Sanhedrin 71
חַיָּיב.
he is liable for entering the Temple while intoxicated.
אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר וְיִשְׁתֶּה יַיִן. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אָכַל כׇּל מַאֲכָל וְלֹא אָכַל בָּשָׂר, שָׁתָה כׇּל מַשְׁקֶה וְלֹא שָׁתָה יַיִן – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר וְיִשְׁתֶּה יַיִן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״זוֹלֵל וְסֹבֵא״.
§ The mishna teaches that the boy does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he actually eats meat and drinks wine. The Sages taught in a baraita: If he ate any other food but did not eat meat, or if he drank any other beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he actually eats meat and drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard.”
וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָיה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אַל תְּהִי בְסֹבְאֵי יָיִן בְּזֹלְלֵי בָשָׂר לָמוֹ״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״כִּי סֹבֵא וְזוֹלֵל יִוָּרֵשׁ וּקְרָעִים תַּלְבִּישׁ נוּמָה״. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל הַיָּשֵׁן בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ תּוֹרָתוֹ נַעֲשֵׂית לוֹ קְרָעִים קְרָעִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּקְרָעִים תַּלְבִּישׁ נוּמָה״.
And although there is no explicit proof to the matter, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers, among gluttonous eaters of meat” (Proverbs 23:20). And the verse states: “For the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty, and drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags” (Proverbs 23:21). That is to say, a person who is a glutton and a drunkard, and sleeps a lot due to his excessive eating and drinking, will end up poor and dressed in rags. Rabbi Zeira expounds the same verse and says: With regard to anyone who sleeps in the study hall, his Torah shall become tattered, as it is stated: “And drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags.”
מַתְנִי׳ גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְיֹאכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וּמִשֶּׁל אִמּוֹ.
MISHNA: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother.
גְּמָ׳ גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו. אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁכִיחַ לֵיהּ, בְּעִית.
GEMARA: The Gemara explains the reasons for the various halakhot taught in the mishna: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, even though this is accessible to him and it is easy for him to steal, he is afraid that his father will see him eating what he had stolen, and therefore he will not be drawn after his action to further evil.
מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים. אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא בְּעִית – לָא שְׁכִיחַ לֵיהּ. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ לֵיהּ וּבְעִית.
If he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, even though he is not afraid of them, as they neither know him nor watch over him, this theft is not easily accessible to him, as it is performed on someone else’s property, and therefore he will not be drawn to additional sin. And all the more so if he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, in which case it is not accessible to him, and he is also afraid of his father.
עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו, וְיֹאכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים. דִּשְׁכִיחַ לֵיהּ, וְלָא בְּעִית.
Therefore, he is not liable unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others, in which case it is easily accessible to him, and he is not afraid, and there is concern that he will be drawn after his action to additional sin.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וּמִשֶּׁל אִמּוֹ. אִמּוֹ מְנָא לַהּ? מַה שֶּׁקָּנְתָה אִשָּׁה קָנָה בַּעְלָהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מִסְּעוּדָה הַמּוּכֶנֶת לְאָבִיו וּלְאִמּוֹ.
The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother. The Gemara asks: With regard to his mother, from where does she have independently owned property that her son can steal? The basis for this question is the halakha that anything that a woman acquires is acquired by her husband. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says in answer to this question: The mishna is referring to a case where the boy stole food from a meal that had been prepared for his father and for his mother. In such a case the husband grants his wife ownership of the food that she will eat over the course of her meal.
וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי חָנָן בַּר מוֹלָדָה אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיִּקְנֶה בָּשָׂר בְּזוֹל וְיֹאכַל, יַיִן בְּזוֹל וְיִשְׁתֶּה? אֶלָּא, אֵימָא: מִדְּמֵי סְעוּדָה הַמּוּכֶנֶת לְאָבִיו וּלְאִמּוֹ.
The Gemara raises a difficulty. But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanan bar Molada say that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he purchases inexpensive meat and eats it, and he purchases inexpensive wine and drinks it, which indicates that he becomes liable only if he steals money, not if he steals the actual meat and wine? Rather, say that the boy stole from money set aside for a meal that was to be prepared for his father and for his mother.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּאַקְנִי לַהּ אַחֵר, וַאֲמַר לַהּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לְבַעְלִיךְ רְשׁוּת בָּהֶן״.
The Gemara presents another answer to the question posed concerning the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: If you wish, say instead that another person gave property to the mother and said to her: This shall be yours on the condition that your husband shall have no right to it. In such a case, the woman acquires the property for herself and her husband does not acquire it. Therefore, it is possible for the son to steal from his mother’s property.
מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה אָבִיו רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ אֵינָהּ רוֹצֶה, אָבִיו אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ רוֹצָה – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם רוֹצִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם לֹא הָיְתָה אִמּוֹ רְאוּיָה לְאָבִיו, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה.
MISHNA: If his father wishes to have him punished but his mother does not wish that, or if his father does not wish to have him punished but his mother wishes that, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish that he be punished. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father, the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה״? אִילֵּימָא חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת וְחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין, סוֹף סוֹף אֲבוּהּ אֲבוּהּ נִיהוּ, וְאִמֵּיהּ אִמֵּיהּ נִיהִי!
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he speaks of the mother as being not suited for the father? If we say that due to their union they are among those who are liable to receive karet, in which case the marriage does not take effect, and certainly if the union puts them in the category of those who are liable to receive one of the types of court-imposed death penalty, in which case the marriage also does not take effect, there is a difficulty: Why should it matter if they are not married? Ultimately, his father is still his father and his mother is still his mother, and the verses concerning the stubborn and rebellious son can be fulfilled.
אֶלָּא בְּשָׁוָה לְאָבִיו קָאָמַר. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אִם לֹא הָיְתָה אִמּוֹ שָׁוָה לְאָבִיו בְּקוֹל וּבְמַרְאֶה וּבַקּוֹמָה, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ״. מִדְּקוֹל בָּעֵינַן שָׁוִין, מַרְאֶה וְקוֹמָה נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן שָׁוִין.
Rather, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the boy’s mother must be identical to his father in several aspects. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not identical to his father in voice, appearance, and height, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? As the verse states: “He will not obey our voices [kolenu]” (Deuteronomy 21:20), which indicates that they both have the same voice. And since we require that they be identical in voice, we also require that they be identical in appearance and height.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה לֹא הָיָה וְלֹא עָתִיד לִהְיוֹת, וְלָמָּה נִכְתַּב? דְּרוֹשׁ וְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future, as it is impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning, this being an aspect of the Torah that has only theoretical value. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who requires that the parents have certain identical characteristics, making it virtually impossible to apply the halakha.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָכַל זֶה תַּרְטֵימָר בָּשָׂר וְשָׁתָה חֲצִי לוֹג יַיִן הָאִיטַלְקִי, אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ לְסׇקְלוֹ? אֶלָּא לֹא הָיָה וְלֹא עָתִיד לִהְיוֹת, וְלָמָּה נִכְתַּב? דְּרוֹשׁ וְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: אֲנִי רְאִיתִיו וְיָשַׁבְתִּי עַל קִבְרוֹ.
If you wish, say instead that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: And is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that his father and his mother shall take him out to stone him? Rather, there has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I saw one. I was once in a place where a stubborn and rebellious son was condemned to death, and I even sat on his grave after he was executed.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת לֹא הָיְתָה וְלֹא עֲתִידָה לִהְיוֹת, וְלָמָּה נִכְתְּבָה – דְּרוֹשׁ וְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, כׇּל עִיר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ אֲפִילּוּ מְזוּזָה אַחַת אֵינָהּ נַעֲשֵׂית עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת.
The Gemara raises a similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been an idolatrous city and there will never be one in the future, as it is virtually impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to an idolatrous city written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Any city that has even one mezuza or any other sacred scroll cannot become an idolatrous city. It is difficult to imagine an entire city without even one mezuza.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאֶת כׇּל שְׁלָלָהּ תִּקְבֹּץ אֶל תּוֹךְ רְחֹבָהּ וְשָׂרַפְתָּ בָאֵשׁ״. וְכֵיוָן דְּאִי אִיכָּא מְזוּזָה, לָא אֶפְשָׁר, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן כֵּן לַה׳ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: אֲנִי רְאִיתִיהָ וְיָשַׁבְתִּי עַל תִּילָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a city that has even one mezuza cannot become an idolatrous city? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the open space of the city, and shall burn with fire both the city and the entire plunder taken in it” (Deuteronomy 13:17). And since if there is a mezuza there it is impossible to burn all the contents of the city, as it is written: “And you shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their asherim with fire…This you shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). It is derived from this verse that it is prohibited to destroy a sacred item such as a mezuza. Therefore, in a city that has even one mezuza, it is impossible to fulfill the halakhot of an idolatrous city, as not all of its contents may be burned. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I once saw an idolatrous city that was condemned to destruction, and I even sat on its ruins.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: בַּיִת הַמְנוּגָּע לֹא הָיָה וְלֹא עָתִיד לִהְיוֹת, וְלָמָּה נִכְתַּב – דְּרוֹשׁ וְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, לְעוֹלָם אֵין הַבַּיִת טָמֵא עַד שֶׁיֵּרָאֶה כִּשְׁתֵּי גְרִיסִין עַל שְׁתֵּי אֲבָנִים בִּשְׁתֵּי כְתָלִים בְּקֶרֶן זָוִית, אׇרְכּוֹ כִּשְׁנֵי גְרִיסִין וְרׇחְבּוֹ כִּגְרִיס.
The Gemara asks another similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a house afflicted with leprosy of the house and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to leprosy of the house written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 12:3) that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house never becomes impure with leprosy until a mark about the size of two split beans is seen on two stones in two walls that form a corner between them, the mark being about two split beans in length and about one split bean in width. It is difficult to imagine that such a precise situation will ever occur.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? כְּתִיב ״קִיר״ וּכְתִיב ״קִירֹת״. אֵיזֶהוּ קִיר שֶׁהוּא כְּקִירוֹת? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה קֶרֶן זָוִית.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that a house does not become impure unless it has a mark precisely in the corner? The verse states: “And he shall look at the leprous mark, and, behold, if the leprous mark be in the walls of the house, in greenish or reddish depressions, which in sight are lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). In one part of the verse it is written “wall,” and in another part of the verse it is written “walls.” Which wall is like two walls? You must say this is a corner.
תַּנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי צָדוֹק, מָקוֹם הָיָה בִּתְחוּם עַזָּה, וְהָיוּ קוֹרִין אוֹתוֹ חוּרְבָּתָא סְגִירְתָּא. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אִישׁ כְּפַר עַכּוֹ: פַּעַם אַחַת הָלַכְתִּי לְגָלִיל וְרָאִיתִי מָקוֹם שֶׁמְּצַיְּינִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאָמְרוּ: אֲבָנִים מְנוּגָּעוֹת פִּינוּ לְשָׁם.
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: There was a place in the area of Gaza, and it was called the leprous ruin; that is to say, it was the ruin of a house that had been afflicted with leprosy. Apparently, then, leprosy of the house has existed. Rabbi Shimon of the village of Akko said: I once went to the Galilee and I saw a place that was being marked off as an impure place, and they said that stones afflicted with leprosy were cast there. This too indicates that a house afflicted with leprosy has existed.
מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶם גִּידֵּם, אוֹ חִיגֵּר, אוֹ אִלֵּם, אוֹ סוֹמֵא, אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְתָפְשׂוּ בוֹ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא גִּדְמִין, ״וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֹתוֹ״ – וְלֹא חִגְּרִין, ״וְאָמְרוּ״ – וְלֹא אִלְּמִין, ״בְּנֵנוּ זֶה״ – וְלֹא סוֹמִין, ״אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ״ – וְלֹא חֵרְשִׁין.
MISHNA: If one of the parents was without hands, or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf, their son does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:19–20). The Sages derive: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him,” but not people without hands, who cannot do this. “And bring him out,” but not lame people, who cannot walk. “And they shall say,” but not mutes. “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this.” “He will not obey our voices,” but not deaf people, who cannot hear whether or not he declined to obey them.
מַתְרִין בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ. חָזַר וְקִלְקֵל – נִדּוֹן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְאֵינוֹ נִסְקָל עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שָׁם שְׁלֹשָׁה הָרִאשׁוֹנִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בְּנֵנוּ זֶה״ – זֶהוּ שֶׁלָּקָה בִּפְנֵיכֶם.
