Sanhedrin 30
וְכֹל לִישָּׁנֵי דְּבֵי דִינָא, וְלָא הֲוָה כְּתִב בַּהּ ״בְּמוֹתַב תְּלָתָא הֲוֵינָא וְחַד לֵיתוֹהִי״.
and all of the formulations of an enactment of the court were written in it. But only two were signed on it, and the following statement was not written in it: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer here, as he died or left for another reason. There was therefore room for concern that perhaps there were only two witnesses, and they wrote the document of admission improperly.
סְבַר רָבִינָא לְמֵימַר: הַיְינוּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נָתָן בַּר אַמֵּי: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, כֹּל כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא חָיְישִׁינַן לְבֵית דִּין טוֹעִין.
Ravina thought to say that this is a case in which the principle of Reish Lakish, that witnesses do not sign a document unless the action was performed appropriately, applies. Rav Natan bar Ami said to him: This is what we say in the name of Rava: In any cases like this, we are concerned for the possibility of an erroneous court that thinks that two constitute a court.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אִי כְּתִב בַּהּ ״בֵּי דִינָא״, תּוּ לָא צְרִיךְ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: If it was written in the document: We, the members of the court, convened, it is unnecessary for the deed to further state that one of the judges is no longer there, as a standard court consists of three judges.
וְדִילְמָא בֵּית דִּין חָצוּף הוּא? דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ, דִּינֵיהֶן דִּין, אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בֵּית דִּין חָצוּף. דִּכְתִב בַּיהּ: ״בֵּי דִינָא דְּרַבְנָא אָשֵׁי״.
The Gemara asks: But perhaps it was an impudent court, as Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; but because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court must be composed of three judges, they are called an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It was a document in which it was written: We, the members of the court of Rabbana Ashi, convened. Rav Ashi’s court presumably conformed to rabbinic protocol.
וְדִילְמָא רַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רַב אָשֵׁי כִּשְׁמוּאֵל סְבִירָא לְהוּ? דִּכְתִיב בַּהּ: ״וַאֲמַרְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבַּנָא אָשֵׁי״, ״וַאֲמַר לַן רַבַּנָא אָשֵׁי.״
The Gemara asks: But perhaps the Sages of the court of Rav Ashi hold like Shmuel, that the verdict of two judges is binding, and they convened an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It is a document in which it is written: And we said to Rabbana Ashi, and Rabbana Ashi said to us. Rav Ashi himself certainly would not have participated in the discussions of an impudent court.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, אָמַר לָהֶן אֶחָד: אֲנִי רָאִיתִי אֲבִיכֶם שֶׁהִטְמִין מָעוֹת בְּשִׁידָּה, תֵּיבָה, וּמִגְדָּל, וְאָמַר ״שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי הֵן״, ״שֶׁל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי הֵן״ – בַּבַּיִת לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, בַּשָּׂדֶה דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
§ The Gemara continues its discussion of when an admission is deemed credible. The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one said to the children of another: I saw that your father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, saying: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, and the money was found where he said, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If the chest, box, or cabinet was in the house, the witness has said nothing. His testimony about the status of the money is not accepted, as he is only one witness, and he could not have taken the money for himself had he wanted to. But if it was in the field, his statement stands, i.e., is accepted.
כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: כֹּל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לִיטְּלָן – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; אֵין בְּיָדוֹ לִיטְּלָן – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
The principle of the matter is as follows: In any case where it is in the power of the witness to take the money, his statement stands; if it is not in his power to take the money, he has said nothing.
הֲרֵי שֶׁרָאוּ אֶת אֲבִיהֶן שֶׁהִטְמִין מָעוֹת בְּשִׁידָּה תֵּיבָה וּמִגְדָּל, וְאָמַר: ״שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי הֵן״, ״שֶׁל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי הֵן״ – אִם כְּמוֹסֵר, דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; אִם כְּמַעֲרִים, לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
In a case where the children themselves saw that their father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and the father said: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, if he said so as one who relays information to his own children, his statement stands. But if he said so as one who employs artifice, i.e., he appears to have told them that the money was not his only so that they would not take it, he has said nothing, and they may spend the money.
הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה מִצְטַעֵר עַל מָעוֹת שֶׁהִנִּיחַ לוֹ אָבִיו, וּבָא בַּעַל הַחֲלוֹם וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ הֵן״, ״בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי הֵן״, ״שֶׁל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי הֵן״. זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וְאָמְרוּ: דִּבְרֵי חֲלוֹמוֹת לֹא מַעֲלִין וְלֹא מוֹרִידִין.
In a case where one was distressed about money that his father left him as an inheritance, because he could not find it, and the master of the dream, i.e., someone in his dream, came and said to him: It is such and such an amount of money and it is in such and such a place, but the money is second tithe, and he found this amount in the place of which he dreamed; and this was an actual incident that was brought before the Sages, and they said that he can spend the money, as matters appearing in dreams do not make a difference in determining the practical halakha.
שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי כּוּ׳. מִיכְתָּב הֵיכִי כָּתְבִי?
§ The mishna teaches that if two judges say the defendant is exempt and one says he is liable, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: When there is a dispute between the judges, how do they write the verdict?
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: ״זַכַּאי״. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְזַכִּין, וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְחַיְּיבִין״. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמַר: ״מִדִּבְרֵיהֶן נִזְדַּכָּה פְּלוֹנִי״.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They write that he is exempt, without mentioning the dispute. Reish Lakish says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable; they must mention that there was a dispute. Rabbi Eliezer says that they do not specify the names of the judges, but rather they add the phrase: From the statement of the judges so-and-so was deemed exempt, to the wording of the verdict. This indicates that not all the judges agreed that he is exempt, but does not specify which judges came to which conclusion.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי אִיהוּ מְנָתָא בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ, דִּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״זַכַּאי״ – מְשַׁלֵּם, וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְזַכִּין וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְחַיְּיבִין״ – לָא מְשַׁלֵּם.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these opinions, besides the wording of the verdict? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether or not, in a case where it is discovered that the verdict was erroneous, the judge who was in the minority must pay his portion of restitution along with the judges of the majority. As according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, the minority judge pays as well, and according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, he does not pay.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״זַכַּאי״, מְשַׁלֵּם?! לֵימָא לְהוּ: אִי לְדִידִי צָיְיתִיתוּן, אַתּוּן נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁלְּמִיתוּן!
The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why does he pay? Let him say to the other judges: If you would have listened to me you would not have paid either. Why should I have to pay for your mistake?
אֶלָּא, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי אִינְהוּ מְנָתָא דִּידֵיהּ: לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״זַכַּאי״ – מְשַׁלְּמִי, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְזַכִּין וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְחַיְּיבִין״ – לָא מְשַׁלְּמִי.
Rather, he does not pay, and the practical difference between the opinions is with regard to whether or not those other judges must pay his portion of the restitution. According to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, they pay the full sum, as they did not mention that there was a dispute over the matter. But according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, they do not pay the portion of the overruled judge, and he does not pay it either.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר זַכַּאי, מְשַׁלְּמִי? וְלֵימְרוּ לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו אַתְּ בַּהֲדַן, לָא הֲוָה סָלֵיק דִּינָא מִידֵּי!
The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why do they pay his portion? Let them say to him: If you had not been with us the judgment would have had no verdict at all, as two judges cannot issue a verdict. Therefore, you share the responsibility with us and should participate in the payment.
אֶלָּא, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: ״זַכַּאי״ – מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל״.
Rather, the difference between the opinions is only with regard to the wording of the verdict, and is due to the prohibition of: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that they write that he is exempt due to the prohibition of gossip, as derived from the verse: “You shall not go as a talebearer.”
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְזַכִּין, וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְחַיְּיבִין״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּשִׁיקְרָא.
Reish Lakish says they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, because otherwise the document would have the appearance of falsehood, as not all the judges deemed him exempt.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּמָר, וְאִית לֵיהּ דְּמָר. הִלְכָּךְ, כָּתְבִי הָכִי: ״מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם נִזְדַּכָּה פְּלוֹנִי״.
And Rabbi Elazar accepts the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, and accepts the opinion of that Sage, Reish Lakish. Therefore, this is what they write: From the statement of the judges, so-and-so was deemed exempt. This wording indicates that the ruling was not based on a consensus among the judges, so that it will not have the appearance of falsehood, but it also does not specify what each judge said, to avoid gossip.
גָּמְרוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר, הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין כּוּ׳. לְמַאן? אִילֵימָא לְבַעֲלֵי דִינִין – הָתָם קָיְימִי! אֶלָּא לְעֵדִים.
§ The mishna teaches that after the judges finished the matter and reached a decision, they would bring them in. The Gemara asks: Whom would they bring in? If we say they would bring in the litigants, this cannot be, as they were there the whole time; they never left the room. Rather, they would bring in the witnesses.
כְּמַאן? דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא: לְעוֹלָם אֵין עֵדוּתָן מִצְטָרֶפֶת עַד שֶׁיִּרְאוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קָרְחָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה.
If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan; as it is taught in a baraita: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other.
וְאֵין עֵדוּתָן מִתְקַיֶּימֶת בְּבֵית דִּין עַד שֶׁיָּעִידוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: שׁוֹמְעִין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל זֶה הַיּוֹם, וּכְשֶׁיָּבֹא חֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר שׁוֹמְעִין אֶת דְּבָרָיו.
The baraita continues: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together. Rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that the verdict must be given with the two witnesses present together.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם לְבַעֲלֵי דִינִין. וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר, כָּךְ הָיָה מִנְהָגָן שֶׁל נְקִיֵּי הַדַּעַת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם: מַכְנִיסִין לְבַעֲלֵי דִינִין וְשׁוֹמְעִין דִּבְרֵיהֶן, וּמַכְנִיסִין אֶת הָעֵדִים וְשׁוֹמְעִין דִּבְרֵיהֶם, וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתָן לַחוּץ וְנוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין בְּדָבָר. גָּמְרוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר, מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן כּוּ׳.
The Gemara reverses its interpretation of the mishna: No, actually it can be explained that the judges would bring in the litigants; and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the custom of the scrupulous people of Jerusalem: When they would judge, they would bring in the litigants and hear their statements, and then they would bring in the witnesses and hear their statements in the presence of the litigants, and then they would take them all outside of the courtroom and discuss the matter in their absence. Once they finished the matter they would bring them, i.e., the litigants, in, to hear their verdict.
וְהָתַנְיָא: גָּמְרוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר, מַכְנִיסִין אֶת הָעֵדִים! הָהִיא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita explicitly: When they finished the matter they would bring in the witnesses? The Gemara answers: That baraita is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.
גּוּפָא: לְעוֹלָם אֵין עֵדוּתָן מִצְטָרֶפֶת עַד שֶׁיִּרְאוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קָרְחָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא.
§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: אַמָּנֶה דְּקָא מַסְהֵיד הַאי, לָא קָא מַסְהֵיד הַאי, וּמָנֶה דְּקָא מַסְהֵיד הַאי, לָא קָמַסְהֵיד הַאי. וְאִידַּךְ: אַמָּנֶה בְּעָלְמָא תַּרְוַיְיהוּ קָמַסְהֲדִי.
The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning: The first tanna holds that the witnesses must see the incident transpire together, as otherwise, about the one hundred dinars of debt that this one is testifying, that one is not testifying, and about the one hundred dinars that that one is testifying, this one is not testifying. There is only one witness of each incident, which is not sufficient. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, holds that since both witnesses are testifying about one hundred dinars in general, the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff one hundred dinars.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״.
And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, as it is written: “And if anyone sins, hearing the voice of adjuration, and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).
וְתַנְיָא: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יָקוּם עֵד״ – אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא אֶחָד? מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֶחָד״?
The Gemara explains: And it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); by inference, from that which is stated in the verse: A witness shall not rise up against a man, even without the word “one,” do I not know that it is referring to one witness? After all, the verse is written in the singular. Therefore, what is the meaning when the verse states explicitly: “One witness”?
זֶה בָּנָה אָב: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עֵד״ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״אֶחָד״.
This established a paradigm, a basis for the principle that in every place in the Torah where the word “witness” is stated, it means that there are two witnesses, unless the verse specifies for you that it is referring to only one witness.
וְאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן חַד, לְמֵימַר: עַד דְּחָזוּ תַּרְוַויְיהוּ כְּחַד. וְאִידַּךְ, ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
And according to the first tanna, the Merciful One expresses it in the singular form, i.e., “witness” and not “witnesses,” to say that they are not combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, derives from the phrase: “And he is a witness, whether he has seen or known,” that in any case where one testifies about what he sees and knows, his testimony is valid.
וְאֵין עֵדוּתָן מִתְקַיֶּימֶת בְּבֵית דִּין עַד שֶׁיָּעִידוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: שׁוֹמְעִין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל זֶה הַיּוֹם, וּכְשֶׁיָּבֹא חֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר שׁוֹמְעִין דְּבָרָיו. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא.
The baraita cited above teaches: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together; rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מָר סָבַר, עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אָתֵי – לִשְׁבוּעָה אָתֵי, לְמָמוֹנָא לָא אָתֵי.
The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, as one Sage, the first tanna, holds that when one witness comes to testify, he comes to render the defendant liable to take an oath. This is the halakha when there is one witness against the defendant in a case of monetary law. He does not come to render the defendant liable to pay money, because for this two witnesses are necessary.
וְאִידַּךְ: אַטּוּ כִּי אָתוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, בְּחַד פּוּמָּא קָא מַסְהֲדִי? אֶלָּא מְצָרְפִינַן לְהוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי לִיצָרְפִינְהוּ.
And the other tanna, Rabbi Natan, responds: Is that to say that when they come together, they render the defendant financially liable because they testify with one mouth? Obviously they testify one after the other. Rather, clearly it is the judges who combine their two testimonies into one. Here too, when the witnesses come to court at different times, let the judges combine their testimonies.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ״,
And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1),
וּדְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּרַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, וְהָכָא בְּאַקּוֹשֵׁי הַגָּדָה לִרְאִיָּה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: מַקְּשִׁינַן הַגָּדָה לִרְאִיָּה, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן.
and everyone, both the first tanna and Rabbi Natan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, and derive from this verse that it is necessary that the witnesses see the incident together, i.e., they were both present and observed the incident at the same time. And here, with regard to whether or not the witnesses must testify in court together, they disagree with regard to whether or not the statement of the witnesses, i.e., their testimony in court, is compared to their observation of the incident. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that we compare their statement to their observation. Therefore, just as they must see the incident together, so too, they must testify together in court. And one Sage, Rabbi Natan, holds that we do not compare their statement to their observation.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְיָקִים הֲוָה מִשְׁתְּקִיד עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא לְמִסְמְכֵיהּ, וְלָא קָא מִיסְתַּיַּיע מִילְּתָא. יוֹמָא חַד הֲוָה יָתֵיב קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן,
The Gemara relates: Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was striving to ordain Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and was not successful in his attempts. One day, Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan among Rabbi Yoḥanan’s other students.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: מִי אִיכָּא דְּיָדַע הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, אוֹ לָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְיָקִים: דֵּין יָדַע. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֵימָא אֵיזוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִיסְמְכֵיהּ מָר בְּרֵישָׁא. סַמְכֵיהּ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to his students: Is there anyone who knows whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, or not? Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: This one, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, knows. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If so, let him say. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: Let the Master ordain him first; since we are all in need of his wisdom, he is fit for ordination. Rabbi Yoḥanan then ordained Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּנִי, אֱמוֹר לִי כֵּיצַד שָׁמַעְתָּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי, שֶׁמּוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה לְרַבִּי נָתָן.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: My son, tell me what you heard. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to him: This is what I heard: That Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Natan that it is unnecessary for the witnesses to testify together.
אָמַר: לָזֶה הוּצְרַכְתִּי?! הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה עִיקַּר רְאִיָּה בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה ״לָא בָּעֵינַן״, הַגָּדָה מִיבַּעְיָא?
Rabbi Yoḥanan was disappointed, and said: For this I needed to ordain him? Now that with regard to the main element of testimony, i.e., observing the incident, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says we do not need both witnesses to see it together, with regard to their statement in court, is it necessary to explicate that there is no requirement that they testify together?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוֹאִיל וְעָלִיתָ, לֹא תֵּרֵד. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, גַּבְרָא רַבָּה, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיסְתְּמִיךְ – אִיסְתְּמִיךְ.
Although the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was unnecessary, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Since you ascended, i.e., you were ordained, you will not descend, even though it was in error. Rabbi Zeira said: Conclude from it that with regard to a great man, once he is ordained, even if it was due to mistaken judgment, he is ordained. The ordination is not canceled.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, בֵּין בְּקַרְקָעוֹת בֵּין בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין.
As for the halakha in this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that it is unnecessary for the two witnesses to observe the incident together, both with regard to cases of land and with regard to cases of movable property.
עוּלָּא אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה בְּקַרְקָעוֹת, אֲבָל לֹא בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין.
Ulla says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, which is unmovable, and therefore both testimonies are certainly about the same piece of land; but not with regard to movable property, as there is a concern that they are not testifying about the same item.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הֲלָכָה, מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה בְּעֵדוּת קַרְקַע!
Abaye said to Ulla: If you say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, by inference you hold that they disagree with regard to this matter. But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna says that Rav says: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to testimony concerning land?
וְתָנֵי רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין בִּנְזִיקִין דְּבֵי קַרְנָא: מוֹדִין חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה בְּעֵדוּת בְּכוֹר, וּבְעֵדוּת קַרְקַע, וּבְעֵדוּת חֲזָקָה, וְכֵן שֶׁבַּבֵּן וְשֶׁבַּבַּת.
And Rav Idi bar Avin teaches in the halakhot of damages that were taught at the school of the Sage Karna: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the witnesses do not need to see the incident together with regard to testimony concerning a blemish in a male firstborn kosher animal, which renders it permitted to derive benefit from it, and with regard to testimony concerning ownership of land, and with regard to testimony concerning presumptive ownership of land. Since it is clear that they are testifying about the same land, it is unnecessary for them to see it together. And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl, which are a sign of adulthood.
גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית? מָר סָבַר פְּלִיגִי, וּמָר סָבַר לָא פְּלִיגִי.
The Gemara rejects Abaye’s question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? One Sage, Ulla, holds that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa even with regard to land, and one Sage, i.e., Rav and Rav Idi, holds that they do not disagree.
מַאי ״וְכֵן שֶׁבַּבֵּן וְשֶׁבַּבַּת״? אִילֵּימָא: אֶחָד אוֹמֵר אַחַת בְּגַבָּהּ, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אַחַת בִּכְרֵיסָהּ? הַאי חֲצִי דָבָר וַחֲצִי עֵדוּת הוּא!
The Gemara asks tangentially about the statement: And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl: What is this referring to? If we say it is referring to testimony that a girl has reached majority, in which one witness says that he saw one hair on the her lower back and one witness says that he saw one hair on her lower abdomen, that is difficult. A girl is considered to have reached maturity when she has two pubic hairs. In this case, two witnesses separately testify that they have each seen one hair. In this case each testimony is obviously invalid, as it is half a matter and also half a testimony. Not only does each testimony refer to one hair, which is half a matter, it is submitted by one witness, which is half a testimony. Consequently, it is obvious that the girl is not considered to have reached majority in this case.
אֶלָּא, אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: שְׁתַּיִם בְּגַבָּהּ, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: שְׁתַּיִם בִּכְרֵיסָהּ.
Rather, it must be referring to a case where one says that he saw two hairs on her lower back, and the other one says he saw two hairs on her lower abdomen. Since they each testify that she has reached adulthood, it is unnecessary for them to see the same hairs.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֲנָא אָמֵינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, בֵּין בְּקַרְקָעוֹת בֵּין בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין. וְרַבָּנַן דְּאָתוּ מִמָּחוֹזָא אָמְרִי: אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת – אִין, אֲבָל לָא בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין.
Rav Yosef said: I say in the name of Ulla that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property. But the Sages who came from Meḥoza say that Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Rav: With regard to land the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, but not with regard to movable property.
רַב לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב: הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הוֹדָאָה, הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה – מִצְטָרְפִי.
The Gemara comments: Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: Testimonies of an admission following an admission are combined into one; if one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant in a separate incident, their testimonies are combined. Likewise, testimonies of an admission following a loan are combined into one; where one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other one testifies that on a previous date the respondent borrowed money from the claimant in his presence, their testimonies are combined.
הַלְוָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה, הַלְוָאָה אַחַר הוֹדָאָה – לָא מִצְטָרְפִי.
Rav continues: But testimonies of a loan following a loan are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent the respondent one hundred dinars in his presence, and the other testifies that he lent him one hundred dinars in a separate incident in his presence, their testimonies are not combined, as they are clearly testifying about two separate loans. Similarly, testimonies of a loan following an admission are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent money to the respondent, and the other one testifies that on an earlier date the respondent admitted to owing the claimant, their testimonies are not combined.
אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי שְׁנָא הַלְוָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה דְּלָא? דְּמָנֶה דְּקָא חָזֵי הַאי, לָא קָא חָזֵי הַאי. הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הוֹדָאָה נָמֵי – אַמָּנֶה דְּקָא מוֹדֵי קַמֵּי הַאי, לָא מוֹדֵי קַמֵּי הַאי?
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak encountered Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. He said to him: What is different about a loan following a loan, in which case the testimonies are not combined, as the one hundred dinars that this witness saw, that witness did not see? In the case of an admission following an admission as well, perhaps the one hundred dinars about which the respondent admitted in the presence of this witness, he did not admit in the presence of that witness. Perhaps his admissions were in reference to two separate loans, and therefore the testimonies should not be combined.
דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְהַאי בָּתְרָא: בְּהַאי מָנֶה דְּאוֹדַיי לֵיהּ קַמָּךְ, אוֹדַיי לֵיהּ נָמֵי קַמֵּי פְּלוֹנִי.
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered him: The reference is to a case where the respondent said to this last witness: With regard to the one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted to owing them in the presence of so-and-so, the first witness, as well.
אַכַּתִּי, בָּתְרָא יָדַע, קַמָּא לָא יָדַע.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak asked: Still, the last witness knows that he is testifying about the same loan as the first witness, but the first witness does not know this. Since only one witness testifies that it is the same loan, the testimonies still cannot be combined.
דַּהֲדַר אָזֵיל, אָמַר לֵיהּ לְקַמָּא: הַאי מָנֶה דְּאוֹדַיי לֵיהּ קַמָּךְ, אוֹדַיי לֵיהּ נָמֵי קַמֵּי פְּלוֹנִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּנוּחַ דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁהִתְנַחְתָּ אֶת דַּעְתִּי.
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered: It is a case where, after his admission to the second witness, the respondent went back and said to the first witness: With regard to those one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted owing them in the presence of so-and-so as well. Therefore, both witnesses know that they are testifying about the same loan. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: May your mind be settled, as you have settled my mind and put it at ease by answering this question that was troubling me.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי נִיחוּתָא? דְּרָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, שְׁדָא בַּהּ נַרְגָּא – לָאו הַיְינוּ הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה?
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him: What is settling about this explanation? As Rava, and some say Rav Sheshet, threw an ax at my answer, i.e., he rejected my explanation, as follows: According to this interpretation of the case of an admission following an admission, isn’t this the same as an admission following a loan? The case of an admission following an admission is now rendered superfluous, as it adds no new insight on the matter.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַיְינוּ דִּשְׁמִיעַ לִי עֲלַיְיכוּ, דְּרָמֵיתוּ דִּיקְלֵי וְזָקְפִיתוּ לְהוּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: This is what I heard about you Sages of Meḥoza, that you knock down palm trees and erect them, i.e., you build and then destroy what you built. After you came up with such an excellent explanation, you ruined it yourselves.
נְהַרְדָּעֵי אָמְרִי: בֵּין הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הוֹדָאָה, בֵּין הוֹדָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה, בֵּין הַלְוָאָה אַחַר הַלְוָאָה, בֵּין הַלְוָאָה אַחַר הוֹדָאָה – מִצְטָרְפוֹת. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה.
The Sages of Neharde’a say: Whether it is a case of an admission following an admission, or an admission following a loan, or a loan following a loan, or a loan following an admission, in all these cases the testimonies are combined. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who teaches that since both witnesses testify about a debt of one hundred dinars, it is considered like one testimony.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: עֵדוּת הַמַּכְחֶשֶׁת זוֹ אֶת זוֹ בִּבְדִיקוֹת, כְּשֵׁרָה בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת.
§ Rav Yehuda says: Testimony of two witnesses who contradict the testimony of each other in response to the judges’ examination of the details of the story is valid in cases of monetary law, although a contradiction of this type disqualifies testimony in cases of capital law.
אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה בְּאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בְּאַרְנָקִי שְׁחוֹרָה״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בְּאַרְנָקִי לְבָנָה״. אֲבָל אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״מָנֶה שָׁחוֹר״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״מָנֶה לָבָן״ – אֵין מִצְטָרְפִין.
Rava says: The statement of Rav Yehuda is reasonable in a case where one witness says: The money was in a black purse [be’arnaki], and the other one says: It was in a white purse. Since this is a secondary detail, they may not remember it accurately. But if one says: He lent him a black coin, i.e., the coin was dark, and the other one says: He lent him a white coin, the testimonies are not combined. Since they contradict each other with regard to a characteristic of the money itself, one is probably lying.
וְאַרְנָקִי שְׁחוֹרָה בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת לָא? וְהָאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בְּסַיִיף הֲרָגוֹ״ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בַּאֲרִירָן הֲרָגוֹ״ – אֵין זֶה ״נָכוֹן״; אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״כֵּלָיו שְׁחוֹרִים״ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״כֵּלָיו לְבָנִים״ – הֲרֵי זֶה ״נָכוֹן״.
The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling: And if witnesses contradict each other with regard to secondary details such as a black purse in cases of capital law, is it the case that their testimony is not accepted? But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another type of weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.
