Sanhedrin 87
בְּמוּפְלָא שֶׁבְּבֵית דִּין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. ״מִמְּךָ״ – זֶה יוֹעֵץ, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״מִמֵּךְ יָצָא חֹשֵׁב עַל ה׳ רָעָה יֹעֵץ בְּלִיַּעַל״. ״דָּבָר״ – זוֹ הֲלָכָה. ״לַמִּשְׁפָּט״ – זֶה הַדִּין.
it is with regard to the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court, an ordained, expert judge, that the verse is speaking. “For you [mimmekha]”; this is a reference to an adviser, who is consulted with regard to significant matters, e.g., intercalation of the year; and likewise it says: “From you [mimmekh] he emerged, who devised evil against the Lord, an adviser of wickedness” (Nahum 1:11). “A matter”; this halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles.
״בֵּין דָּם לְדָם״ – בֵּין דַּם נִדָּה, דַּם לֵידָה, דַּם זִיבָה. ״בֵּין דִּין לְדִין״ – בֵּין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, דִּינֵי מַכּוֹת. ״בֵּין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע״ – בֵּין נִגְעֵי אָדָם, נִגְעֵי בָתִּים, נִגְעֵי בְגָדִים.
“Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of a menstruating woman, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. “Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law and cases of monetary law, with regard to which there are differences in evidence protocols, and laws involving the liability to receive lashes. “Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments (see Leviticus, chapter 14).
״דִּבְרֵי״ – אֵלּוּ הַחֲרָמִים, וְהָעֲרָכִין, וְהַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת. ״רִיבֹת״ – זוֹ הַשְׁקָאַת סוֹטָה, וַעֲרִיפַת עֶגְלָה, וְטׇהֳרַת מְצוֹרָע. ״בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ״ – זוֹ לֶקֶט, שִׁכְחָה, וּפֵאָה.
“Matters of [divrei]”; these are the dedications to God or to a priest, and the valuations of one’s value to the Temple, and the consecrations, all of which are matters of speech [dibbur]. “Controversy”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota (see Numbers, chapter 5), which results from a dispute between husband and wife; and the heifer whose neck is broken, which results from an unresolved murder (Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and the purification of a leper, who is afflicted due to evil speech. “Within your gates”; this is referring to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a], all of which are given to the poor who eat at the gates of the city.
״וְקַמְתָּ״ – מִבֵּית דִּין. ״וְעָלִיתָ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ גָּבוֹהַּ מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל גָּבוֹהַּ מִכׇּל הָאֲרָצוֹת. ״אֶל הַמָּקוֹם״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַמָּקוֹם גּוֹרֵם.
“Then you shall arise” from the court where he sits as a judge. “And ascend”; this teaches that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands. Therefore, the language of ascent is employed with regard to travel to Eretz Yisrael. “To the place that the Lord, your God, shall choose”; this teaches that the location that God chose for the Sanhedrin to convene causes their rulings to be authoritative, in the sense here in the mishna that the rebellious elder who instructs others to act contrary to a ruling issued there is liable.
בִּשְׁלָמָא בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ גָּבוֹהַּ מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְעָלִיתָ״. אֶלָּא אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל גָּבוֹהַּ מִכׇּל הָאֲרָצוֹת מְנָא לֵיהּ? דִּכְתִיב: ״לָכֵן הִנֵּה יָמִים בָּאִים נְאֻם ה׳ לֹא יֵאָמֵר חַי ה׳ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם. כִּי אִם חַי ה׳ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָה וַאֲשֶׁר הֵבִיא אֶת זֶרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֶרֶץ צָפֹנָה וּמִכֹּל הָאֲרָצוֹת אֲשֶׁר הִדַּחְתִּים שָׁם וְיָשְׁבוּ עַל אַדְמָתָם״.