After he is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people and then they flog him for having stolen. If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, but he is not stoned unless the first three judges before whom he had been flogged are present there, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you.
גְּמָ׳ שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ: בָּעֵינַן קְרָא כְּדִכְתִיב? שָׁאנֵי הָכָא,
GEMARA: The Gemara draws a conclusion from the mishna: You can learn from the mishna that we require that a verse be fulfilled precisely as it is written, in strict conformity with its literal sense, and not in looser or more expansive fashion. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no proof from here. Here it is different,
דְּכוּלֵּיהּ קְרָא יַתִּירָא הוּא.
since the entire verse is superfluous. The verse’s description of how the father and mother bring their son out appears to be unnecessary, and therefore each element in the verse limits the halakha in a precise manner. When a verse is not superfluous, it is not strictly interpreted.
וּמַתְרִין בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה? לְמָה לִי? בִּתְרֵי סַגְיָא! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכִי קָאָמַר – מַתְרִין בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם, וּמַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה.
§ The mishna teaches that after the rebellious son is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people. The Gemara asks: Why do I need him to be admonished before three people? Two witnesses should suffice, as in all other matters of halakha. Abaye says: This is what the mishna is saying: He is admonished before two people, who serve as witnesses, and he is flogged before three people, who constitute a court.
מַלְקוּת בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה הֵיכָא כְּתִיבָא? כִּדְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: לָמַדְנוּ ״וְיִסְּרוּ״ מִ״וְּיִסְּרוּ״, ״וְיִסְּרוּ״ מִ״בֶּן״, וּ״בֶן״ מִ״בִּן״ – ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״.
The Gemara asks: Where is it written that lashes are administered to a stubborn and rebellious son? There is no explicit mention of lashes in the verse. The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Abbahu said in another context, as Rabbi Abbahu says: We learned the meaning of the word “chastise” as stated with regard to a defamer: “And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him” (Deuteronomy 22:18), by means of a verbal analogy from the word “chastise” stated with regard to a rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18). And the meaning of the word “chastise” in the latter verse is derived from the word “son” that appears in the same verse. And the meaning of the word “son [ben]” with regard to a rebellious son is derived from the similar word “bin” stated with regard to lashes: “Then it shall be if the wicked man deserves [bin] to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Consequently, the chastisement mentioned with regard to both a defamer and a rebellious son involves flogging.
חָזַר וְקִלְקֵל, נִידּוֹן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה [וְכוּ׳]. הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״זֶה״ – וְלֹא סוֹמִין? אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״בְּנֵנוּ הוּא״. מַאי ״בְּנֵנוּ זֶה״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
The mishna teaches: If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, which must include the three judges before whom he was brought initially, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you. The Gemara asks: But isn’t that verse needed for the derivation mentioned earlier: “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this”? The Gemara answers: If so, that these words serve only to teach that the original judges must also be present, the verse should have written: He is our son, which would indicate: He who was already flogged before you. What is the meaning of: “This son of ours”? Conclude two conclusions from it: That the three original judges must also be present at the second trial, and that the son of blind parents cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרַח עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – פָּטוּר. וְאִם מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בָּרַח, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – חַיָּיב.
MISHNA: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty. Once his lower beard grows around his genitals, he can no longer be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son. But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. Once he is sentenced to death his sentence remains in force.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: בֶּן נֹחַ שֶׁבֵּירַךְ אֶת הַשֵּׁם וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְגַּיֵּיר – פָּטוּר, הוֹאִיל וְנִשְׁתַּנָּה דִּינוֹ, נִשְׁתַּנֵּית מִיתָתוֹ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥanina says: If a descendant of Noah blessed, i.e., cursed, the name of God, and afterward he converted to Judaism, he is exempt from punishment, since his trial procedure changed, and the death penalty to which he is subject also changed. A descendant of Noah is tried by a single judge, and he can be sentenced to death on the basis of the testimony of a single witness even without having been forewarned; whereas a Jew is tried by a court of twenty-three and can be executed only on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, and this only after having been forewarned. A descendant of Noah is killed by the sword for this transgression, whereas a Jew is killed by stoning.
