Sanhedrin 41

תנהו ענין למלקות

apply it to the matter of lashes, as forewarning is required for the court to be able to administer lashes.

דבי חזקיה תנא ׳וכי יזד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה׳ שהתרו בו ועדיין הוא מזיד

The school of Ḥizkiyya taught a source for the requirement of forewarning from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to a murderer, as it is states: “But if a man come intentionally upon his neighbor to slay him with guile” (Exodus 21:14). How do the witnesses know that he acted intentionally? It must be that they forewarned him, and still he acts intentionally.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא ׳המצאים אתו מקשש עצים׳ שהתרו בו ועדיין הוא מקושש

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a source for the requirement to forewarn transgressors from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to the wood-gatherer on Shabbat in the wilderness, as it is stated: “And they that found him gathering sticks brought him” (Numbers 15:33). By writing “gathering” in the present tense, the verse indicates that they forewarned him, but he is still gathering.

דבי רבי תנא ׳על דבר אשר ענה׳ על עסקי דיבור

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a source for the requirement to forewarn a transgressor from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman, as it is stated: “For the matter [devar] that he has humbled his neighbor’s wife” (Deuteronomy 22:24). They make a verbal analogy: For matters involving speech [dibbur], the punishment is given only if the witnesses issued a verbal forewarning.

וצריכא דאי כתב רחמנא אחתו הוה אמינא חייבי מלקות אין חייבי מיתות לא כתב רחמנא כי יזד

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to have all of these sources, since if the Merciful One would write the requirement of forewarning in the context of “his sister” (Leviticus 20:17) alone, I would say: Those liable to receive lashes, yes, they do require forewarning, but those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishments, whose transgressions are severe, do not require forewarning. Therefore the Merciful One writes, with regard to a murderer: “If a man come intentionally.”

ואי כתב רחמנא וכי יזד הוה אמינא הני מילי סייף דקיל אבל סקילה דחמורה אימא לא צריכא

And if the Merciful One would write only: “If a man come intentionally,” I would say that this statement applies only when the penalty is death by the sword, as that is a lenient form of court-imposed capital punishment. But with regard to stoning, which is a severe form of court-imposed capital punishment, one could say that it does not require forewarning. Therefore, it is necessary to state the requirement of forewarning with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat.

ותרתי בנסקלין למה לי לרבי שמעון לאתויי נשרפין

The Gemara asks: And why do I need two verses that state the requirement for forewarning in the context of those liable to be stoned? Both the Shabbat violator and one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman are punished with stoning. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that death by burning is more severe than death by stoning, the additional verse serves to add the halakha that a forewarning must be issued to those liable to be burned for their transgressions, by way of the application of the principle: If this halakha is not needed for the matter in which it is written, apply it to a different matter.

לרבנן מילתא דאתיא בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא ולכתוב רחמנא בנסקלין וליתו הנך וליגמרו מיניה הכא נמי מילתא דאתיא בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא

According to the opinion of the Rabbis that death by stoning is more severe than death by burning, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. The Gemara challenges: But let the Merciful One write this halakha only in the context of those liable to be stoned, and let these others be derived from it, as stoning is the most severe punishment. The Gemara answers: Here too, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

התיר עצמו למיתה מנא לן אמר רבא ואיתימא חזקיה אמר קרא יומת המת עד שיתיר עצמו למיתה

§ The baraita teaches that one of the questions the court asks of the witnesses is: Did he release himself to death, i.e., did he acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that he must release himself to death? Rava said, and some say it was Ḥizkiyya who said, that the verse states: “By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the dead be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6). By referring to the transgressor as dead even before he is executed, the verse indicates that he is not executed until he releases himself to death, by stating that he is aware that he will be executed for his transgression.

אמר רב חנן עדי נערה המאורסה שהוזמו אין נהרגין מתוך שיכולים לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו

Rav Ḥanan says: Witnesses who testify to the adultery of a betrothed young woman who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not killed. Although conspiring witnesses are generally punished with the same punishment they attempted to impose on the purported transgressor (see Deuteronomy 19:19), this is an exception. This is because they can say: We did not come to testify in order to have her be executed; rather, we came to forbid her to her husband, as a betrothed or married woman who willingly engages in adulterous sexual intercourse is forbidden to her husband.

והא אתרו בה דלא אתרו בה ואי לא אתרו בה היכי מיקטלא

The Gemara challenges this ruling: But they must testify that they forewarned her before her transgression, and a forewarning includes apprising the transgressor of the punishment he or she will receive. How can the witnesses claim that they did not intend this result? The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥanan stated his halakha with regard to a case where they claim they did not forewarn her. The Gemara asks: But if they claim they did not forewarn her, how can she be killed? If she would not have been killed, there is no novelty to Rav Ḥanan’s statement that the witnesses are not killed.

באשה חבירה ואליבא דרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דתניא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר חבר אין צריך התראה לפי שלא נתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד

The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥanan stated his halakha with regard to a woman who is a ḥavera, knowledgeable in Torah, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver does not require forewarning in order to be liable for a transgression, because forewarning is given only in order to distinguish between an intentional and an unintentional act.

וכיון דאינהו לא מיקטלי איהי היכי מיקטלא הויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה וכל עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה לא שמה עדות

The Gemara asks further: But since the witnesses are not killed for their conspiratory testimony in the case of a ḥavera, how can she be killed for her action? Their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony, i.e., the witnesses cannot be punished for their testimony, and any testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony is not categorized as testimony.

הכי נמי קאמר מתוך שאין נהרגין שיכולין לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו אף היא אינה נהרגת דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה

The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying: Since the witnesses are not killed, as they can say: We came to forbid her to her husband, she is also not killed, since their testimony is testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony.

אלא באשה חבירה דקיימא לן דמיקטלא אליבא דרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה היכי משכחת לה כשזינתה וחזרה וזינתה

The Gemara challenges: But with regard to a woman who is a ḥavera, since we maintain that she can be killed without being forewarned, how can you find this occurring according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As there was no forewarning, the witnesses can claim that their intention was to forbid her to her husband. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery and then they testified that she again committed adultery. The witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was meant to forbid her to her husband, as she was already forbidden to him due to the first time she committed adultery.

והא יכולין לומר לאוסרה על בועלה שני באנו שזינתה מבועל ראשון אי נמי שזינתה מקרוביה

The Gemara questions this: But the witnesses can say: We come to forbid her to her second paramour. The halakha is that in addition to becoming forbidden to her husband, an adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her paramour. The witnesses can claim that this was their intent in testifying. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she again committed adultery with the first paramour, i.e., the second act was with the same paramour, to whom she was already forbidden. Alternatively, it is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery with one of her relatives, to whom she is forbidden regardless.

מאי שנא נערה מאורסה דנקט אפילו נשואה נמי אין אלא אפילו האי דלא יתבא תותיה יכולין לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו

The Gemara clarifies: What is different that Rav Ḥanan chose to state his halakha with regard to a betrothed young woman? His halakha could be stated with regard to a married woman as well. The Gemara answers: Yes, that is correct. But the novelty of this element of his ruling is that even with regard to this betrothed young woman, who does not live under her husband, the witnesses can say: We came to forbid her to her husband.

אמר רב חסדא אחד אומר בסייף הרגו ואחד אומר בארירן הרגו אין זה נכון אחד אומר כליו שחורין ואחד אומר כליו לבנים הרי זה נכון

§ Rav Ḥisda says: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.

מיתיבי ׳נכון׳ שיהא נכון אחד אומר ׳בסייף הרגו׳ ואחד אומר ׳בארירן הרגו׳ אחד אומר ׳כליו שחורין׳ ואחד אומר ׳כליו לבנים׳ אין זה ׳נכון׳ תרגמה רב חסדא בסודר שחנקו בו דהיינו סייף וארירן

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states with regard to testimony: “And behold it be truth, the matter certain” (Deuteronomy 17:4). The meaning of “certain” is that the testimony of the two witnesses must be congruent. If one witness says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, or if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda interpreted that baraita as speaking about a scarf with which the murderer strangled the victim, as this is the same as a contradiction with regard to a sword and an ariran. As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

תא שמע אחד אומר ׳סנדליו שחורין׳ ואחד אומר ׳סנדליו לבנים׳ אין זה ׳נכון׳ התם נמי כגון שבעט בו בסנדלו והרגו

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were black, and one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda can explain that there also, it is speaking of a case where the murderer kicked the victim with his sandal and killed him.

תא שמע מעשה ובדק בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנה אמר רמי בר חמא כגון שעקץ תאנה בשבת דעלה קא מיקטיל

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs, indicating that even a contradiction concerning a minor point such as this would render the testimony incongruent. The Gemara answers: Rami bar Ḥama said: It is speaking there of a case where he picked a fig on Shabbat, as he is killed for that act itself. Picking a fruit from its source of growth is an example of the forbidden labor of reaping, so the testimony about the characteristics of the fig is significant.

והא תניא אמרו לו ׳תחת תאנה הרגו׳ אלא אמר רמי בר חמא כגון ששפדו בייחור של תאנה

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When ben Zakkai asked the witnesses the question about the stems of figs, they said to him: The murderer killed the victim beneath a fig tree, indicating that it is speaking of a murder case? Rather, Rami bar Ḥama said: The mishna is speaking of a case where the murderer stabbed the victim with a branch of a fig tree. As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

תא שמע אמר להן ׳תאנה זו עוקציה דקין עוקציה גסין תאנים שחורות תאנים לבנות׳ אלא אמר רב יוסף מבן זכאי לותיב איניש שאני בן זכאי דבדיקות כחקירות משוי ליה

Come and hear a proof, as in that same examination ben Zakkai said to the witnesses: This fig tree about which you are testifying, were its stems thin or were its stems thick? Were the figs on it black or were the figs white? These questions concern the fruit itself, not the characteristics of a branch. Rather, Rav Yosef says: Should a person raise a difficulty from the conduct of ben Zakkai? Ben Zakkai is different, as he equated examinations with interrogations. According to ben Zakkai’s opinion, a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an examination is as significant as a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an interrogation, and it also renders the testimony incongruent.

מאן בן זכאי אילימא רבי יוחנן בן זכאי מי הוה בסנהדרי והתניא כל שנותיו של רבי יוחנן בן זכאי מאה ועשרים שנה ארבעים שנה עסק בפרקמטיא ארבעים שנה למד ארבעים שנה לימד

§ The Gemara clarifies: Who is the ben Zakkai mentioned in the mishna? If we say it is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, was he a member in a Sanhedrin that judged capital cases? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: All the years of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai were 120 years. For forty of those years he dealt in business [biferakmatya], for forty of those years he studied, and for forty of those years he taught and guided the Jewish people.

ותניא ארבעים שנה קודם חורבן הבית גלתה סנהדרין וישבה לה בחנות ואמר רבי יצחק בר אבודימי לומר שלא דנו דיני קנסות דיני קנסות סלקא דעתך אלא שלא דנו דיני נפשות

The Gemara continues its question: And it is taught in a baraita: Forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and sat in the store near the Temple Mount. And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: The intent of the statement concerning the relocation of the Sanhedrin is to say that they no longer judged laws of fines. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they no longer judged laws of fines? It is known that the Sanhedrin would judge laws of fines for hundreds of years after the destruction of the Temple. Rather, he must have said that the Sanhedrin no longer judged cases of capital law. Once the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone, the court’s power to judge capital cases was nullified.

