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Today’s Daf — Zevachim 34 / 10.18.2025 / כ״ו בתשרי תשפ״ו

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Sanhedrin 6

12.23.2024 | כ״ב בכסלו תשפ״ה

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12.22.2024 | כ״א בכסלו תשפ״ה

This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”

Sanhedrin

Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.

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12.22.2024 | כ״א בכסלו תשפ״ה

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Today’s daf is sponsored in honor of Marcel Loewenberg on his 75th birthday, with love from his children and grandchildren. “We are grateful for the joy of Torah learning you’ve instilled in us.”

While Shmuel maintains that a ruling by two judges is valid, Rabbi Abahu disagrees with this position. Rabbi Abba challenges Rabbi Abahu’s view from a Mishna in Bechorot 28b, which appears to validate even a single judge’s ruling. This apparent contradiction is resolved by explaining that the Mishna refers to a specific case where both litigants explicitly accepted the authority of the single judge to rule on their case.

The Mishna in Bechorot addresses a case where the litigants accepted a judge’s authority, but he subsequently made an error in his ruling and became liable for any resulting losses. However, if his mistake involved ruling contrary to an explicit Mishna, he bears no liability since such a ruling is automatically void. Consequently, the Gemara concludes that the judge’s error must have involved a matter of judgment – specifically, determining which opinion to follow.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis dispute whether mediation requires one or three people. The Gemara initially suggests that this debate parallels the disagreement between Rabbi Abahu and Shmuel, as mediation is likened to judgment based on the verse in Samuel II 8:15. However, this parallel is ultimately rejected. Instead, their disagreement centers on whether mediation should be equated with formal judgment at all. Rav Acha explains that the requirement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel for two people in mediation serves only to ensure proper witnessing of the proceedings – in principle, a single mediator would suffice.

Is it necessary to perform a kinyan, act of acquisition, in a mediation proceeding?

If judges have concluded proceedings (gmar din) in a case, they can no longer switch to mediation. Rav later provides a precise definition of what constitutes gmar din.

The text then explores several fundamental questions regarding mediation and compromise: Is it merely permitted or actually preferred? Could it sometimes be forbidden? If mediation is permitted, at what stage in the legal proceedings does this option expire? Multiple opinions are presented addressing these questions.

In Tehillim 10:3 it says that God scorns a botzea who blesses or one who blesses a botzea. Three different interpretations of that verse are brought – one of which relates to mediation and how it is despised by God.

The Gemara also explores multiple interpretations of two other relevant verses: Samuel II 8:15, which discusses the relationship between law and charity, and Deuteronomy 1:17, which instructs judges not to fear any person.

The discussion concludes with several statements emphasizing the gravity of judicial responsibility and the solemnity with which judges must approach their rulings.

This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”

Sanhedrin

Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.

Sanhedrin 6

וְכִי תֵּימָא: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין! גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית?

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: דָּן אֶת הַדִּין וְזִיכָּה אֶת הַחַיָּיב, וְחִיֵּיב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי, טִימֵּא אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, טִיהֵר אֶת הַטָּמֵא – מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, וּמְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ.

§ Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? דְּקַיבְּלוּהוּ עֲלַיְיהוּ. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי מְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ? דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: דָּיְינַתְּ לַן דִּין תּוֹרָה.

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סָפְרָא לְרַבִּי אַבָּא: דִּטְעָה בְּמַאי? אִילֵימָא דִּטְעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה, וְהָאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר? אֶלָּא דִּטְעָה בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת.

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן תְּרֵי תַנָּאֵי וּתְרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי דִּפְלִיגִי אַהֲדָדֵי, וְלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּמָר וְלָא כְּמָר, וְסוּגְיַין דְּעָלְמָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וַעֲבַד כְּאִידַּךְ – הַיְינוּ שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: בִּיצּוּעַ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פְּשָׁרָה בְּיָחִיד. סַבְרוּהָ, לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין.

