Sanhedrin 36

מה יום טוב שנדחה מפני קרבן יחיד אין רציחה דוחה אותו קרבן יחיד שהוא דוחה את יום טוב אינו דין שלא תהא רציחה דוחה אותו

Just as with regard to a Festival, which is overridden due to an offering of an individual, as voluntary offerings of individuals are sacrificed on Festivals, and nevertheless murder does not override it, as the court does not execute one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment on a Festival, with regard to an offering of an individual, which overrides a Festival, is it not logical that murder should not override it? Therefore, unlike the explanation of Abaye, the court should not take a priest to him in the event he liable to receive capital punishment if this will result in the offering of an individual not being sacrificed.

הניחא למאן דאמר אין נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב אלא למאן דאמר נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב מאי איכא למימר

Rava clarifies: This works out well according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival. Since the offerings of an individual do not override a Festival, there is no place for this a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, what is there to say? Why would one not make the above a fortiori inference?

אלא אמר רבא לא מיבעיא למאן דאמר נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב דהא לא מתקיים מעם מזבחי כלל

Rather, Rava says that Abaye’s explanation of the verse is incorrect according to all opinions. It is not necessary to say that the inference is incorrect according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, as according to that opinion one cannot justify the verse of “from My altar” at all, as there is no distinction between the offering of an individual and a communal offering, as both override a Festival. Accordingly, court-imposed capital punishment should not override either type of offering.

אלא אפילו למאן דאמר נדרים ונדבות אין קריבין ביום טוב הכתיב מעם מזבחי מזבחי המיוחד לי ומאי נינהו תמיד ואמר רחמנא מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות

But even according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival, in which case Abaye’s explanation is possible, this is difficult. But isn’t it written: “From My altar”? The term “My altar” indicates: My altar, the offering that is designated to Me. And what offering is this? It is the daily offering. And yet, the Merciful One states: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die.” Accordingly, the verse is not stated specifically with regard to an offering of an individual.

דיני ממונות הטמאות והטהרות כו׳ אמר רב אנא הואי במנינא דבי רבי ומינאי דידי הוו מתחלי ברישא והא אנן מתחילין מן הגדול תנן

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. Rav says: I was among the quorum of judges in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they would commence from me, i.e., I was first when ascertaining the opinions of the judges. The Gemara questions this statement: But we learned in the mishna that the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges, and Rav was one of the junior judges of that court.

אמר רבה בריה דרבא ואיתימא רבי הלל בריה דרבי וולס שאני מניינא דבי רבי דכולהו מנינייהו מן הצד הוו מתחלי

Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: The counting of the vote in the court in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is different, as all of their deliberations and the counting of the vote would commence from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. This was because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was held in such high esteem that once he expressed his opinion, no one would be so brazen as to contradict him.

ואמר רבה בריה דרבא ואיתימא רבי הלל בריה דרבי וולס מימות משה ועד רבי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד

And with regard to the greatness of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: From the days of Moses and until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual.

ולא הא הוה יהושע הוה אלעזר והא הוה פנחס הוו זקנים

The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? Wasn’t there Joshua, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his time there was Elazar, who was Joshua’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Pinehas, who outlived Elazar? The Gemara answers: There were the Elders, who were equal to Pinehas in Torah knowledge.

והא הוה שאול הוה שמואל והא נח נפשיה כולהו שניה קאמרינן

The Gemara further objects: But wasn’t there Saul, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: There was Samuel, who was Saul’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Samuel die in Saul’s lifetime, leaving Saul the leading figure in both domains? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that from the days of Moses until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

והא הוה דוד הוה עירא היאירי והא נח נפשיה כולהו שניה קאמרינן

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there David, who was both the greatest Torah authority and the most powerful temporal authority of his day? The Gemara answers: There was Ira the Yairite, who was David’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Ira the Yairite die in David’s lifetime? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

והא הוה שלמה הוה שמעי בן גרא והא קטליה כוליה שניה קאמרינן

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Solomon, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his day there was Shimi ben Gera, who was Solomon’s master in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Solomon kill him at the beginning of his reign (see I Kings, chapter 2)? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

הא הוה חזקיה הוה שבנא והא איקטיל כולהו שניה קאמרינן והא הוה עזרא הוה נחמיה בן חכליה

The Gemara further objects: Wasn’t there Hezekiah, who was both the leading Torah scholar of his age and also the king of his people? The Gemara answers: There was Shebnah in that generation, who was Hezekiah’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t he killed in the war against Sennacherib? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Ezra, who was the greatest Torah Sage of his day and the leader of the Jewish people? The Gemara answers: There was Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, who was his equal.