The Gemara asks: Granted, the fact that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And ascend.” But from where does the tanna derive the fact that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands? The Gemara answers that it is derived from this verse, as it is written: “Therefore, behold, the days come, says the Lord, and they will no longer say: As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of Egypt; rather, as the Lord lives, Who brought up and led the descendants of the house of Israel from the north country and from all the countries where I had driven them, and they shall dwell upon their land” (Jeremiah 23:7–8). Apparently, coming from other countries to Eretz Yisrael is also characterized as ascent.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: זָקֵן מַמְרֵא אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַל דָּבָר שֶׁעִיקָּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וּפֵירוּשׁוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ דִּקְדּוּק אֶחָד מִדִּקְִדּוּקֵי סוֹפְרִים.
The Sages taught in a baraita: A rebellious elder is liable only for instructing another to perform an action involving a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable for a matter whose essence is known from the words of the Torah itself and whose explanation is understood from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah. The elder is not liable if the essence of the matter with regard to which he issues his ruling does not appear in the Torah or if the entire matter is written in the Torah. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he differs with regard to one of the minutiae of the scribes in interpreting the Torah, the elder is liable, irrespective of the severity of the transgression.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? גָּמַר ״דָּבָר״ ״דָּבָר״. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר מֵעֵינֵי הַקָּהָל״. מָה לְהַלָּן דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּיב עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּיב עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He derives a verbal analogy between the term matter written here and the term matter that is written elsewhere. Here, matter is written in the verse: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment” (Deuteronomy 17:8), and there, it is written: “And the matter shall be concealed from the eyes of the assembly” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there, in the verse in Leviticus, the sin-offering of the congregation is brought only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: ״עַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ״ – עַד דְּאִיכָּא ״תּוֹרָה״ וְ״יוֹרוּךָ״.
And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “According to the Torah that they shall instruct you” (Deuteronomy 17:11), indicating that there is no liability until it is a matter that consists of elements of both the Written Torah and in that the Sages shall instruct you in interpretation of the Written Torah.
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא״ – אֲפִילּוּ כֹּל דְּהוּ.
And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “That they shall declare unto you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10), from which Rabbi Shimon derives that one is liable even if he deviates from the ruling of the Sanhedrin to any degree whatsoever.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא לְרָבָא: תַּרְגְּמַהּ לִי לְהָא מַתְנִיתָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב פָּפָּא: פּוֹק תַּרְגְּמַהּ לֵיהּ.
Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to Rava: Interpret for me that baraita, in which the liability of the rebellious elder for rulings in different areas of halakha is derived from the verses, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. How is such a prohibition found in each of the categories enumerated in the baraita? Rava said to Rav Pappa his student: Go and interpret it for him.
״כִּי יִפָּלֵא״ – בְּמוּפְלָא שֶׁבְּבֵית דִּין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. ״מִמְּךָ״ – זֶה יוֹעֵץ, שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לְעַבֵּר שָׁנִים וְלִקְבּוֹעַ חֳדָשִׁים. כְּדִתְנַן: הֵן הֵעִידוּ שֶׁמְּעַבְּרִים אֶת הַשָּׁנָה כׇּל אֲדָר, שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹמְרִים עַד הַפּוּרִים.
Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna: “If there shall be a matter too hard”; there the verse is speaking with regard to the most distinguished member of the court. “For you”; this is referring to an adviser, who knows how to intercalate years and establish months. How is there liability in this matter for karet or a sin-offering? It is as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 7:7): Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified that the judges may intercalate the year throughout the entire month of Adar, as the other Sages would say that the judges may do so only until the day of Purim.
דְּאִי לְהַאי גִּיסָא, קָא שָׁרֵי חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח. וְאִי לְהַאי גִּיסָא, קָא שָׁרֵי חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח.
A ruling contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin could result in a matter for which one is liable to receive karet, as, if his disagreement is to this side, e.g., the court intercalated the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is not intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. And if his disagreement is to that side, e.g., the court did not intercalate the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. One who intentionally eats leavened bread on Passover is liable to receive karet, and one who does so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering.
דָּבָר זֶה – הֲלָכָה. זוֹ הִלְכַת אַחַד עָשָׂר. דְּאִיתְּמַר: עֲשִׂירִי, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: עֲשִׂירִי כִּתְשִׁיעִי, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: עֲשִׂירִי כְּאַחַד עָשָׂר.
“A matter”; this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. This is a matter involving karet in the case of the halakhot of eleven days, which is the minimal number of days between one menstrual period and another, when if a woman experiences a flow of blood on three consecutive days during those eleven days, she assumes the status of a greater zava, with regard to whom there are unique halakhot, e.g., the passage of seven clean days before purification by Torah law. When the woman experiences a discharge of blood for one or two days, she is a lesser zava, and if she observes the third day clean from the discharge of blood she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. As it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood on the tenth of those eleven days. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר, עֲשִׂירִי כִּתְשִׁיעִי: מָה תְּשִׁיעִי בָּעֵי שִׁימּוּר – אַף עֲשִׂירִי בָּעֵי שִׁימּוּר.
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day: Just as a discharge on the ninth day requires the woman to examine herself the following day and requires the observance of a day clean from discharges, so too does a discharge on the tenth day require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day before immersing in a ritual bath. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a woman who experiences a discharge on the tenth day assumes the status of a woman who observes a clean day for one or two days after she experiences a discharge.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר, עֲשִׂירִי כְּאַחַד עָשָׂר: מָה אַחַד עָשָׂר לֹא בָּעֵי שִׁימּוּר – אַף עֲשִׂירִי לָא בָּעֵי שִׁימּוּר.
And Reish Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day: Just as a discharge on the eleventh day does not require observance of a day clean from discharge before immersing in a ritual bath, so too does a discharge on the tenth day not require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day. Even if she were to experience a discharge of blood on the days that follow, the eleventh and the twelfth days, she would not assume the status of a greater zava, as in that case the blood that she saw on the twelfth day would be the blood of menstruation and not the discharge of a zava. According to Reish Lakish, she does not assume that status. Therefore, if the Sanhedrin issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with that woman before her purification is liable to receive karet. If the rebellious elder issued a ruling in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, then one who intentionally engaged in intercourse with the woman is liable to receive karet. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
״מִשְׁפָּט״ – זֶה הַדִּין.
“In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles,
דִּין בִּתּוֹ מֵאֲנוּסָתוֹ.
for example, the halakha of the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter born from the victim of his rape.
דְּאָמַר רָבָא: אֲמַר לִי רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אֲבוּדִימִי, אָתְיָא ״הֵנָּה״ ״הֵנָּה״,
As Rava says: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: This prohibition is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word henna, in the verse: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word henna in a different verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness: They [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). This verbal analogy indicates that just as intercourse with one’s granddaughter and with one’s wife’s daughter or granddaughter is forbidden, so too, intercourse with one’s daughter is prohibited.
אָתְיָא ״זִמָּה״ ״זִמָּה״.
Furthermore, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire, both he and they, so that there be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), that one who engages in sexual intercourse with his daughter or granddaughter is liable to be executed by burning.
״בֵּין דָּם לְדָם״ – בֵּין דַּם נִדָּה, דַּם לֵידָה, דַּם זִיבָה. דַּם נִדָּה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל וְרַבָּנַן, דִּתְנַן: דָּם הַיָּרוֹק – עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מְטַמֵּא, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַהֲרִין.
“Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of menstruation, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. In each of these cases, there is a dispute between the Sages with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet. In the case of the blood of menstruation, it is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nidda 19a): With regard to blood that is green that is discharged by a woman, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems it blood of menstruation and impure, and the Rabbis deem it pure. According to Akavya ben Mahalalel, one who engages in intercourse with a woman who discharged green blood is liable to receive karet, while according to the Rabbis, he is exempt.
דַּם לֵידָה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַב וְלֵוִי, דְּאִתְּמַר, רַב אָמַר: מַעְיָן אֶחָד הוּא, הַתּוֹרָה טִמְּאַתּוּ וְהַתּוֹרָה טִיהֲרַתּוּ.
