Sanhedrin 23
מַתְנִי׳ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁנֵי דַיָּינִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.
MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.
זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין אוֹ מוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.
This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them.
זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.
This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד״? בִּתְלָתָא סַגִּי!
GEMARA: The Gemara assumes that the statement: This litigant chooses one and that litigant chooses one and the two of them choose one more, means that each litigant chooses a court of three judges and the two courts together choose one more court, for a total of nine judges. The Gemara asks: For what purpose does this litigant choose one court for himself and that litigant choose one court for himself; isn’t it sufficient to judge the case with three judges?
הָכִי קָאָמַר: כְּשֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ בֵּית דִּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ בֵּית דִּין אֶחָד, שְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.
The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where this litigant chooses one court for himself, i.e., he requests to be judged before three specific judges, and that litigant chooses one other court of three judges for himself, as he does not wish to be judged before the court that the first litigant requested, in this case, both of them choose one more court for themselves, i.e., they must reach a compromise and decide about the composition of the court that will judge them.
וַאֲפִילּוּ לֹוֶה מָצֵי מְעַכֵּב? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מַלְוֶה, אֲבָל לֹוֶה כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And can even a debtor restrict the choice of the court? But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages taught that only a creditor can refuse a court chosen by the debtor, due to his desire to be judged by a prominent court, but that as for a debtor, they compel him to appear in the court that presides in his own city.
כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ. אֲבָל מוּמְחִין – לָא.
The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says concerning a different matter, that the Sages taught that other matter with regard to the laymen’s courts [be’arkaot] in Syria. Here too, the Sages taught the halakha in the mishna with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria, which allow even the debtor to refuse to be judged before the court chosen by the creditor, claiming that they are not worthy judges. But if the creditor chooses a court of experts, the debtor does not have the right to refuse to be judged before them.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא מוּמְחִין, כְּגוֹן בֵּי דִינָא דְּרַב הוּנָא וּדְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: מִי קָא מַטְרַחְנָא לָךְ?
Rav Pappa said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to courts of experts in the same city, such as the courts of Rav Huna and of Rav Ḥisda. As in that case, each litigant can say to the other: Am I burdening you by requesting that you be judged by a different court?
תְּנַן: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּינִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן בֵּית דִּין – בֵּית דִּין בָּתַר דְּפָסְלִי לְהוּ, אָזְלוּ וּבָרְרוּ לְהוּ בֵּי דִינָא אַחֲרִינֵי?
We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more for themselves. And if it enters your mind to interpret the mishna as we said before, that each litigant chose a court of three judges, this statement is difficult; after each court was disqualified by one of the litigants, shall the members of both courts go and choose another court for themselves?
וְעוֹד, מַאי ״זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד״?
And furthermore, for what reason would the mishna state that the standard procedure for choosing judges is that this litigant chooses one court for himself and that litigant chooses one court for himself, each disqualifying the court that the other chose?
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: כְּשֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, שְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.
Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: When this litigant chooses one judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, and that litigant chooses one other judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, the two litigants then choose one more judge for themselves, and the case is adjudicated by these three judges.
מַאי שְׁנָא דְּעָבְדִי הָכִי? אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד – יֵצֵא הַדִּין לַאֲמִיתּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: What is different about this procedure; i.e., that the selection of the judges is performed specifically in this manner? The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: As a result of the fact that this litigant chooses one judge for himself, and that litigant chooses one judge for himself, and the two litigants choose one more judge for themselves, the true judgment will emerge. Each litigant assumes that the judges he chose do not bear a grudge against him, and he will accept their ruling.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים כּוּ׳. נֵימָא בִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב קָמִיפַּלְגִי?
§ The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to what Rav Yehuda says that Rav says.
דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי חוֹתֵם עִמָּהֶן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְרַבָּנַן אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב.
As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. One does not sign a document unless he recognizes that those signing with him are fit to bear witness. According to the Gemara’s suggestion, Rabbi Meir does not accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. Therefore, the litigants can choose the third judge, as the first two judges will be amenable to signing the court order without knowing the third judge. And the Rabbis accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and the judges would not sign the court order without themselves knowing the third judge.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְדַעַת הַדַּיָּינִין – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּבָעֵינַן. כִּי פְּלִיגִי – דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין: רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי דַּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין בָּעֵינַן, דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין לָא בָּעֵינַן.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone accepts that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and everyone agrees with the premise that we need the consent of the first two judges for the appointment of the third. Rather, when they disagree, it is about whether the consent of the litigants is necessary. Rabbi Meir holds that we need the consent of the litigants as well, and the Rabbis hold that although we need the consent of the other two judges, we do not need the consent of the litigants.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר כּוּ׳. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: כָּךְ הָיוּ נְקִיֵּי הַדַּעַת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עוֹשִׂין – לֹא הָיוּ חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי חוֹתֵם עִמָּהֶן, וְלֹא הָיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין בְּדִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי יוֹשֵׁב עִמָּהֶן, וְלֹא הָיוּ נִכְנָסִין בִּסְעוּדָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי מֵסֵב עִמָּהֶן.
Returning to the matter itself, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. That is also taught in a baraita: This is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do: They would not sign a document unless they knew who was signing with them, and they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting with them, and they would not join a meal unless they knew who was reclining, i.e., eating, with them.
זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ כּוּ׳. כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ דְּפָסֵיל דַּיָּינֵי?
§ The mishna teaches: This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant. The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to disqualify judges?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ, אֲבָל מוּמְחִים – לֹא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught this matter with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria. In those courts, each litigant can refuse to be judged by the judge the other litigant chose. But this halakha is not stated with regard to a court of expert judges.
הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין, אוֹ מוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מוּמְחִין נָמֵי קָאָמַר!
The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? When he brings evidence that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason; but if they are fit to serve as judges, or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. By inference, Rabbi Meir is also speaking of a court of experts when he says that one can refuse to be judged.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין, נַעֲשׂוּ כְּמוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין, וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.
The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: But if they are fit to serve as judges they are treated like experts ordained by the court, and he cannot disqualify them.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁפּוֹסֵל דַּיָּין שֶׁמּוּמְחֶה לְרַבִּים.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita that contradicts this interpretation: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge who is accepted as an expert for the public. Apparently, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to an expert judge.
אֵימָא: לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁפּוֹסֵל דַּיָּין שֶׁהִמְחוּהוּ רַבִּים עֲלֵיהֶם.
The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be emended as follows: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge whom the public accepted upon themselves as an expert judge for their matters, just as the halakha is concerning the laymen’s courts in Syria.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: לְעוֹלָם פּוֹסֵל וְהוֹלֵךְ, עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמּוּמְחֶה לְרַבִּים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
That interpretation is also taught in a baraita, which teaches: A litigant can continuously disqualify the judges chosen by the other litigant forever, until the latter accepts to be judged by a court that is accepted as an expert court for the public; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Clearly, Rabbi Meir concedes that one cannot refuse to have the case judged by an expert court.
וְהָא עֵדִים כְּמוּמְחִין דָּמֵי? וְאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה.
The Gemara asks: But aren’t witnesses like experts, in that their standing is independent of their being accepted by the litigants? And yet Rabbi Meir says: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant.
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: פֶּה קָדוֹשׁ יֹאמַר דָּבָר זֶה? תְּנִי: ״עֵדוֹ״.
The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that statement of Rabbi Meir that Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.
עֵדוֹ לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לְמָמוֹן, רַחֲמָנָא פַּסְלֵיהּ! אִי לִשְׁבוּעָה, הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימַן כְּבֵי תְּרֵי!
The Gemara asks: For what purpose does his single witness testify? If we say it is to testify about monetary matters, the Merciful One already disqualifies him, as by Torah law the testimony of only one witness is not accepted. If it is to render the defendant liable to take an oath that he does not owe the money being claimed, in this regard the testimony of one witness is deemed credible like two witnesses; the Torah states that if one witness supports the claim of the claimant, the defendant is required to take an oath that he does not owe the money.
לְעוֹלָם לְמָמוֹן. לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ כְּבֵי תְרֵי.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the purpose of the testimony is to testify about monetary matters; and no, one should not raise that challenge, as this ruling is necessary only in a case where the litigant initially accepted upon himself the single witness as equivalent to two witnesses. Afterward, he retracted his agreement to accept the single witness’s testimony as if it were that of two witnesses. Rabbi Meir rules that his retraction is valid, and the testimony is not accepted.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּמָצֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ? תְּנֵינָא: אָמַר לוֹ ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא״, ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ״, ״נֶאֱמָנִין עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָּקָר״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us, that one can retract this kind of agreement? We learn this in the following mishna (24a): If one of the litigants says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are legally disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says that the one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say that he cannot retract it, and must accept their verdict.
וְאָמַר רַב דִּימִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כְּגוֹן דְּקַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּחַד.
And Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Yosef, says: This is referring to a case where the litigant accepted one of these people upon himself as one of the judges, in addition to two fit judges. Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a litigant retracting his acceptance of someone who is generally disqualified from judging is stated in the next mishna, why is it stated in this mishna as well?
צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּנָא ״אַבָּא״ וְ״אָבִיךְ״ – בְּהָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן דְּלָא מָצֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּאַבָּא וְאָבִיךְ חֲזוּ לְעָלְמָא. אֲבָל חַד כְּבֵי תְרֵי, דִּלְעָלְמָא לָא חֲזֵי – אֵימָא: מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara answers: The statements in both mishnayot are necessary. As, had the Mishna taught this dispute only with regard to a litigant who said: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, one might have reasoned that only in this case did the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his acceptance, because: My father, and: Your father, are fit to judge for the general public. But in a case where a litigant accepts one witness as equivalent to two witnesses, since one witness is someone who is not fit to testify by himself for the general public one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated with regard to the case in this mishna as well.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא – אֵימָא מוֹדוּ לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן. צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the Mishna would teach us their dispute only with regard to this case, where a litigant effectively accepted one witness as equivalent to two, one might have reasoned that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance. But in that case, where he accepted his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that he cannot retract his acceptance. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to state both disputes.
הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא ״דַּיָּינוֹ״, וְסֵיפָא ״עֵדָיו״ – אַלְמָא דַּוְקָא קָתָנֵי.
The Gemara asks: But from the fact that in the former clause the mishna teaches that one litigant can disqualify the judge, in singular, chosen by the other litigant, and in the latter clause the wording is his witnesses, in plural, evidently the mishna teaches this specifically with regard to a case of two witnesses. It is incorrect to emend the text to read witness instead of witnesses.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּבָא הוּא וְאַחֵר לְפוֹסְלָן.
Rabbi Elazar said: The mishna is referring to a case where the litigant and another person come to disqualify the witnesses, testifying that they are disqualified from bearing witness.
כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ? נוֹגֵעַ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ הוּא!
The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to testify that the witnesses of the other litigant are disqualified from bearing witness? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest; how can the court accept it?
אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּרָא עָלָיו עַרְעָר.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The mishna is referring to a case where he raised a challenge against the witness’s fitness to testify, which cannot be disregarded due to his conflict of interest.
עַרְעָר דְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא עַרְעָר דְּגַזְלָנוּתָא, כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ? נוֹגֵעַ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ הוּא!
The Gemara asks: A challenge over which matter? If we say that he raises a challenge by testifying that the witness is guilty of theft or some other transgression, is it in his power to testify to that effect? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest.
אֶלָּא: עַרְעָר דִּפְגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: הָנֵי אַמִּשְׁפָּחָה קָמַסְהֲדִי, וְאִיהוּ מִמֵּילָא קָפָסֵיל. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: סוֹף סוֹף נוֹגֵעַ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ הוּא.
Rather, it is a challenge over a family flaw. The litigant testifies that the witness’s lineage prevents him from testifying, as he is from a family of Canaanite slaves. Rabbi Meir holds that the litigant’s testimony is accepted, as these witnesses, the litigant and the witness who testifies with him, are testifying about the family of the witness, and the witness is disqualified indirectly. The litigant is therefore not disqualified from giving this testimony due to his conflict of interest. And the Rabbis hold that since his testimony is ultimately tainted by a conflict of interest, it is not accepted.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a case in which one of the litigants claims that there are two sets of witnesses who can testify on his behalf, and the other litigant responds that one of the sets of witnesses is disqualified. In this case, the second litigant’s claim is not tainted by a conflict of interest, as there is another set of witnesses who can testify against him in any event.
דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: צָרִיךְ לְבָרֵר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְבָרֵר. אֲבָל בְּכַת אַחַת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.
Rabbi Meir maintains that the litigant cannot give this testimony, as Rabbi Meir holds that a litigant who claims in court to have a certain number of witnesses ready to testify on his behalf is required to substantiate that they exist. Therefore, there is no concern that the other set of witnesses will not be brought to court, causing that litigant to lose the case due to the disqualification of the first set. And the Rabbis hold that one is not required to substantiate the existence of witnesses he claims to have. As the disqualification of the first set of witnesses can cause the first litigant to lose the case, the second litigant is consequently unable to disqualify that first set, due to his conflict of interest. But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them, due to his conflict of interest.
אָמְרוּ לְפָנָיו רַב אַמֵּי וְרַב אַסִּי: אֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא כַּת אַחַת, מַהוּ?
Rav Dimi continued: Rav Ami and Rav Asi said before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the halakha?
אֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא כַּת אַחַת? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: אֲבָל בְּכַת אַחַת דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן! אֶלָּא, נִמְצֵאת כַּת שְׁנִיָּה קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְסוּלִין – מַהוּ?
The Gemara interrupts: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the dilemma? But didn’t you already say: But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them? Rather, the question should be understood as follows: According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a litigant can disqualify one of the other litigant’s two sets of witnesses, if the second set is ultimately found to be related to one of the litigants or to each other, or is disqualified from bearing witness for other reasons, what is the halakha? Can the litigant whose witnesses were disqualified then claim that the other litigant was not capable of disqualifying the first set, as it turned out that they were the only witnesses who would be testifying against him?
אָמַר לָהֶן: כְּבָר הֵעִידוּ עֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כְּבָר הֵעִידוּ עֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: The first pair of witnesses, i.e., the second litigant, who disqualified the other litigant’s first set of witnesses, already testified. Since his testimony was valid at the time it cannot be disqualified afterward. Some say this statement in the name of a different amora: Rav Ashi says: The first pair of witnesses already testified.
נֵימָא, בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי?
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?
דְּתַנְיָא: הַבָּא לִידּוֹן בִּשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה, נִידּוֹן בִּשְׁטָר – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נִידּוֹן בַּחֲזָקָה.
As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who comes to court to be judged concerning a claim against land that is in his possession, if in order to support his claim of ownership he comes to court both with a deed of purchase proving that the land is his and with a claim of presumptive ownership of the land stating that it had been in his possession for the past three years, which would render the deed superfluous, in this case his claim is judged on the basis of the deed. The court examines whether or not the deed is valid. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: His claim is judged on the basis of his presumptive ownership.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: בַּחֲזָקָה וְלֹא בִּשְׁטָר? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: אַף בַּחֲזָקָה.
And we discussed this dispute, asking: Can Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel possibly mean that the defendant’s claim is judged on the basis of only his presumptive ownership and not on the basis of his deed, i.e., is his deed of purchase ignored? Clearly, there is no reason to ignore the deed of purchase. Rather, say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel means that the defendant’s claim is judged not only on the basis of the deed of purchase, but even on the basis of his presumptive ownership. In other words, either claim suffices.
וְקַיְימָא לַן, דִּבְצָרִיךְ לְבָרֵר פְּלִיגִי.
And we maintain that they disagree with regard to whether or not a litigant who claims to have more than one type of evidence is required to substantiate the existence of all his types of evidence. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one who claims to have a deed of purchase is required to bring it to court and cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel he can rely on his presumptive ownership. Apparently, this dispute is parallel to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the mishna.
לָא. אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי. דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר כְּרַבִּי.
The Gemara rejects this: No. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, everyone agrees that there is no need to substantiate the existence of all the types of evidence. When Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Meir holds that one is required to substantiate the existence of all of his types of evidence, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי לָךְ: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי הָתָם אֶלָּא בַּחֲזָקָה, דְּמִכֹּחַ שְׁטָרָא קָאָתֵי. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּהָנֵי עֵדִים לָאו מִכֹּחַ עֵדִים אַחֲרִינֵי קָאָתוּ, אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מוֹדֶה דְּאֵין צָרִיךְ לְבָרֵר.
And the Rabbis could have said to you that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there that one is required to substantiate the existence of his types of evidence only vis-à-vis a claim of presumptive ownership of the land. If one claims that he possesses the deed of sale for his land he cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, as the power of his presumptive ownership comes from the power of the deed; mere possession without an accompanying claim of how one became the owner is disregarded (see Bava Batra 41a). But here, in the case of two sets of witnesses, since the power of these witnesses does not come from the power of the other witnesses, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that one is not required to substantiate the existence of the other set of witnesses.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רֵישָׁא
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says a different interpretation of the dispute: The former clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify a judge,
