Sanhedrin 31

גברא אגברא קא רמית

The Gemara answers: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Rav Ḥisda holds that a contradiction with regard to secondary details does not disqualify the testimony even in capital law, and Rav Yehuda holds that it does disqualify the testimony. Neither Sage is bound by the statement of the other.

נהרדעי אמרי אפילו אחד אומר מנה שחור ואחד אומר מנה לבן מצטרפים

The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if one says that it was a black coin and the other one says that it was a white coin their testimonies are combined.

כמאן כרבי יהושע בן קרחה אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי יהושע בן קרחה היכא דלא מכחשו אהדדי היכא דמכחשי אהדדי מי אמר

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that as long as both witnesses testify that the defendant owes the plaintiff the same sum, the testimonies are combined? Say that you heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa saying that two testimonies are combined in a case where they do not contradict each other; but in a case where they contradict each other, did he say that they are combined?

אלא הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על שתי כיתי עדים שאחת אומרת מאתים ואחת אומרת מנה שיש בכלל מאתים מנה

Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to a case of two sets of witnesses, where one set says that the plaintiff lent the defendant two hundred dinars, and the other one says that he lent him one hundred dinars. Both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that this is not considered a contradiction, and the testimony is accepted concerning the amount of one hundred dinars, as one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred, i.e., testimony concerning a large amount includes testimony concerning a smaller amount.

על מה נחלקו על כת אחת שבית שמאי אומרים נחלקה עדותן ובית הלל אומרים יש בכלל מאתים מנה

With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree over the case of one set of two witnesses, where one witness testifies that the defendant owes the plaintiff two hundred dinars, and the other witness says that he owes him one hundred. As Beit Shammai say that their testimony is divided. Since they are not testifying about the same amount, the entire testimony is disqualified. And Beit Hillel say: One hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred. Apparently, according to Beit Hillel’s opinion, as transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although the testimonies are not identical, since both attest to the defendant’s liability to pay a certain amount of money, they are combined and accepted to that effect. This is the source for the opinion of the Sages of Neharde’a.

אחד אומר חבית של יין ואחד אומר חבית של שמן הוה עובדא ואתי לקמיה דרבי אמי חייביה רבי אמי לשלומי ליה חביתא דחמרא מיגו חביתא דמשחא

With regard to a case where one witness says that the plaintiff gave the defendant a barrel of wine, and the other one says that he gave him a barrel of oil, there was actually such an incident, and it came before Rabbi Ami. Since wine was cheaper than oil, Rabbi Ami deemed the defendant liable to pay the plaintiff only the value of a barrel of wine out of the value of a barrel of oil, an amount both witnesses agreed that he owed.

כמאן כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר אימר דאמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר היכא דיש בכלל מאתים מנה כי האי גוונא מי אמר

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that two contradicting testimonies can be combined in a case where one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred; perhaps one of the witnesses saw only half the loan, and the other one saw it all. But in a case like this, where the testimonies are about completely different items, did he say that they can be combined?

לא צריכא לדמי

The Gemara answers: No, this is not a case of a direct contradiction. This ruling is necessary only with regard to monetary value, i.e., where one witness says that the defendant owes the value of a barrel of wine, and the second one says that he owes the value of a barrel of oil. Therefore, it is comparable to a case of one hundred dinars and two hundred dinars.

אחד אומר בדיוטא העליונה ואחד אומר בדיוטא התחתונה אמר רבי חנינא מעשה בא לפני רבי וצירף עדותן

With regard to a case where one witness says that the incident took place on the upper floor [badeyota] and the other one says that it occurred on the lower floor, Rabbi Ḥanina says that an incident like this came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he combined their testimonies. This was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that since they agree with regard to the matter itself, the secondary details are insignificant.

ומניין לכשיצא כו׳ תנו רבנן מניין לכשיצא לא יאמר ׳הריני מזכה וחבירי מחייבין אבל מה אעשה שחבירי רבו עלי׳ תלמוד לומר ׳לא תלך רכיל בעמיך׳ ואומר ׳הולך רכיל מגלה סוד׳

§ The mishna teaches: And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom, he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13). The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that when the judge leaves he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? The verse states: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).

ההוא תלמידא דנפיק עליה קלא דגלי מילתא דאיתמר בי מדרשא בתר עשרין ותרתין שנין אפקיה רב אמי מבי מדרשא אמר דין גלי רזיא

The Gemara relates: There was a certain student, about whom a rumor emerged that he revealed a statement that was stated in the study hall and should have been kept secret, and the rumor emerged twenty-two years after the time the statement was revealed. Rav Ami removed him from the study hall as a punishment. Rav Ami said: This is a revealer of secrets and he cannot be trusted.

מתני׳ כל זמן שמביא ראיה סותר את הדין אמר לו כל ראיות שיש לך הבא מיכן עד שלשים יום מצא בתוך שלשים יום סותר לאחר שלשים יום אינו סותר

MISHNA: Any time one of the litigants brings additional proof, he can overturn the verdict that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant said to the other: Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days from now, if he found additional proof within thirty days, he can overturn the verdict. If he found it after thirty days, he cannot overturn the verdict anymore.

אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מה יעשה זה שלא מצא בתוך שלשים ומצא לאחר שלשים

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He can still overturn the verdict, as what should this litigant, who sought and did not find additional proof within thirty days but found it after thirty days, have done?

אמר לו הבא עדים ואמר אין לי עדים אמר הבא ראיה ואמר אין לי ראיה ולאחר זמן הביא ראיה ומצא עדים הרי זה אינו כלום

In a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and the latter said: I have no witnesses, and the former said to him: Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses, in this case, this proof or these witnesses are worth nothing. It is apparently a false proof or false testimony.

אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מה יעשה זה שלא היה יודע שיש לו עדים ומצא עדים לא היה יודע שיש לו ראיה ומצא ראיה

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this litigant, who did not know that he has witnesses and ultimately found witnesses, or who did not know that he has a proof and ultimately found proof, have done? Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict.

ראה שמתחייב בדין ואמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני ויעידוני או שהוציא ראיה מתחת פונדתו הרי זה אינו כלום

If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then he saw that he was about to be deemed liable to pay in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [pundato], even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is worth nothing. If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now.

גמ׳ אמר רבה בר רב הונא הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אין הלכה כדברי חכמים

GEMARA: With regard to the first halakha in the mishna, Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

פשיטא כיון דאמר הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל ממילא ידענא דאין הלכה כחכמים

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

מהו דתימא הני מילי לכתחילה אבל דיעבד שפיר דמי קא משמע לן דאי עביד מהדרינן ליה

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this statement, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, applies ab initio, but after the fact, even if the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the ruling is valid, as their opinion was not entirely rejected, Rabba bar Rav Huna therefore teaches us that if the court acts in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, we send the case back to court.

אמר לו הבא עדים כו׳ אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל כו׳ אמר רבה בר רב הונא אמר רבי יוחנן הלכה כדברי חכמים ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אמר רבי יוחנן אין הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

§ The mishna teaches that in a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and he admitted that he had none, and he subsequently found witnesses, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that their testimony is valid. Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

פשיטא כיון דאמר הלכה כדברי חכמים ממילא ידענא דאין הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

הא קא משמע לן דבההיא אין הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל הא בכולהו הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches us that specifically with regard to that halakha, the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but with regard to all other statements of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the corpus of the Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

לאפוקי מהא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן כל מקום ששנה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל במשנתנו הלכה כמותו חוץ מערב וצידן וראיה אחרונה

This is to the exclusion of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥanna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement. Whereas in the former dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the latter dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabba bar Rav Huna, by contrast, maintains that in the case of a guarantor and in the case in Tzaidan, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

ההוא ינוקא דתבעוהו לדינא קמיה דרב נחמן אמרו ליה אית לך סהדי אמר להו לא אית לך ראיה אמר להו לא חייביה רב נחמן

The Gemara relates: There was a certain child who was taken to court before Rav Naḥman. They said to him: Do you have witnesses on your behalf? The child said to them: No. They continued to ask: Do you have evidence? The child said to them: No. Rav Naḥman deemed him liable, in accordance with the claim of the other litigant.

הוה קא בכי ואזיל שמעוהו הנך אינשי אמרו ליה אנן ידעינן במילי דאבוך אמר רב נחמן בהא אפילו רבנן מודו דינוקא במילי דאבוה לא ידע

The child was walking and crying. These people heard him, and said to him: We know about the monetary matters of your father and can testify on your behalf. When he brought them before Rav Naḥman, Rav Naḥman said: In a case like this, even the Rabbis concede that the testimony is accepted, as a child does not know about the monetary matters of his father. Clearly, when he said that he has no witnesses or proof, he said so out of ignorance and was mistaken; there is no concern about artifice.

ההיא איתתא דנפק שטרא מתותי ידה אמרה ליה ידענא בהאי שטרא דפריע הוה הימנה רב נחמן

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman from whose possession a promissory note emerged, i.e., she was appointed to hold it. She said to the judge: I know that this promissory note was repaid. The creditor should not use it to collect. Rav Naḥman deemed her testimony credible and did not allow the creditor to collect the debt.

אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן כמאן כרבי דאמר אותיות נקנות במסירה

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose opinion is your ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that letters, i.e., the content of a promissory note, are acquired by merely transferring the document? In other words, there is no need to write a deed for the transfer of a monetary document from one individual’s ownership to another. By giving it to the recipient, he becomes the owner of the document. Therefore, since the promissory note is in this woman’s possession, she is considered its legal owner, and her claim that it was repaid is consequently accepted.

אמר ליה שאני הכא דאי בעיא קלתיה

Rav Naḥman said to him: That is not the reason for my ruling; rather, here it is different. Here the woman’s claim is accepted in any event, as, since the promissory note was in her possession, if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. Therefore, she is presumably telling the truth.

איכא דאמרי לא הימנה רב נחמן אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן והא אי בעיא

Some say that there is another version of the story, according to which Rav Naḥman did not deem her testimony credible. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But if she had wanted to,

קלתיה

she could have burned it. Why did you not accept her testimony?

כיון דאיתחזק בבי דינא איבעיא קלתיה לא אמרינן

Rav Naḥman answered him: Since the promissory note was ratified in court, we do not say that she is deemed credible to nullify its validity because if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. The validity of a ratified document is not nullified without evidence.

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן סימפון שיש עליו עדים יתקיים בחותמיו אין עליו עדים ויצא מתחת ידי שליש או שיצא אחר חיתום שטרות כשר אלמא שליש מהימן

Rava raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: A receipt [simfon] of repayment of a debt upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. The witnesses testify that these are their signatures, and it is thereby ratified. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the receipt emerged from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerged after the signing of the documents, i.e., the receipt was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid. Rava states his objection: Apparently, the testimony of a third party serving as a trustee is deemed credible, as he can testify that the receipt is valid even if it was not signed by witnesses.

תיובתא דרב נחמן תיובתא

The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Naḥman is indeed a conclusive refutation.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן לעולם מביא ראיה וסותר עד שיסתתם טענותיו ויאמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני והעידוני

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One can always bring a proof for his claim and overturn the previous verdict, until his claims are stopped up, i.e., until he has no more claims, and he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, in which case those witnesses are not allowed to testify.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת יסתתם טענותיו אתאן לרבנן והדר אמרת קרבו איש פלוני ופלוני והעידוני אתאן לרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. When you say: Until his claims are stopped up, we arrive at, i.e., this represents, the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold in the mishna that once a litigant stops presenting his claims, he cannot present additional claims later. And when you then say: Until he says come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, we arrive at the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that it is only in that case that the testimony is not accepted.

וכי תימא כולה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל ופרושי קא מפרש מאי עד שיסתתם טענותיו עד שיאמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני והעידוני והא אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן כל מקום ששנה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל במשנתינו הלכה כמותו חוץ מערב וצידן וראיה אחרונה

And if you would say that the entire statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is explaining his own statement, saying: What is the meaning of the phrase: Until his claims are stopped up? Until he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, this is difficult. But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement? Evidently, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case.

אלא כי אתא רב שמואל בר יהודה אמר רבי יוחנן לעולם מביא ראיה וסותר עד שיסתתם טענותיו ויאמרו לו הבא עדים ואומר אין לי עדים הבא ראיה ואומר אין לי ראיה אבל באו עדים ממדינת הים או שהיתה דיסקיא של אביו מופקדת ביד אחר הרי זה מביא ראיה וסותר

Rather, the Gemara presents another version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One can always bring a proof and overturn the previous verdict until his claims are stopped up, and the judges say to him: Bring witnesses, and he says: I have no witnesses, and they say to him: Bring evidence, and he says: I have no evidence. This is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. But if witnesses came from overseas, or if there was a saddlebag [disakkaya] of his father’s documents deposited by another individual, which are cases where he did not know of the evidence, he can bring this evidence and overturn the previous verdict, as there is no concern of artifice.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן התוקף את חבירו בדין אחד אומר נדון כאן ואחד אומר נלך למקום הוועד כופין אותו וילך למקום הוועד

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who attacks another in judgment, i.e., tenaciously raises legal claims against another, and one of the litigants says: Let us go to court here in our locale, and the other one says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, i.e., the Sanhedrin, or another High Court, the former litigant is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly.

אמר לפניו רבי אלעזר רבי מי שנושה בחבירו מנה יוציא מנה על מנה אלא כופין אותו ודן בעירו

Rabbi Elazar said before him: My teacher, if so, must one who claims a debt of one hundred dinars from another spend one hundred dinars of travel and lodging expenses for the one hundred dinars he wants to collect? Rather, one is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city.

איתמר נמי אמר רב ספרא אמר רבי יוחנן שנים שנתעצמו בדין אחד אומר נדון כאן ואחד אומר נלך למקום הוועד כופין אותו ודן בעירו ואם הוצרך דבר לשאול כותבין ושולחין

It was also stated that Rav Safra says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to two who were struggling in judgment, one of whom says: Let us go to court here, and one of whom says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, the latter litigant is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city. And if the local court needs to ask a higher court about a certain matter, the judges write to the Assembly, and the higher court sends its response.

ואם אמר כתבו ותנו לי מאיזה טעם דנתוני כותבין ונותנין לו

And if one of the litigants says to a court: Write for what reason you judged me in this manner and give it to me, as I do not trust your decision without explanation, the judges write it and give it to him.

והיבמה הולכת אחר היבם להתירה

Another halakha was stated with regard to the location of the judgment: And with regard to a woman whose husband had a brother, and he died childless [vehayevama], she follows her brother-in-law [hayavam] for him to free her of the levirate bond through ḥalitza. The yavam does not have to go to her.

עד כמה אמר רבי אמי אפילו מטבריא לצפורי

The Gemara asks: How far does she have to go? Rabbi Ami says: Even from Tiberias to Tzippori. This is the halakha even though the court in Tiberias is more prestigious than the one in Tzippori.

אמר רב כהנא מאי קרא וקראו לו זקני עירו ולא זקני עירה

Rav Kahana says: What is the verse that alludes to this halakha? It is the verse that states: “Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him, and if he stands and says: I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). The fact that the elders of his city, and not the elders of her city, are mentioned indicates that ḥalitza is performed in his city and not in hers.

אמר אמימר הילכתא כופין אותו וילך למקום הוועד אמר ליה רב אשי לאמימר והא אמר רבי אלעזר כופין אותו ודן בעירו הני מילי היכא דקאמר ליה לוה למלוה אבל מלוה עבד לוה לאיש מלוה

Ameimar says: The halakha is that if one litigant wants to go to the place of the Assembly and the other does not, the latter is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that he is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city? Ameimar answered: This statement applies in a case where the borrower said to the lender: Let us go to the place of the Assembly; in that case, the debtor is compelled to be judged in his city. But if the lender requests to go to the place of the Assembly, his request is accepted, as it is stated: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7).

שלחו ליה למר עוקבא לדזיו ליה כבר בתיה שלם עוקבן הבבלי קבל קדמנא ירמיה אחי העביר עלי את הדרך ואמרו לו השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא

The Sages sent a letter to Mar Ukva, the Exilarch in Babylonia, which stated: To he who has light upon him, like Moses, who is called the son of Bithiah, Shalom. The letter continued: Ukvan the Babylonian complained before us as follows: Yirmeya, my brother, came past me, i.e., did me a great evil. And therefore tell Yirmeya; induce him [hassiuhu] to see our face in Tiberias, where we will judge his case.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת אמרו לו אלמא דיינוה אתון השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא אלמא שדרוהו הכא

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult to understand. You said: Tell him. Apparently the intention was: Judge him yourselves in Babylonia. But then the letter states: Induce him to see our face in Tiberias. Apparently the intention was: Send him here.

אלא הכי קאמרי אמרו ליה דיינו אתון אי ציית ציית ואי לא השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא

Rather, this is what the Sages were saying: Tell him, i.e., judge him yourselves. If he listens to the court, he listens, and the issue is resolved. But if he does not listen, induce him to see our face in Tiberias.

רב אשי אמר דיני קנסות הוה ובבבל לא דיינו דיני קנסות והא דשלחו ליה הכי כדי לחלוק כבוד למר עוקבא

Rav Ashi said: That is not the correct understanding of the letter. Rather, it was a case pertaining to the halakhot of fines, and in Babylonia the courts do not adjudicate in cases pertaining to the halakhot of fines, as there are no ordained judges there; such Sages are found only in Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, it was necessary to send the case to Eretz Yisrael. And the fact that they sent the letter to Mar Ukva using this wording, as though he were capable of adjudicating the case himself, was in order to give honor to Mar Ukva, who was a Sage and a leader. They hinted to him that he could not judge this case and that he therefore had to send the defendant to Eretz Yisrael.

הדרן עלך זה בורר