נֵימָא מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ: בָּרַח עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: הוֹאִיל וְאִישְׁתַּנִּי – אִישְׁתַּנִּי?
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna supports him: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty? What is the reason for this exemption? Isn’t it because we say: Since his legal status has changed, his liability has also changed?
לָא, שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאִי עֲבַד הַשְׁתָּא – לָאו בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא.
The Gemara rejects this claim: No, it is different here, with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, as were he now, after he grew his lower beard, to perform the same actions that render one liable as a rebellious son, he would not be fit for execution, and therefore he is exempt. This is different from a gentile who cursed God’s name and then converted, as even if he cursed God after having converted, he would still be liable to receive the death penalty.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אִם מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בָּרַח, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – חַיָּיב. נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ קָאָמְרַתְּ? נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ גַּבְרָא קְטִילָא הוּא!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the latter half of the mishna: But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. This indicates that even though his legal status has changed, he is nevertheless executed. The Gemara rejects this argument: There is no proof from here; you speak of a case where he was already sentenced to death. Once he was already sentenced, he is considered a dead man and his verdict can no longer be changed.
תָּא שְׁמַע: בֶּן נֹחַ שֶׁהִכָּה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ, וּבָא עַל אֵשֶׁת חֲבֵירוֹ, וְנִתְגַּיֵּיר – פָּטוּר. עָשָׂה כֵּן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִתְגַּיֵּיר – חַיָּיב. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִישְׁתַּנִּי – אִישְׁתַּנִּי!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from what was stated in a baraita: If a descendant of Noah struck and killed another gentile or engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile, and he then converted to Judaism, he is exempt. But if he did this to an Israelite, killing a Jew or engaging in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, and then converted, he is liable. But why should this be so? Let us say that since his legal status changed, his liability changed as well, and therefore he should no longer be subject to the death penalty. The baraita indicates that this rationale is not accepted.
דִּינוֹ וּמִיתָתוֹ בָּעֵינַן, וְהַאי – דִּינוֹ אִישְׁתַּנִּי, מִיתָתוֹ לָא אִישְׁתַּנַּי.
The Gemara refutes this proof: There is no comparison between the cases, because in order to nullify one’s death penalty we require a change both in his trial procedure and in the specific death penalty to which he is subject. But this descendant of Noah, though his trial procedure changed, the death penalty to which he is subject did not change.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רוֹצֵחַ, מֵעִיקָּרָא סַיִיף וְהַשְׁתָּא סַיִיף. אֶלָּא אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, מֵעִיקָּרָא סַיִיף וְהַשְׁתָּא חֶנֶק?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, with regard to the case of a murderer, this answer is understandable, as initially, while he was still a gentile, he was subject to death by the sword, and now that he is a Jew he is still subject to death by the sword. Consequently, there is no change in the punishment to which he is subject. But with regard to the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a married woman, initially when he was still a gentile he was subject to death by the sword, but now that he is a Jew he is subject to death by strangulation. Accordingly, there is a change both in his trial procedure and in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject.
בְּנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה, דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בִּסְקִילָה.
The Gemara answers: The case of a married woman mentioned here involves a man who engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, so that in both this case, where he engaged in intercourse with her when he was still a descendant of Noah, and in that case, where he did so when he was already a Jew, he is subject to death by stoning. Since there was no change in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject, he remains liable and is executed.
וְהָא ״עָשָׂה כֵּן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״, דּוּמְיָא דְּאֵשֶׁת חֲבֵירוֹ קָתָנֵי.
The Gemara raises an objection: But the baraita teaches the case where he did this to an Israelite, i.e., engaged in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, similar to the case where he engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile. Both cases seem to be addressing identical circumstances, and the unique halakha governing a betrothed young woman exists only for Jews, not for descendants of Noah. Accordingly, the baraita must be discussing the case of a fully married woman.
אֶלָּא, קַלָּה בַּחֲמוּרָה מֵישָׁךְ שָׁיְיכָא.
Rather, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one. If initially, when he was a gentile, he was liable to receive a more severe punishment, and now that he is a Jew he is liable to receive a more lenient punishment, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and he remains liable to receive the lenient punishment. By contrast, if the punishment that he is now liable to receive is more severe, he is exempt from all punishment.
הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: ״סַיִיף חָמוּר״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״חֶנֶק חָמוּר״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that death by the sword is more severe than death by strangulation. Therefore, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, so that he was subject to death by the sword, and then he converted to Judaism, so that his sentence was lightened to death by strangulation, he is still executed. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword, what can be said? The convert should now be exempt from all punishment.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּתַנָּא דְבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל מִיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה לִבְנֵי נֹחַ אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא חֶנֶק.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says: Any death mentioned in connection with the descendants of Noah is nothing other than death by strangulation, and not death by the sword. Accordingly, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, and he then converted, his punishment did not become more severe with his conversion; rather, it stayed the same, death by strangulation, and he is still executed.
בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, מֵעִיקָּרָא חֶנֶק וְהַשְׁתָּא חֶנֶק. אֶלָּא רוֹצֵחַ, מֵעִיקָּרָא חֶנֶק וְהַשְׁתָּא סַיִיף? קַלָּה בַּחֲמוּרָה מֵישָׁךְ שָׁיְיכָא.
The Gemara challenges: Granted, with regard to the case of a married woman, this answer is understandable. Initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, he was subject to death by strangulation, and now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by strangulation. But as for a murderer, initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, according to the tanna of the school of Menashe he was subject to death by strangulation, but now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by the sword. The Gemara explains: The lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword. Consequently, he is executed.
לֵימָא מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ: סָרְחָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּגְרָה – תִּידּוֹן בְּחֶנֶק. בִּסְקִילָה מַאי טַעְמָא לָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהוֹאִיל וְאִישְׁתַּנַּי אִישְׁתַּנִּי? וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי לִגְמָרֵי! הָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְתַנָּא: תְּנִי ״תִּידּוֹן בִּסְקִילָה״.
The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the following baraita supports Rabbi Ḥanina: If a betrothed young woman sinned by committing adultery, and afterward she reached her majority, at which time she was brought to trial, she is sentenced to death by strangulation like any other betrothed grown woman who commits adultery. What is the reason that she is not sentenced to death by stoning, the punishment imposed upon a betrothed young woman who commits adultery? Is it not that since her legal status changed, her liability changed as well? And all the more so here, in the case of the descendant of Noah who converted, where he changed completely from a gentile to a Jew, his sentence should change. The Gemara rejects this argument: No proof can be derived from here, as doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the tanna who taught this baraita before him: Emend your version of the baraita and teach: She is sentenced to death by stoning.
מַתְנִי׳ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה נִידּוֹן עַל שֵׁם סוֹפוֹ. יָמוּת זַכַּאי וְאַל יָמוּת חַיָּיב, שֶׁמִּיתָתָן שֶׁל רְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶן וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם. לַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶן וְרַע לָעוֹלָם.
MISHNA: A stubborn and rebellious son is sentenced to death not because of the severity of the transgression that he already committed but on account of his ultimate end, because a boy of his nature will grow up to lead an immoral life, and it is better that he should die while he is still innocent, before causing excessive harm, and not die after he becomes guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them, because they can no longer sin, and it is also beneficial to the world, which is now rid of those who do it harm. Conversely, the death of the righteous is detrimental to them, as they can no longer engage in the performance of mitzvot, and it is also detrimental to the world, as the righteous are now absent from it.
יַיִן וְשֵׁינָה לָרְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶן וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם, וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶן וְרַע לָעוֹלָם.
By way of association, the mishna continues: The wine and sleep of the wicked are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, as when they are sleeping or under the influence of wine, they do not cause harm to others. And, conversely, the wine and sleep of the righteous are detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, as wine and sleep prevent them from engaging in their good deeds.
פִּיזּוּר לָרְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶן וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם. וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶן וְרַע לָעוֹלָם. כִּנּוּס לָרְשָׁעִים – רַע לָהֶן וְרַע לָעוֹלָם. וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶן וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם. שֶׁקֶט לָרְשָׁעִים – רַע לָהֶן וְרַע לָעוֹלָם. לַצַּדִּיקִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶן וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם.
The dispersal of the wicked, so that they are not found in close proximity to each other, is beneficial to them, as they are less likely to provoke each other to sin, and it is beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The assembly of the wicked in one place is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the assembly of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.
