This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
This week’s learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z”l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch.
Sanhedrin
Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
This week’s learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z”l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch.
Sanhedrin
Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.
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Sanhedrin 57
דִּכְתִיב: ״וַתִּשָּׁחֵת הָאָרֶץ לִפְנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים״. וְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר הַשְׁחָתָה, אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא דְּבַר עֶרְוָה וַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. דָּבָר עֶרְוָה – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הִשְׁחִית כׇּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ״. עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״פֶּן תַּשְׁחִתוּן וַעֲשִׂיתֶם וְגוֹ׳״.
as it is written: “And the earth was corrupt before God” (Genesis 6:11), presumably referring to a transgression, and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Anywhere that the term corruption is stated, it is referring to nothing other than a matter of licentiousness and idol worship. The Gemara cites proofs for this claim: Corruption refers to a matter of licentiousness, as it is stated: “For all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth” (Genesis 6:12); the word “way” alludes to sexual intercourse. And corruption also refers to idol worship, as it is written: “Lest you deal corruptly, and make you a graven image” (Deuteronomy 4:16).
וְאִידָּךְ, אוֹרְחַיְיהוּ דְּקָא מְגַלֵּי.
The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im, who do not derive from the verse “And the earth was corrupt before God” that the descendants of Noah are prohibited from engaging in idol worship and forbidden sexual relations, interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the verse merely exposes the behavior of the generation of Noah.
שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם וְגוֹ׳״. וְאִידַּךְ? קְטָלַיְיהוּ הוּא דְּקָמְגַלֵּי.
According to the school of Menashe, the prohibition of bloodshed for the descendants of Noah is stated separately in the Torah, as it is written: “One who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the verse reveals the type of death penalty administered to the descendants of Noah, but it is not the source for the prohibition of bloodshed.
גָּזֵל, דִּכְתִיב: ״כְּיֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב נָתַתִּי לָכֶם אֶת כֹּל״. וְאָמַר רַבִּי לֵוִי: כְּיֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב, וְלֹא כְּיֶרֶק גִּנָּה. וְאִידַּךְ? הָהוּא לְמִישְׁרֵי בָּשָׂר הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
The prohibition of robbery is stated, according to the school of Menashe, as it is written: “Every moving thing that is alive shall be for food for you; like the green herbs I have given you all” (Genesis 9:3). And Rabbi Levi says: Like the green herbs that sprout all over by themselves and are ownerless, and not like the vegetation of a garden, which belongs to the garden’s owner alone. This indicates that robbery is prohibited. The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that verse comes to permit the consumption of meat.
אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, דִּכְתִיב: ״אַךְ בָּשָׂר בְּנַפְשׁוֹ דָמוֹ לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״. וְאִידַּךְ? הָהוּא לְמִישְׁרֵי שְׁרָצִים הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
The prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Only flesh with its life, which is its blood, you shall not eat” (Genesis 9:4), i.e., it is prohibited to eat flesh while the animal that it comes from is still alive. And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? In their opinion, that verse comes to permit eating a limb from living creeping animals; this prohibition does not apply to creeping animals (see 59b).
סֵירוּס, דִּכְתִיב: ״שִׁרְצוּ בָאָרֶץ וּרְבוּ בָהּ״. וְאִידַּךְ? לִבְרָכָה בְּעָלְמָא.
The prohibition of castration that applies to the descendants of Noah is stated, as it is written: “And you be fruitful and multiply, swarm in the earth and multiply in it” (Genesis 9:7), indicating that nothing may be done to prevent reproduction. And the other tanna’im hold that this verse is written merely as a blessing, not as a mitzva.
כִּלְאַיִם, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵהָעוֹף לְמִינֵהוּ״. וְאִידַּךְ? הָהוּא לְצַוְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא.
The prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to the descendants of Noah is stated, as it is written: “Of the fowl after their kind and of the cattle after their kind, of every creeping thing of the ground after its kind” (Genesis 6:20), indicating that each species must be kept separate, and that crossbreeding is prohibited. And according to the other tanna’im, that verse does not indicate a mitzva; rather, the reason for keeping the species separate in Noah’s Ark was merely for the sake of companionship, as animals are most comfortable in the company of other members of their own species.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב, עַל שָׁלֹשׁ מִצְוֹת בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג (גֶּשֶׁר סִימָן) – עַל גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת, וְעַל שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, וְעַל בִּרְכַּת הַשֵּׁם.
Rav Yosef says: They say in the study hall that a descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing three mitzvot, which are represented by the letters gimmel, shin, reish in a mnemonic device: For forbidden sexual relations, for bloodshed, and for blessing, i.e., cursing, the name of God.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, דִּכְתִיב ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם וְגוֹ׳״, אֶלָּא הָנָךְ מְנָא לְהוּ?
Rav Sheshet objects to this statement: Granted, a descendant of Noah is executed for bloodshed, as it is written: “One who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). But with regard to those other prohibitions, from where do the Sages derive that a descendant of Noah who transgresses them is executed?
אִי גָּמַר מִשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, אֲפִילּוּ כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי. אִי מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיתְרַבַּאי מֵ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״, עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָמֵי אִיתְרַבַּי מֵ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״.
If they derive it from the punishment for bloodshed by means of an analogy, then descendants of Noah should be executed even if they transgressed any of the other Noahide mitzvot. If they are executed because they are included in the term “anyone” and similarly, the term “no one” stated with regard to these two prohibitions, as it is stated with regard to cursing the name of God: “Anyone who curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15), and it is stated with regard to forbidden sexual relations: “No one shall approach any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6), then gentiles should be executed for idol worship too, as they are included in the term “anyone” stated in that context (see Leviticus 20:2).
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב, עַל אַרְבַּע מִצְוֹת בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג.
Rather, Rav Sheshet says that Rav Yosef’s version should be rejected, and that this is what they say in the study hall: A descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing four mitzvot; the three that were listed, and idol worship.
וְעַל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג? וְהָתַנְיָא: בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מְמִיתִין עֲלֵיהֶן – בֶּן נֹחַ מוּזְהָר עֲלֵיהֶן. אַזְהָרָה – אִין, מִיתָה – לָא! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַזְהָרָה שֶׁלָּהֶן – זוֹ הִיא מִיתָתָן.
The Gemara asks: And is a descendant of Noah executed for idol worship? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to idol worship, matters for which a Jewish court executes the transgressor are prohibited to a descendant of Noah. The Gemara infers: Yes, there is a prohibition for a descendant of Noah, but there is no death penalty. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Their prohibition is their death penalty. Since the only punishment mentioned in the Torah for transgressing a Noahide mitzva is execution, any descendant of Noah who transgresses is liable to be executed.
רַב הוּנָא וְרַב יְהוּדָה וְכוּלְּהוּ תַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב אָמְרִי: עַל שֶׁבַע מִצְוֹת בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג. גַּלִּי רַחֲמָנָא בַּחֲדָא, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכוּלְּהוּ.
Rav Huna, Rav Yehuda, and all of the other students of Rav say: A descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing any of the seven Noahide mitzvot; the Merciful One revealed this punishment with regard to one mitzva, the prohibition of bloodshed, and the same is true with regard to all of them.
וְעַל הַגָּזֵל בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג? וְהָתַנְיָא: עַל הַגָּזֵל, גָּנַב וְגָזַל, וְכֵן יְפַת תּוֹאַר, וְכֵן כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן – גּוֹי בְּגוֹי וְגוֹי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אָסוּר, וְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּגוֹי מוּתָּר. וְאִם אִיתָא, נִיתְנֵי ״חַיָּיב״!
The Gemara asks: But is a descendant of Noah executed for robbery? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the following types of robbery: One who steals or robs, and likewise one who engages in intercourse with a married beautiful woman who was taken as a prisoner of war, and likewise all actions similar to these, if they are done by a gentile to another gentile, or by a gentile to a Jew, the action is prohibited; but if a Jew does so to a gentile, it is permitted? The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so that a gentile is liable to be executed for robbery, and it is not merely prohibited to him, let the baraita teach that he is liable to be executed.
מִשּׁוּם דְּקָבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: ״יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּגוֹי מוּתָּר״, תְּנָא רֵישָׁא: ״אָסוּר״.
The Gemara answers: Because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause that if a Jew does so to a gentile, it is permitted, he taught in the former clause that if a gentile does one of these, it is prohibited. If the baraita were to state that if a gentile does so, he is liable, it would have to state that if a Jew does so to a gentile, he is exempt, because this is the opposite of liable. That would indicate that it is actually prohibited for a Jew to do so to a gentile, and that he is merely exempt from liability, which is not the case. Therefore, the word prohibited is used with regard to a gentile. Therefore, this does not prove that a gentile is exempt from capital punishment.
