Sanhedrin 74
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בִּמְפוּתָּה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
Rav Pappa says: The ruling of the mishna, which lists his sister among those for whom he must pay a fine, is stated with regard to a young woman who was seduced, and in the case of seduction all agree that the woman is not saved at the cost of the seducer’s life, as the intercourse was consensual.
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּיָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו, וְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן שָׁאוּל הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר, רוֹדֵף שֶׁהָיָה רוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְהוֹרְגוֹ, וְיָכוֹל לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו וְלֹא הִצִּיל – נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו.
Abaye says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a young woman who was raped in a case where one was able to save her by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, so that it was not necessary to kill him in order to achieve her rescue, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and one was able to save the pursued party without killing the pursuer, but instead by injuring him in one of his limbs, but he did not save him in this manner and rather chose to kill him, he is executed on his account as a murderer.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן שָׁאוּל? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים (יַחְדָּו) וְגוֹ׳״. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּמַצּוּת שֶׁבְּמִיתָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבַּר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״. וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul? As it is written: “If men strive and strike a woman with child, so that her fruit departs, and yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished, according to the demands that the woman’s husband makes on him; and he shall pay it as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). And concerning this Rabbi Elazar says: The verse is speaking of striving to kill, where each man was trying to kill the other. The proof is that it is written: “But if any harm ensues, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23), and if there was no intention to kill, why should he be executed? And even so, the Merciful One states: “And yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished,” teaching that he must pay the monetary value of the fetus to the woman’s husband.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא: יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו, לֹא נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ – הַיְינוּ דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּיֵעָנֵשׁ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו.
Granted, if you say that in a case where one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he may not save the pursued party at the cost of the pursuer’s life, and if he killed the pursuer rather than injure him he is liable to receive the death penalty, that is how you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished. This would be in a case where it was possible to save the man under attack, i.e., one of the men who were fighting, by injuring the pursuer, i.e., the other man, who ultimately struck the woman, in one of his limbs. In this case, the one who ultimately struck the woman was not subject to being killed. Therefore, he is subject to pay a fine.
אֶלָּא, אִי אָמְרַתְּ: יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵבָרָיו נָמֵי נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּיֵעָנֵשׁ?
But if you say that even if one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he can also save him at the cost of the pursuer’s life, how can you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished? When he was going to strike the other man, he was at risk of being killed, as anybody could have killed him at that time, and the halakha is that anybody who commits an act warranting death exempts himself from any monetary obligation ensuing from that act.
דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּמִיתָה לָזֶה וְתַשְׁלוּמִין לָזֶה.
The Gemara tries to refute this reasoning: Perhaps it is different here because his two liabilities are not on account of the same person; rather, his liability to be put to death is on account of this person, the man with whom he fought, while his liability to give payment is on account of that person, the woman he ultimately struck. Consequently, he is liable to receive both punishments.
לָא שְׁנָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: רוֹדֵף שֶׁהָיָה רוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ, וְשִׁיבֵּר אֶת הַכֵּלִים – בֵּין שֶׁל נִרְדׇּף וּבֵין שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא.
The Gemara rejects this distinction: There is no difference. As Rava says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and during the course of the chase the pursuer broke vessels belonging either to the person being pursued or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for the broken vessels. What is the reason for this? The reason is that he is liable to be killed, since everyone is entitled to kill him in order to save the victim’s life, and one who commits an act rendering himself liable to be killed is exempt from any monetary obligation arising from that act, even if the payment were to be made to a person not connected to the act for which he is liable to be killed.
וְנִרְדׇּף שֶׁשִּׁיבֵּר אֶת הַכֵּלִים שֶׁל רוֹדֵף – פָּטוּר, שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם – חַיָּיב. שֶׁל רוֹדֵף פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מָמוֹנוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִגּוּפוֹ. שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם חַיָּיב, שֶׁמַּצִּיל עַצְמוֹ בְּמָמוֹן חֲבֵירוֹ.
