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Today's Daf Yomi

August 8, 2017 | 讟状讝 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Sanhedrin 23

How are judges chosen? 聽Does each side have the ability to disqualify witnesses or judges that the other side brought/chose? 聽Is this mishna referring to a regular court system or to an arbitration court? 聽There are many difficulties with the simple reading of the mishna and the amoraim struggle to understand the different sections of the mishna.


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诪转谞讬壮 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖谞讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 砖诇 讝讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 注诇讬讛谉 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讜 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 注诇讬讛谉 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other鈥檚 witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讘转诇转讗 住讙讬

GEMARA: The Gemara assumes that the statement: This litigant chooses one and that litigant chooses one and the two of them choose one more, means that each litigant chooses a court of three judges and the two courts together choose one more court, for a total of nine judges. The Gemara asks: For what purpose does this litigant choose one court for himself and that litigant choose one court for himself; isn鈥檛 it sufficient to judge the case with three judges?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where this litigant chooses one court for himself, i.e., he requests to be judged before three specific judges, and that litigant chooses one other court of three judges for himself, as he does not wish to be judged before the court that the first litigant requested, in this case, both of them choose one more court for themselves, i.e., they must reach a compromise and decide about the composition of the court that will judge them.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讜讛 诪爪讬 诪注讻讘 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诪诇讜讛 讗讘诇 诇讜讛 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讜讚谉 讘注讬专讜

The Gemara asks: And can even a debtor restrict the choice of the court? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages taught that only a creditor can refuse a court chosen by the debtor, due to his desire to be judged by a prominent court, but that as for a debtor, they compel him to appear in the court that presides in his own city.

讻讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讗讘诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诇讗

The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Yo岣nan says concerning a different matter, that the Sages taught that other matter with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts [be鈥檃rkaot] in Syria. Here too, the Sages taught the halakha in the mishna with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria, which allow even the debtor to refuse to be judged before the court chosen by the creditor, claiming that they are not worthy judges. But if the creditor chooses a court of experts, the debtor does not have the right to refuse to be judged before them.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讻讙讜谉 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬 拽讗 诪讟专讞谞讗 诇讱

Rav Pappa said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to courts of experts in the same city, such as the courts of Rav Huna and of Rav 岣sda. As in that case, each litigant can say to the other: Am I burdening you by requesting that you be judged by a different court?

转谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖谞讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讚拽讗诪专讬谞谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘转专 讚驻住诇讬 诇讛讜 讗讝诇讜 讜讘专专讜 诇讛讜 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讬

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more for themselves. And if it enters your mind to interpret the mishna as we said before, that each litigant chose a court of three judges, this statement is difficult; after each court was disqualified by one of the litigants, shall the members of both courts go and choose another court for themselves?

讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚

And furthermore, for what reason would the mishna state that the standard procedure for choosing judges is that this litigant chooses one court for himself and that litigant chooses one court for himself, each disqualifying the court that the other chose?

讗诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: When this litigant chooses one judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, and that litigant chooses one other judge for him-self before whom he requests to be judged, the two litigants then choose one more judge for themselves, and the case is adjudicated by these three judges.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚注讘讚讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 讘诪注专讘讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讜讱 砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讬爪讗 讛讚讬谉 诇讗诪讬转讜

The Gemara asks: What is different about this procedure; i.e., that the selection of the judges is performed specifically in this manner? The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: As result of the fact that this litigant chooses one judge for himself, and that litigant chooses one judge for himself, and the two litigants choose one more judge for themselves, the true judgment will emerge. Each litigant assumes that the judges he chose do not bear a grudge against him, and he will accept their ruling.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜壮 谞讬诪讗 讘讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

搂 The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to what Rav Yehuda says that Rav says.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛注讚讬诐 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讞讜转诐 注诪讛谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘

As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. One does not sign a document unless he recognizes that those signing with him are fit to bear witness. According to the Gemara鈥檚 suggestion, Rabbi Meir does not accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. Therefore, the litigants can choose the third judge, as the first two judges will be amenable to signing the court order without knowing the third judge. And the Rabbis accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and the judges would not sign the court order without themselves knowing the third judge.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讚注转 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讘注讬谞谉 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 谞诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚注转 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone accepts that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and everyone agrees with the premise that we need the consent of the first two judges for the appointment of the third. Rather, when they disagree, it is about whether the consent of the litigants is necessary. Rabbi Meir holds that we need the consent of the litigants as well, and the Rabbis hold that although we need the consent of the other two judges, we do not need the consent of the litigants.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛注讚讬诐 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讻讜壮 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讻讱 讛讬讜 谞拽讬讬 讛讚注转 砖讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诇讗 讛讬讜 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讞讜转诐 注诪讛谉 讜诇讗 讛讬讜 讬讜砖讘讬谉 讘讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讬讜砖讘 注诪讛谉 讜诇讗 讛讬讜 谞讻谞住讬谉 讘住注讜讚讛 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 诪住讘 注诪讛谉

Returning to the matter itself, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. That is also taught in a baraita: This is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do: They would not sign a document unless they knew who was signing with them, and they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting with them, and they would not join a meal unless they knew who was reclining, i.e., eating, with them.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 讻讜壮 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 讚驻住讬诇 讚讬讬谞讬

搂 The mishna teaches: This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant. The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to disqualify judges?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讗讘诇 诪讜诪讞讬诐 诇讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The Sages taught this matter with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria. In those courts, each litigant can refuse to be judged by the judge the other litigant chose. But this halakha is not stated with regard to a court of expert judges.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讜 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜诪讞讬谉 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专

The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? When he brings evidence that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason; but if they are fit to serve as judges, or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. By inference, Rabbi Meir is also speaking of a court of experts when he says that one can refuse to be judged.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 谞注砖讜 讻诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: But if they are fit to serve as judges they are treated like experts ordained by the court, and he cannot disqualify them.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 讻诇 讛讬诪谞讜 砖驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谉 砖诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita that contradicts this interpretation: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: It is not within a litigant鈥檚 power to disqualify a judge who is accepted as an expert for the public. Apparently, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to an expert judge.

讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讻诇 讛讬诪谞讜 砖驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谉 砖讛诪讞讜讛讜 专讘讬诐 注诇讬讛诐

The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be emended as follows: It is not within a litigant鈥檚 power to disqualify a judge whom the public accepted upon themselves as an expert judge for their matters, just as the halakha is concerning the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诇注讜诇诐 驻讜住诇 讜讛讜诇讱 注讚 砖讬拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

That interpretation is also taught in a baraita, which teaches: A litigant can continuously disqualify the judges chosen by the other litigant forever, until the latter accepts to be judged by a court that is accepted as an expert court for the public; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Clearly, Rabbi Meir concedes that one cannot refuse to have the case judged by an expert court.

讜讛讗 注讚讬诐 讻诪讜诪讞讬谉 讚诪讬 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛

The Gemara asks: But aren鈥檛 witnesses like experts, in that their standing is independent of their being accepted by the litigants? And yet Rabbi Meir says: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 壮驻讛 拽讚讜砖 讬讗诪专 讚讘专 讝讛壮 转谞讬 注讚讜

The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that statement of Rabbi Meir that Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

注讚讜 诇诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇诪诪讜谉 专讞诪谞讗 驻住诇讬讛 讗讬 诇砖讘讜注讛 讛讬诪讜谞讬 诪讛讬诪谉 讻讘讬 转专讬

The Gemara asks: For what purpose does his single witness testify? If we say it is to testify about monetary matters, the Merciful One already disqualifies him, as by Torah law the testimony of only one witness is not accepted. If it is to render the defendant liable to take an oath that he does not owe the money being claimed, in this regard the testimony of one witness is deemed credible like two witnesses; the Torah states that if one witness supports the claim of the claimant, the defendant is required to take an oath that he does not owe the money.

诇注讜诇诐 诇诪诪讜谉 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讻讘讬 转专讬

The Gemara answers: Actually, the purpose of the testimony is to testify about monetary matters; and no, one should not raise that challenge, as this ruling is necessary only in a case where the litigant initially accepted upon himself the single witness as equivalent to two witnesses. Afterward, he retracted his agreement to accept the single witness鈥檚 testimony as if it were that of two witnesses. Rabbi Meir rules that his retraction is valid, and the testimony is not accepted.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讜 壮谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讗壮 壮谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讬讱壮 壮谞讗诪谞讬谉 注诇讬 砖诇砖讛 专讜注讬 讘拽专壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us, that one can retract this kind of agreement? We learn this in the following mishna (24a): If one of the litigants says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are legally disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says that the one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say that he cannot retract it, and must accept their verdict.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚

And Rav Dimi, son of Rav Na岣an, son of Rav Yosef, says: This is referring to a case where the litigant accepted one of these people upon himself as one of the judges, in addition to two fit judges. Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a litigant retracting his acceptance of someone who is generally disqualified from judging is stated in the next mishna, why is it stated in this mishna as well?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讞讝讜 诇注诇诪讗 讗讘诇 讞讚 讻讘讬 转专讬 讚诇注诇诪讗 诇讗 讞讝讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara answers: The statements in both mishnayot are necessary. As, had the Mishna taught this dispute only with regard to a litigant who said: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, one might have reasoned that only in this case did the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his acceptance, because: My father, and: Your father, are fit to judge for the general public. But in a case where a litigant accepts one witness as equivalent to two witnesses, since one witness is someone who is not fit to testify by himself for the general public one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated with regard to the case in this mishna as well.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讘诇 讘讛讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the Mishna would teach us their dispute only with regard to this case, where a litigant effectively accepted one witness as equivalent to two, one might have reasoned that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance. But in that case, where he accepted his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that he cannot retract his acceptance. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to state both disputes.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讚讬讬谞讜 讜住讬驻讗 注讚讬讜 讗诇诪讗 讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that in the former clause the mishna teaches that one litigant can disqualify the judge, in singular, chosen by the other litigant, and in the latter clause the wording is his witnesses, in plural, evidently the mishna teaches this specifically with regard to a case of two witnesses. It is incorrect to emend the text to read witness instead of witnesses.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讘讗 讛讜讗 讜讗讞专 诇驻讜住诇谉

Rabbi Elazar said: The mishna is referring to a case where the litigant and another person come to disqualify the witnesses, testifying that they are disqualified from bearing witness.

讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to testify that the witnesses of the other litigant are disqualified from bearing witness? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest; how can the court accept it?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讻讙讜谉 砖拽专讗 注诇讬讜 注专注专

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: The mishna is referring to a case where he raised a challenge against the witness鈥檚 fitness to testify, which cannot be disregarded due to his conflict of interest.

注专注专 讚诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 注专注专 讚讙讝诇谞讜转讗 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: A challenge over which matter? If we say that he raises a challenge by testifying that the witness is guilty of theft or some other transgression, is it in his power to testify to that effect? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest.

讗诇讗 注专注专 讚驻讙诐 诪砖驻讞讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讛谞讬 讗诪砖驻讞讛 拽诪住讛讚讬 讜讗讬讛讜 诪诪讬诇讗 拽驻住讬诇 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 住讜祝 住讜祝 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

Rather, it is a challenge over a family flaw. The litigant testifies that the witness鈥檚 lineage prevents him from testifying, as he is from a family of Canaanite slaves. Rabbi Meir holds that the litigant鈥檚 testimony is accepted, as these witnesses, the litigant and the witness who testifies with him, are testifying about the family of the witness, and the witness is disqualified indirectly. The litigant is therefore not disqualified from giving this testimony due to his conflict of interest. And the Rabbis hold that since his testimony is ultimately tainted by a conflict of interest, it is not accepted.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to a case in which one of the litigants claims that there are two sets of witnesses who can testify on his behalf, and the other litigant responds that one of the sets of witnesses is disqualified. In this case, the second litigant鈥檚 claim is not tainted by a conflict of interest, as there is another set of witnesses who can testify against him in any event.

讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 讗讘诇 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

Rabbi Meir maintains that the litigant cannot give this testimony, as Rabbi Meir holds that a litigant who claims in court to have a certain number of witnesses ready to testify on his behalf is required to substantiate that they exist. Therefore, there is no concern that the other set of witnesses will not be brought to court, causing that litigant to lose the case due to the disqualification of the first set. And the Rabbis hold that one is not required to substantiate the existence of witnesses he claims to have. As the disqualification of the first set of witnesses can cause the first litigant to lose the case, the second litigant is consequently unable to disqualify that first set, due to his conflict of interest. But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them, due to his conflict of interest.

讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬讜 专讘 讗诪讬 讜专讘 讗住讬 讗讬谉 砖诐 讗诇讗 讻转 讗讞转 诪讛讜

Rav Dimi continued: Rav Ami and Rav Asi said before Rabbi Yo岣nan: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the halakha?

讗讬谉 砖诐 讗诇讗 讻转 讗讞转 讜讛讗诪专转 讗讘诇 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉 讗诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讻转 砖谞讬讛 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 诪讛讜

The Gemara interrupts: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the dilemma? But didn鈥檛 you already say: But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them? Rather, the question should be understood as follows: According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a litigant can disqualify one of the other litigant鈥檚 two sets of witnesses, if the second set is ultimately found to be related to one of the litigants or to each other, or is disqualified from bearing witness for other reasons, what is the halakha? Can the litigant whose witnesses were disqualified then claim that the other litigant was not capable of disqualifying the first set, as it turned out that they were the only witnesses who would be testifying against him?

讗诪专 诇讛谉 讻讘专 讛注讬讚讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讘专 讛注讬讚讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to them: The first pair of witnesses, i.e., the second litigant, who disqualified the other litigant鈥檚 first set of witnesses, already testified. Since his testimony was valid at the time it cannot be disqualified afterward. Some say this statement in the name of a different amora: Rav Ashi says: The first pair of witnesses already testified.

谞讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

讚转谞讬讗 讛讘讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘砖讟专 讜讘讞讝拽讛 谞讬讚讜谉 讘砖讟专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讞讝拽讛

As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who comes to court to be judged concerning a claim against land that is in his possession, if in order to support his claim of ownership he comes to court both with a deed of purchase proving that the land is his and with a claim of presumptive ownership of the land stating that it had been in his possession for the past three years, which would render the deed superfluous, in this case his claim is judged on the basis of the deed. The court examines whether or not the deed is valid. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: His claim is judged on the basis of his presumptive ownership.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 讘讞讝拽讛 讜诇讗 讘砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 讘讞讝拽讛

And we discussed this dispute, asking: Can Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel possibly mean that the defendant鈥檚 claim is judged on the basis of only his presumptive ownership and not on the basis of his deed, i.e., is his deed of purchase ignored? Clearly, there is no reason to ignore the deed of purchase. Rather, say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel means that the defendant鈥檚 claim is judged not only on the basis of the deed of purchase, but even on the basis of his presumptive ownership. In other words, either claim suffices.

讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讘爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 驻诇讬讙讬

And we maintain that they disagree with regard to whether or not a litigant who claims to have more than one type of evidence is required to substantiate the existence of all his types of evidence. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one who claims to have a deed of purchase is required to bring it to court and cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel he can rely on his presumptive ownership. Apparently, this dispute is parallel to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the mishna.

诇讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬

The Gemara rejects this: No. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, everyone agrees that there is no need to substantiate the existence of all the types of evidence. When Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Meir holds that one is required to substantiate the existence of all of his types of evidence, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 诇讱 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘讞讝拽讛 讚诪讻讞 砖讟专讗 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讛谞讬 注讚讬诐 诇讗讜 诪讻讞 注讚讬诐 讗讞专讬谞讬 拽讗转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讜讚讛 讚讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专

And the Rabbis could have said to you that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there that one is required to substantiate the existence of his types of evidence only vis-脿-vis a claim of presumptive ownership of the land. If one claims that he possesses the deed of sale for his land he cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, as the power of his presumptive ownership comes from the power of the deed; mere possession without an accompanying claim of how one became the owner is disregarded (see Bava Batra 41a). But here, in the case of two sets of witnesses, since the power of these witnesses does not come from the power of the other witnesses, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that one is not required to substantiate the existence of the other set of witnesses.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讬砖讗

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan says a different interpretation of the dispute: The former clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify a judge,

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Sanhedrin 23

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 23

诪转谞讬壮 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖谞讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 砖诇 讝讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 注诇讬讛谉 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讜 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 注诇讬讛谉 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other鈥檚 witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讘转诇转讗 住讙讬

GEMARA: The Gemara assumes that the statement: This litigant chooses one and that litigant chooses one and the two of them choose one more, means that each litigant chooses a court of three judges and the two courts together choose one more court, for a total of nine judges. The Gemara asks: For what purpose does this litigant choose one court for himself and that litigant choose one court for himself; isn鈥檛 it sufficient to judge the case with three judges?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where this litigant chooses one court for himself, i.e., he requests to be judged before three specific judges, and that litigant chooses one other court of three judges for himself, as he does not wish to be judged before the court that the first litigant requested, in this case, both of them choose one more court for themselves, i.e., they must reach a compromise and decide about the composition of the court that will judge them.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讜讛 诪爪讬 诪注讻讘 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诪诇讜讛 讗讘诇 诇讜讛 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讜讚谉 讘注讬专讜

The Gemara asks: And can even a debtor restrict the choice of the court? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages taught that only a creditor can refuse a court chosen by the debtor, due to his desire to be judged by a prominent court, but that as for a debtor, they compel him to appear in the court that presides in his own city.

讻讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讗讘诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诇讗

The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Yo岣nan says concerning a different matter, that the Sages taught that other matter with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts [be鈥檃rkaot] in Syria. Here too, the Sages taught the halakha in the mishna with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria, which allow even the debtor to refuse to be judged before the court chosen by the creditor, claiming that they are not worthy judges. But if the creditor chooses a court of experts, the debtor does not have the right to refuse to be judged before them.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讻讙讜谉 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬 拽讗 诪讟专讞谞讗 诇讱

Rav Pappa said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to courts of experts in the same city, such as the courts of Rav Huna and of Rav 岣sda. As in that case, each litigant can say to the other: Am I burdening you by requesting that you be judged by a different court?

转谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖谞讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讚拽讗诪专讬谞谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘转专 讚驻住诇讬 诇讛讜 讗讝诇讜 讜讘专专讜 诇讛讜 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讬

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more for themselves. And if it enters your mind to interpret the mishna as we said before, that each litigant chose a court of three judges, this statement is difficult; after each court was disqualified by one of the litigants, shall the members of both courts go and choose another court for themselves?

讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗讞讚

And furthermore, for what reason would the mishna state that the standard procedure for choosing judges is that this litigant chooses one court for himself and that litigant chooses one court for himself, each disqualifying the court that the other chose?

讗诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚

Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: When this litigant chooses one judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, and that litigant chooses one other judge for him-self before whom he requests to be judged, the two litigants then choose one more judge for themselves, and the case is adjudicated by these three judges.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚注讘讚讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 讘诪注专讘讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讜讱 砖讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜讝讛 讘讜专专 诇讜 讚讬讬谉 讗讞讚 讜砖谞讬讛谉 讘讜专专讬谉 诇讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讬爪讗 讛讚讬谉 诇讗诪讬转讜

The Gemara asks: What is different about this procedure; i.e., that the selection of the judges is performed specifically in this manner? The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: As result of the fact that this litigant chooses one judge for himself, and that litigant chooses one judge for himself, and the two litigants choose one more judge for themselves, the true judgment will emerge. Each litigant assumes that the judges he chose do not bear a grudge against him, and he will accept their ruling.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜壮 谞讬诪讗 讘讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

搂 The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to what Rav Yehuda says that Rav says.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛注讚讬诐 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讞讜转诐 注诪讛谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘

As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. One does not sign a document unless he recognizes that those signing with him are fit to bear witness. According to the Gemara鈥檚 suggestion, Rabbi Meir does not accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. Therefore, the litigants can choose the third judge, as the first two judges will be amenable to signing the court order without knowing the third judge. And the Rabbis accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and the judges would not sign the court order without themselves knowing the third judge.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讚注转 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讘注讬谞谉 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 谞诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚注转 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬 讚讬谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone accepts that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and everyone agrees with the premise that we need the consent of the first two judges for the appointment of the third. Rather, when they disagree, it is about whether the consent of the litigants is necessary. Rabbi Meir holds that we need the consent of the litigants as well, and the Rabbis hold that although we need the consent of the other two judges, we do not need the consent of the litigants.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛注讚讬诐 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讻讜壮 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讻讱 讛讬讜 谞拽讬讬 讛讚注转 砖讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诇讗 讛讬讜 讞讜转诪讬谉 注诇 讛砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讞讜转诐 注诪讛谉 讜诇讗 讛讬讜 讬讜砖讘讬谉 讘讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 讬讜砖讘 注诪讛谉 讜诇讗 讛讬讜 谞讻谞住讬谉 讘住注讜讚讛 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 诪讬 诪住讘 注诪讛谉

Returning to the matter itself, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. That is also taught in a baraita: This is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do: They would not sign a document unless they knew who was signing with them, and they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting with them, and they would not join a meal unless they knew who was reclining, i.e., eating, with them.

讝讛 驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谞讜 讻讜壮 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 讚驻住讬诇 讚讬讬谞讬

搂 The mishna teaches: This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant. The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to disqualify judges?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注专讻讗讜转 砖讘住讜专讬讗 砖谞讜 讗讘诇 诪讜诪讞讬诐 诇讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The Sages taught this matter with regard to the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria. In those courts, each litigant can refuse to be judged by the judge the other litigant chose. But this halakha is not stated with regard to a court of expert judges.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讛谉 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讗讜 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜诪讞讬谉 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专

The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? When he brings evidence that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason; but if they are fit to serve as judges, or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. By inference, Rabbi Meir is also speaking of a court of experts when he says that one can refuse to be judged.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讘诇 讗诐 讛讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 谞注砖讜 讻诪讜诪讞讬谉 诪驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: But if they are fit to serve as judges they are treated like experts ordained by the court, and he cannot disqualify them.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 讻诇 讛讬诪谞讜 砖驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谉 砖诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita that contradicts this interpretation: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: It is not within a litigant鈥檚 power to disqualify a judge who is accepted as an expert for the public. Apparently, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to an expert judge.

讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讻诇 讛讬诪谞讜 砖驻讜住诇 讚讬讬谉 砖讛诪讞讜讛讜 专讘讬诐 注诇讬讛诐

The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be emended as follows: It is not within a litigant鈥檚 power to disqualify a judge whom the public accepted upon themselves as an expert judge for their matters, just as the halakha is concerning the laymen鈥檚 courts in Syria.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诇注讜诇诐 驻讜住诇 讜讛讜诇讱 注讚 砖讬拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

That interpretation is also taught in a baraita, which teaches: A litigant can continuously disqualify the judges chosen by the other litigant forever, until the latter accepts to be judged by a court that is accepted as an expert court for the public; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Clearly, Rabbi Meir concedes that one cannot refuse to have the case judged by an expert court.

讜讛讗 注讚讬诐 讻诪讜诪讞讬谉 讚诪讬 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讝讛 驻讜住诇 注讚讬讜 砖诇 讝讛

The Gemara asks: But aren鈥檛 witnesses like experts, in that their standing is independent of their being accepted by the litigants? And yet Rabbi Meir says: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 壮驻讛 拽讚讜砖 讬讗诪专 讚讘专 讝讛壮 转谞讬 注讚讜

The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that statement of Rabbi Meir that Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

注讚讜 诇诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇诪诪讜谉 专讞诪谞讗 驻住诇讬讛 讗讬 诇砖讘讜注讛 讛讬诪讜谞讬 诪讛讬诪谉 讻讘讬 转专讬

The Gemara asks: For what purpose does his single witness testify? If we say it is to testify about monetary matters, the Merciful One already disqualifies him, as by Torah law the testimony of only one witness is not accepted. If it is to render the defendant liable to take an oath that he does not owe the money being claimed, in this regard the testimony of one witness is deemed credible like two witnesses; the Torah states that if one witness supports the claim of the claimant, the defendant is required to take an oath that he does not owe the money.