וְהָא כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ חִיּוּבָא מִיתְנָא קָתָנֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: עַל שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים – גּוֹי בְּגוֹי וְגוֹי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל חַיָּיב, יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּגוֹי פָּטוּר.
The Gemara challenges: But wherever there is liability for capital punishment, this tanna teaches it; as it is taught in the first clause: With regard to bloodshed, if a gentile murders another gentile, or a gentile murders a Jew, he is liable. If a Jew murders a gentile, he is exempt. Evidently, the term liable is used in the baraita.
הָתָם, הֵיכִי לִיתְנֵי? לִיתְנֵי ״אָסוּר״ וּ״מוּתָּר״? וְהָתַנְיָא: גּוֹי, וְרוֹעֵי בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה – לֹא מַעֲלִין וְלֹא מוֹרִידִין.
The Gemara answers: There, in that case, how should the tanna teach it? Should he teach it using the terms prohibited and permitted, indicating that a Jew may kill a gentile ab initio? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that with regard to a gentile, and likewise with regard to Jewish shepherds of small livestock, who were typically robbers, one may not raise them out of a pit into which they fell, and one may not lower them into a pit? In other words, one may not rescue them from danger, but neither may one kill them ab initio. With regard to robbery, the term permitted is relevant, as it is permitted for a Jew to rob a gentile.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ בְּגָזֵל, מַאי הִיא? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְפוֹעֵל בַּכֶּרֶם.
The Gemara returns to discuss the details of the prohibition of robbery mentioned in the baraita, which included actions similar to it. The Gemara asks: With regard to robbery, to what actions similar to it is the baraita referring? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It is necessary only to teach the halakha of a laborer working in a vineyard who eats from the fruit of the vineyard; his action is similar to robbery, and it is prohibited for a gentile to do so.
פּוֹעֵל בַּכֶּרֶם אֵימַת? אִי בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר מְלָאכָה – הֶתֵּירָא הוּא, אִי לָאו בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר מְלָאכָה – גָּזֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא.
The Gemara asks: When does this laborer in a vineyard eat from the fruit? If he does so at the time of the completion of the work, i.e., while he is harvesting the fruit, it is permitted for him to do so, just as a Jew working for another Jew is allowed to do so. If it is not at the time of the completion of its work, eating the fruit is full-fledged robbery, and there is no novel element to this case.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. אִי הָכִי, גּוֹי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אָסוּר? הָא בַּר מְחִילָה הוּא! נְהִי דְּבָתַר הָכִי מָחֵיל לֵיהּ, צַעֲרָא בְּשַׁעְתֵּיהּ מִי לֵית לֵיהּ?
Rather, Rav Pappa says that the mention in the baraita of actions similar to robbery is necessary only to teach the halakha of one who robs another of less than the value of one peruta. The Gemara asks: If so, why does the baraita state that it is prohibited for a gentile to do so to a Jew? Isn’t a Jew apt to forgive such a tiny debt? Why is this considered robbery? The Gemara answers: Although afterward the owner forgives him, does he not incur distress at the time of the robbery? Consequently, at the time of the robbery the robber commits a transgression and is liable to be punished for it.
גּוֹי בְּגוֹי כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן, כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו בְּנֵי מְחִילָה נִינְהוּ – גָּזֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא.
The Gemara challenges: If the mention of actions similar to robbery is referring to the robbery of less than the value of one peruta, what is the novel element in the case of a gentile who robs a gentile? Since they are not apt to grant forgiveness, robbing a gentile of even a minuscule amount is considered full-fledged robbery, and not merely similar to robbery.
אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְכוֹבֵשׁ שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר. גּוֹי בְּגוֹי וְגוֹי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל – אָסוּר; יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּגוֹי – מוּתָּר.
Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says that there is a different explanation: It is necessary only to teach the halakha of one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer; for a gentile to do so to another gentile and for a gentile to do so to a Jew is prohibited, but for a Jew to do so to a gentile is permitted. This case is less obvious than other types of robbery, as instead of taking an item from the victim, the robber withholds money that is due to the victim.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בִּיפַת תּוֹאַר, מַאי הִיא? כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: בֶּן נֹחַ שֶׁיִּיחֵד שִׁפְחָה לְעַבְדּוֹ וּבָא עָלֶיהָ – נֶהֱרָג עָלֶיהָ.