Rava continues: And if the pursued party broke vessels while fleeing from the pursuer, if those vessels belonged to the pursuer, the pursued party is exempt. But if they belonged to anyone else, he is liable to pay for them. The Gemara explains: If the vessels belonged to the pursuer, he is exempt. The reason for this is so that the pursuer’s property should not be more precious to the pursuer than his own body. Were the one being pursued to cause the pursuer bodily harm, he would be exempt; all the more so when the pursued one breaks the pursuer’s vessels. And if the vessels belonged to anyone else, he is liable, as he saved himself at the expense of another’s property, and that other person should not have to suffer a loss on his account.
וְרוֹדֵף שֶׁהָיָה רוֹדֵף אַחַר רוֹדֵף לְהַצִּילוֹ, וְשִׁיבֵּר אֶת הַכֵּלִים – בֵּין שֶׁל רוֹדֵף, בֵּין שֶׁל נִרְדׇּף, בֵּין שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם – פָּטוּר. וְלֹא מִן הַדִּין, שֶׁאִם אִי אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן, נִמְצָא אֵין לָךְ כׇּל אָדָם שֶׁמַּצִּיל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ מִיַּד הָרוֹדֵף.
Rava continues: But if one pursuer was pursuing another pursuer in order to save him, i.e., if he was trying to save the person being pursued by killing the pursuer, and while doing so he broke vessels belonging either to the pursuer or to the one being pursued, or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for them. The Gemara comments: This is not by strict law, as if one who saves himself at another’s expense is liable to pay for the damage, certainly one who saves another at the expense of a third party should bear similar liability. Rather, it is an ordinance instituted by the Sages. This is because if you do not say that he is exempt, it will be found that no person will save another from a pursuer, as everyone will be afraid of becoming liable to pay for damage caused in the course of saving the pursued party.
אֲבָל הָרוֹדֵף אַחַר בְּהֵמָה. תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי אוֹמֵר: הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר. וּמָה פְּגַם הֶדְיוֹט נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, פְּגַם גָּבוֹהַּ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? וְכִי עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין?! קָא סָבַר: עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין.
§ The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One who seeks to worship idols may be saved from transgressing at the cost of his life. This is derived through an a fortiori inference: If to avoid the degradation of an ordinary person, such as in the case of a rapist who degrades his victim, he can be saved even at the cost of his life, all the more so is it not clear that one may kill the transgressor to avoid the degrading of the honor of God through the worship of idols? The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai maintains that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הַמְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. סָבַר לַהּ כַּאֲבוּהּ, דְּאָמַר: עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין. וְאָתְיָא שַׁבָּת בְּ״חִילּוּל״ ״חִילּוּל״ מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One who seeks to desecrate Shabbat may be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who says: The court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference, and the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat is derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of idol worship.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוֹצָדָק: נִימְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ בַּעֲלִיַּת בֵּית נַתְּזָה בְּלוֹד, כׇּל עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה אִם אוֹמְרִין לָאָדָם ״עֲבוֹר וְאַל תֵּהָרֵג״ – יַעֲבוֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג, חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְגִילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים.
§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.
וַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, מִנַּיִן שֶׁאִם אָמְרוּ לוֹ לָאָדָם ״עֲבוֹד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְאַל תֵּהָרֵג״, מִנַּיִן שֶׁיַּעֲבוֹד וְאַל יֵהָרֵג? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וָחַי בָּהֶם״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיָּמוּת בָּהֶם.
The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.
יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלֹא תְחַלְּלוּ אֶת שֵׁם קׇדְשִׁי וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי״.
The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.
אִינְהוּ דַּאֲמוּר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ אֵת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכׇל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ וּבְכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״. אִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״? וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״?
The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous.
אִם יֵשׁ לְךָ אָדָם שֶׁגּוּפוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִמָּמוֹנוֹ, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״. וְאִם יֵשׁ לָךְ אָדָם שֶׁמָּמוֹנוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִגּוּפוֹ, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״.
Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol.
גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, כִּדְרַבִּי. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה״. וְכִי מָה לָמַדְנוּ מֵרוֹצֵחַ?
From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?
מֵעַתָּה, הֲרֵי זֶה בָּא לְלַמֵּד וְנִמְצָא לָמֵד. מַקִּישׁ רוֹצֵחַ לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה: מָה נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה – נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, אַף רוֹצֵחַ – נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ.
Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.
וּמַקִּישׁ נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה לְרוֹצֵחַ: מָה רוֹצֵחַ יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר, אַף נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה תֵּהָרֵג וְאַל תַּעֲבוֹר.
And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.
רוֹצֵחַ גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָא לַן? סְבָרָא הוּא, דְּהָהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲמַר לִי מָרֵי דּוּרַאי ״זִיל קַטְלֵיהּ לִפְלָנְיָא, וְאִי לָא קָטֵילְנָא לָךְ״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִקְטְלוּךָ וְלָא תִּיקְטוֹל. מִי יֵימַר דִּדְמָא דִּידָךְ סוּמָּק טְפֵי? דִּילְמָא דְּמָא דְּהוּא גַּבְרָא סוּמָּק טְפֵי.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁמָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁמָד, אֲפִילּוּ מִצְוָה קַלָּה – יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר.
§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁמָד, לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא בְּצִינְעָא, אֲבָל בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא אֲפִילּוּ מִצְוָה קַלָּה – יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר.
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress.
מַאי מִצְוָה קַלָּה? אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב:
The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says:
אֲפִילּוּ לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי עַרְקְתָא דִּמְסָאנָא.
Even to change the strap of a sandal. There was a Jewish custom with regard to sandal straps. If the gentile authorities were to decree that Jews must change their practice and wear sandal straps like those worn by the gentiles, one would be obligated to give up his life rather than veer from the accepted custom.
וְכַמָּה פַּרְהֶסְיָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין פַּרְהֶסְיָא פְּחוּתָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם. פְּשִׁיטָא, יִשְׂרְאֵלִים בָּעֵינַן, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״. בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: תִּשְׁעָה יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגוֹי אֶחָד, מַהוּ?
The Gemara asks: And the presence of how many people is required so that it should be deemed a public act? Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An action is not considered a public act if it is performed in the presence of fewer than ten people. The Gemara clarifies this point: It is obvious that we require that these ten people be Jews, as it is written in the verse from which we derive the requirement of ten for the sanctification of God’s name: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:32). Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the halakha if there were nine Jews and one gentile present?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַב יַנַּאי אֲחוּהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: אָתְיָא ״תּוֹךְ״ ״תּוֹךְ״ – כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״הִבָּדְלוּ מִתּוֹךְ הָעֵדָה הַזֹּאת״. מָה לְהַלָּן עֲשָׂרָה וְכוּלְּהוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַף כָּאן עֲשָׂרָה וְכוּלְּהוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל.
The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer from what Rav Yannai, the brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, teaches in a baraita: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “among” written with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, and the word “among” written with regard to Korah and his assembly. Here, with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, it is written: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel,” and there, with regard to Korah, it is written: “Separate yourselves from among this congregation” (Numbers 16:21). The meaning of the word “congregation” written with regard to Korah is derived by means of a verbal analogy to the word “congregation” written with regard to the spies sent out by Moses to scout the land: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation” (Numbers 14:27). Just as there, the congregation of spies numbered ten, and all were Jews, so too here, concerning the sanctification of God, there must be ten, all of them being Jews.
וְהָא אֶסְתֵּר פַּרְהֶסְיָא הֲוַאי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֶסְתֵּר קַרְקַע עוֹלָם הָיְתָה.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t the incident involving Esther, i.e., her cohabitation with Ahasuerus, a public sin? Why then did Esther not surrender her life rather than engage in intercourse? The Gemara answers: Abaye says: Esther was merely like natural ground, i.e., she was a passive participant. The obligation to surrender one’s life rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse applies only to a man who transgresses the prohibition in an active manner. A woman who is passive and merely submits is not required to give up her life so that she not sin.
רָבָא אָמַר: הֲנָאַת עַצְמָן שָׁאנֵי.
Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public.
דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, הָנֵי קְוָואקֵי וְדֵימוֹנִיקֵי הֵיכִי יָהֲבִינַן לְהוּ? אֶלָּא הֲנָאַת עַצְמָן שָׁאנֵי. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֲנָאַת עַצְמָן שָׁאנֵי.
Rava explains: As if you do not say so, then how do we give them coal shovels [kevakei vedimonikei]? The Persian priests would take coal shovels from every house, fill them with coals, and use them to heat their temples on their festival days. Although this involved assisting idol worship in public, Jews would not sacrifice their lives in order not to do so. Rather, the reason they cooperated is certainly that a measure enacted for the gentiles’ personal pleasure is different. Here too, concerning Esther, Ahasuerus engaged in intercourse with her for his personal pleasure, and a measure enacted for a gentile’s personal pleasure is different, and there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life to avoid it.
וְאַזְדָּא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: גּוֹי דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְהַאי יִשְׂרָאֵל, ״קְטוֹל אַסְפַּסְתָּא בְּשַׁבְּתָא וּשְׁדִי לְחֵיוָתָא, וְאִי לָא קָטֵילְנָא לָךְ״ – לִיקְטוֹל וְלָא לִקְטְלֵיהּ. ״שְׁדִי לְנַהְרָא״ – לִיקְטְלֵיהּ וְלָא לִיקְטוֹל. מַאי טַעְמָא? לְעַבּוֹרֵי מִילְּתָא קָא בָּעֵי.
The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his own line of reasoning, as Rava says: If a gentile said to a certain Jew: Cut grass [aspasta] on Shabbat and throw it before the cattle, and if you do not do this I will kill you, he should cut the grass and not be killed. But if the gentile said to him: Cut the grass and throw it into the river, he should be killed and not cut the grass. What is the reason for the latter ruling? Because it is clear that the gentile is not seeking his own personal pleasure, but rather he wants to force the Jew to violate his religion.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבִּי אַמֵּי: בֵּן נֹחַ מְצוֶּּוה עַל קְדוּשַּׁת הַשֵּׁם, אוֹ אֵין מְצוֶּּוה עַל קְדוּשַּׁת הַשֵּׁם?
§ The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: Is a descendant of Noah, who is commanded to refrain from idol worship, also commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, or is he not commanded about the sanctification of God’s name?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: שֶׁבַע מִצְוֹת נִצְטַוּוּ בְּנֵי נֹחַ. וְאִם אִיתָא, תַּמְנֵי הָוְיָין! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִינְהוּ וְכֹל אַבְזְרַיְיהוּ.
Abaye says: Come and hear an answer to this question from a baraita in which it was taught: Descendants of Noah were commanded to observe seven mitzvot: To establish courts of law, to refrain from cursing God, idol worship, adultery, bloodshed, robbery, and from eating the limb of a living animal. And if it is so that they are commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, then there would be eight mitzvot in which they are commanded. Rava said to him: There is no proof from here, as when the baraita speaks of seven mitzvot it means the seven mitzvot themselves with all their associated [avzaraihu] obligations. The mitzva to sanctify God’s name can be understood as a detail of the prohibition of idolatry.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב, כְּתִיב: ״לַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יִסְלַח ה׳ לְעַבְדֶּךָ בְּבוֹא אֲדֹנִי בֵית רִמּוֹן לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת שָׁמָּה וְהוּא נִשְׁעָן עַל יָדִי וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֵיתִי״, וּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ לֵךְ לְשָׁלוֹם״.
The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Adda bar Ahava says that they say in the school of Rav: It is written that Naaman, commander of the army of the king of Aram, said to the prophet Elisha: “For this matter may the Lord pardon your servant, that when my master goes into the house of Rimmon to bow down there and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself down in the house of Rimmon” (II Kings 5:18). That is, he was forced to bow down before an idol out of fear of his master, the king of Aram. And it is written in the following verse: “And he said to him: Go in peace,” indicating that Elisha did not criticize him for acting in this manner.