诇注讜诇诐 诇诪诪讜谉 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讻讘讬 转专讬

The Gemara answers: Actually, the purpose of the testimony is to testify about monetary matters; and no, one should not raise that challenge, as this ruling is necessary only in a case where the litigant initially accepted upon himself the single witness as equivalent to two witnesses. Afterward, he retracted his agreement to accept the single witness鈥檚 testimony as if it were that of two witnesses. Rabbi Meir rules that his retraction is valid, and the testimony is not accepted.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讜 壮谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讗壮 壮谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讬讱壮 壮谞讗诪谞讬谉 注诇讬 砖诇砖讛 专讜注讬 讘拽专壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us, that one can retract this kind of agreement? We learn this in the following mishna (24a): If one of the litigants says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are legally disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says that the one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say that he cannot retract it, and must accept their verdict.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚

And Rav Dimi, son of Rav Na岣an, son of Rav Yosef, says: This is referring to a case where the litigant accepted one of these people upon himself as one of the judges, in addition to two fit judges. Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a litigant retracting his acceptance of someone who is generally disqualified from judging is stated in the next mishna, why is it stated in this mishna as well?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讞讝讜 诇注诇诪讗 讗讘诇 讞讚 讻讘讬 转专讬 讚诇注诇诪讗 诇讗 讞讝讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara answers: The statements in both mishnayot are necessary. As, had the Mishna taught this dispute only with regard to a litigant who said: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, one might have reasoned that only in this case did the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his acceptance, because: My father, and: Your father, are fit to judge for the general public. But in a case where a litigant accepts one witness as equivalent to two witnesses, since one witness is someone who is not fit to testify by himself for the general public one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated with regard to the case in this mishna as well.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讘诇 讘讛讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the Mishna would teach us their dispute only with regard to this case, where a litigant effectively accepted one witness as equivalent to two, one might have reasoned that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance. But in that case, where he accepted his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that he cannot retract his acceptance. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to state both disputes.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讚讬讬谞讜 讜住讬驻讗 注讚讬讜 讗诇诪讗 讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that in the former clause the mishna teaches that one litigant can disqualify the judge, in singular, chosen by the other litigant, and in the latter clause the wording is his witnesses, in plural, evidently the mishna teaches this specifically with regard to a case of two witnesses. It is incorrect to emend the text to read witness instead of witnesses.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讘讗 讛讜讗 讜讗讞专 诇驻讜住诇谉

Rabbi Elazar said: The mishna is referring to a case where the litigant and another person come to disqualify the witnesses, testifying that they are disqualified from bearing witness.

讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to testify that the witnesses of the other litigant are disqualified from bearing witness? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest; how can the court accept it?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讻讙讜谉 砖拽专讗 注诇讬讜 注专注专

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: The mishna is referring to a case where he raised a challenge against the witness鈥檚 fitness to testify, which cannot be disregarded due to his conflict of interest.

注专注专 讚诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 注专注专 讚讙讝诇谞讜转讗 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讬讛 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: A challenge over which matter? If we say that he raises a challenge by testifying that the witness is guilty of theft or some other transgression, is it in his power to testify to that effect? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest.

讗诇讗 注专注专 讚驻讙诐 诪砖驻讞讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讛谞讬 讗诪砖驻讞讛 拽诪住讛讚讬 讜讗讬讛讜 诪诪讬诇讗 拽驻住讬诇 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 住讜祝 住讜祝 谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜 讛讜讗

Rather, it is a challenge over a family flaw. The litigant testifies that the witness鈥檚 lineage prevents him from testifying, as he is from a family of Canaanite slaves. Rabbi Meir holds that the litigant鈥檚 testimony is accepted, as these witnesses, the litigant and the witness who testifies with him, are testifying about the family of the witness, and the witness is disqualified indirectly. The litigant is therefore not disqualified from giving this testimony due to his conflict of interest. And the Rabbis hold that since his testimony is ultimately tainted by a conflict of interest, it is not accepted.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to a case in which one of the litigants claims that there are two sets of witnesses who can testify on his behalf, and the other litigant responds that one of the sets of witnesses is disqualified. In this case, the second litigant鈥檚 claim is not tainted by a conflict of interest, as there is another set of witnesses who can testify against him in any event.

讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 讗讘诇 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉

Rabbi Meir maintains that the litigant cannot give this testimony, as Rabbi Meir holds that a litigant who claims in court to have a certain number of witnesses ready to testify on his behalf is required to substantiate that they exist. Therefore, there is no concern that the other set of witnesses will not be brought to court, causing that litigant to lose the case due to the disqualification of the first set. And the Rabbis hold that one is not required to substantiate the existence of witnesses he claims to have. As the disqualification of the first set of witnesses can cause the first litigant to lose the case, the second litigant is consequently unable to disqualify that first set, due to his conflict of interest. But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them, due to his conflict of interest.

讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬讜 专讘 讗诪讬 讜专讘 讗住讬 讗讬谉 砖诐 讗诇讗 讻转 讗讞转 诪讛讜

Rav Dimi continued: Rav Ami and Rav Asi said before Rabbi Yo岣nan: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the halakha?

讗讬谉 砖诐 讗诇讗 讻转 讗讞转 讜讛讗诪专转 讗讘诇 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇驻讜住诇谉 讗诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讻转 砖谞讬讛 拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 诪讛讜

The Gemara interrupts: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the dilemma? But didn鈥檛 you already say: But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them? Rather, the question should be understood as follows: According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a litigant can disqualify one of the other litigant鈥檚 two sets of witnesses, if the second set is ultimately found to be related to one of the litigants or to each other, or is disqualified from bearing witness for other reasons, what is the halakha? Can the litigant whose witnesses were disqualified then claim that the other litigant was not capable of disqualifying the first set, as it turned out that they were the only witnesses who would be testifying against him?

讗诪专 诇讛谉 讻讘专 讛注讬讚讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讘专 讛注讬讚讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to them: The first pair of witnesses, i.e., the second litigant, who disqualified the other litigant鈥檚 first set of witnesses, already testified. Since his testimony was valid at the time it cannot be disqualified afterward. Some say this statement in the name of a different amora: Rav Ashi says: The first pair of witnesses already testified.

谞讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

讚转谞讬讗 讛讘讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘砖讟专 讜讘讞讝拽讛 谞讬讚讜谉 讘砖讟专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讞讝拽讛

As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who comes to court to be judged concerning a claim against land that is in his possession, if in order to support his claim of ownership he comes to court both with a deed of purchase proving that the land is his and with a claim of presumptive ownership of the land stating that it had been in his possession for the past three years, which would render the deed superfluous, in this case his claim is judged on the basis of the deed. The court examines whether or not the deed is valid. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: His claim is judged on the basis of his presumptive ownership.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 讘讞讝拽讛 讜诇讗 讘砖讟专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 讘讞讝拽讛

And we discussed this dispute, asking: Can Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel possibly mean that the defendant鈥檚 claim is judged on the basis of only his presumptive ownership and not on the basis of his deed, i.e., is his deed of purchase ignored? Clearly, there is no reason to ignore the deed of purchase. Rather, say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel means that the defendant鈥檚 claim is judged not only on the basis of the deed of purchase, but even on the basis of his presumptive ownership. In other words, either claim suffices.

讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讘爪专讬讱 诇讘专专 驻诇讬讙讬

And we maintain that they disagree with regard to whether or not a litigant who claims to have more than one type of evidence is required to substantiate the existence of all his types of evidence. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one who claims to have a deed of purchase is required to bring it to court and cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel he can rely on his presumptive ownership. Apparently, this dispute is parallel to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the mishna.

诇讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬

The Gemara rejects this: No. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, everyone agrees that there is no need to substantiate the existence of all the types of evidence. When Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Meir holds that one is required to substantiate the existence of all of his types of evidence, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 诇讱 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘讞讝拽讛 讚诪讻讞 砖讟专讗 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讛谞讬 注讚讬诐 诇讗讜 诪讻讞 注讚讬诐 讗讞专讬谞讬 拽讗转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讜讚讛 讚讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讘专专

And the Rabbis could have said to you that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there that one is required to substantiate the existence of his types of evidence only vis-脿-vis a claim of presumptive ownership of the land. If one claims that he possesses the deed of sale for his land he cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, as the power of his presumptive ownership comes from the power of the deed; mere possession without an accompanying claim of how one became the owner is disregarded (see Bava Batra 41a). But here, in the case of two sets of witnesses, since the power of these witnesses does not come from the power of the other witnesses, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that one is not required to substantiate the existence of the other set of witnesses.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讬砖讗

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan says a different interpretation of the dispute: The former clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify a judge,

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