The Gemara clarifies further: What is the action that is similar to engaging in intercourse with a beautiful woman who is a prisoner of war, to which the baraita is referring? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of a descendant of Noah who designated a maidservant as a mate for his slave, and then he himself engaged in intercourse with her, he is executed on her account. Although the maidservant is his property and is not the slave’s full-fledged wife, nevertheless, he is guilty of adultery.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ דִּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים לָא תַּנְיָא. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן שָׁאוּל הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: רוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְהוֹרְגוֹ, וְיָכוֹל לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו וְלֹא הִצִּיל –
The Gemara comments: The baraita does not teach that a descendant of Noah is liable for actions similar to bloodshed. Abaye says: If you find a baraita that teaches this, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a person pursues another to kill him, and the one being pursued can save himself by injuring one of the limbs of the pursuer, but he does not save himself in this manner and instead kills the pursuer,
נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו.
he is executed for killing him even though he acted in self-defense, and a descendant of Noah is also killed for this.
אַשְׁכַּח רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אַחָא דַּהֲוָה כְּתִיב בְּסֵפֶר אַגַּדְתָּא דְּבֵי רַב: בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג בְּדַיָּין אֶחָד, וּבְעֵד אֶחָד, שֶׁלֹּא בְּהַתְרָאָה, מִפִּי אִישׁ וְלֹא מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, וַאֲפִילּוּ קָרוֹב. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ: אַף עַל הָעוּבָּרִין.
§ Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa found that it was written in a book of Aggadot in the study hall of Rav: Contrary to the halakha with regard to a Jew, a descendant of Noah is executed on the basis of the verdict of even one judge, and by the testimony of even one witness, and without being given forewarning before committing the transgression. He can be judged or testified against only by the mouth of a man and not by the mouth of a woman; but even a relative may judge his case or testify against him. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that a descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses.
מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: דְּאָמַר קְרָא, ״אַךְ אֶת דִּמְכֶם לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם אֶדְרֹשׁ״, אֲפִילּוּ בְּדַיָּין אֶחָד.
The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “And your blood of your lives I will require; at the hand of every animal I will require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man’s brother, I will require the life of man” (Genesis 9:5). It is derived from the term “I will require,” which is stated in the singular, that a descendant of Noah is executed on the basis of the verdict of even one judge.
״מִיָּד כׇּל חַיָּה״, אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהַתְרָאָה. ״אֶדְרְשֶׁנּוּ וּמִיַּד הָאָדָם״, אֲפִילּוּ בְּעֵד אֶחָד. ״מִיַּד אִישׁ״, וְלֹא מִיַּד אִשָּׁה. ״אָחִיו״, אֲפִילּוּ קָרוֹב.
It is derived from the phrase “at the hand of every animal” that one is executed even without forewarning, as an animal certainly cannot forewarn someone. It is derived from the phrase “I will require it; and at the hand of man,” with “I” stated in the singular, that the sentence is issued on the basis of the testimony of even one witness. It is derived from the phrase “at the hand of every man,” that the judgment and testimony must be at the hand of a man, but not at the hand of a woman. It is derived from the term “his brother” that the testimony of the witness is accepted even if he is a relative of the defendant.
מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ: אַף עַל הָעוּבָּרִין. מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל? דִּכְתִיב: ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״. אֵיזֶהוּ אָדָם שֶׁהוּא בָּאָדָם? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה עוּבָּר שֶׁבִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ.
It is stated in that book of Aggadot that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: A descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: It is derived from that which is written: “One who sheds the blood of a person, by a person [ba’adam] his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The word ba’adam literally means: In a person, and is interpreted homiletically: What is a person that is in a person? You must say: This is a fetus that is in its mother’s womb. Accordingly, a descendant of Noah is liable for killing a fetus.
וְתַנָּא קַמָּא תַּנָּא דְבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה הוּא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל מִיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה לִבְנֵי נֹחַ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא חֶנֶק, וּשְׁדִי לֵיהּ הַאי ״בָּאָדָם״ אַסֵּיפֵיהּ דִּקְרָא, וּדְרוֹשׁ בֵּיהּ הָכִי: ״בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״ – אֵיזֶהוּ שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים שֶׁל אָדָם שֶׁהוּא בְּגוּפוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה חֶנֶק.
The Gemara comments: And the first tanna, who does not derive the halakha concerning fetuses, is the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says that all death penalties stated with regard to the descendants of Noah are referring to nothing other than strangulation. And he interprets this verse as follows: Cast, i.e., redirect, this term: “In a person,” and explain it with regard to the latter part of the verse, and interpret it homiletically like this: “In a person, his blood shall be shed.” In what manner is a person’s blood shed while it is in the person’s body, without external bleeding? You must say that this is strangulation. It is therefore derived that the execution of a descendant of Noah is by strangulation.
מֵתִיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: וְאִשָּׁה לָא מִפַּקְדָה? וְהָכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְדַעְתִּיו לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה וְגוֹ׳״!
Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to the statement in the book of Aggadot that a descendant of Noah can be judged or testified against only by a man and not by a woman: And is a woman who is a descendant of Noah not commanded to establish courts of judgment? But isn’t it written with regard to Abraham, who at that point had the status of a descendant of Noah: “For I have known him, to the end that he may command his sons and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do righteousness and justice” (Genesis 18:19). The word “household” is referring to the women, indicating that they are also commanded to execute justice.
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ: ״בָּנָיו״ – לְדִין, ״בֵּיתוֹ״ – לִצְדָקָה.
He raises the objection and he resolves it: Abraham commanded his sons to carry out justice, whereas his household, the women in his family, he commanded to give charity; the Hebrew word for righteousness [tzedek] can also mean charity [tzedaka].
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַוְיָא סָבָא לְרַב פָּפָּא: אֵימָא בַּת נֹחַ שֶׁהָרְגָה לֹא תֵּיהָרֵג, ״מִיַּד אִישׁ״, וְלֹא ״מִיַּד אִשָּׁה״ כְּתִיב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
Rav Avya the Elder said to Rav Pappa: Why not say that a female descendant of Noah who killed someone should not be executed; as it is written: “At the hand of every man,” and not “at the hand of every woman”? Rav Pappa said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda says: It is derived from the phrase “one who sheds the blood of a person” that one who murders is liable to be executed in any case, whether that person is male or female.
אֵימָא: בַּת נֹחַ שֶׁזִּינְּתָה לֹא תֵּיהָרֵג, דִּכְתִיב ״עַל כֵּן יַעֲזׇב אִישׁ״ וְלֹא אִשָּׁה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: ״וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד״ – הֲדַר עָרְבִינְהוּ קְרָא.
Rav Avya asked further: Why not say that a female descendant of Noah who committed adultery should not be executed, as it is written: “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh” (Genesis 2:24); a man, but not a woman? Rav Pappa said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda says: At the end of the verse it states: “And they shall be one flesh.” The verse then combines men and women, indicating that the same halakha applies to both.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַגּוֹיִים, שֶׁמּוּזְהָרִין עַל הָעֲרָיוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “No one [ish ish] shall approach any that is kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6): The verse could have stated: One [ish] shall not approach. Why must the verse state “no one”? It is to include the gentiles, who are prohibited from engaging in forbidden sexual relations, as Jews are.
וְהָא מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא! ״לֵאמֹר״ – זֶה גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת.
The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here? It is derived from there, from the verse that was already interpreted as teaching this halakha: “And the Lord God commanded the man, saying” (Genesis 2:16), this alludes to forbidden sexual relations (see 56b).
הָתָם בַּעֲרָיוֹת דִּידְהוּ, וְהָכָא בַּעֲרָיוֹת דִּידַן, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: בָּא עַל עֲרָיוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל – נִידּוֹן בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל.
The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to their women, gentiles, with whom relations are forbidden. And here it is referring to our women, Jews, with whom relations are forbidden. In other words, a gentile who engages in intercourse with a married Jewish woman is liable. As it is taught in the latter clause of the baraita: If a gentile engages in intercourse with those Jewish women with whom relations are forbidden, i.e., a married Jewish woman, he is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews.
לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לָעֵדָה, וְעֵדִים, וְהַתְרָאָה.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this gentile judged according to the halakhot of the Jews? Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The statement of the baraita is necessary only to teach these halakhot: That he must be judged by a Sanhedrin, and that he is punished only if two witnesses testify concerning him, and only if he was issued a forewarning before his transgression.
מִגְרָע גָּרַע?
