One, as the world and everything in it belongs to God, and therefore it makes no difference if he delays in bringing it to the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that even when one has not set aside a specific animal he transgresses the prohibition.

ואי אשמעינן אפריש ולא אקריב דקא משהי ליה גביה אבל אמר ולא אפריש אימא דיבורא לא כלום הוא צריכא

And had the Torah taught us only about the case where one set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he is keeping the animal for himself. But if he said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might say that his mere speech is nothing, and there is no transgression provided he has not actually set aside an animal. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases.

ומי מצית אמרת דאמר ולא אפריש והא נדבה כתיבא ותנן אי זהו נדר האומר הרי עלי עולה ואי זו היא נדבה האומר הרי זו עולה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where one merely said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal? Isn’t a gift-offering mentioned in the verse, and we learned in a mishna: What is a vow-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering. And what is a gift-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says, concerning a particular animal: I undertake to bring this animal as a burnt-offering.

ומה בין נדר לנדבה נדר מת או נגנב חייב באחריותו נדבה מתה או נגנבה אינו חייב באחריותה

And what is the difference between a vow-offering and a gift-offering? With regard to vow-offerings, if the animal died or was stolen, the one who took the vow is obligated to pay restitution for it. He undertook to bring a burnt-offering without specifying the animal, and therefore until he brings that offering he is not absolved of his obligation. With regard to a gift-offering, however, if the animal died or was stolen, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it because he undertook to bring a specific animal, and that is no longer possible. In the case of a gift-offering, then, a specific animal must have already been set aside as an offering.

אמר רבא משכחת לה כגון דאמר הרי עלי עולה על מנת שאיני חייב באחריותה

Rava said: You can find a case of a gift-offering where a specific animal has not yet been set aside; for example, where one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that after I set an animal aside in fulfillment of my vow, I will not be liable to replace it should the animal die or be stolen.

בפיך זו צדקה אמר רבא וצדקה מיחייב עלה לאלתר מאי טעמא דהא קיימי עניים

§ The baraita stated: “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity. Rava said: In the case of vows of charity, one is liable immediately if he is late in distributing the charity that he had promised to give. What is the reason for this halakha? It is that poor people to whom the charity may be given exist in all places, and so the charity can be distributed to them immediately, unlike an offering, which must be brought to the Temple.

פשיטא מהו דתימא כיון דבעניינא דקרבנות כתיבא עד דעברי עלה שלשה רגלים כקרבנות קא משמע לן התם הוא דתלינהו רחמנא ברגלים אבל הכא לא דהא שכיחי עניים

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that charity must be given to the poor without delay. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that since the halakha pertaining to vows of charity is written in the passage dealing with offerings, perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying until three Festivals have passed, as is the halakha with regard to offerings, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not so. Rather, there, with regard to the offerings, the Merciful One made the timing of the transgression dependent upon the time of the Festivals, when one must go on pilgrimage to the Temple. However, here, with regard to charity vows, this is not so because poor people who are ready to accept charity are found in all places.

אמר רבא כיון שעבר עליו רגל אחד עובר בעשה

Rava said: Although, according to most opinions one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have elapsed, once even one Festival has passed and he has not sacrificed the offerings that he vowed to bring, he immediately violates a positive mitzva.

מיתיבי העיד רבי יהושע ורבי פפייס על ולד שלמים שיקרב שלמים אמר רבי פפייס אני מעיד שהיתה לנו פרה של זבחי שלמים ואכלנוה בפסח ואכלנו ולדה שלמים בחג

The Gemara raises an objection from the following mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas testified about the offspring of peace-offerings. They said that if the mother animal was consecrated before it conceived or during its pregnancy, the offspring, too, must be sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I testify that we once had a cow that was sacrificed as a peace-offering, and we ate it on Passover [beFesaḥ], and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival [beḤag], i.e., on Sukkot.

בשלמא בפסח לא אקרבוה אימור דמחוסר זמן הוה אלא ולדה בעצרת היכי משהי לה ועברי עליה בעשה

The Gemara clarifies the details of this story: Granted, on Passover itself Rabbi Papeyyas and his family did not sacrifice the offspring, as one can say that the animal was lacking the requisite time, i.e., it was less than eight days old, and it is prohibited to sacrifice such a young animal. But how could they delay and not sacrifice the offspring on Shavuot, the first Festival after Passover, if, according to Rava, they would have violates a positive mitzva as soon as the first Festival passed?

אמר רב זביד משמיה דרבא כגון

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: For example, this occurs

שהיה חולה בעצרת רב אשי אמר מאי ואכלנו ולדה שלמים בחג דקתני חג השבועות

in a case where the offspring was sick on Shavuot, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of Sukkot, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of Shavuot. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.

ואידך כל היכא דתני פסח תני עצרת

The Gemara asks: And what does the other amora, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the tanna teaches a halakha concerning Passover using the term Pesaḥ, he teaches the halakha concerning Shavuot using the term Atzaret, not the term Ḥag. In such a context, the term Ḥag is reserved exclusively for Sukkot.

אמר רבא כיון שעברו עליו שלשה רגלים בכל יום ויום עובר בבל תאחר מיתיבי אחד בכור ואחד כל הקדשים כיון שעברו עליהם שנה בלא רגלים רגלים בלא שנה עובר בבל תאחר

Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following baraita: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year without three Festivals has passed, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.

והאי מאי תיובתיה אמר רב כהנא מאן דקא מותיב שפיר קא מותיב מכדי תנא אלאוי קא מהדר ליתני בכל יום ויום עובר בבל תאחר

The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the tanna of the baraita is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the tanna of the baraita teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.

ואידך תנא למיקבעיה בלאו קא מהדר בלאוי יתירי לא קא מהדר

And how does the other amora, Rava, explain the baraita? He understands that the tanna is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.

גופא אחד בכור ואחד כל הקדשים כיון שעברו עליהם שנה בלא רגלים רגלים בלא שנה עובר בבל תאחר בשלמא רגלים בלא שנה משכחת לה אלא שנה בלא רגלים היכי משכחת לה

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and Sukkot. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?

הניחא למאן דאית ליה כסדרן משכחת לה אלא למאן דלית ליה כסדרן היכי משכחת לה

The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before Shavuot, in which case the year will end before Shavuot the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until Sukkot of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

בשלמא לרבי משכחת לה בשנה מעוברת דתניא שנה תמימה רבי אומר מונה שלש מאות וששים וחמשה יום כמנין ימות החמה

The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: “And if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year” (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.

וחכמים אומרים מונה שנים עשר חדש מיום ליום ואם נתעברה שנה נתעברה לו משכחת לה לרבי דאקדשה בתר חג המצות דכי מטא שילהי אדר בתראה שנה מליא רגלים לא מלו אלא לרבנן היכי משכחת לה

And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller’s benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

כדתני רב שמעיה עצרת פעמים חמשה פעמים ששה פעמים שבעה הא כיצד שניהן מלאין חמשה שניהן חסרין שבעה אחד מלא ואחד חסר ששה

The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: Shavuot sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of Shavuot, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of Shavuot occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after Shavuot, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of Shavuot occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.

ומאן תנא דפליג עליה דרב שמעיה אחרים היא דתניא אחרים אומרים אין בין עצרת לעצרת אין בין ראש השנה לראש השנה אלא ארבעה ימים בלבד ואם היתה שנה מעוברת חמשה

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: The difference between Shavuot of one year and Shavuot of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.

בעי רבי זירא יורש מהו בבל תאחר כי תדור נדר אמר רחמנא והא לא נדר או דלמא ובאת שמה והבאתם שמה והא מיחייב

§ Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father’s offerings.

תא שמע דתני רבי חייא מעמך פרט ליורש

Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a baraita that says: The verse states: “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.

והאי מעמך מיבעי ליה זה לקט שכחה ופאה קרי ביה עמך וקרי ביה מעמך

The Gemara asks: But this phrase “from you” is necessary to teach a different halakha, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥiyya derived two halakhot from this word. He read into the verse: “You [imakh],” which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: “From you [me’imakh],” with the extra letter mem coming to exclude an heir.

בעי רבי זירא אשה מה היא בבל תאחר מי אמרינן הא לא מיחייבא בראיה או דלמא הא איתה בשמחה

§ Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?

אמר ליה אביי ותיפוק ליה דהא איתה בשמחה ומי אמר אביי הכי והאמר אביי אשה בעלה משמחה לדבריו דרבי זירא קאמר

Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn’t Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.

איבעיא להו בכור מאימתי מונין לו שנה אביי אמר משעה שנולד רב אחא בר יעקב אמר משעה שנראה להרצאה

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).

ולא פליגי הא בתם

The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.