Sanhedrin 60

מכשפה לא תחיה וכתיב כל שכב עם בהמה מות יומת כל שישנו בכלל כל שכב עם בהמה ישנו בכלל מכשפה לא תחיה

“You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), and it is written in the following verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). It is derived from here that anyone who is included in the prohibition of: “Whoever lies with an animal,” including gentiles, is included in the command: “You shall not allow a witch to live.”

רבי אלעזר אומר אף על הכלאים מנא הני מילי אמר שמואל דאמר קרא את חקתי תשמרו חוקים שחקקתי לך כבר בהמתך לא תרביע כלאים שדך לא תזרע כלאים

The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, “you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed.”

מה בהמתך בהרבעה אף שדך בהרכבה מה בהמתך בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ אף שדך בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ

The Gemara derives the details of this prohibition from the verse: Just as the Noahide prohibition concerning your animal applies with regard to breeding animals of different species, and not with regard to plowing with animals of two different species working together, which is prohibited only for Jews, so too, the Noahide prohibition in your field applies with regard to grafting one species onto another, which is equivalent to breeding, but it is not prohibited for gentiles to sow different seeds together. Furthermore, just as the Noahide prohibition against breeding your animal applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael, so too, the Noahide prohibition against grafting diverse kinds in your field applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

אלא מעתה ושמרתם את חקתי ואת משפטי חקים שחקקתי לך כבר

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the term “My statutes” is understood as referring to mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, then the verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances” (Leviticus 18:5), referring to the entire Torah, should also obligate the descendants of Noah, as it would be referring to: Statutes that I have already instituted for you.

התם ושמרתם את חקתי דהשתא הכא את חקתי תשמרו חקים דמעיקרא תשמרו

The Gemara answers: There the verse states: “You shall therefore keep My statutes,” indicating only those statutes that I am giving you now, whereas here, in the verse concerning diverse kinds, the wording is “My statutes you shall keep,” meaning statutes that obligate you from the outset you shall keep in the future.

אמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה כו׳

§ After clarifying the halakhot of the descendants of Noah, the Gemara returns to the halakhot stated in the mishna with regard to one who blasphemes. It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said that during a blasphemer’s trial, the judges ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, they would use the sentence: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, like the Tetragrammaton.

אמר רב אחא בר יעקב אינו חייב עד שיברך שם בן ארבע אותיות לאפוקי בן שתי אותיות דלא

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: The blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, i.e., curses, the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of God, which is to the exclusion of one who curses the two-letter name of God, spelled yod heh, who is not liable.

פשיטא יכה יוסי את יוסי תנן מהו דתימא מילתא בעלמא הוא דנקט קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei, which indicates a four-letter name. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example but does not intend that the witnesses use the four-letter name in particular, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable only for cursing the Tetragrammaton.

איכא דאמרי אמר רב אחא בר יעקב שמע מינה שם בן ארבע אותיות נמי שם הוא

There are those who say that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says as follows: Conclude from the mishna that the Tetragrammaton is also a name for which one is liable, and he is liable not only for cursing the forty-two-letter name of God.

פשיטא יכה יוסי את יוסי תנן מהו דתימא עד דאיכא שם רבה ומילתא בעלמא הוא דנקט קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that one is not liable unless there is a grand name that he curses, i.e., the forty-two-letter name, and the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable even for cursing the Tetragrammaton, and the name Yosei is mentioned specifically.

נגמר הדין כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: When the judgment is over, and judges need to hear the exact wording of the curse so they can sentence the defendant, the eldest of the witnesses repeats the curse, and the judges rise and make a tear in their clothing.

עומדין מנלן אמר רבי יצחק בר אמי דאמר קרא ואהוד בא אליו והוא ישב בעלית המקרה אשר לו לבדו ויאמר אהוד דבר אלהים לי אליך ויקם מעל הכסא והלא דברים קל וחומר ומה עגלון מלך מואב שהוא נכרי ולא ידע אלא בכינוי עמד ישראל ושם המפורש על אחת כמה וכמה

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the judges must stand? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ami says: It is derived from that which the verse states about Eglon: “And Ehud came to him, and he was sitting by himself alone in his cool upper chamber. And Ehud said: I have a message from God [Elohim] to you. And he arose out of his seat” (Judges 3:20). And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? And if Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew the name of God only by an appellation, stood in honor, all the more so must a Jew stand if he hears the ineffable name.

קורעין מנלן דכתיב ויבא אליקים בן חלקיהו [וגו׳] ושבנא הספר ויואח בן אסף המזכיר אל חזקיהו קרועי בגדים ויגידו לו את דברי רבשקה

The mishna teaches that upon hearing the curse the judges each make a tear in their garments. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that it is derived from that which is written: “Then came Eliakim, son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebna the scribe, and Joah, son of Asaph, the recorder, to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him Rabshakeh’s statement” (II Kings 18:37). Apparently, since they heard the blasphemous statement of Rabshakeh they were obligated to make a tear in their garments.

לא מאחין מנלן

It is furthermore stated that the judges do not ever fully stitch the tear together again. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?

אמר רבי אבהו אתיא קריעה קריעה כתיב הכא קרועי בגדים וכתיב התם ואלישע ראה והוא מצעק אבי אבי רכב ישראל ופרשיו ולא ראהו עוד ויחזק בבגדיו ויקרעם לשנים קרעים ממשמע שנאמר ויקרעם לשנים איני יודע שהן קרעים ומה תלמוד לומר קרעים מלמד שהן קרועים לעולם

Rabbi Abbahu says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the tearing stated in this regard and the tearing stated with regard to Elijah’s ascendance to heaven. It is written here, with regard to those who heard Rabshakeh’s blasphemy: “With torn garments,” and it is written there: “And Elisha saw it, and he cried: My father, my father, the chariots of Israel and its horsemen. And he saw him no more, and he grabbed hold of his clothes and tore them into two pieces” (II Kings 2:12). From the meaning of that which is stated: “And tore them into two,” do I not know that they are pieces? And why must the verse state: “Pieces”? This teaches that they remain torn forever; they may never be fully stitched back together, but only partially sewn.

תנו רבנן אחד השומע ואחד שומע מפי שומע חייב לקרוע והעדים אין חייבין לקרוע שכבר קרעו בשעה ששמעו

The Sages taught: Both one who hears the curse himself and one who hears it from the one who heard it are obligated to make a tear in their garments. But the witnesses are not obligated to make a tear when they testify, as they already made a tear when they heard it from the blasphemer himself.

וכי קרעו בשעה ששמעו מאי הוי הא קא שמעי השתא לא סלקא דעתך דכתיב ויהי כשמע המלך חזקיהו את דברי רבשקה ויקרע את בגדיו המלך חזקיהו קרע והם לא קרעו

The Gemara asks: And if they made a tear when they heard the curse, what of it? Aren’t they also hearing the curse now? The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that they are obligated to make a tear a second time, as it is written: “And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard the statement of Rabshakeh, that he tore his clothes” (II Kings 19:1). It can be inferred that King Hezekiah tore his clothes, but those who reported the blasphemy did not tear their clothes a second time.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל השומע אזכרה מפי הנכרי אינו חייב לקרוע ואם תאמר רבשקה ישראל מומר היה

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין קורעין אלא על שם המיוחד בלבד לאפוקי כינוי דלא

And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One makes a tear only for hearing a curse of the ineffable name of God, to the exclusion of hearing a curse of an appellation for the name of God, for which one does not make a tear.

ופליגי דרבי חייא בתרוייהו דאמר רבי חייא השומע אזכרה בזמן הזה אינו חייב לקרוע שאם אי אתה אומר כן נתמלא כל הבגד קרעים

The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Ḥiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Ḥiyya says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears.

ממאן אילימא מישראל מי פקירי כולי האי אלא פשיטא מנכרי ואי שם המיוחד מי גמירי אלא לאו בכינוי

The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God’s name about which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that one’s entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Ḥiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God’s name?

ושמע מינה בזמן הזה הוא דלא הא מעיקרא חייב שמע מינה

And conclude from it that it is specifically nowadays that, according to Rav Ḥiyya, one is not obligated to make a tear in his garment when hearing the curse of a gentile and when hearing a curse of God that referred to God with an appellation, but initially, when the fundamental halakha was practiced, one was obligated to make a tear in these cases, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

השני אומר ׳אף אני כמוהו׳ אמר ריש לקיש שמע מינה אף אני כמוהו כשר בדיני ממונות ובדיני נפשות ומעלה הוא דעביד רבנן והכא כיון דלא אפשר אוקמוה רבנן אדאורייתא

§ The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse.

דאי סלקא דעתך פסול הכא משום דלא אפשר קטלינן לגברא

As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law.

והשלישי אומר ׳אף אני כמוהו׳ סתמא כרבי עקיבא דמקיש שלשה לשנים

The mishna teaches: And the third witness says: I too heard as he did. The Gemara comments: The unattributed tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares three witnesses to two. Rabbi Akiva maintains that just as in a case where there are two witnesses, the disqualification of one disqualifies all of the testimony, so too, even if there are three witnesses, and one of the three is disqualified, all of the testimony is disqualified. Similarly, here too he holds that if there are three witnesses, each of them must testify concerning the curse.

מתני׳ העובד עבודה זרה אחד העובד ואחד המזבח ואחד המקטר ואחד המנסך ואחד המשתחוה ואחד המקבלו עליו לאלוה והאומר לו אלי אתה

MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god.

אבל המגפף והמנשק והמכבד והמרבץ והמרחץ והסך והמלביש והמנעיל עובר בלא תעשה הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו עובר בלא תעשה

But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition.

הפוער עצמו לבעל פעור זו היא עבודתה הזורק אבן למרקוליס זו היא עבודתה

One who defecates before the idol known as Ba’al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship.

גמ׳ מאי אחד העובד

GEMARA: What is added in the mishna by stating the phrase: One who worships? Since worship is the general description of all the actions detailed in the mishna, why is this phrase necessary?

אמר רבי ירמיה הכי קאמר אחד העובד כדרכה ואחד המזבח ואחד המקטר ואחד המנסך ואחד המשתחוה ואפילו שלא כדרכה

Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol’s typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple.

וליחשוב נמי זורק אמר אביי זורק היינו מנסך דכתיב בל אסיך נסכיהם מדם

The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: “I will not pour their libations of blood” (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation.

מנהני מילי

§ The Gemara asks with regard to the halakha that one is liable for worshipping an idol in these manners even if they are not the way the idol is typically worshipped: From where are these matters derived?

דתנו רבנן אילו נאמר ׳זבח יחרם׳ הייתי אומר בזובח קדשים בחוץ הכתוב מדבר תלמוד לומר ׳לאלהים׳ בזובח לעבודה זרה הכתוב מדבר

The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be utterly destroyed, except to the Lord alone” (Exodus 22:19): If it were stated: One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed, I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard, referring to a severe transgression that is stated elsewhere in the Torah. Therefore, the verse states: “To the gods,” indicating that the verse speaks of one who slaughters an offering to an idol.

אין לי אלא בזובח מקטר ומנסך מניין תלמוד לומר ׳בלתי לה׳ לבדו׳ ריקן העבודות כולן לשם המיוחד

The baraita asks: From here I know only the halakha of one who slaughters an offering to an idol. From where is it derived that one who burns incense or pours a libation is also liable to receive the death penalty? The baraita answers that the verse states: “Except to the Lord alone”; the verse emptied out, i.e., designated, all the sacrificial rites to the ineffable name of God, indicating that one who performs any of these rites in idol worship is liable.

לפי שיצאה זביחה לידון בעבודות פנים מניין לרבות השתחואה

The baraita asks: Since slaughter is singled out from all of the forms of worship to be mentioned in this verse in order to derive from it that with regard to all the sacrificial rites performed inside the Temple, one who performs them in idol worship is liable to receive capital punishment, from where is it derived that this halakha includes bowing down to an idol, which is not a sacrificial rite?

תלמוד לומר ׳וילך ויעבד אלהים אחרים וישתחו להם׳ וסמיך ליה ׳והוצאת את האיש ההוא׳ וגו׳

The baraita answers that the verse states: “And has gone and served other gods and bowed to them” (Deuteronomy 17:3), and a verse near it states: “Then you shall bring forth that man or that woman who has done this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:5). It is derived from the juxtaposition of these two verses that one who bows down to an idol is liable to be executed.

עונש שמענו אזהרה מניין תלמוד לומר ׳כי לא תשתחוה לאל אחר׳

The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14).

יכול שאני מרבה המגפף והמנשק והמנעיל תלמוד לומר ׳זבח׳

One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: “One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed,” referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship.

זביחה בכלל היתה ולמה יצאה להקיש אליה ולומר לך מה זביחה מיוחדת שהיא עבודת פנים וחייבין עליה מיתה אף כל שהיא עבודת פנים וחייבין עליה מיתה

The baraita explains: The slaughter of an offering was included in the general category of the prohibited forms of idol worship, and why was it singled out to be mentioned in this verse? It was singled out to compare a matter to it and say to you: Just as slaughter is notable in that it is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple, and those who perform this rite for the purpose of idol worship are liable to receive the death penalty for it, so too, any form of worship that is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple is prohibited when performed for idol worship, and transgressors are liable to receive the death penalty for it.

יצאה השתחואה לידון בעצמה יצאה זביחה לידון על הכלל כולו

Therefore, the act of bowing to an idol is singled out to be mentioned in a separate verse to derive the death penalty for that action itself, despite the fact that it is not a sacrificial rite performed in the Temple, whereas the slaughter of an offering is singled out to be mentioned in order to derive from it the principle with regard to the entire category, namely, that generally one is not liable to receive capital punishment for a form of worship that is not performed in the Temple.

אמר מר הייתי אומר בזובח קדשים בחוץ הכתוב מדבר זובח קדשים בחוץ כרת הוא

The Gemara proceeds to clarify the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: The punishment for one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard is karet, not capital punishment, as it is stated: “Each and every man…who offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice it to the Lord, even that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). Therefore, how can the baraita suggest that a verse that mentions capital punishment could be referring to this transgression?

סלקא דעתך אמינא כי אתרו ביה קטלא כי לא אתרו ביה כרת קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that in a case when the witnesses warned the transgressor not to slaughter the offering outside the Temple he is liable to receive the death penalty, but in a case when they did not warn him he is liable to receive karet. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple is not liable to receive the death penalty even if he was warned.

אמר ליה רבא בר רב חנן לאביי אימא יצאה השתחואה ללמד על הכלל כולו

The baraita states that the principle concerning the forms of idol worship that are punishable by execution is derived from the verse that mentions slaughtering an animal as an idolatrous offering, whereas bowing to an idol is mentioned in the verse as an exception. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing is singled out to be mentioned to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship, when performed for the sake of idol worship, carries the death penalty, not only sacrificial rites performed the Temple.

וכי תימא זובח למה לי לגופיה דמחשבין מעבודה לעבודה

And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process.

דאיתמר השוחט בהמה לזרוק דמה לעבודה זרה ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודה זרה רבי יוחנן אמר

As it was stated that with regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood in idol worship or to burn its fat in idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: