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Today's Daf Yomi

August 27, 2017 | ื”ืณ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืขืดื–

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 41

The gemaraย discusses further details of what types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and what aren’t. ย Details about the blessing over the new moon are discussed (kiddush levana). ย Can women partake in this mitzva or not?

ืชื ื”ื• ืขื ื™ืŸ ืœืžืœืงื•ืช

apply it to the matter of lashes, as forewarning is required for the court to be able to administer lashes.

ื“ื‘ื™ ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืชื ื ืณื•ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“ ืื™ืฉ ืขืœ ืจืขื”ื• ืœื”ืจื’ื• ื‘ืขืจืžื”ืณ ืฉื”ืชืจื• ื‘ื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืžื–ื™ื“

The school of แธคizkiyya taught a source for the requirement of forewarning from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to a murderer, as it is states: โ€œBut if a man come intentionally upon his neighbor to slay him with guileโ€ (Exodus 21:14). How do the witnesses know that he acted intentionally? It must be that they forewarned him, and still he acts intentionally.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืชื ื ืณื”ืžืฆืื™ื ืืชื• ืžืงืฉืฉ ืขืฆื™ืืณ ืฉื”ืชืจื• ื‘ื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืžืงื•ืฉืฉ

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a source for the requirement to forewarn transgressors from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to the wood-gatherer on Shabbat in the wilderness, as it is stated: โ€œAnd they that found him gathering sticks brought himโ€ (Numbers 15:33). By writing โ€œgatheringโ€ in the present tense, the verse indicates that they forewarned him, but he is still gathering.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืชื ื ืณืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืืฉืจ ืขื ื”ืณ ืขืœ ืขืกืงื™ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจ

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a source for the requirement to forewarn a transgressor from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman, as it is stated: โ€œFor the matter [devar] that he has humbled his neighborโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:24). They make a verbal analogy: For matters involving speech [dibbur], the punishment is given only if the witnesses issued a verbal forewarning.

ื•ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืื—ืชื• ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ืžืœืงื•ืช ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ืžื™ืชื•ืช ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to have all of these sources, since if the Merciful One would write the requirement of forewarning in the context of โ€œhis sisterโ€ (Leviticus 20:17) alone, I would say: Those liable to receive lashes, yes, they do require forewarning, but those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishments, whose transgressions are severe, do not require forewarning. Therefore the Merciful One writes, with regard to a murderer: โ€œIf a man come intentionally.โ€

ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื“ืงื™ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืกืงื™ืœื” ื“ื—ืžื•ืจื” ืื™ืžื ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื

And if the Merciful One would write only: โ€œIf a man come intentionally,โ€ I would say that this statement applies only when the penalty is death by the sword, as that is a lenient form of court-imposed capital punishment. But with regard to stoning, which is a severe form of court-imposed capital punishment, one could say that it does not require forewarning. Therefore, it is necessary to state the requirement of forewarning with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat.

ื•ืชืจืชื™ ื‘ื ืกืงืœื™ืŸ ืœืžื” ืœื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืœืืชื•ื™ื™ ื ืฉืจืคื™ืŸ

The Gemara asks: And why do I need two verses that state the requirement for forewarning in the context of those liable to be stoned? Both the Shabbat violator and one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman are punished with stoning. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that death by burning is more severe than death by stoning, the additional verse serves to add the halakha that a forewarning must be issued to those liable to be burned for their transgressions, by way of the application of the principle: If this halakha is not needed for the matter in which it is written, apply it to a different matter.

ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืžื™ืœืชื ื“ืืชื™ื ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื˜ืจื— ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืงืจื ื•ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื‘ื ืกืงืœื™ืŸ ื•ืœื™ืชื• ื”ื ืš ื•ืœื™ื’ืžืจื• ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืžื™ืœืชื ื“ืืชื™ื ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื˜ืจื— ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืงืจื

According to the opinion of the Rabbis that death by stoning is more severe than death by burning, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. The Gemara challenges: But let the Merciful One write this halakha only in the context of those liable to be stoned, and let these others be derived from it, as stoning is the most severe punishment. The Gemara answers: Here too, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

ื”ืชื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืœืžื™ืชื” ืžื ื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ืื™ืชื™ืžื ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื™ื•ืžืช ื”ืžืช ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืœืžื™ืชื”

ยง The baraita teaches that one of the questions the court asks of the witnesses is: Did he release himself to death, i.e., did he acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that he must release himself to death? Rava said, and some say it was แธคizkiyya who said, that the verse states: โ€œBy the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the dead be put to deathโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:6). By referring to the transgressor as dead even before he is executed, the verse indicates that he is not executed until he releases himself to death, by stating that he is aware that he will be executed for his transgression.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ื™ ื ืขืจื” ื”ืžืื•ืจืกื” ืฉื”ื•ื–ืžื• ืื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื™ื ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื•

Rav แธคanan says: Witnesses who testify to the adultery of a betrothed young woman who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not killed. Although conspiring witnesses are generally punished with the same punishment they attempted to impose on the purported transgressor (see Deuteronomy 19:19), this is an exception. This is because they can say: We did not come to testify in order to have her be executed; rather, we came to forbid her to her husband, as a betrothed or married woman who willingly engages in adulterous sexual intercourse is forbidden to her husband.

ื•ื”ื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื“ืœื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื•ืื™ ืœื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื

The Gemara challenges this ruling: But they must testify that they forewarned her before her transgression, and a forewarning includes apprising the transgressor of the punishment he or she will receive. How can the witnesses claim that they did not intend this result? The Gemara answers: Rav แธคanan stated his halakha with regard to a case where they claim they did not forewarn her. The Gemara asks: But if they claim they did not forewarn her, how can she be killed? If she would not have been killed, there is no novelty to Rav แธคananโ€™s statement that the witnesses are not killed.

ื‘ืืฉื” ื—ื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื—ื‘ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืฆืจื™ืš ื”ืชืจืื” ืœืคื™ ืฉืœื ื ืชื ื” ื”ืชืจืื” ืืœื ืœื”ื‘ื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื•ื’ื’ ืœืžื–ื™ื“

The Gemara explains: Rav แธคanan stated his halakha with regard to a woman who is a แธฅavera, knowledgeable in Torah, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A แธฅaver does not require forewarning in order to be liable for a transgression, because forewarning is given only in order to distinguish between an intentional and an unintentional act.

ื•ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื™ ืื™ื”ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื•ื›ืœ ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ืœื ืฉืžื” ืขื“ื•ืช

The Gemara asks further: But since the witnesses are not killed for their conspiratory testimony in the case of a แธฅavera, how can she be killed for her action? Their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony, i.e., the witnesses cannot be punished for their testimony, and any testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony is not categorized as testimony.

ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืงืืžืจ ืžืชื•ืš ืฉืื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื• ืืฃ ื”ื™ื ืื™ื ื” ื ื”ืจื’ืช ื“ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื”

The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying: Since the witnesses are not killed, as they can say: We came to forbid her to her husband, she is also not killed, since their testimony is testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony.

ืืœื ื‘ืืฉื” ื—ื‘ื™ืจื” ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื›ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ื•ื—ื–ืจื” ื•ื–ื™ื ืชื”

The Gemara challenges: But with regard to a woman who is a แธฅavera, since we maintain that she can be killed without being forewarned, how can you find this occurring according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As there was no forewarning, the witnesses can claim that their intention was to forbid her to her husband. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery and then they testified that she again committed adultery. The witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was meant to forbid her to her husband, as she was already forbidden to him due to the first time she committed adultery.

ื•ื”ื ื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ื•ืขืœื” ืฉื ื™ ื‘ืื ื• ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ืžื‘ื•ืขืœ ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ืื™ ื ืžื™ ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ืžืงืจื•ื‘ื™ื”

The Gemara questions this: But the witnesses can say: We come to forbid her to her second paramour. The halakha is that in addition to becoming forbidden to her husband, an adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her paramour. The witnesses can claim that this was their intent in testifying. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she again committed adultery with the first paramour, i.e., the second act was with the same paramour, to whom she was already forbidden. Alternatively, it is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery with one of her relatives, to whom she is forbidden regardless.

ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื ืขืจื” ืžืื•ืจืกื” ื“ื ืงื˜ ืืคื™ืœื• ื ืฉื•ืื” ื ืžื™ ืื™ืŸ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ืื™ ื“ืœื ื™ืชื‘ื ืชื•ืชื™ื” ื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื•

The Gemara clarifies: What is different that Rav แธคanan chose to state his halakha with regard to a betrothed young woman? His halakha could be stated with regard to a married woman as well. The Gemara answers: Yes, that is correct. But the novelty of this element of his ruling is that even with regard to this betrothed young woman, who does not live under her husband, the witnesses can say: We came to forbid her to her husband.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื”ืจื’ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืืจื™ืจืŸ ื”ืจื’ื• ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื ื›ื•ืŸ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ื ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ื ื›ื•ืŸ

ยง Rav แธคisda says: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ืฉื™ื”ื ื ื›ื•ืŸ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืืจื™ืจืŸ ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื›ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื›ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ืืณ ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ืชืจื’ืžื” ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื‘ืกื•ื“ืจ ืฉื—ื ืงื• ื‘ื• ื“ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื•ืืจื™ืจืŸ

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states with regard to testimony: โ€œAnd behold it be truth, the matter certainโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:4). The meaning of โ€œcertainโ€ is that the testimony of the two witnesses must be congruent. If one witness says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, or if one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav แธคisda. The Gemara answers: Rav แธคisda interpreted that baraita as speaking about a scarf with which the murderer strangled the victim, as this is the same as a contradiction with regard to a sword and an ariran. As Rav แธคisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืกื ื“ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืกื ื“ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ืืณ ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ื”ืชื ื ืžื™ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ืขื˜ ื‘ื• ื‘ืกื ื“ืœื• ื•ื”ืจื’ื•

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were black, and one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav แธคisda. The Gemara answers: Rav แธคisda can explain that there also, it is speaking of a case where the murderer kicked the victim with his sandal and killed him.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื‘ืขื•ืงืฆื™ ืชืื ื” ืืžืจ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืขืงืฅ ืชืื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ื“ืขืœื” ืงื ืžื™ืงื˜ื™ืœ

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs, indicating that even a contradiction concerning a minor point such as this would render the testimony incongruent. The Gemara answers: Rami bar แธคama said: It is speaking there of a case where he picked a fig on Shabbat, as he is killed for that act itself. Picking a fruit from its source of growth is an example of the forbidden labor of reaping, so the testimony about the characteristics of the fig is significant.

ื•ื”ื ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจื• ืœื• ืณืชื—ืช ืชืื ื” ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืฉืคื“ื• ื‘ื™ื™ื—ื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืชืื ื”

The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: When ben Zakkai asked the witnesses the question about the stems of figs, they said to him: The murderer killed the victim beneath a fig tree, indicating that it is speaking of a murder case? Rather, Rami bar แธคama said: The mishna is speaking of a case where the murderer stabbed the victim with a branch of a fig tree. As Rav แธคisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืœื”ืŸ ืณืชืื ื” ื–ื• ืขื•ืงืฆื™ื” ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืขื•ืงืฆื™ื” ื’ืกื™ืŸ ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ืชืื ื™ื ืœื‘ื ื•ืชืณ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืžื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื•ืชื™ื‘ ืื™ื ื™ืฉ ืฉืื ื™ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื“ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ื›ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื™ ืœื™ื”

Come and hear a proof, as in that same examination ben Zakkai said to the witnesses: This fig tree about which you are testifying, were its stems thin or were its stems thick? Were the figs on it black or were the figs white? These questions concern the fruit itself, not the characteristics of a branch. Rather, Rav Yosef says: Should a person raise a difficulty from the conduct of ben Zakkai? Ben Zakkai is different, as he equated examinations with interrogations. According to ben Zakkaiโ€™s opinion, a contradiction in the witnessesโ€™ answers to an examination is as significant as a contradiction in the witnessesโ€™ answers to an interrogation, and it also renders the testimony incongruent.

ืžืืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืžื™ ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื›ืœ ืฉื ื•ืชื™ื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืžืื” ื•ืขืฉืจื™ื ืฉื ื” ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืขืกืง ื‘ืคืจืงืžื˜ื™ื ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืœืžื“ ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืœื™ืžื“

ยง The Gemara clarifies: Who is the ben Zakkai mentioned in the mishna? If we say it is Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai, was he a member in a Sanhedrin that judged capital cases? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: All the years of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai were 120 years. For forty of those years he dealt in business [biferakmatya], for forty of those years he studied, and for forty of those years he taught and guided the Jewish people.

ื•ืชื ื™ื ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืงื•ื“ื ื—ื•ืจื‘ืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื’ืœืชื” ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื•ื™ืฉื‘ื” ืœื” ื‘ื—ื ื•ืช ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื•ื“ื™ืžื™ ืœื•ืžืจ ืฉืœื ื“ื ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืืœื ืฉืœื ื“ื ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช

The Gemara continues its question: And it is taught in a baraita: Forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and sat in the store near the Temple Mount. And Rabbi Yitzแธฅak bar Avudimi says: The intent of the statement concerning the relocation of the Sanhedrin is to say that they no longer judged laws of fines. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they no longer judged laws of fines? It is known that the Sanhedrin would judge laws of fines for hundreds of years after the destruction of the Temple. Rather, he must have said that the Sanhedrin no longer judged cases of capital law. Once the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone, the courtโ€™s power to judge capital cases was nullified.

ื•ืชื ืŸ ืžืฉื—ืจื‘ ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื”ืชืงื™ืŸ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™

The Gemara concludes its question: And since as we learned in a mishna (Sukka 41a): Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the mitzva of lulav should be performed even in the rest of the country for seven days in commemoration of the Temple, it is clear that he was in a position of prominence after the destruction of the Temple. Since the Sanhedrin ceased judging cases of capital law forty years before the destruction of the Temple, and Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai was in a position of prominence for only forty years, he could not have been a judge in a capital case.

ืืœื ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืžืกืชื‘ืจื ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™

The Gemara suggests: Rather, one can say that it was merely a different person named ben Zakkai, not the well-known Sage of that name. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, as if it enters your mind that this was Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai, would Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi call him ben Zakkai, without any title? He must have been referring to someone else.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื‘ืขื•ืงืฆื™ ืชืื ื™ื ืืœื ืชืœืžื™ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื• ื”ื•ื” ื•ืืžืจ ืžื™ืœืชื ื•ืžืกืชื‘ืจ ืœื”ื• ื˜ืขืžื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita explicitly: An incident occurred, and Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs? This proves that the Sage in question is Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai. Rather, one can say that at that time, when this incident occurred, Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai was a student sitting before his teacher, and in those years the Sanhedrin was in its place and judged cases of capital law. And he said a matter in the course of examining the witnesses, and his reasoning was logical to them, and the judges asked his question,

ื•ืงื‘ืขื•ื” ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื” ืœืžื“ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื”ื•ื” ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื›ืชืœืžื™ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ืžื“ ื”ื•ื” ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื›ื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืขืœ ืฉื ื“ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื•ื›ื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืขืœ ืฉื ื“ื”ืฉืชื

and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established it in the mishna in his name. When he was studying, they called him ben Zakkai, in the manner that they would call a student sitting before his teacher, and when he was teaching others they called him Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai. In terms of the baraita and the mishna, when they called him ben Zakkai in the Mishna, that was based on the name that he was called initially. And when they called him Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai in the other baraita, that was based on the name that he was called now.

ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ื›ื•ืณ ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ ืชืจื™ ื ืžื™ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช

ยง The mishna teaches: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs. What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two witnesses say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if two say? Isnโ€™t it obvious? The mishna already stated that when one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, indicating that knowledge of the answers to these types of questions is not required. Accordingly, when two witnesses say that they do not know, their testimony stands as well. What is the novelty of this ruling?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืจื™ืฉื ืงืื™ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื™ื“ืขื ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืžืงื™ืฉ ืฉืœืฉื” ืœืฉื ื™ื

Rav Sheshet said: This clause is referring to the first clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the interrogations, even if two witnesses say: We know, and one additional witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares in all court proceedings three witnesses to two, holding that just as two witnesses must testify a fully valid testimony, so it is with three. Therefore, if the third witness does not know the answer to an interrogation, the testimony of all three is void.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ื”ื ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืงืชื ื™ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื™ื“ืขื ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื

Rava says: But the mishna teaches: Their testimony stands, not: Their testimony is void. Rather, Rava said: This is what the mishna is saying: Even with regard to the interrogations, if two witnesses say: We know, and one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as the court accepts the testimony of the two. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? Not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื•ืจื‘ ืกืคืจื ืชื ื• ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื” ืคื’ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืžืื™ ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื•ืžืื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื“ืชื ื•ืžืื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืœืš

The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana and Rav Safra studied tractate Sanhedrin in the school of Rabba. Rami bar แธคama encountered them. Rami bar แธคama said to them: What do you say concerning tractate Sanhedrin that you learned in the school of Rabba? Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: And what do we say concerning the regular tractate Sanhedrin? And what is difficult for you? Do you have a specific difficulty you would like answered?

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืžื”ื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืณืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืœื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื™ืŸ ืื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืขื™ื ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืชืณ ืžื›ื“ื™ ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื”ื™ื ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช

Rami bar แธคama said to them: I have a difficulty from that which is taught in the mishna: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Rami bar แธคama asks: After all, this type of question and that type of question are required by Torah law; what is different about interrogations and what is different about examinations? Why is there a difference in halakha between the two?

ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืณืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืขืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื“ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืณืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืขืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื”ื•ื

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: How can these cases be compared? With regard to the interrogations, if one witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as it is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. If the witnesses do not state a specific time and place, there is no way for other witnesses to claim that the first witnesses had been with them elsewhere at the time they claim the event occurred. By contrast, with regard to the examinations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as it is testimony that you can render conspiratory testimony.

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืžื˜ื™ื‘ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืžืจ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืžื ื–ื™ื”ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืžืจ ืœื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื•ืœื ื—ื“ื

Rami bar แธคama said to them: If you said an incisive statement like this about this tractate, you said much about it. Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: Due to the Masterโ€™s goodness, that is, due to your good will and desire to accept our answer to your question, we said much about it. But with the Masterโ€™s rebuke and challenge we would not say even one answer about it, i.e., if you had wished to criticize this answer you could have refuted it, and it would be as if we did not say any answer.

ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ืณ ืขื“ ื›ืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืกื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ืจื•ื‘ื• ืฉืœ ื—ื•ื“ืฉ

ยง The mishna teaches that if one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that one witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, while the other witness does not know of it. Their testimony is considered congruent. The Gemara asks: Until how many days into the month does the court assume that one of the witnesses does not know when the month began? Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until the majority of the month has passed.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืฉืœืฉื”ืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ื—ืžืฉื”ืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื•ืืžืื™ ื ื™ืžื ืฉื–ื” ื™ื•ื“ืข ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืขื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืขื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืืœื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื‘ืจื•ื‘ื” ื™ื“ืข

Rava says: We learn this in the mishna as well, as it teaches: If one witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void. But why is it void? Let us say that it not a contradiction, as this witness knows of two additions, i.e., that a day was added to the two previous months, and that witness does not know of the two additions. Rather, is it not void because once the majority of the month passed a witness knows what day it is, so that an error of two days cannot occur?

ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ืžื ืœืš ื‘ืจื•ื‘ื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ื™ื“ืข ื•ื‘ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ื™ื“ืข ื‘ื—ื“ ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ืืžืจ ื“ื˜ืขื™ ื‘ืชืจื™ ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ืœื ืืžืจ ื“ื˜ืขื™

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that a witness may not know the day even once the majority of the month has passed. The reason for the ruling of the mishna is that he knows about the shofar [ubeshipura], which the court would blow at the New Moon. It is possible that with regard to one blast of the shofar it could be said that he erred and was not aware of it. With regard to two blasts of the shofar it cannot be said that he erred. By contrast, in the case of the mishna here, perhaps as long as the witnesses are testifying about two consecutive days within one month, the error of one of them persisted throughout the month.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืžื” ืžื‘ืจื›ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ื—ื“ืฉ ืขื“ ืฉืชืชืžืœื ืคื’ื™ืžืชื” ื•ื›ืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืขืงื‘ ื‘ืจ ืื™ื“ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืขื“ ืฉื‘ืขื” ื ื”ืจื“ืขื™ ืืžืจื™ ืขื“ ืฉืฉื” ืขืฉืจ

ยง Having cited a statement of Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, the Gemara cites another statement in his name: Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until how many days into a new month may one recite a blessing on the month, i.e., Birkat HaLevana? Until the flaw of the moon is filled, when it no longer appears deficient. And until how many days is that? Rav Yaโ€™akov bar Idi says that Rav Yehuda says: Until seven days of the month have passed. The Sages of Nehardeโ€™a say: Until sixteen days of the month have passed.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 41

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 41

ืชื ื”ื• ืขื ื™ืŸ ืœืžืœืงื•ืช

apply it to the matter of lashes, as forewarning is required for the court to be able to administer lashes.

ื“ื‘ื™ ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืชื ื ืณื•ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“ ืื™ืฉ ืขืœ ืจืขื”ื• ืœื”ืจื’ื• ื‘ืขืจืžื”ืณ ืฉื”ืชืจื• ื‘ื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืžื–ื™ื“

The school of แธคizkiyya taught a source for the requirement of forewarning from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to a murderer, as it is states: โ€œBut if a man come intentionally upon his neighbor to slay him with guileโ€ (Exodus 21:14). How do the witnesses know that he acted intentionally? It must be that they forewarned him, and still he acts intentionally.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืชื ื ืณื”ืžืฆืื™ื ืืชื• ืžืงืฉืฉ ืขืฆื™ืืณ ืฉื”ืชืจื• ื‘ื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืžืงื•ืฉืฉ

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a source for the requirement to forewarn transgressors from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to the wood-gatherer on Shabbat in the wilderness, as it is stated: โ€œAnd they that found him gathering sticks brought himโ€ (Numbers 15:33). By writing โ€œgatheringโ€ in the present tense, the verse indicates that they forewarned him, but he is still gathering.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืชื ื ืณืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืืฉืจ ืขื ื”ืณ ืขืœ ืขืกืงื™ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจ

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a source for the requirement to forewarn a transgressor from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman, as it is stated: โ€œFor the matter [devar] that he has humbled his neighborโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:24). They make a verbal analogy: For matters involving speech [dibbur], the punishment is given only if the witnesses issued a verbal forewarning.

ื•ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืื—ืชื• ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ืžืœืงื•ืช ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ืžื™ืชื•ืช ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to have all of these sources, since if the Merciful One would write the requirement of forewarning in the context of โ€œhis sisterโ€ (Leviticus 20:17) alone, I would say: Those liable to receive lashes, yes, they do require forewarning, but those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishments, whose transgressions are severe, do not require forewarning. Therefore the Merciful One writes, with regard to a murderer: โ€œIf a man come intentionally.โ€

ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื›ื™ ื™ื–ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื“ืงื™ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืกืงื™ืœื” ื“ื—ืžื•ืจื” ืื™ืžื ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื

And if the Merciful One would write only: โ€œIf a man come intentionally,โ€ I would say that this statement applies only when the penalty is death by the sword, as that is a lenient form of court-imposed capital punishment. But with regard to stoning, which is a severe form of court-imposed capital punishment, one could say that it does not require forewarning. Therefore, it is necessary to state the requirement of forewarning with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat.

ื•ืชืจืชื™ ื‘ื ืกืงืœื™ืŸ ืœืžื” ืœื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืœืืชื•ื™ื™ ื ืฉืจืคื™ืŸ

The Gemara asks: And why do I need two verses that state the requirement for forewarning in the context of those liable to be stoned? Both the Shabbat violator and one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman are punished with stoning. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that death by burning is more severe than death by stoning, the additional verse serves to add the halakha that a forewarning must be issued to those liable to be burned for their transgressions, by way of the application of the principle: If this halakha is not needed for the matter in which it is written, apply it to a different matter.

ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืžื™ืœืชื ื“ืืชื™ื ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื˜ืจื— ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืงืจื ื•ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื‘ื ืกืงืœื™ืŸ ื•ืœื™ืชื• ื”ื ืš ื•ืœื™ื’ืžืจื• ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืžื™ืœืชื ื“ืืชื™ื ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื˜ืจื— ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืงืจื

According to the opinion of the Rabbis that death by stoning is more severe than death by burning, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. The Gemara challenges: But let the Merciful One write this halakha only in the context of those liable to be stoned, and let these others be derived from it, as stoning is the most severe punishment. The Gemara answers: Here too, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

ื”ืชื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืœืžื™ืชื” ืžื ื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ืื™ืชื™ืžื ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื™ื•ืžืช ื”ืžืช ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืœืžื™ืชื”

ยง The baraita teaches that one of the questions the court asks of the witnesses is: Did he release himself to death, i.e., did he acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that he must release himself to death? Rava said, and some say it was แธคizkiyya who said, that the verse states: โ€œBy the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the dead be put to deathโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:6). By referring to the transgressor as dead even before he is executed, the verse indicates that he is not executed until he releases himself to death, by stating that he is aware that he will be executed for his transgression.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ื™ ื ืขืจื” ื”ืžืื•ืจืกื” ืฉื”ื•ื–ืžื• ืื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื™ื ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื•

Rav แธคanan says: Witnesses who testify to the adultery of a betrothed young woman who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not killed. Although conspiring witnesses are generally punished with the same punishment they attempted to impose on the purported transgressor (see Deuteronomy 19:19), this is an exception. This is because they can say: We did not come to testify in order to have her be executed; rather, we came to forbid her to her husband, as a betrothed or married woman who willingly engages in adulterous sexual intercourse is forbidden to her husband.

ื•ื”ื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื“ืœื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื•ืื™ ืœื ืืชืจื• ื‘ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื

The Gemara challenges this ruling: But they must testify that they forewarned her before her transgression, and a forewarning includes apprising the transgressor of the punishment he or she will receive. How can the witnesses claim that they did not intend this result? The Gemara answers: Rav แธคanan stated his halakha with regard to a case where they claim they did not forewarn her. The Gemara asks: But if they claim they did not forewarn her, how can she be killed? If she would not have been killed, there is no novelty to Rav แธคananโ€™s statement that the witnesses are not killed.

ื‘ืืฉื” ื—ื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื—ื‘ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืฆืจื™ืš ื”ืชืจืื” ืœืคื™ ืฉืœื ื ืชื ื” ื”ืชืจืื” ืืœื ืœื”ื‘ื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื•ื’ื’ ืœืžื–ื™ื“

The Gemara explains: Rav แธคanan stated his halakha with regard to a woman who is a แธฅavera, knowledgeable in Torah, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A แธฅaver does not require forewarning in order to be liable for a transgression, because forewarning is given only in order to distinguish between an intentional and an unintentional act.

ื•ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื™ ืื™ื”ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื•ื›ืœ ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ืœื ืฉืžื” ืขื“ื•ืช

The Gemara asks further: But since the witnesses are not killed for their conspiratory testimony in the case of a แธฅavera, how can she be killed for her action? Their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony, i.e., the witnesses cannot be punished for their testimony, and any testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony is not categorized as testimony.

ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืงืืžืจ ืžืชื•ืš ืฉืื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื• ืืฃ ื”ื™ื ืื™ื ื” ื ื”ืจื’ืช ื“ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื”

The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying: Since the witnesses are not killed, as they can say: We came to forbid her to her husband, she is also not killed, since their testimony is testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony.

ืืœื ื‘ืืฉื” ื—ื‘ื™ืจื” ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืžื™ืงื˜ืœื ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื›ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ื•ื—ื–ืจื” ื•ื–ื™ื ืชื”

The Gemara challenges: But with regard to a woman who is a แธฅavera, since we maintain that she can be killed without being forewarned, how can you find this occurring according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As there was no forewarning, the witnesses can claim that their intention was to forbid her to her husband. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery and then they testified that she again committed adultery. The witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was meant to forbid her to her husband, as she was already forbidden to him due to the first time she committed adultery.

ื•ื”ื ื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ื•ืขืœื” ืฉื ื™ ื‘ืื ื• ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ืžื‘ื•ืขืœ ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ืื™ ื ืžื™ ืฉื–ื™ื ืชื” ืžืงืจื•ื‘ื™ื”

The Gemara questions this: But the witnesses can say: We come to forbid her to her second paramour. The halakha is that in addition to becoming forbidden to her husband, an adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her paramour. The witnesses can claim that this was their intent in testifying. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she again committed adultery with the first paramour, i.e., the second act was with the same paramour, to whom she was already forbidden. Alternatively, it is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery with one of her relatives, to whom she is forbidden regardless.

ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื ืขืจื” ืžืื•ืจืกื” ื“ื ืงื˜ ืืคื™ืœื• ื ืฉื•ืื” ื ืžื™ ืื™ืŸ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ืื™ ื“ืœื ื™ืชื‘ื ืชื•ืชื™ื” ื™ื›ื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืื•ืกืจื” ืขืœ ื‘ืขืœื” ื‘ืื ื•

The Gemara clarifies: What is different that Rav แธคanan chose to state his halakha with regard to a betrothed young woman? His halakha could be stated with regard to a married woman as well. The Gemara answers: Yes, that is correct. But the novelty of this element of his ruling is that even with regard to this betrothed young woman, who does not live under her husband, the witnesses can say: We came to forbid her to her husband.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื”ืจื’ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืืจื™ืจืŸ ื”ืจื’ื• ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื ื›ื•ืŸ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ื ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ื ื›ื•ืŸ

ยง Rav แธคisda says: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ืฉื™ื”ื ื ื›ื•ืŸ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืืจื™ืจืŸ ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื›ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื›ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ืืณ ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ืชืจื’ืžื” ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื‘ืกื•ื“ืจ ืฉื—ื ืงื• ื‘ื• ื“ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืกื™ื™ืฃ ื•ืืจื™ืจืŸ

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states with regard to testimony: โ€œAnd behold it be truth, the matter certainโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:4). The meaning of โ€œcertainโ€ is that the testimony of the two witnesses must be congruent. If one witness says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, or if one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murdererโ€™s garments were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav แธคisda. The Gemara answers: Rav แธคisda interpreted that baraita as speaking about a scarf with which the murderer strangled the victim, as this is the same as a contradiction with regard to a sword and an ariran. As Rav แธคisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืกื ื“ืœื™ื• ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ืŸืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืกื ื“ืœื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื™ืืณ ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืณื ื›ื•ืŸืณ ื”ืชื ื ืžื™ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ืขื˜ ื‘ื• ื‘ืกื ื“ืœื• ื•ื”ืจื’ื•

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were black, and one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav แธคisda. The Gemara answers: Rav แธคisda can explain that there also, it is speaking of a case where the murderer kicked the victim with his sandal and killed him.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื‘ืขื•ืงืฆื™ ืชืื ื” ืืžืจ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืขืงืฅ ืชืื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ื“ืขืœื” ืงื ืžื™ืงื˜ื™ืœ

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs, indicating that even a contradiction concerning a minor point such as this would render the testimony incongruent. The Gemara answers: Rami bar แธคama said: It is speaking there of a case where he picked a fig on Shabbat, as he is killed for that act itself. Picking a fruit from its source of growth is an example of the forbidden labor of reaping, so the testimony about the characteristics of the fig is significant.

ื•ื”ื ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจื• ืœื• ืณืชื—ืช ืชืื ื” ื”ืจื’ื•ืณ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืฉืคื“ื• ื‘ื™ื™ื—ื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืชืื ื”

The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: When ben Zakkai asked the witnesses the question about the stems of figs, they said to him: The murderer killed the victim beneath a fig tree, indicating that it is speaking of a murder case? Rather, Rami bar แธคama said: The mishna is speaking of a case where the murderer stabbed the victim with a branch of a fig tree. As Rav แธคisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืœื”ืŸ ืณืชืื ื” ื–ื• ืขื•ืงืฆื™ื” ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืขื•ืงืฆื™ื” ื’ืกื™ืŸ ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ืชืื ื™ื ืœื‘ื ื•ืชืณ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืžื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื•ืชื™ื‘ ืื™ื ื™ืฉ ืฉืื ื™ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื“ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ื›ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื™ ืœื™ื”

Come and hear a proof, as in that same examination ben Zakkai said to the witnesses: This fig tree about which you are testifying, were its stems thin or were its stems thick? Were the figs on it black or were the figs white? These questions concern the fruit itself, not the characteristics of a branch. Rather, Rav Yosef says: Should a person raise a difficulty from the conduct of ben Zakkai? Ben Zakkai is different, as he equated examinations with interrogations. According to ben Zakkaiโ€™s opinion, a contradiction in the witnessesโ€™ answers to an examination is as significant as a contradiction in the witnessesโ€™ answers to an interrogation, and it also renders the testimony incongruent.

ืžืืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืžื™ ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื›ืœ ืฉื ื•ืชื™ื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืžืื” ื•ืขืฉืจื™ื ืฉื ื” ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืขืกืง ื‘ืคืจืงืžื˜ื™ื ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืœืžื“ ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืœื™ืžื“

ยง The Gemara clarifies: Who is the ben Zakkai mentioned in the mishna? If we say it is Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai, was he a member in a Sanhedrin that judged capital cases? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: All the years of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai were 120 years. For forty of those years he dealt in business [biferakmatya], for forty of those years he studied, and for forty of those years he taught and guided the Jewish people.

ื•ืชื ื™ื ืืจื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื ื” ืงื•ื“ื ื—ื•ืจื‘ืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื’ืœืชื” ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื•ื™ืฉื‘ื” ืœื” ื‘ื—ื ื•ืช ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื•ื“ื™ืžื™ ืœื•ืžืจ ืฉืœื ื“ื ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืืœื ืฉืœื ื“ื ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช

The Gemara continues its question: And it is taught in a baraita: Forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and sat in the store near the Temple Mount. And Rabbi Yitzแธฅak bar Avudimi says: The intent of the statement concerning the relocation of the Sanhedrin is to say that they no longer judged laws of fines. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they no longer judged laws of fines? It is known that the Sanhedrin would judge laws of fines for hundreds of years after the destruction of the Temple. Rather, he must have said that the Sanhedrin no longer judged cases of capital law. Once the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone, the courtโ€™s power to judge capital cases was nullified.

ื•ืชื ืŸ ืžืฉื—ืจื‘ ื‘ื™ืช ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื”ืชืงื™ืŸ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™

The Gemara concludes its question: And since as we learned in a mishna (Sukka 41a): Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the mitzva of lulav should be performed even in the rest of the country for seven days in commemoration of the Temple, it is clear that he was in a position of prominence after the destruction of the Temple. Since the Sanhedrin ceased judging cases of capital law forty years before the destruction of the Temple, and Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai was in a position of prominence for only forty years, he could not have been a judge in a capital case.

ืืœื ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืžืกืชื‘ืจื ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™

The Gemara suggests: Rather, one can say that it was merely a different person named ben Zakkai, not the well-known Sage of that name. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, as if it enters your mind that this was Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai, would Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi call him ben Zakkai, without any title? He must have been referring to someone else.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื‘ืขื•ืงืฆื™ ืชืื ื™ื ืืœื ืชืœืžื™ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื• ื”ื•ื” ื•ืืžืจ ืžื™ืœืชื ื•ืžืกืชื‘ืจ ืœื”ื• ื˜ืขืžื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita explicitly: An incident occurred, and Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs? This proves that the Sage in question is Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai. Rather, one can say that at that time, when this incident occurred, Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai was a student sitting before his teacher, and in those years the Sanhedrin was in its place and judged cases of capital law. And he said a matter in the course of examining the witnesses, and his reasoning was logical to them, and the judges asked his question,

ื•ืงื‘ืขื•ื” ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื” ืœืžื“ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื”ื•ื” ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื›ืชืœืžื™ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ืžื“ ื”ื•ื” ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ื›ื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืขืœ ืฉื ื“ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื•ื›ื™ ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืขืœ ืฉื ื“ื”ืฉืชื

and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established it in the mishna in his name. When he was studying, they called him ben Zakkai, in the manner that they would call a student sitting before his teacher, and when he was teaching others they called him Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai. In terms of the baraita and the mishna, when they called him ben Zakkai in the Mishna, that was based on the name that he was called initially. And when they called him Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai in the other baraita, that was based on the name that he was called now.

ืžืขืฉื” ื•ื‘ื“ืง ื›ื•ืณ ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ ืชืจื™ ื ืžื™ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช

ยง The mishna teaches: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs. What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two witnesses say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if two say? Isnโ€™t it obvious? The mishna already stated that when one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, indicating that knowledge of the answers to these types of questions is not required. Accordingly, when two witnesses say that they do not know, their testimony stands as well. What is the novelty of this ruling?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืจื™ืฉื ืงืื™ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื™ื“ืขื ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืžืงื™ืฉ ืฉืœืฉื” ืœืฉื ื™ื

Rav Sheshet said: This clause is referring to the first clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the interrogations, even if two witnesses say: We know, and one additional witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares in all court proceedings three witnesses to two, holding that just as two witnesses must testify a fully valid testimony, so it is with three. Therefore, if the third witness does not know the answer to an interrogation, the testimony of all three is void.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ื”ื ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืงืชื ื™ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื™ื“ืขื ื• ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื

Rava says: But the mishna teaches: Their testimony stands, not: Their testimony is void. Rather, Rava said: This is what the mishna is saying: Even with regard to the interrogations, if two witnesses say: We know, and one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as the court accepts the testimony of the two. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? Not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื•ืจื‘ ืกืคืจื ืชื ื• ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื” ืคื’ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืžืื™ ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื•ืžืื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื‘ืกื ื”ื“ืจื™ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื“ืชื ื•ืžืื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืœืš

The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana and Rav Safra studied tractate Sanhedrin in the school of Rabba. Rami bar แธคama encountered them. Rami bar แธคama said to them: What do you say concerning tractate Sanhedrin that you learned in the school of Rabba? Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: And what do we say concerning the regular tractate Sanhedrin? And what is difficult for you? Do you have a specific difficulty you would like answered?

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืžื”ื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืณืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืœื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื™ืŸ ืื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืขื™ื ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืชืณ ืžื›ื“ื™ ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื”ื™ื ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช

Rami bar แธคama said to them: I have a difficulty from that which is taught in the mishna: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Rami bar แธคama asks: After all, this type of question and that type of question are required by Torah law; what is different about interrogations and what is different about examinations? Why is there a difference in halakha between the two?

ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืณืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืขืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื“ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื” ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืื™ ืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื‘ื“ื™ืงื•ืช ืืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืžื”ืŸ ืณืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืขืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืขื“ื•ืช ืฉืืชื” ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื” ื”ื•ื

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: How can these cases be compared? With regard to the interrogations, if one witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as it is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. If the witnesses do not state a specific time and place, there is no way for other witnesses to claim that the first witnesses had been with them elsewhere at the time they claim the event occurred. By contrast, with regard to the examinations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as it is testimony that you can render conspiratory testimony.

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืืžืจื™ืชื• ื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืžื˜ื™ื‘ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืžืจ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืžื ื–ื™ื”ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืžืจ ืœื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ื•ืœื ื—ื“ื

Rami bar แธคama said to them: If you said an incisive statement like this about this tractate, you said much about it. Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: Due to the Masterโ€™s goodness, that is, due to your good will and desire to accept our answer to your question, we said much about it. But with the Masterโ€™s rebuke and challenge we would not say even one answer about it, i.e., if you had wished to criticize this answer you could have refuted it, and it would be as if we did not say any answer.

ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ืณ ืขื“ ื›ืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืกื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ืจื•ื‘ื• ืฉืœ ื—ื•ื“ืฉ

ยง The mishna teaches that if one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that one witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, while the other witness does not know of it. Their testimony is considered congruent. The Gemara asks: Until how many days into the month does the court assume that one of the witnesses does not know when the month began? Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until the majority of the month has passed.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ืฉืœืฉื”ืณ ื•ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืณื‘ื—ืžืฉื”ืณ ืขื“ื•ืชืŸ ื‘ื˜ื™ืœื” ื•ืืžืื™ ื ื™ืžื ืฉื–ื” ื™ื•ื“ืข ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืขื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืขื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืืœื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื‘ืจื•ื‘ื” ื™ื“ืข

Rava says: We learn this in the mishna as well, as it teaches: If one witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void. But why is it void? Let us say that it not a contradiction, as this witness knows of two additions, i.e., that a day was added to the two previous months, and that witness does not know of the two additions. Rather, is it not void because once the majority of the month passed a witness knows what day it is, so that an error of two days cannot occur?

ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ืžื ืœืš ื‘ืจื•ื‘ื” ื ืžื™ ืœื ื™ื“ืข ื•ื‘ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ื™ื“ืข ื‘ื—ื“ ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ืืžืจ ื“ื˜ืขื™ ื‘ืชืจื™ ืฉื™ืคื•ืจื ืœื ืืžืจ ื“ื˜ืขื™

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that a witness may not know the day even once the majority of the month has passed. The reason for the ruling of the mishna is that he knows about the shofar [ubeshipura], which the court would blow at the New Moon. It is possible that with regard to one blast of the shofar it could be said that he erred and was not aware of it. With regard to two blasts of the shofar it cannot be said that he erred. By contrast, in the case of the mishna here, perhaps as long as the witnesses are testifying about two consecutive days within one month, the error of one of them persisted throughout the month.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืžื” ืžื‘ืจื›ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ื—ื“ืฉ ืขื“ ืฉืชืชืžืœื ืคื’ื™ืžืชื” ื•ื›ืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืขืงื‘ ื‘ืจ ืื™ื“ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืขื“ ืฉื‘ืขื” ื ื”ืจื“ืขื™ ืืžืจื™ ืขื“ ืฉืฉื” ืขืฉืจ

ยง Having cited a statement of Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, the Gemara cites another statement in his name: Rabbi Aแธฅa bar แธคanina says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until how many days into a new month may one recite a blessing on the month, i.e., Birkat HaLevana? Until the flaw of the moon is filled, when it no longer appears deficient. And until how many days is that? Rav Yaโ€™akov bar Idi says that Rav Yehuda says: Until seven days of the month have passed. The Sages of Nehardeโ€™a say: Until sixteen days of the month have passed.

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