ותנן משחרב בית המקדש התקין רבן יוחנן בן זכאי

The Gemara concludes its question: And since as we learned in a mishna (Sukka 41a): Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the mitzva of lulav should be performed even in the rest of the country for seven days in commemoration of the Temple, it is clear that he was in a position of prominence after the destruction of the Temple. Since the Sanhedrin ceased judging cases of capital law forty years before the destruction of the Temple, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was in a position of prominence for only forty years, he could not have been a judge in a capital case.

אלא בן זכאי דעלמא הכי נמי מסתברא דאי סלקא דעתך רבן יוחנן בן זכאי קרי ליה רבי בן זכאי

The Gemara suggests: Rather, one can say that it was merely a different person named ben Zakkai, not the well-known Sage of that name. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, as if it enters your mind that this was Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, would Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi call him ben Zakkai, without any title? He must have been referring to someone else.

והתניא מעשה ובדק רבן יוחנן בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנים אלא תלמיד היושב לפני רבו הוה ואמר מילתא ומסתבר להו טעמיה

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita explicitly: An incident occurred, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs? This proves that the Sage in question is Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. Rather, one can say that at that time, when this incident occurred, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was a student sitting before his teacher, and in those years the Sanhedrin was in its place and judged cases of capital law. And he said a matter in the course of examining the witnesses, and his reasoning was logical to them, and the judges asked his question,

וקבעוה בשמיה כי הוה למד בן זכאי הוה קרי ליה כתלמיד היושב לפני רבו כי הוה לימד הוה קרי ליה רבן יוחנן בן זכאי כי קרי ליה בן זכאי על שם דמעיקרא וכי קרי ליה רבן יוחנן בן זכאי על שם דהשתא

and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established it in the mishna in his name. When he was studying, they called him ben Zakkai, in the manner that they would call a student sitting before his teacher, and when he was teaching others they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. In terms of the baraita and the mishna, when they called him ben Zakkai in the Mishna, that was based on the name that he was called initially. And when they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in the other baraita, that was based on the name that he was called now.

מעשה ובדק כו׳ מה בין חקירות כו׳ מאי אפילו שנים אומרים פשיטא כי אמר אחד איני יודע עדותן קיימת כי אמרי בי תרי נמי עדותן קיימת

§ The mishna teaches: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs. What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two witnesses say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if two say? Isn’t it obvious? The mishna already stated that when one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, indicating that knowledge of the answers to these types of questions is not required. Accordingly, when two witnesses say that they do not know, their testimony stands as well. What is the novelty of this ruling?

אמר רב ששת ארישא קאי והכי קאמר בחקירות אפילו שנים אומרים ידענו ואחד אומר איני יודע עדותן בטילה כמאן כרבי עקיבא דמקיש שלשה לשנים

Rav Sheshet said: This clause is referring to the first clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the interrogations, even if two witnesses say: We know, and one additional witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares in all court proceedings three witnesses to two, holding that just as two witnesses must testify a fully valid testimony, so it is with three. Therefore, if the third witness does not know the answer to an interrogation, the testimony of all three is void.

אמר רבא והא עדותן קיימת קתני אלא אמר רבא הכי קאמר אפילו בחקירות שנים אומרים ידענו ואחד אומר איני יודע עדותן קיימת כמאן דלא כרבי עקיבא

Rava says: But the mishna teaches: Their testimony stands, not: Their testimony is void. Rather, Rava said: This is what the mishna is saying: Even with regard to the interrogations, if two witnesses say: We know, and one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as the court accepts the testimony of the two. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? Not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

רב כהנא ורב ספרא תנו סנהדרין בי רבה פגע בהו רמי בר חמא אמר להו מאי אמריתו בה בסנהדרין דבי רבה אמרי ליה ומאי אמרינן בה בסנהדרין גרידתא ומאי קשיא לך

The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana and Rav Safra studied tractate Sanhedrin in the school of Rabba. Rami bar Ḥama encountered them. Rami bar Ḥama said to them: What do you say concerning tractate Sanhedrin that you learned in the school of Rabba? Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: And what do we say concerning the regular tractate Sanhedrin? And what is difficult for you? Do you have a specific difficulty you would like answered?

אמר להו מהא דקתני ׳מה בין חקירות לבדיקות חקירות אחד אומר איני יודע עדותן בטילה בדיקות אמר אחד איני יודע ואפילו שנים אומרים אין אנו יודעים עדותן קיימת׳ מכדי אידי ואידי דאורייתא היא מאי שנא חקירות ומאי שנא בדיקות

Rami bar Ḥama said to them: I have a difficulty from that which is taught in the mishna: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Rami bar Ḥama asks: After all, this type of question and that type of question are required by Torah law; what is different about interrogations and what is different about examinations? Why is there a difference in halakha between the two?

אמרי ליה הכי השתא בחקירות אמר אחד ׳איני יודע׳ עדותן בטילה דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה בדיקות אמר אחד מהן ׳איני יודע׳ עדותן קיימת עדות שאתה יכול להזימה הוא

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: How can these cases be compared? With regard to the interrogations, if one witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as it is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. If the witnesses do not state a specific time and place, there is no way for other witnesses to claim that the first witnesses had been with them elsewhere at the time they claim the event occurred. By contrast, with regard to the examinations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as it is testimony that you can render conspiratory testimony.

אמר להו אי הכי אמריתו בה טובא אמריתו בה אמרי ליה מטיבותיה דמר אמרינן בה טובא מנזיהותיה דמר לא אמרינן בה ולא חדא

Rami bar Ḥama said to them: If you said an incisive statement like this about this tractate, you said much about it. Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: Due to the Master’s goodness, that is, due to your good will and desire to accept our answer to your question, we said much about it. But with the Master’s rebuke and challenge we would not say even one answer about it, i.e., if you had wished to criticize this answer you could have refuted it, and it would be as if we did not say any answer.

אחד אומר כו׳ עד כמה אמר רבי אחא בר חנינא אמר רבי אסי אמר רבי יוחנן עד רובו של חודש

§ The mishna teaches that if one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that one witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, while the other witness does not know of it. Their testimony is considered congruent. The Gemara asks: Until how many days into the month does the court assume that one of the witnesses does not know when the month began? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until the majority of the month has passed.

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא אחד אומר ׳בשלשה׳ ואחד אומר ׳בחמשה׳ עדותן בטילה ואמאי נימא שזה יודע בשני עיבורין וזה אינו יודע בשני עיבורין אלא לאו משום דברובה ידע

Rava says: We learn this in the mishna as well, as it teaches: If one witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void. But why is it void? Let us say that it not a contradiction, as this witness knows of two additions, i.e., that a day was added to the two previous months, and that witness does not know of the two additions. Rather, is it not void because once the majority of the month passed a witness knows what day it is, so that an error of two days cannot occur?

לעולם אימא לך ברובה נמי לא ידע ובשיפורא ידע בחד שיפורא אמר דטעי בתרי שיפורא לא אמר דטעי

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that a witness may not know the day even once the majority of the month has passed. The reason for the ruling of the mishna is that he knows about the shofar [ubeshipura], which the court would blow at the New Moon. It is possible that with regard to one blast of the shofar it could be said that he erred and was not aware of it. With regard to two blasts of the shofar it cannot be said that he erred. By contrast, in the case of the mishna here, perhaps as long as the witnesses are testifying about two consecutive days within one month, the error of one of them persisted throughout the month.

ואמר רבי אחא בר חנינא אמר רב אסי אמר רבי יוחנן עד כמה מברכין על החדש עד שתתמלא פגימתה וכמה אמר רב יעקב בר אידי אמר רב יהודה עד שבעה נהרדעי אמרי עד ששה עשר

§ Having cited a statement of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoḥanan, the Gemara cites another statement in his name: Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until how many days into a new month may one recite a blessing on the month, i.e., Birkat HaLevana? Until the flaw of the moon is filled, when it no longer appears deficient. And until how many days is that? Rav Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rav Yehuda says: Until seven days of the month have passed. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Until sixteen days of the month have passed.