§ The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁנַיִם? לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין, וּמָר סָבַר לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין.

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

לֵימָא: תְּלָתָא תַּנָּאֵי בִּפְשָׁרָה, דְּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁנַיִם, וּמָר סָבַר בְּיָחִיד. אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יֵימַר בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא: מַאן דְּאָמַר תְּרֵי – אֲפִילּוּ חַד נָמֵי, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר תְּרֵי – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהְווֹ עֲלֵיהּ סָהֲדִי.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ פְּשָׁרָה אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צְרִיכָה – תְּלָתָא לְמָה לִי? תִּסְגֵּי בִּתְרֵי וְלִיקְנֵי מִינֵּיהּ! וְהִלְכְתָא: פְּשָׁרָה צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן.

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, כָּךְ בִּיצּוּעַ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

נִגְמַר הַדִּין, אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לִבְצוֹעַ.

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

סרמ״ש בנק״ש סִימָן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אָסוּר לִבְצוֹעַ, וְכׇל הַבּוֹצֵעַ – הֲרֵי זֶה חוֹטֵא, וְכׇל הַמְבָרֵךְ אֶת הַבּוֹצֵעַ – הֲרֵי זֶה מְנָאֵץ. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״בֹּצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3).

אֶלָּא יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הַמִּשְׁפָּט לֵאלֹהִים הוּא״. וְכֵן מֹשֶׁה הָיָה אוֹמֵר: יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר. אֲבָל אַהֲרֹן אוֹהֵב שָׁלוֹם וְרוֹדֵף שָׁלוֹם, וּמֵשִׂים שָׁלוֹם בֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵירוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״תּוֹרַת אֱמֶת הָיְתָה בְּפִיהוּ וְעַוְלָה לֹא נִמְצָא בִשְׂפָתָיו בְּשָׁלוֹם וּבְמִישׁוֹר הָלַךְ אִתִּי וְרַבִּים הֵשִׁיב מֵעָוֹן״.

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁגָּזַל סְאָה שֶׁל חִטִּים, וּטְחָנָהּ וַאֲפָאָהּ וְהִפְרִישׁ מִמֶּנָּה חַלָּה, כֵּיצַד מְבָרֵךְ? אֵין זֶה מְבָרֵךְ אֶלָּא מְנָאֵץ. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״וּבֹצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא נֶאֱמַר ״בּוֹצֵעַ״ אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יְהוּדָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה אֶל אֶחָיו מַה בֶּצַע כִּי נַהֲרֹג אֶת אָחִינוּ״. וְכׇל הַמְבָרֵךְ אֶת יְהוּדָה – הֲרֵי זֶה מְנָאֵץ, וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״וּבֹצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: מִצְוָה לִבְצוֹעַ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֱמֶת וּמִשְׁפַּט שָׁלוֹם שִׁפְטוּ בְּשַׁעֲרֵיכֶם״. וַהֲלֹא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ מִשְׁפָּט – אֵין שָׁלוֹם, וּבִמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם – אֵין מִשְׁפָּט? אֶלָּא אֵיזֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁלוֹם? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה בִּיצּוּעַ.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְהִי דָוִד עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה״. וַהֲלֹא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ מִשְׁפָּט – אֵין צְדָקָה, וּצְדָקָה – אֵין מִשְׁפָּט? אֶלָּא אֵיזֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ צְדָקָה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה בִּיצּוּעַ.

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

אֲתָאן לְתַנָּא קַמָּא. דָּן אֶת הַדִּין, זִיכָּה אֶת הַזַּכַּאי וְחִיֵּיב אֶת הַחַיָּיב. וְרָאָה שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב עָנִי מָמוֹן, וְשִׁלֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ – זֶה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה.

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה: מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹן, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁשִּׁילֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ. וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְהִי דָוִד עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה לְכׇל עַמּוֹ״. מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ אֶת מָמוֹנוֹ, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁשִּׁילֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ.

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי: הַאי ״לְכׇל עַמּוֹ״ – לַעֲנִיִּים מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁילֵּם מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, זֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה. מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה: מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹנוֹ, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁהוֹצִיא גְּזֵילָה מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ.

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לְפָנֶיךָ לַדִּין, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן, אוֹ מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן דִּין נוֹטֶה – אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״צְאוּ וּבִצְעוּ״. מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן הַדִּין נוֹטֶה – אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״צְאוּ וּבִצְעוּ״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״פּוֹטֵר מַיִם רֵאשִׁית מָדוֹן וְלִפְנֵי הִתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב נְטוֹשׁ״. קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב – אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְנׇטְשׁוֹ; מִשֶּׁנִּתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב – אִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְנׇטְשׁוֹ.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לַדִּין, אֶחָד רַךְ וְאֶחָד קָשֶׁה, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶם, אוֹ מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאֵין אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן דִּין נוֹטֶה – אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶם: ״אֵין אֲנִי נִזְקָק לָכֶם״, שֶׁמָּא נִתְחַיֵּיב חָזָק וְנִמְצָא חָזָק רוֹדְפוֹ. מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן הַדִּין נוֹטֶה – אִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״אֵינִי נִזְקָק לָכֶם״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תָגוּרוּ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ״.

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17).

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִין לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְרָאָה זְכוּת לֶעָנִי וְחוֹבָה לֶעָשִׁיר, מִנַּיִין שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתּוֹק? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תָגוּרוּ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ״. רַבִּי חָנִין אוֹמֵר: לֹא תַּכְנִיס דְּבָרֶיךָ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ. וִיהוּ עֵדִים יוֹדְעִים אֶת מִי הֵן מְעִידִין, וְלִפְנֵי מִי הֵן מְעִידִין, וּמִי עָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מֵהֶן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר לָהֶם הָרִיב לִפְנֵי ה׳״.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17).

וִיהוּ הַדַּיָּינִין יוֹדְעִין אֶת מִי הֵן דָּנִין, וְלִפְנֵי מִי הֵן דָּנִין, וּמִי עָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מֵהֶן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֱלֹהִים נִצָּב בַּעֲדַת אֵל״. וְכֵן בִּיהוֹשָׁפָט הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל הַשֹּׁפְטִים רְאוּ מָה אַתֶּם עֹשִׂים כִּי לֹא לְאָדָם תִּשְׁפְּטוּ כִּי אִם לַה׳״. שֶׁמָּא יֹאמַר הַדַּיָּין: מָה לִי בְּצַעַר הַזֶּה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עִמָּכֶם בִּדְבַר מִשְׁפָּט״. אֵין לוֹ לַדַּיָּין אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁעֵינָיו רוֹאוֹת.

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי גְּמַר דִּין? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה חַיָּיב, אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה זַכַּאי. אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה. אִינִי? וְהָא רַב הוּנָא תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרַב הֲוָה! כִּי הֲוָה אָתוּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר לְהוּ: אִי דִּינָא בָּעֵיתוּ, אִי פְּשָׁרָה בָּעֵיתוּ? מַאי ״מִצְוָה״ נָמֵי דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה?

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?

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Diana Bloom

Diana Bloom

Tampa, United States

A Gemara shiur previous to the Hadran Siyum, was the impetus to attend it.It was highly inspirational and I was smitten. The message for me was התלמוד בידינו. I had decided along with my Chahsmonaim group to to do the daf and take it one daf at time- without any expectations at all. There has been a wealth of information, insights and halachik ideas. It is truly exercise of the mind, heart & Soul

Phyllis Hecht.jpeg

Phyllis Hecht

Hashmonaim, Israel

I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .

Martha Tarazi

Martha Tarazi

Panama, Panama

Retirement and Covid converged to provide me with the opportunity to commit to daily Talmud study in October 2020. I dove into the middle of Eruvin and continued to navigate Seder Moed, with Rabannit Michelle as my guide. I have developed more confidence in my learning as I completed each masechet and look forward to completing the Daf Yomi cycle so that I can begin again!

Rhona Fink

Rhona Fink

San Diego, United States

Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!

Judith Weil

Judith Weil

Raanana, Israel

What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.

Marian Frankston

Marian Frankston

Pennsylvania, United States

I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.

Leah Herzog

Leah Herzog

Givat Zev, Israel

My husband learns Daf, my son learns Daf, my son-in-law learns Daf.
When I read about Hadran’s Siyyum HaShas 2 years ago, I thought- I can learn Daf too!
I had learned Gemara in Hillel HS in NJ, & I remembered loving it.
Rabbanit Michelle & Hadran have opened my eyes & expanding my learning so much in the past few years. We can now discuss Gemara as a family.
This was a life saver during Covid

Renee Braha

Renee Braha

Brooklyn, NY, United States

Studying has changed my life view on הלכה and יהדות and time. It has taught me bonudaries of the human nature and honesty of our sages in their discourse to try and build a nation of caring people .

Goldie Gilad

Goldie Gilad

Kfar Saba, Israel

After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.

Madeline Cohen

Madeline Cohen

London, United Kingdom

Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.

Lisa S. Malik

Lisa S. Malik

Wynnewood, United States

At almost 70 I am just beginning my journey with Talmud and Hadran. I began not late, but right when I was called to learn. It is never too late to begin! The understanding patience of staff and participants with more experience and knowledge has been fabulous. The joy of learning never stops and for me. It is a new life, a new light, a new depth of love of The Holy One, Blessed be He.

Deborah Hoffman-Wade

Deborah Hoffman-Wade

Richmond, CA, United States

With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!

Sharon Mink

Sharon Mink

Haifa, Israel

I was inspired to start learning after attending the 2020 siyum in Binyanei Hauma. It has been a great experience for me. It’s amazing to see the origins of stories I’ve heard and rituals I’ve participated in my whole life. Even when I don’t understand the daf itself, I believe that the commitment to learning every day is valuable and has multiple benefits. And there will be another daf tomorrow!

Khaya Eisenberg

Khaya Eisenberg

Jerusalem, Israel

I decided to give daf yomi a try when I heard about the siyum hashas in 2020. Once the pandemic hit, the daily commitment gave my days some much-needed structure. There have been times when I’ve felt like quitting- especially when encountering very technical details in the text. But then I tell myself, “Look how much you’ve done. You can’t stop now!” So I keep going & my Koren bookshelf grows…

Miriam Eckstein-Koas

Miriam Eckstein-Koas

Huntington, United States

My curiosity was peaked after seeing posts about the end of the last cycle. I am always looking for opportunities to increase my Jewish literacy & I am someone that is drawn to habit and consistency. Dinnertime includes a “Guess what I learned on the daf” segment for my husband and 18 year old twins. I also love the feelings of connection with my colleagues who are also learning.

Diana Bloom

Diana Bloom

Tampa, United States

In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.

Rhondda May

Rhondda May

Atlanta, Georgia, United States

Sanhedrin 6

וְכִי תֵּימָא: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין! גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית?

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: דָּן אֶת הַדִּין וְזִיכָּה אֶת הַחַיָּיב, וְחִיֵּיב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי, טִימֵּא אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, טִיהֵר אֶת הַטָּמֵא – מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, וּמְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ.

§ Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? דְּקַיבְּלוּהוּ עֲלַיְיהוּ. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי מְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ? דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: דָּיְינַתְּ לַן דִּין תּוֹרָה.

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סָפְרָא לְרַבִּי אַבָּא: דִּטְעָה בְּמַאי? אִילֵימָא דִּטְעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה, וְהָאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר? אֶלָּא דִּטְעָה בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת.

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן תְּרֵי תַנָּאֵי וּתְרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי דִּפְלִיגִי אַהֲדָדֵי, וְלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּמָר וְלָא כְּמָר, וְסוּגְיַין דְּעָלְמָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וַעֲבַד כְּאִידַּךְ – הַיְינוּ שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: בִּיצּוּעַ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פְּשָׁרָה בְּיָחִיד. סַבְרוּהָ, לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין.

§ The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁנַיִם? לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין, וּמָר סָבַר לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין.

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

לֵימָא: תְּלָתָא תַּנָּאֵי בִּפְשָׁרָה, דְּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁנַיִם, וּמָר סָבַר בְּיָחִיד. אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יֵימַר בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא: מַאן דְּאָמַר תְּרֵי – אֲפִילּוּ חַד נָמֵי, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר תְּרֵי – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהְווֹ עֲלֵיהּ סָהֲדִי.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ פְּשָׁרָה אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צְרִיכָה – תְּלָתָא לְמָה לִי? תִּסְגֵּי בִּתְרֵי וְלִיקְנֵי מִינֵּיהּ! וְהִלְכְתָא: פְּשָׁרָה צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן.

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, כָּךְ בִּיצּוּעַ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

נִגְמַר הַדִּין, אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לִבְצוֹעַ.

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

סרמ״ש בנק״ש סִימָן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אָסוּר לִבְצוֹעַ, וְכׇל הַבּוֹצֵעַ – הֲרֵי זֶה חוֹטֵא, וְכׇל הַמְבָרֵךְ אֶת הַבּוֹצֵעַ – הֲרֵי זֶה מְנָאֵץ. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״בֹּצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3).

אֶלָּא יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הַמִּשְׁפָּט לֵאלֹהִים הוּא״. וְכֵן מֹשֶׁה הָיָה אוֹמֵר: יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר. אֲבָל אַהֲרֹן אוֹהֵב שָׁלוֹם וְרוֹדֵף שָׁלוֹם, וּמֵשִׂים שָׁלוֹם בֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵירוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״תּוֹרַת אֱמֶת הָיְתָה בְּפִיהוּ וְעַוְלָה לֹא נִמְצָא בִשְׂפָתָיו בְּשָׁלוֹם וּבְמִישׁוֹר הָלַךְ אִתִּי וְרַבִּים הֵשִׁיב מֵעָוֹן״.

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁגָּזַל סְאָה שֶׁל חִטִּים, וּטְחָנָהּ וַאֲפָאָהּ וְהִפְרִישׁ מִמֶּנָּה חַלָּה, כֵּיצַד מְבָרֵךְ? אֵין זֶה מְבָרֵךְ אֶלָּא מְנָאֵץ. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״וּבֹצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא נֶאֱמַר ״בּוֹצֵעַ״ אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יְהוּדָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה אֶל אֶחָיו מַה בֶּצַע כִּי נַהֲרֹג אֶת אָחִינוּ״. וְכׇל הַמְבָרֵךְ אֶת יְהוּדָה – הֲרֵי זֶה מְנָאֵץ, וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״וּבֹצֵעַ בֵּרֵךְ נִאֵץ ה׳״.

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: מִצְוָה לִבְצוֹעַ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֱמֶת וּמִשְׁפַּט שָׁלוֹם שִׁפְטוּ בְּשַׁעֲרֵיכֶם״. וַהֲלֹא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ מִשְׁפָּט – אֵין שָׁלוֹם, וּבִמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם – אֵין מִשְׁפָּט? אֶלָּא אֵיזֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁלוֹם? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה בִּיצּוּעַ.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְהִי דָוִד עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה״. וַהֲלֹא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ מִשְׁפָּט – אֵין צְדָקָה, וּצְדָקָה – אֵין מִשְׁפָּט? אֶלָּא אֵיזֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ צְדָקָה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה בִּיצּוּעַ.

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

אֲתָאן לְתַנָּא קַמָּא. דָּן אֶת הַדִּין, זִיכָּה אֶת הַזַּכַּאי וְחִיֵּיב אֶת הַחַיָּיב. וְרָאָה שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב עָנִי מָמוֹן, וְשִׁלֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ – זֶה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה.

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה: מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹן, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁשִּׁילֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ. וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְהִי דָוִד עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה לְכׇל עַמּוֹ״. מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ אֶת מָמוֹנוֹ, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁשִּׁילֵּם לוֹ מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ.

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי: הַאי ״לְכׇל עַמּוֹ״ – לַעֲנִיִּים מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁילֵּם מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, זֶהוּ מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה. מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה: מִשְׁפָּט לָזֶה – שֶׁהֶחְזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹנוֹ, וּצְדָקָה לָזֶה – שֶׁהוֹצִיא גְּזֵילָה מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ.

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לְפָנֶיךָ לַדִּין, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן, אוֹ מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן דִּין נוֹטֶה – אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״צְאוּ וּבִצְעוּ״. מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן הַדִּין נוֹטֶה – אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״צְאוּ וּבִצְעוּ״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״פּוֹטֵר מַיִם רֵאשִׁית מָדוֹן וְלִפְנֵי הִתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב נְטוֹשׁ״. קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב – אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְנׇטְשׁוֹ; מִשֶּׁנִּתְגַּלַּע הָרִיב – אִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְנׇטְשׁוֹ.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לַדִּין, אֶחָד רַךְ וְאֶחָד קָשֶׁה, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶם, אוֹ מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאֵין אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן דִּין נוֹטֶה – אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לוֹמַר לָהֶם: ״אֵין אֲנִי נִזְקָק לָכֶם״, שֶׁמָּא נִתְחַיֵּיב חָזָק וְנִמְצָא חָזָק רוֹדְפוֹ. מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְאַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ לְהֵיכָן הַדִּין נוֹטֶה – אִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לָהֶן: ״אֵינִי נִזְקָק לָכֶם״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תָגוּרוּ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ״.

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17).

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִין לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְרָאָה זְכוּת לֶעָנִי וְחוֹבָה לֶעָשִׁיר, מִנַּיִין שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתּוֹק? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תָגוּרוּ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ״. רַבִּי חָנִין אוֹמֵר: לֹא תַּכְנִיס דְּבָרֶיךָ מִפְּנֵי אִישׁ. וִיהוּ עֵדִים יוֹדְעִים אֶת מִי הֵן מְעִידִין, וְלִפְנֵי מִי הֵן מְעִידִין, וּמִי עָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מֵהֶן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר לָהֶם הָרִיב לִפְנֵי ה׳״.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17).

וִיהוּ הַדַּיָּינִין יוֹדְעִין אֶת מִי הֵן דָּנִין, וְלִפְנֵי מִי הֵן דָּנִין, וּמִי עָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מֵהֶן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֱלֹהִים נִצָּב בַּעֲדַת אֵל״. וְכֵן בִּיהוֹשָׁפָט הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל הַשֹּׁפְטִים רְאוּ מָה אַתֶּם עֹשִׂים כִּי לֹא לְאָדָם תִּשְׁפְּטוּ כִּי אִם לַה׳״. שֶׁמָּא יֹאמַר הַדַּיָּין: מָה לִי בְּצַעַר הַזֶּה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עִמָּכֶם בִּדְבַר מִשְׁפָּט״. אֵין לוֹ לַדַּיָּין אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁעֵינָיו רוֹאוֹת.

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי גְּמַר דִּין? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה חַיָּיב, אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה זַכַּאי. אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה. אִינִי? וְהָא רַב הוּנָא תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרַב הֲוָה! כִּי הֲוָה אָתוּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר לְהוּ: אִי דִּינָא בָּעֵיתוּ, אִי פְּשָׁרָה בָּעֵיתוּ? מַאי ״מִצְוָה״ נָמֵי דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה?

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?

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