The Gemara asks: Should the halakha of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a forbidden Jewish woman be less stringent than that of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a forbidden gentile woman, in which case these conditions do not apply?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹחָנָן: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה, דִּלְדִידְהוּ לֵית לְהוּ, דְּדָיְינִינַן לְהוּ בְּדִינָא דִּידַן.
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement of the baraita is necessary only to teach the halakha in the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young Jewish woman, which does not apply to gentiles. By halakha, only marriage applies to gentiles, not betrothal. Therefore, we judge them according to our halakha in that case.
אֲבָל אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, בְּדִינָא דִּידְהוּ דָּיְינִינַן לְהוּ? וְהָתַנְיָא: בָּא עַל נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה – נִידּוֹן בִּסְקִילָה, עַל אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ – נִידּוֹן בְּחֶנֶק. וְאִי בְּדִינָא דִּידְהוּ, סַיִיף הוּא!
The Gemara asks: And with regard to gentiles who engage in intercourse with a married Jewish woman, do we judge them according to their halakha? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a gentile engages in intercourse with a betrothed young Jewish woman, he is punished by stoning; if he engages in intercourse with a married Jewish woman he is punished by strangulation? The Gemara explains its question: And if they are judged according to their halakha, he would be executed by the sword.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַאי אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ דְּקָתָנֵי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה, דִּלְדִידְהוּ לֵית לְהוּ. דָּיְינִינַן לְהוּ בְּדִינָא דִּידַן.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of the phrase: A married woman, which the tanna teaches? It is referring to a case where the woman had entered the wedding canopy but had not yet engaged in intercourse with her husband, in which case she is considered married according to the halakhot that apply to Jews but not according to the halakhot that apply to gentiles. Since with regard to gentiles, marriage has not yet taken effect, we judge them according to our halakhot. Therefore, a gentile who engages in intercourse with such a Jewish woman is executed by strangulation.
דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: בְּעוּלַת בַּעַל – יֵשׁ לָהֶן, נִכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה – אֵין לָהֶן.
As Rabbi Ḥanina teaches: Gentiles can have the status of a married woman who has engaged in intercourse with her husband, i.e., such a woman is considered married according to their laws, but they cannot have the status of a married woman who has entered the wedding canopy but has not engaged in intercourse with her husband.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל עֶרְוָה שֶׁבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מְמִיתִין עָלֶיהָ – בֶּן נֹחַ מוּזְהָר עָלֶיהָ. אֵין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מְמִיתִין עָלֶיהָ – אֵין בֶּן נֹחַ מוּזְהָר עָלֶיהָ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַרְבֵּה עֲרָיוֹת יֵשׁ שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מְמִיתִין עֲלֵיהֶן, וּבֶן נֹחַ מוּזְהָר עֲלֵיהֶן.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court administers capital punishment are prohibited to a descendant of Noah, and any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court does not administer capital punishment are not prohibited to a descendant of Noah; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: There are many types of forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court does not administer capital punishment and are nevertheless prohibited to a descendant of Noah.
בָּא עַל עֲרָיוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל – נִידּוֹן בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. בָּא עַל עֲרָיוֹת בֶּן נֹחַ – נִידּוֹן בְּדִינֵי בֶּן נֹחַ. וְאָנוּ אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה בִּלְבַד.
If a gentile engages in intercourse with those Jews with whom relations are forbidden, he is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews. If he engages in intercourse with those descendants of Noah with whom relations are forbidden, he is judged according to the halakhot of the descendants of Noah. And we have only the case of a betrothed young woman as a case where a gentile is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
וְנִחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי נִכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה? הַאי תַּנָּא תַּנָּא דְבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה הוּא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל מִיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה לִבְנֵי נֹחַ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא חֶנֶק. אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חֶנֶק הוּא.
The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also count the case of a woman who had entered the wedding canopy but had not yet engaged in intercourse with her husband. The Gemara explains: This tanna is the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says that all death penalties stated with regard to the descendants of Noah are referring to nothing other than strangulation, and since the punishment in Jewish halakha for engaging in intercourse with a married woman is also strangulation, both this punishment and that punishment are strangulation; there is no difference between the halakha for Jews and the halakha for gentiles in such a case.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: כׇּל עֶרְוָה שֶׁבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מְמִיתִין עָלֶיהָ, בֶּן נֹחַ מוּזְהָר עָלֶיהָ? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: גֵּר
With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir stated in the first clause of the baraita, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir hold that any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court administers capital punishment are prohibited to a descendant of Noah? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert