Sanhedrin 75
וְאִם אִיתָא, לָא לֵימָא לֵיהּ? הָא בְּצִנְעָה, הָא בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא.
And if it is so that a descendant of Noah is commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, he should not have said to him: “Go in peace.” The Gemara answers: This situation, where Elisha permitted Naaman’s conduct, happened in private. When Naaman bowed down in the house of Rimmon, he did not do so in the presence of ten Jews. Whereas that question that was raised is whether or not a descendant of Noah must sanctify God’s name in public, in the presence of ten Jews. Consequently, the question remains without a solution.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁנָּתַן עֵינָיו בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת, וְהֶעֱלָה לִבּוֹ טִינָא. וּבָאוּ וְשָׁאֲלוּ לָרוֹפְאִים, וְאָמְרוּ: אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה עַד שֶׁתִּבָּעֵל. אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: יָמוּת וְאַל תִּבָּעֵל לוֹ. תַּעֲמוֹד לְפָנָיו עֲרוּמָּה: יָמוּת וְאַל תַּעֲמוֹד לְפָנָיו עֲרוּמָּה. תְּסַפֵּר עִמּוֹ מֵאֲחוֹרֵי הַגָּדֵר: יָמוּת וְלֹא תְּסַפֵּר עִמּוֹ מֵאֲחוֹרֵי הַגָּדֵר.
§ Apropos the discussion of the obligation to allow oneself to be killed rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse, the Gemara notes that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a certain man who set his eyes upon a certain woman and passion rose in his heart, to the point that he became deathly ill. And they came and asked doctors what was to be done with him. And the doctors said: He will have no cure until she engages in sexual intercourse with him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not engage in sexual intercourse with him. The doctors said: She should at least stand naked before him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not stand naked before him. The doctors suggested: The woman should at least converse with him behind a fence in a secluded area, so that he should derive a small amount of pleasure from the encounter. The Sages insisted: Let him die, and she may not converse with him behind a fence.
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידֵּי וְרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי: חַד אָמַר: אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הָיְתָה, וְחַד אָמַר: פְּנוּיָה הָיְתָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הָיְתָה – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר פְּנוּיָה הָיְתָה – מַאי כּוּלֵּי הַאי?
The Gemara comments: Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi and Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani disagree about this issue. One of them says: The woman in question was a married woman, and the other one says: She was unmarried. The Gemara tries to clarify the issue: Granted, according to the one who says that she was a married woman, the matter is properly understood. Since the case involved a severely prohibited forbidden relationship, the Sages did not allow any activity hinting at intimacy. But according to the one who says that she was unmarried, what is the reason for all this opposition? Why did the Sages say that the man must be allowed to die, rather than have the woman do as was requested?
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל פְּרוּצוֹת בַּעֲרָיוֹת.
Rav Pappa says: This is due to the potential family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name, as it is not permitted to bring disgrace to the entire family in order to save the lovesick man. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says: This is so that the daughters of Israel should not be promiscuous with regard to forbidden sexual relations. Were they to listen to the doctors’ recommendations, Jewish women might lose moral restraint.
וְלִינְסְבַהּ מִינְסָב? לָא מְיַיתְּבָה דַּעְתֵּיהּ, כִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִיּוֹם שֶׁחָרַב בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, נִיטְּלָה טַעַם בִּיאָה וְנִיתְּנָה לְעוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״מַיִם גְּנוּבִים יִמְתָּקוּ וְלֶחֶם סְתָרִים יִנְעָם״.
The Gemara asks: But if the woman was unmarried, let the man marry her. The Gemara answers: His mind would not have been eased by marriage, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Since the day the Temple was destroyed, sexual pleasure was taken away from those who engage in permitted intercourse and given to transgressors, as it is stated: “Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant” (Proverbs 9:17). Therefore, the man could have been cured only by engaging in illicit sexual interaction.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה.
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַנִּשְׂרָפִין: הַבָּא עַל אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ, וּבַת כֹּהֵן שֶׁזִּנְּתָה.
MISHNA: And these are the transgressors who are burned in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and one who is the daughter of a priest and who committed adultery.
יֵשׁ בִּכְלַל אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ: בִּתּוֹ, וּבַת בִּתּוֹ, וּבַת בְּנוֹ, וּבַת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וּבַת בִּתָּהּ, וּבַת בְּנָהּ, חֲמוֹתוֹ, וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ, וְאֵם חָמִיו.
Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son. Likewise, the following are also included in this category: Intercourse with the daughter of his wife, even though she is not his daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, as well as intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The prohibition and punishment apply both in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her daughter, and in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her mother.
גְּמָ׳ הַבָּא עַל אִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּשָׂא בִּתָּהּ – לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא הַבָּא עַל אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ. מִכְּלָל דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא, וּמַאן נִינְהוּ? חֲמוֹתוֹ וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ.
GEMARA: The tanna does not teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married. Rather, the tanna teaches the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that both the woman and her daughter are mentioned in the mishna for the purpose of establishing that there is a prohibition of intercourse with either of them, and when he engages in intercourse with the first of them he is liable to be executed. And who are these women? The reference is to his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law.
וְקָתָנֵי: ״יֵשׁ בִּכְלַל אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ כְּתִיבִי בְּהֶדְיָא, וְהָנָךְ מִדְּרָשָׁא אָתְיָא.
And the tanna teaches: Additional women are included in the category of the prohibition of and the punishment for engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that with regard to both his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law, the prohibition and punishment are written explicitly in the Torah, and with regard to those additional women enumerated in the mishna, the prohibition and punishment are derived by means of interpretation.
הָנִיחָא לְאַבָּיֵי, דְּאָמַר: מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא.
The Gemara comments: This works out well according to Abaye, who says that with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva cited later in the Gemara (76b), the difference between their opinions is only concerning the interpretation of the meaning of the verse, but there is no practical difference between their opinions. According to Abaye, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Abaye explains that Rabbi Akiva maintains that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah.
אֶלָּא לְרָבָא דְּאָמַר: חֲמוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: תְּנִי ״הַבָּא עַל אִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּשָׂא בִּתָּהּ״.
But according to Rava, who says that the difference between their opinions is with regard to the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law after the death of his wife, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The opinion of the tanna of the mishna corresponds neither to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva nor to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as they both maintain that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is not stated explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you: Emend the mishna and teach: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married.
יֵשׁ בִּכְלַל אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ: חֲמוֹתוֹ, וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ, וְאֵם חָמִיו. לְאַבָּיֵי, אַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא אֵם חָמִיו, תָּנֵי נָמֵי חֲמוֹתוֹ וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ.
The mishna teaches: Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Gemara comments: Abaye holds that everyone agrees that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah, and the tanna enumerates his mother-in-law together with relatives concerning whom the prohibition is derived by means of interpretation. Therefore, according to Abaye, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law is included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law as well, despite the fact the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah.
לְרָבָא, אַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא אֵם חָמִיו וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ, תָּנֵי נָמֵי חֲמוֹתוֹ.
By contrast, Rava holds that the woman and her daughter mentioned in the first clause of the mishna are his wife and his mother-in-law. Therefore, according to Rava, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law are included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law in the latter clause as well, despite the fact that it is stated explicitly in the Torah.
מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אִשָּׁה וְאֶת אִמָּהּ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִשָּׁה וְאִמָּהּ. בַּת אִשָּׁה, וּבַת בִּתָּהּ, וּבַת בְּנָהּ מִנַּיִן?
§ The mishna enumerates several women with whom intercourse is forbidden who are included in the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, which is punished by execution by burning. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived as the Sages taught: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14). I have derived only that this punishment applies to one who engages in intercourse with a woman and with her mother. From where is it derived that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the woman married to him, or with the daughter of her daughter, or with the daughter of her son, is also liable to be executed by burning?
נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זִמָּה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זִמָּה״. מָה לְהַלָּן – בִּתָּהּ וּבַת בִּתָּהּ וּבַת בְּנָהּ, אַף כָּאן – בִּתָּהּ וּבַת בִּתָּהּ וּבַת בְּנָהּ.
The baraita continues: Lewdness is stated here, with regard to the punishment: “There shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), and lewdness is stated there, with regard to the prohibition: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are near kinswomen, it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). It is derived by means of a verbal analogy that just as there the prohibition applies to the woman’s daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, so too here, the punishment of burning applies to one who engages in intercourse with the woman’s daughter, and to the daughter of her daughter, and to the daughter of her son.
מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת זְכָרִים כִּנְקֵבוֹת? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זִמָּה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זִמָּה״. מָה לְהַלָּן זְכָרִים כִּנְקֵבוֹת, אַף כָּאן זְכָרִים כִּנְקֵבוֹת.
The baraita continues: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females with regard to this punishment? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of males like that of female relatives, so too here, the Torah renders the status of males like that of females.
מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זִמָּה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זִמָּה״. מָה לְהַלָּן לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה, אַף כָּאן לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה. וּמָה כָּאן לְמַעְלָה כִּלְמַטָּה, אַף לְהַלָּן לְמַעְלָה כִּלְמַטָּה.
From where is it derived to render the status of relatives below like the status of relatives above? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above, so too here, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above. And just as here, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below, so too there, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below.
אָמַר מָר: מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת זְכָרִים כִּנְקֵבוֹת. מַאי ״זְכָרִים כִּנְקֵבוֹת״? אִילֵּימָא בַּת בְּנָהּ כְּבַת בִּתָּהּ? בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי קָאָתְיָאן!
The Gemara proceeds to elaborate on the derivations cited in the baraita. The Master says: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The status of males like that of females? If we say that it means that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the son of his wife is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of her daughter, the status of the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter are derived together in the first clause of the baraita, as both are written explicitly in the prohibition.
אֶלָּא, אֵם חָמִיו כְּאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ. הַשְׁתָּא, אֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ לָא קָמָה לַן, אֵם חָמִיו מִיהְדָּר עֲלַהּ?
Rather, this clause in the baraita means that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law. The Gemara asks: Now, we have not yet established the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law, and the baraita is seeking to derive the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law from the halakha of the mother of his mother-in-law?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכִי קָאָמַר, מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת שְׁאֵר הַבָּא מִמֶּנּוּ כִּשְׁאֵר הַבָּא מִמֶּנָּה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זִמָּה״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זִמָּה״ וְכוּ׳. וְהָא בִּשְׁאֵר דִּידֵיהּ לָא כְּתִיבָא בֵּיהּ ״זִמָּה״!
Abaye says: This is what the baraita is saying. From where is it derived to render a relative who comes from his family, e.g., the daughter of his daughter and the daughter of his son, like a relative who comes from her family, e.g., the daughter of his wife and the daughter of his wife’s daughter? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of male relatives like that of female relatives, so too here, the Torah renders the status of males like that of females. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it so that with regard to a relative from his family the term lewdness is not written, as the verse states: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, their nakedness you shall not expose; for theirs is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10)?
אָמַר רָבָא: אֲמַר לִי רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אֲבוּדִימִי, אָתְיָא ״הֵנָּה״ ״הֵנָּה״, אָתְיָא ״זִמָּה״ ״זִמָּה״.
Rava says: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: The equation of his relative to her relative is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “henna” written with regard to his relative: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, their nakedness you shall not expose; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word “henna” written with regard to her relative: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). Additionally, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14).
אָמַר מָר: מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה. מַאי ״לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה״? אִילֵּימָא בַּת בְּנָהּ וּבַת בִּתָּהּ כְּבִתָּהּ, בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי קָאָתְיָין!
The Master says: From where is it derived to render the status of a relative below like the status of a relative above? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The status of a relative below like the status of a relative above? If we say this means that the status of second-generation relative, i.e., the daughter of the son of his wife and the daughter of her daughter is like the status of first-generation relative, i.e., her daughter, this is difficult, as they are derived together, as all of them are mentioned in the same verse (see Leviticus 18:17).
אֶלָּא, אֵם חָמִיו וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ כַּחֲמוֹתוֹ. הַאי ״לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה״? ״לְמַעְלָה כִּלְמַטָּה״ הוּא! תְּנִי: ״לְמַעְלָה כִּלְמַטָּה״.
Rather, it means that the status of the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law is like that of his mother-in-law. The Gemara challenges: If so, is this an example of: A relative below is like the status of a relative above? On the contrary, it is an example of: A relative above is like the status of a relative below. The Gemara responds: Emend the baraita and teach: The status of a relative from the generation above is like the status of a relative from the generation below them.
אִי הָכִי, נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זִמָּה״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זִמָּה״, וּמָה הַשְׁתָּא: אִינְהִי לָא כְּתִיבָא, זִמָּה דִּידְהוּ כְּתִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: If so, as for the continuation of the baraita: Lewdness is stated here, with regard to the prohibition, and lewdness is stated there, with regard to the punishment, now, if the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law are not written in the Torah and are derived through interpretation, is the term lewdness written concerning them?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכִי קָאָמַר, מִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַעְלָה כִּשְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַטָּה? נֶאֱמַר לְמַטָּה ״זִמָּה״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְמַעְלָה ״זִמָּה״. מָה לְמַטָּה שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת, אַף לְמַעְלָה שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת.
Abaye says: This is what the baraita is saying: From where is it derived to render the status of a relative for three generations above, his wife, his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, like the status of a relative for three generations below, his wife, his daughter, and the daughter of his daughter? Lewdness is stated with regard to relatives below, the offspring of his wife (Leviticus 18:17), and lewdness is stated with regard to relatives above, the ancestors of his wife (Leviticus 20:14). Just as with regard to relatives below, one is liable for engaging in intercourse with three generations of women, so too with regard to relatives above, one is liable for engaging in intercourse with three generations of women.
וּמָה בָּעוֹנֶשׁ עָשָׂה לְמַטָּה כִּלְמַעְלָה, אַף בָּאַזְהָרָה נָמֵי עָשָׂה לְמַעְלָה כִּלְמַטָּה.
And just as with regard to punishment, the verse rendered the status of relatives below like that of relatives above, so too, with regard to the prohibition, the verse rendered the status of relatives above like that of relatives below.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי, וּמַאי ״לְמַטָּה״? לְמַטָּה בְּאִיסּוּר.
Rav Ashi says: Actually, it is not necessary to emend the baraita, and the baraita may be interpreted as it is taught. And what is the meaning of the term below? The reference is to below in terms of the prohibition, i.e., below refers to more distant relatives, e.g., the mother of his mother-in-law, with regard to whom the prohibition is less severe, and above refers to closer relatives, e.g., his mother-in-law, with regard to whom the prohibition is more severe.
אִי: מָה הִיא – אֵם אִמָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, אַף הוּא – אֵם אִמּוֹ אֲסוּרָה?
Based on that interpretation of the baraita, the Gemara asks: If so, why not say: Just as the mother of the mother of his wife is forbidden to him, so too the mother of his mother is forbidden to him, and say that he would be liable to be executed by burning?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָמַר קְרָא ״אִמְּךָ הִיא״, מִשּׁוּם אִמּוֹ אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם אֵם אִמּוֹ.
Abaye says that it is not possible that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother, as the verse states: “The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not expose; she is your mother, you shall not expose her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:7). Infer from this: Due to his intercourse with his mother you deem him liable to be executed, but you do not deem him liable to be executed due to his intercourse with the mother of his mother.
רָבָא אָמַר: בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ״, וּבֵין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ״ – לָא אָתְיָא.
Rava says: Both according to the one who says with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy: Infer the halakha from it, i.e., from the source of the verbal analogy, and derive the details from it, i.e., from that source, and according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., the derived halakha is subject to the principles that govern that which is derived by means of the verbal analogy, it is not derived that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother.
לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ, מָה הִיא אֵם אִמָּהּ אֲסוּרָה – אַף הוּא נָמֵי אֵם אִמּוֹ אֲסוּרָה. וּמִינַּהּ: מָה הִיא בִּשְׂרֵיפָה – אַף הוּא נָמֵי בִּשְׂרֵיפָה.
The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, one might infer: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, the mother of her mother is forbidden to him, so too with regard to his relatives, the mother of his mother is forbidden to him. And derive again from it: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, he is liable to be executed by burning due to his intercourse with the mother of her mother, so too with regard to his relatives, he is also liable to be executed by burning due to his intercourse with the mother of his mother.
לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂרֵיפָה חֲמוּרָה, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ. מָה לְהִיא – שֶׁכֵּן אִמָּהּ בִּשְׂרֵיפָה, תֹּאמַר בְּהוּא – שֶׁאִמּוֹ בִּסְקִילָה?
The Gemara proceeds to explain why one cannot derive that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother. According to the one who says: Execution by burning is more severe than execution by stoning, the inference from the halakha of relatives of his wife can be refuted as follows: What is notable about her relatives, where he is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of her mother? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of burning, not the less severe, more common, punishment of stoning. Will you then say that the same halakha should apply with regard to his relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of stoning?
וְעוֹד: אִמּוֹ בִּסְקִילָה, אֵם אִמּוֹ בִּשְׂרֵיפָה?
And furthermore, as one who engages in intercourse with his mother is executed by the less severe punishment of stoning, is it possible that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother, a more distant relative, is executed by the more severe punishment of burning?
וְעוֹד: מָה הִיא – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בָּהּ בֵּין אִמָּהּ לְאֵם אִמָּהּ, אַף הוּא – נָמֵי לָא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין אִמּוֹ לְאֵם אִמּוֹ?
And furthermore, just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her mother and the mother of her mother, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by burning, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his mother and the mother of his mother. Since one who engages in intercourse with his mother is punished by stoning, not burning, it follows that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is punished by stoning, not burning.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר סְקִילָה חֲמוּרָה, מֵהַאי קוּשְׁיָא לָא נְידוּנַהּ.
And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe than burning, although the first two refutations of the derivation, based on the fact that execution by burning is more severe, are not relevant, due to this third difficulty, this halakha is not derived. Just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her mother and the mother of her mother, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his mother and the mother of his mother.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר, דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ: מָה הִיא – אֵם אִמָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, אַף הוּא נָמֵי – אֵם אִמּוֹ אֲסוּרָה. וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ: הָתָם הוּא דְּבִשְׂרֵיפָה, אֲבָל הָכָא בִּסְקִילָה, כִּדְאַשְׁכְּחַן בְּאִמּוֹ.
And according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, one might infer: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, the mother of her mother is forbidden to him, so too with regard to his relatives, the mother of his mother is forbidden to him. And interpret the halakha according to its own place: It is there, with regard to the relatives of his wife, that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of her mother is executed by burning; but here, with regard to his relatives, one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is executed by stoning, as we found that this is the punishment with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother.
לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׂרֵיפָה חֲמוּרָה, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ:
The Gemara explains why the derivation with regard to the prohibition is not valid. According to the one who says that execution by burning is more severe than execution by stoning, the derivation can be refuted:
