Sanhedrin 112
קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara comments: The matter presents a difficulty with the opinion of Reish Lakish.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הוּדְּחוּ מֵאֲלֵיהֶן, מַהוּ? ״וַיַּדִּיחוּ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא שֶׁהוּדְּחוּ מֵאֲלֵיהֶן? אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֲפִילּוּ הוּדְּחוּ מֵאֲלֵיהֶן?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the inhabitants of an idolatrous city subverted themselves to idol worship and were not subverted by others, what is the halakha? Since the Merciful One states: “And have subverted,” perhaps it may be inferred: But not if they subvert themselves; or perhaps even if they subverted themselves to idol worship, the city can be deemed an idolatrous city.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הִדִּיחוּהָ נָשִׁים וּקְטַנִּים, אַמַּאי? לֶיהֱוֵי כְּהוּדְּחוּ מֵאֲלֵיהֶן! הָנָךְ בָּתַר נַפְשַׁיְיהוּ גְּרִידִי, הָנֵי בָּתַר נָשִׁים וּקְטַנִּים גְּרִידִי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the mishna: If women or children subvert the inhabitants of the city, these idol worshippers are judged as individuals. Why is that so? Let their status be considered as though they subverted themselves. Apparently, if the inhabitants subverted themselves the city is not deemed an idolatrous city. The Gemara rejects this proof: These cases are not comparable, as these, who subverted themselves, are drawn after their own initiative and worship idols wholeheartedly, and therefore perhaps the city is rendered an idolatrous city. Those, who are subverted by women and children, are drawn after women and children and are not committed to idol worship, and therefore, perhaps the city is not rendered an idolatrous city.
עַד שֶׁיּוּדַח רוּבָּהּ. הֵיכִי עָבְדִינַן? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: דָּנִין וְחוֹבְשִׁין, דָּנִין וְחוֹבְשִׁין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ עוּלָּא: נִמְצָא אַתָּה מְעַנֶּה אֶת דִּינָן שֶׁל אֵלּוּ! אֶלָּא, אָמַר עוּלָּא: דָּנִין וְסוֹקְלִין, דָּנִין וְסוֹקְלִין.
§ The mishna teaches that a city is not deemed an idolatrous city unless most of the inhabitants of the city are subverted. The Gemara asks: How do we act in order to determine if most of the inhabitants have been subverted? Rav Yehuda says: The court judges each inhabitant suspected of idol worship, and if he is found liable imprisons him in a jail, and it judges and imprisons each succeeding idolater until a majority of the city has been convicted. Ulla said to him: That will result in you delaying justice for those already sentenced and awaiting execution, and it is prohibited to delay justice. Rather, Ulla says: The court judges each inhabitant and stones him if he is found liable, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater until half of the city is found guilty, and all future convicted idolaters are executed by the sword.
אִיתְּמַר, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: דָּנִין וְסוֹקְלִין, דָּנִין וְסוֹקְלִין, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מַרְבִּין לָהֶן בָּתֵּי דִינִין.
It was stated that there is a parallel amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court judges and stones the idolater, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater. And Reish Lakish says: One increases the number of courts for them so that all the inhabitants of the city can stand trial at the same time and the means of their execution will be determined with no delay of justice.
אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי חָמָא בַּר יוֹסֵי אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: ״וְהוֹצֵאתָ אֶת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא אוֹ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה הָהִיא״ – אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה אַתָּה מוֹצִיא לִשְׁעָרֶיךָ, וְאִי אַתָּה מוֹצִיא כָּל הָעִיר כּוּלָּהּ לִשְׁעָרֶיךָ! אֶלָּא, מַרְבִּין לָהֶן בָּתֵּי דִינִין וּמְעַיְּינִין בְּדִינֵיהֶן, וּמַסְּקִינַן לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל, וְגָמְרִי לְהוּ לְדִינַיְיהוּ, וְקָטְלִי לְהוּ.
The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosei say that Rabbi Oshaya says that it is written: “And you shall take that man or that woman out…to your gates” (Deuteronomy 17:5), from which it is derived: You take a man and a woman out to your gates and they are judged by the local court, but you do not take the entire city out to your gates; instead, they stand trial before the Great Sanhedrin. Rather, the procedure is that one increases the number of courts for them and those courts analyze their cases, and when they conclude that a majority of the inhabitants are guilty of idolatry they are not sentenced; instead, we take them to the High Court [Sanhedrin] and the court issues the verdict of the idolaters and executes them.
״הַכֵּה תַכֶּה אֶת יֹשְׁבֵי הָעִיר וְכוּ׳״. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחַמֶּרֶת וְהַגַּמֶּלֶת הָעוֹבֶרֶת מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם, לָנוּ בְּתוֹכָהּ וְהוּדְּחוּ עִמָּהּ – אִם נִשְׁתַּהוּ שָׁם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, הֵן בְּסַיִיף וּמָמוֹנָן אָבֵד. פָּחוֹת מִיכָּן, הֵן בִּסְקִילָה וּמָמוֹנָן פָּלֵט.
§ It is written: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita: The caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, that lodged in the city and were subverted with it, if they had stayed there thirty days they are executed by the sword and their property is destroyed. If they had stayed there less than that, they are executed by stoning, as individual idolaters, and their property is spared.
וּרְמִינְהִי: כַּמָּה יִהְיֶה בָּעִיר וְיִהְיֶה כְּאַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר? שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ! אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא לְמִיהְוֵי מִבְּנֵי מָתָא, הָא לְמִיהְוֵי מִיָּתְבֵי מָתָא.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: How long shall one be in the city and as a result, his status will be like that of the residents of the city with regard to giving charity and paying taxes? He is obligated if he remained there twelve months, and not thirty days. Rava says: This contradiction is not difficult, and it may be resolved: This period of twelve months is the period required to become one of the citizens of the city; this period of thirty days is the period required to become one of the inhabitants of the city.
וְהָתַנְיָא: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִבְּנֵי הָעִיר, אִם יֵשׁ אָדָם שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּהָא שָׁם שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ – אָסוּר לֵיהָנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ, פָּחוֹת מִיכָּן – מוּתָּר לֵיהָנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ. בְּיוֹשְׁבֵי הָעִיר, אִם נִשְׁתַּהָא שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – אָסוּר לֵיהָנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ, פָּחוֹת מִיכָּן – מוּתָּר לֵיהָנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ.
And so it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the citizens of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there twelve months, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the inhabitants of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there thirty days, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. In the context of an idolatrous city, the reference is to the inhabitants of the city, which includes anyone who had stayed there for thirty days.
״הַחֲרֵם אֹתָהּ וְאֶת כׇּל אֲשֶׁר בָּהּ״ כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הַחֲרֵם אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת כׇּל אֲשֶׁר בָּהּ״ – פְּרָט לְנִכְסֵי צַדִּיקִים שֶׁבְּחוּצָה לָהּ. ״וְאֶת כׇּל אֲשֶׁר בָּהּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת נִכְסֵי צַדִּיקִים שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ. ״שְׁלָלָהּ״ – וְלֹא שְׁלַל שָׁמַיִם. ״וְאֶת כׇּל שְׁלָלָהּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת נִכְסֵי רְשָׁעִים שֶׁחוּצָה לָהּ.
It is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to that which is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it”; this serves to exclude the property of the righteous that is located outside the city, which is not destroyed. “And all that is in it”; this serves to include the property of the righteous that is located inside the city; it is also destroyed. It is stated: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17). From the term “its spoils” it is derived: But not the spoils of Heaven; all consecrated property is excluded. The phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה נִכְסֵי צַדִּיקִים שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ יֹאבֵדוּ? מִי גָּרַם לָהֶם שֶׁיָּדוּרוּ בְּתוֹכָהּ? מָמוֹנָם. לְפִיכָךְ מָמוֹנָם אָבֵד. אָמַר מָר: ״וְאֶת כׇּל שְׁלָלָהּ תִּקְבֹּץ״ – לְרַבּוֹת נִכְסֵי רְשָׁעִים שֶׁבְּחוּצָה לָהּ. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: וּבְנִקְבָּצִים לְתוֹכָהּ.
Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason does the Torah say that the property of the righteous that is in it shall be destroyed? Why must they suffer for the sins of others? The reason is: Who caused the righteous to live in this city inhabited by wicked people? It is their property that tied them to this city; therefore, their property is destroyed. The Master said that the phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed. Rav Ḥisda says: And this is the halakha only with regard to property that can be gathered into the city.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פִּקְדוֹנוֹת שֶׁל אַנְשֵׁי עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת מוּתָּרִין. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי לֵימָא דְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת וְאִיתַנְהוּ בְּגַוַּהּ – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמוּתָּרִין, לָאו שְׁלָלָהּ הוּא! וְאֶלָּא דִּידְהוּ וְאִיתַנְהוּ בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת. אִי דְּנִקְבָּצִין לְתוֹכָהּ – אַמַּאי מוּתָּרִין? וְאִי אֵין נִקְבָּצִין לְתוֹכָהּ – הָא אַמְרַהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא!
Rav Ḥisda says: Deposits of the inhabitants of an idolatrous city are permitted, i.e., they are not destroyed. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city and that property is deposited within the idolatrous city, it is obvious that the deposits are permitted, as the deposits are not “its spoils”; they are the property of others. But rather, say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city, and it is deposited within another city. If so, the status of that property should be like any other property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city; if it is property that can be gathered into the city, why are the deposits permitted? It was already established that the property of the wicked is destroyed. And if it is property that cannot be gathered into the city, didn’t Rav Ḥisda already say once that this property is not burned?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם דְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת דְּמַפְקְדִי בְּתוֹכָהּ. וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן דְּקַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ אַחְרָיוּת. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דְּקַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ אַחְרָיוּת, כְּדִידֵיהּ דָּמֵי? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: No, Rav Ḥisda is actually referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city that is deposited within the idolatrous city; and what are we dealing with here? It is a case where an inhabitant of the idolatrous city assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession. Lest you say: Once he assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession, the status of the deposit is like that of his own property and it should be destroyed, therefore Rav Ḥisda teaches us that deposits are permitted and not destroyed.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּהֵמָה חֶצְיָהּ שֶׁל עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת וְחֶצְיָהּ שֶׁל עִיר אַחֶרֶת – אֲסוּרָה. עִיסָּה חֶצְיָהּ שֶׁל עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת וְחֶצְיָהּ שֶׁל עִיר אַחֶרֶת – מוּתֶּרֶת. מַאי טַעְמָא? בְּהֵמָה כְּמַאן דְּלָא פְּלִיגָא דָּמְיָא, עִיסָּה כְּמַאן דִּפְלִיגָא דָּמְיָא.
Rav Ḥisda says: An animal that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city is forbidden. By contrast, with regard to dough that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city, the half that belongs to the other city is permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between them? The Gemara explains: An animal is like an entity that is not divided, as it is possible to eat part of an animal only through the slaughter of the entire animal. Therefore, if any portion of the animal is forbidden, the entire animal is forbidden. Dough is like an entity that is divided. Therefore, the fact that one portion of the dough is forbidden does not render the entire dough forbidden.
בָּעֵי רַב חִסְדָּא: בֶּהֱמַת עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת מַהוּ דְּתִיתְהֲנֵי בַּהּ שְׁחִיטָה לְטַהֲרָהּ מִידֵי נְבֵילָה? לְפִי חֶרֶב אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, לָא שְׁנָא שַׁחֲטַהּ מִשְׁחָט, לָא שְׁנָא קַטְלַהּ מִקְטָל. אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁחְטַהּ מַהְנְיָא לַהּ שְׁחִיטָה? מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Ḥisda raises a dilemma: With regard to the animal of an idolatrous city, what is the halakha; is ritual slaughter effective at least in purifying it from the ritual impurity of an unslaughtered animal carcass? If the animals of the city are killed but not ritually slaughtered, they are impure with the impurity of a carcass and transmit impurity by means of contact as well as if they are lifted. Will the ritual slaughter of those animals prevent the transmission of that impurity? Is it so that since the Merciful One states: “And its animals, with the edge of the sword,” indicating that it is no different if one ritually slaughtered the animal, and it is no different if one killed the animal in another way, its status is that of a carcass and it transmits impurity? Or perhaps, since one ritually slaughtered the animal, ritual slaughter is effective. What is the halakha? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: שְׂעַר נָשִׁים צִדְקָנִיּוֹת מַהוּ? אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דִּרְשָׁעִיּוֹת אָסוּר? ״תִּקְבֹּץ וְשָׂרַפְתָּ״ כְּתִיב. מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּסָּר אֶלָּא קְבִיצָה וּשְׂרֵיפָה – יָצָא זֶה שֶׁמְחוּסָּר תְּלִישָׁה וּקְבִיצָה וּשְׂרֵיפָה.
Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: What is the status of the hair of pious women in the idolatrous city; must it be destroyed? Rava says: Is that to say that the hair of wicked women is forbidden and must be destroyed? “And you shall gather…and you shall burn” (Deuteronomy 13:17), is written, and it is derived: An item that is lacking, i.e., that requires, only gathering and burning must be destroyed, excluding this hair, which is lacking detaching, gathering, and burning. Therefore, even the hair of a wicked woman is not forbidden.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: בְּפֵיאָה נׇכְרִית, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּמְחוּבָּר בְּגוּפַהּ, כְּגוּפַהּ דָּמְיָא. לָא צְרִיכָא דִּתְלֵי בְּסִיבְטָא. כְּנִכְסֵי צַדִּיקִים שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ דָּמֵי וְאָבַד? אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעָיְילָא וְנָפְקָא, כִּלְבוּשַׁהּ דָּמֵי? תֵּיקוּ.
Rather, Rava says: This dilemma is raised with regard to a wig. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the wig is attached to her body, its status is like that of her body. The Gemara answers: No, this dilemma is necessary only in a case where the wig is hanging on a peg. Is its status like that of the property of the righteous inside the city and therefore it is destroyed, or perhaps, since she enters and exits with the wig, its status is like that of a garment, and it is not destroyed? This dilemma shall stand unresolved.
״וְאֶת כׇּל שְׁלָלָהּ תִּקְבֹּץ אֶל תּוֹךְ רְחֹבָהּ״ וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין לָהּ רְחוֹב – אֵינָהּ נַעֲשֵׂית עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין לָהּ רְחוֹב – עוֹשִׂין לָהּ רְחוֹב. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר: ״רְחוֹבָהּ״ – מֵעִיקָּרָא מַשְׁמַע, וּמָר סָבַר: ״רְחוֹבָהּ״ – הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מַשְׁמַע.
With regard to the verse: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17), the Sages taught: If the city has no square, it does not become an idolatrous city, as it does not fulfill the criterion mandated by the verse; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: If the city has no square, one creates a square for the city. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds “its square” indicates a square that existed from the outset. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that “its square” can also indicate a square that was created now.
וְהַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת שֶׁבָּהּ יִפָּדוּ כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָיוּ בָּהּ קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים, קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ – יָמוּתוּ, קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת – יִפָּדוּ, וּתְרוּמוֹת – יֵרָקְבוּ, וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְכִתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ – יִגָּנְזוּ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֶמְתָּהּ״ – וְלֹא בֶּהֱמַת בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר, ״שְׁלָלָהּ״ – פְּרָט לְכֶסֶף הֶקְדֵּשׁ וְכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר.
§ The mishna teaches: And the consecrated property in it must be redeemed. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 14:5): If there were offerings of the most sacred order in it, if they were animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, they shall die; one causes their death. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance must be redeemed, and terumot must be left to decay, and second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. Rabbi Shimon says: That is not so; rather, the term: “Its animals” (Deuteronomy 13:16), serves to exclude a firstborn animal and animal tithe, as they never belonged to the idolatrous city. The term: “Its spoils” (Deuteronomy 13:17), serves to exclude consecrated money and tithe money.
אָמַר מָר: הָיוּ בָּהּ קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים, קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ – יָמוּתוּ. וְאַמַּאי יָמוּתוּ? יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיִמָּכְרוּ, וְיִפְּלוּ דְּמֵיהֶן לִנְדָבָה.
The Gemara proceeds to analyze the baraita. The Master said: If there were offerings of the most sacred order in it, if they were animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, they shall die. The Gemara asks: But why shall they die? They should graze until they become unfit, and then they should be sold and their value should be allocated for communal gift offerings.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: ״זֶבַח רְשָׁעִים תּוֹעֵבָה״. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מָמוֹן בְּעָלִים הוּא. וְהָכָא בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא דְּאָמַר: מָמוֹן בְּעָלִים הוּא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They shall die, as it is written: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27), and it is unacceptable for sacrifice on the altar. Reish Lakish says: They shall die because the animal is the property of its owner and is not exclusively consecrated property. And the reason it is considered the property of the owner is that here, the tanna is referring to offerings with regard to which one bears financial responsibility for their replacement. That responsibility renders the status of these consecrated animals like that of his property. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: An offering with regard to which one bears financial responsibility for its replacement is the property of its owner.
הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, רֵישָׁא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי דְּאָמַר: קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים מָמוֹן בְּעָלִים. אֲבָל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים מַאי? יִפָּדוּ.
The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one may infer that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara suggests a new explanation: Rather, the animals that shall die are offerings of lesser sanctity, and the ruling of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: Offerings of lesser sanctity are the property of their owner. The Gemara infers: But offerings of the most sacred order, what shall be done with them? They shall be redeemed.
אַדְּתָנֵי סֵיפָא: קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת יִפָּדוּ, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, אֲבָל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים – יִפָּדוּ. כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא חַטָּאת שֶׁמֵּתוּ בְּעָלֶיהָ, דִּלְמִיתָה אָזְלָא, לָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the baraita: Items consecrated for Temple maintenance must be redeemed, let the tanna distinguish and teach a distinction within the category of animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar itself, as follows: In what case is this statement, that animals shall die, said? It is stated with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity; but with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, they shall be redeemed. The Gemara answers: Since there is among offerings of the most sacred order the case of the sin-offering whose owners were killed in the idolatrous city, rendering the animal a sin-offering whose owners have died, which is left to die, that distinction is not clear-cut for the tanna, as offerings of the most sacred order are not always redeemed. Therefore, the tanna preferred to cite a distinction without exceptions.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא אָמַר כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דִּכְתִיב: ״זֶבַח רְשָׁעִים תּוֹעֵבָה״. אֶלָּא רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? אָמַר לָךְ: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״זֶבַח רְשָׁעִים תּוֹעֵבָה״, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בְּעֵינַיְיהוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי – אִישְׁתַּנִּי.
The Gemara comments: Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not say his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, due to the fact that it is written: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination,” and he bases his explanation on that verse. But Reish Lakish, what is the reason he does not say his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that when we say: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination,” this statement applies in a case where the offering is in its unadulterated form. But here, since if they were to redeem it, it would have changed and would no longer be the animal of the wicked itself, but rather an animal purchased with the proceeds of the redemption of the original, it would have changed, and it would no longer be an abomination.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֶמְתָּהּ״ – וְלֹא בֶּהֱמַת בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בִּתְמִימִין – שְׁלַל שָׁמַיִם הוּא! אֶלָּא בְּבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין – שְׁלָלָהּ נִינְהוּ?
§ The baraita continues. Rabbi Shimon says that the term “its animals” serves to exclude a firstborn animal and animal tithe. The Gemara asks: What animals are we dealing with? If we say that Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to unblemished animals, like all other offerings they are the spoils of Heaven and not the spoils of the inhabitants of the city. Rather, Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to blemished animals, which belong to their owners. If so, they are the spoils of the city, and what is the reason that Rabbi Shimon says that there is no obligation to destroy these animals?
אָמַר רָבִינָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין, וּמִי שֶׁנֶּאֱכָל בְּתוֹרַת בְּהֶמְתָּהּ. יָצְאוּ אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִין בְּתוֹרַת בְּהֶמְתָּהּ, אֶלָּא בְּתוֹרַת בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר, דִּשְׁלַל שָׁמַיִם נִינְהוּ.
Ravina says: Actually, Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to blemished animals, and his statement should be understood as follows: The mitzva is to destroy that which is eaten as its animals, i.e., as the property of an inhabitant of an idolatrous city. Excluded are those firstborn and tithe animals, which, even when blemished, are not eaten as its animals; rather, they are eaten as firstborn and tithe animals. They are given as gifts to priests, and are considered the spoils of Heaven.
וּפְלִיגָא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַכֹּל קָרֵב וְהַכֹּל נִפְדֶּה. מַאי קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל שֶׁקָּרֵב כְּשֶׁהוּא תָּם, וְנִפְדֶּה כְּשֶׁהוּא בַּעַל מוּם – מִ״שְּׁלָלָהּ״ אִימְּעִיט, וְכׇל שֶׁקָּרֵב כְּשֶׁהוּא תָּם וְאֵינוֹ נִפְדָּה כְּשֶׁהוּא בַּעַל מוּם, כְּגוֹן בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר – מִ״בְּהֶמְתָּהּ״ נָפְקָא.
And this halakha disputes the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: Everything is sacrificed and everything is redeemed. The Gemara asks: What is he saying? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: Any offering that is sacrificed on the altar when it is unblemished and is redeemed when it is blemished is excluded from the term “its spoils,” since it is considered the spoils of Heaven. And the halakha concerning any offering that is sacrificed on the altar when it is unblemished and is not redeemed when it is blemished, e.g., a firstborn animal and animal tithe, is derived from the term “its animals,” as they are not the city’s animals and they are not included in the city’s property.
תְּרוּמוֹת יֵרָקְבוּ. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא תְּרוּמָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל תְּרוּמָה בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, כֵּיוָן דְּמָמוֹנֵיהּ הוּא, תִּשָּׂרֵף.
§ The baraita continues: Terumot must be left to decay. Rav Ḥisda says: The Sages taught this only with regard to teruma that is still in the possession of an Israelite, who has not yet given it to a priest. But concerning teruma that is already in the possession of a priest who lives in the idolatrous city, since it is his property, it shall be burned.
מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְכִתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ יִגָּנְזוּ. וְהָא מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּתְרוּמָה בְּיַד כֹּהֵן דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי יִגָּנְזוּ! אֶלָּא, אִי אִתְּמַר הָכִי אִתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא תְּרוּמָה בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, אֲבָל תְּרוּמָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל תִּנָּתֵן לְכֹהֵן שֶׁבְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת.
Rav Yosef raises an objection from the mishna: Second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. But isn’t the status of second tithe in the possession of an Israelite like that of teruma in the possession of a priest, as he may partake of it and benefit from it in Jerusalem; and nevertheless, it is taught: They must be interred? Rather, if the statement of Rav Ḥisda was stated, this is what was stated: Rav Ḥisda says: The Sages taught this only with regard to teruma that is already in the possession of a priest who lives in the idolatrous city, as even though it is his property, it maintains the sanctity of teruma. But teruma that is still in the possession of an Israelite, which is not his property at all, shall be given to a priest who is in another city, and should not be left to decay.
תְּנַן הָתָם: עִיסָּה שֶׁל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי פְּטוּרָה מִן הַחַלָּה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי מָמוֹן גָּבוֹהַּ הוּא, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי מָמוֹן הֶדְיוֹט הוּא. אֲבָל בִּגְבוּלִין, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּטוּר.
We learned in a baraita there: Second-tithe dough is exempt from having ḥalla separated since it is property belonging to the Most High; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem one liable to separate ḥalla from second-tithe dough. Rav Ḥisda says: This dispute is with regard to second tithe in Jerusalem; as Rabbi Meir holds: Second-tithe produce is property belonging to the Most High, but the Torah permitted its owners to partake of it in Jerusalem. Since it is the property of Heaven, one is exempt from separating priestly gifts. And the Rabbis hold: It is non-sacred property from which one is liable to separate ḥalla. But with regard to second-tithe dough in the outlying areas, everyone agrees that one is exempt from separating ḥalla, as outside of Jerusalem it is prohibited to partake of it.
מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְכִתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ יִגָּנְזוּ. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, מִי הָוְיָא עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת? וְהָתַנְיָא: עֲשָׂרָה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן – אֵינָהּ נַעֲשֵׂית עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת! וְאֶלָּא בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, וְאַסְּקוּהּ לְגַוַּהּ? הָא קַלְטוּהּ מְחִיצוֹת!
Rav Yosef raises an objection from the mishna: Second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. What are we dealing with? If we say that the reference is to second tithe in Jerusalem, can Jerusalem be an idolatrous city? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten matters were stated with regard to Jerusalem, and this is one of them: It does not become an idolatrous city. Rather, apparently the reference is to second tithe in a different city that was rendered an idolatrous city, and before it was so rendered one took the second-tithe produce up into Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: In that case, wasn’t the produce admitted by the walls of Jerusalem, making it no longer associated with the idolatrous city, and it should therefore be permitted to partake of it?
אֶלָּא לָאו בִּגְבוּלִין, וְקָתָנֵי: יִגָּנְזוּ? לָא, לְעוֹלָם דְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, וְאַסְּקוּהּ לְגַוַּהּ. וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? שֶׁנִּטְמָא.
Rather, is the reference in the mishna not to second-tithe produce in an outlying area? And it is taught: They must be interred. Apparently, second-tithe produce is not the property of Heaven; it belongs to an inhabitant of the idolatrous city. The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, the reference in the mishna is to second-tithe produce in a different city, and before it was rendered an idolatrous city one took the second-tithe produce up into Jerusalem. And what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where that second-tithe produce became ritually impure. Since it is prohibited to partake of it, there is no alternative to interment.
וְלִפְרְקֵיהּ? דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מִנַּיִין לְמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי שֶׁנִּטְמָא שֶׁפּוֹדִין אוֹתוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תוּכַל שְׂאֵתוֹ״, וְאֵין שְׂאֵת אֶלָּא אֲכִילָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּשָּׂא מַשְׂאֹת מֵאֵת פָּנָיו״. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּלָקוּחַ.
The Gemara challenges: And let him redeem it in Jerusalem, as Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived with regard to second-tithe produce that became impure, that one may redeem it even in Jerusalem? As the verse states: “And if the way is too long for you so that you are unable to carry it [se’eto]…and you shall turn it into money” (Deuteronomy 14:24–25). And se’et means nothing other than eating, as it is stated: “And he took portions [masot] from before him” (Genesis 43:34), indicating that second-tithe produce that cannot be eaten, whether due to the distance from Jerusalem or due to its impurity, may be redeemed. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? It is not a case where the second-tithe produce became impure; rather, it is a case where an item purchased with second-tithe money became impure.