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה אף אני אומר מימות רבי עד רב אשי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד ולא והא הוה הונא בר נתן הונא בר נתן מיכף הוה כייף ליה לרב אשי

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: I also say a similar statement, that from the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and until the days of Rav Ashi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual. The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? But wasn’t there Huna bar Natan, who lived during the time of Rav Ashi and enjoyed both great Torah scholarship and great wealth? The Gemara answers: Huna bar Natan was subordinate to Rav Ashi, who was his superior in both domains.

דיני נפשות מתחילין מן הצד מנא הני מילי אמר רב אחא בר פפא אמר קרא לא תענה על רב לא תענה על רב

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: The verse states: “Neither shall you answer in a cause [al riv]” (Exodus 23:2), and the Sages interpret: Neither shall you answer after the Master [al rav], i.e., do not dispute the opinion of the greatest among the judges. Therefore, were the judges to commence issuing their opinions from the greatest of them, and he would say that the accused is liable, no judge would acquit him.

רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מהכא ויאמר דוד לאנשיו חגרו איש [את] חרבו ויחגרו איש [את] חרבו ויחגר גם דוד את חרבו

Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The source of this practice is from here: When David decided to punish Nabal the Carmelite, the verse states: “And David said to his men: Every man gird his sword. And every man girded his sword, and David also girded his sword” (I Samuel 25:13). That was a case of capital law, and David, the greatest among them, was last.

אמר רב שונה אדם לתלמידו ודן עמו בדיני נפשות מיתיבי הטהרות והטמאות האב ובנו הרב ותלמידו מונין להם שנים דיני ממונות ודיני נפשות ודיני מכות קידוש החדש ועיבור שנה אב ובנו הרב ותלמידו אין מונין להן אלא אחד

Rav says: A person may teach his student the relevant material and then judge cases of capital law with him, and this student can participate in the deliberations and serve as one of the judges. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 7:2): In cases of ritual purity and impurity, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as two opinions. By inference, in cases of monetary law and cases of capital law, and cases of laws involving the punishment of lashes, as well as court proceedings concerning sanctification of the month and the intercalation of the year, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as only one opinion, as it is assumed the son or student will merely echo the opinion of his father or teacher. This contradicts the ruling of Rav.

כי קאמר רב כגון רב כהנא ורב אסי דלגמריה דרב הוו צריכי ולסבריה דרב לא הוו צריכי

The Gemara answers: When Rav says his statement, he is referring to not every student, but only those such as Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who needed to learn the halakhic traditions of Rav, but they did not need to learn the reasoning of Rav, as they were capable of conducting their own analysis.

אמר רבי אבהו עשרה דברים יש בין דיני ממונות לדיני נפשות וכולן אין נוהגין בשור הנסקל חוץ מעשרים ושלשה

Rabbi Abbahu says: There are ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law, as was taught in the beginning of the chapter, and none of them is practiced with regard to a court hearing concerning an ox that is to be stoned, as it is treated as a case of monetary law, except for the requirement that the animal be judged by twenty-three judges, like in cases of capital law.

מנא הני מילי אמר רב אחא בר פפא דאמר קרא לא תטה משפט אבינך בריבו משפט אביונך אי אתה מטה אבל אתה מטה משפט של שור הנסקל

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “You shall not incline the judgment of your poor in his cause” (Exodus 23:6). He explains: You may not incline the judgment of, i.e., exert effort to find liable, your poor, but you may incline the judgment of an ox that is to be stoned. The reason for the procedural differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law is to render it more likely that one accused of a capital transgression will be acquitted. This is not a factor when judging the ox.

עשרה הא תשעה הוו הא עשרה קתני משום דאין הכל כשרין ועשרים ושלשה חדא היא

The Gemara asks: Are there really ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law? There are only nine differences recorded in the mishna. The Gemara questions this: But the mishna teaches ten differences, not nine. The Gemara clarifies: Although there appear to be ten, there are in fact nine, because the halakha that not all are fit to judge cases of capital law and the halakha that twenty-three judges are required for cases of capital law are one. The reason not all are fit to judge cases of capital law is that the court of twenty-three is derived from the command to Moses: “And they shall bear the burden of the people with you” (Numbers 11:17), which indicates that only those “with you,” i.e., similar in lineage to Moses, can serve on that court (see 17a).

הא איכא אחריתי דתניא אין מושיבין בסנהדרין זקן וסריס ומי שאין לו בנים רבי יהודה מוסיף אף אכזרי וחילופיהן במסית דרחמנא אמר לא תחמל ולא תכסה עליו

The Gemara answers: But there is another difference, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): The court does not seat on the Sanhedrin a very old person or one who is castrated or one who has no children, as those who did not recently raise children may lack compassion. Rabbi Yehuda adds: Even a cruel person is not eligible. The Gemara comments: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as the Merciful One states concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9).

הכל כשרין לדון דיני ממונות הכל לאתויי מאי אמר רב יהודה לאתויי ממזר

§ The mishna teaches that all are fit to judge cases of monetary law. The Gemara asks: What is added by the mishna’s employing the expansive term all? Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer] in the category of those qualified to judge cases of monetary law.

הא תנינא חדא זימנא כל הראוי לדון דיני נפשות ראוי לדון דיני ממונות ויש ראוי לדון דיני ממונות ואין ראוי לדון דיני נפשות והוינן בה לאתויי מאי ואמר רב יהודה לאתויי ממזר חדא לאתויי גר וחדא לאתויי ממזר

The Gemara questions this explanation: But we already learn this halakha one time, as it is taught in a baraita: All who are fit to judge cases of capital law are fit to judge cases of monetary law, but there are those who are fit to judge cases of monetary law and are not fit to judge cases of capital law. And we discussed it: What is included in the expansive term all employed by the baraita? And Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a mamzer. The Gemara responds: One of the two sources serves to include a convert, who is qualified to judge only in cases of monetary law, and one of the two sources serves to include a mamzer.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן גר דראוי לבא בקהל אבל ממזר אימא לא ואי אשמעינן ממזר דבא מטיפה כשרה אבל גר דלא בא מטיפה כשרה אימא לא צריכא

The Gemara comments: And both the mishna and baraita are necessary, as the halakha taught by one source cannot be derived from the halakha taught by the other source. As, if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a convert, one could say that a convert is like a born Jew concerning this, since he is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., marry a Jew of fit lineage, but with regard to a mamzer, who is not fit to enter into the congregation, say that he cannot serve as a judge. And if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a mamzer, one could say that a mamzer is fit to judge, as he came from seed of unflawed lineage, but with regard to a convert, who does not come from seed of unflawed lineage, say that he cannot serve as a judge. Therefore, both sources are necessary.

ואין הכל כשרין לדון דיני נפשות מאי טעמא דתני רב יוסף כשם שבית דין מנוקין בצדק כך מנוקין מכל מום אמר אמימר מאי קרא כלך יפה רעיתי ומום אין בך

§ The mishna teaches: But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; the judges may be only priests, Levites, or Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: As Rav Yosef taught: Just as the court is clean in justice, so too, it is clean of any blemish, i.e., it does not include anyone of flawed lineage. Ameimar says: What is the verse from which it is derived? It states: “You are all fair, my love; and there is no blemish in you” (Song of Songs 4:7).

ודילמא מום ממש אמר רב אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא והתיצבו שם עמך עמך בדומין לך

The Gemara asks: But perhaps you should say that this is referring to an actual blemish, and is teaching that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It is not necessary to learn from this verse the halakha that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin, as the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, teaching that the members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, like Moses.

ודילמא התם משום שכינה אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר קרא ונשאו אתך אתך בדומין לך ליהוי

The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there, those who were with Moses had to be free of any blemish due to the Divine Presence, which was going to rest upon them, but this is not a requirement for judges to serve on the Sanhedrin. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The verse states: “So shall they make it easier for you and bear the burden with you” (Exodus 18:22). The term “with you” is explained to mean: They shall be similar to you, without blemish. This verse is referring to the appointment of regular judges, upon whom the Divine Presence does not rest, and teaches that all members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, and the verse from Song of Songs teaches that they must have unflawed lineage as well.

מתני׳ סנהדרין היתה כחצי גורן עגולה כדי שיהו רואין זה את זה ושני סופרי הדיינין עומדים לפניהם אחד מימין ואחד משמאל וכותבין דברי מחייבין ודברי מזכין רבי יהודה אומר שלשה אחד כותב דברי המזכין ואחד כותב דברי המחייבין והשלישי כותב דברי המזכין ודברי המחייבין

MISHNA: A Sanhedrin of twenty-three was arranged in the same layout as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that all the judges will see one another and the witnesses. And two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.