In the case of the blood of childbirth, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rav and Levi. This is as it was stated that Rav says: Blood that a woman discharges after childbirth is all from one source; the Torah deemed ritually impure the blood discharged for one week after the birth of a male and two weeks after the birth of a female, and the Torah deemed ritually pure the blood that is discharged for the subsequent thirty-three days for a male and sixty-six days for a female. Even if the blood flows continuously, the status of the blood changes after the conclusion of the period of impurity.
וְלֵוִי אָמַר: שְׁנֵי מַעֲיָינוֹת הֵן, נִסְתָּם הַטָּמֵא – נִפְתָּח הַטָּהוֹר, נִסְתָּם הַטָּהוֹר – נִפְתָּח הַטָּמֵא.
And Levi says: It is from two sources; the impure source is sealed after one week for a male and two weeks for a female, and then the pure source is opened, and at the conclusion of the period of the discharge of pure blood, the pure source is sealed and the impure source is opened. Only if the flow of impure blood ceases is a subsequent discharge deemed pure. Therefore, if one engaged in intercourse with a woman who experienced a continuous flow of blood beyond the time of the conclusion of the period of the flow of pure blood, according to Levi, he is liable to receive karet, and according to Rav, he is exempt.
דַּם זִיבָה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. דִּתְנַן: קִישְּׁתָה שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים בְּתוֹךְ אַחַד עָשָׂר יוֹם, אִם שָׁפְתָה מֵעֵת לְעֵת וְיָלְדָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ יוֹלֶדֶת בְּזוֹב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
In the case of the blood of ziva, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 36b): In a case where a woman experienced labor pain accompanied by an emission of blood lasting three consecutive days within the eleven days between the periods when her emissions render her a menstruating woman, during which the emission of blood renders the woman a zava, if she ceased experiencing labor for a twenty-four-hour period, indicating that the blood was not the result of imminent birth, and then she gave birth, that woman gives birth as a zava and is liable to bring the purification offerings of both a woman after childbirth and a zava; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לַיְלָה וָיוֹם, כְּלֵילֵי שַׁבָּת וְיוֹמוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁפְתָה מִן הַצַּעַר וְלֹא מִן הַדָּם.
The mishna continues: And Rabbi Yehoshua says: That is her status only if she ceased experiencing labor for a twenty-four-hour period that is a night and the day that follows, like Shabbat evening and the day that follows it. When the mishna says that she ceased, it is referring to a case where she ceased from having labor pains and not from having the flow of blood. The dispute is whether the woman who gave birth has the status of a zava, who is required to count seven clean days before immersing in flowing water, or whether she has the status of a woman after childbirth. If the two weeks of the blood of impurity after childbirth elapsed and she did not immerse in flowing water, according to Rabbi Eliezer, she remains a zava, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, at that point the blood becomes the blood of purity, and one who engages in intercourse with her is not liable to receive karet.
״בֵּין דִּין לְדִין״ – בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, דִּינֵי מַכּוֹת. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין, אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּקְרָאִין בֵּית דִּין חָצוּף. וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין דִּינֵיהֶן דִּין.
“Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law, cases of monetary law, and cases of laws involving lashes. The Gemara elaborates: In cases of monetary law, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu, as Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who sat in judgment and issued a ruling in cases of monetary law, their ruling is a valid ruling, but they are characterized as an impudent court. And Rabbi Abbahu says: Everyone agrees that their ruling is not a valid ruling. If a tribunal of two judges rules that one of the litigants must pay the other money, and that litigant uses the money to betroth a woman, according to Shmuel she is betrothed, and one who intentionally engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Abbahu she is not betrothed, and one who engages in intercourse with her is not liable.
דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי וְרַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, ״וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״ – מָמוֹן.
In cases of capital law, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to that which is written: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman…and if there shall be a tragedy you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:22–23), the reference is to a monetary payment for the life that he took. The tragedy referenced is the unintentional killing of the mother.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מָמוֹן, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא נֶפֶשׁ מַמָּשׁ? נֶאֱמַר ״נְתִינָה״ לְמַעְלָה, וְנֶאֱמַר ״נְתִינָה״ לְמַטָּה. מָה לְהַלָּן מָמוֹן, אַף כָּאן מָמוֹן.
The tanna deliberates: Do you say that the reference is to a monetary payment, or perhaps the reference is only to giving his actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, giving is stated above: “And you shall give a life for a life,” and giving is stated below: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:23). Just as there, in the phrase “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary payment, so too here, in the phrase “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary payment. The Rabbis hold that the reference is to giving his actual life. If an heir of the victim betrothed a woman with money seized from the assailant, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the woman is betrothed, while according to the Rabbis she is not betrothed.
דִּינֵי מַכּוֹת – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבָּנַן, דִּתְנַן: מַכּוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ: בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.
In cases of laws involving lashes, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (2a): Cases concerning the violation of prohibitions that render one liable to receive lashes are adjudicated by three judges. The Sages stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes are adjudicated by twenty-three judges. According to Rabbi Yishmael, if a tribunal of three sentences an individual to lashes, that individual can claim damages for any injury caused as a result of the lashes, and if he betroths a woman with that money the betrothal is valid. According to the Rabbis, he cannot claim damages, as the court is authorized to sentence him to receive lashes.
״בֵּין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע״ – בֵּין נִגְעֵי אָדָם, נִגְעֵי בָתִּים, נִגְעֵי בְגָדִים.
“Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments.
נִגְעֵי אָדָם – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן: אִם בַּהֶרֶת קָדַם לַשֵּׂעָר הַלָּבָן – טָמֵא, אִם שֵׂעָר לָבָן קָדַם לַבַּהֶרֶת – טָהוֹר, סָפֵק – טָמֵא. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: כֵּהָה. מַאי כֵּהָה? אָמַר רָבָא: כֵּהָה – טָהוֹר.
In the case of leprous marks of a person, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 4:11): If the snow-white leprous mark [baheret] preceded the white hair, the individual is impure with leprosy, as that is the order of events that appears in the Torah, and if the white hair preceded the baheret, the individual is pure. If there is uncertainty concerning which appeared first, the Rabbis say: He is impure, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It has darkened. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: It has darkened? Rava says: Its status is like that of a baheret that darkened, with regard to which the Torah says that he is pure. If one with a baheret and a white hair entered the Temple, and there is uncertainty concerning which appeared first, according to the Rabbis he is liable to receive karet, and according to Rabbi Yehoshua he is not liable.
נִגְעֵי בָתִּים, בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, לְעוֹלָם אֵין הַבַּיִת טָמֵא עַד שֶׁיֵּרָאֶה כִּשְׁנֵי גְרִיסִין עַל שְׁתֵּי אֲבָנִים, בִּשְׁנֵי כְתָלִים בְּקֶרֶן זָוִית. אׇרְכּוֹ כִּשְׁנֵי גְרִיסִין, וְרׇחְבּוֹ כִּגְרִיס.
In the case of leprous marks of houses, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 12:3): Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house is never deemed impure with leprosy unless the leprous mark will be seen to be the size of two Cilician beans, on two stones, on two walls, in a corner between two walls. The length of the mark is that of two Cilician beans and its width is that of one Cilician bean.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? כְּתִיב ״קִיר״ וּכְתִיב ״קִירֹת״. אֵיזֶהוּ קִיר שֶׁהוּא כְּקִירוֹת? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זֶה קֶרֶן זָוִית.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: The word wall is written in the verse and the word walls is written in the same verse: And he shall see the leprous mark…in the walls of the house with hollow streaks, greenish or reddish, and their appearance is lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). Which is one wall that is like multiple walls? You must say: This is a corner between two walls. The Rabbis hold that it is a leprous house even if the mark appears on one wall. Therefore, one who entered a house with a leprous mark on one wall and then entered the Temple is liable to receive karet according to the Rabbis; according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, he is not liable.
נִגְעֵי בְגָדִים – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן אַבְטוּלְמוֹס וְרַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן אַבְטוּלְמוֹס אוֹמֵר, מִנַּיִן
In the case of leprous marks on garments, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived
