Shabbat 106

ידאגו כל האחין כולן אחד מבני חבורה שמת תדאג כל החבורה כולה אמרי לה דמת גדול ואמרי לה דמת קטן:

all of the brothers should be concerned, lest their death be approaching. Similarly, if one member of a group dies, the entire group should be concerned. Some say the concern is greatest if the eldest dies. If he, despite his virtues, could not avoid punishment, others will certainly not be saved. And some say the concern is greatest if the youngest dies, because the least significant people are punished first, and perhaps this is the start of a punishment for the entire group.

וכל המקלקלין פטורין: תני רבי אבהו קמיה דרבי יוחנן כל המקלקלין פטורין חוץ מחובל ומבעיר אמר ליה פוק תני לברא חובל ומבעיר אינה משנה ואם תמצא לומר משנה חובל בצריך לכלבו מבעיר בצריך לאפרו

We learned in the mishna: And anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. Rabbi Abbahu taught this baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt, except for one who inflicts a wound or kindles a fire. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go teach that outside. This baraita is not fit for discussion in the study hall. The opinion that deems one liable for inflicting a wound or kindling a fire on Shabbat is not an accepted teaching and should be ignored. And if you want to say that it is a legitimate teaching, one who inflicts a wound would only be liable in a case where he needed the blood to give to his dog, and one who kindles a fire would only be liable in a case where he needs its ashes.

והאנן תנן כל המקלקלין פטורין מתניתין רבי יהודה ברייתא רבי שמעון מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון מדאיצטריך קרא למישרא מילה הא חובל בעלמא חייב

The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Abbahu teach this baraita? Didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: Anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt, including one who inflicts a wound or who kindles a fire? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for performing labor which is not needed for its own sake, whereas the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts in that case. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems one who inflicts a wound or kindles a fire on Shabbat liable even though these are destructive acts? From the fact that a verse was necessary to permit circumcision on Shabbat, by inference, in general, one who inflicts a wound is liable. If inflicting a wound was not prohibited on Shabbat, there would be no need to permit circumcision.

ומדאסר רחמנא הבערה גבי בת כהן שמע מינה מבעיר בעלמא חייב

Similarly, from the fact that the Torah prohibited kindling a fire on Shabbat even with regard to the execution by burning of a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, conclude from it that in general, one who ignites a fire on Shabbat is liable.

ורבי יהודה התם מתקן הוא כדרב אשי דאמר רב אשי מה לי לתקן מילה מה לי לתקן כלי מה לי לבשל פתילה מה לי לבשל סמנין:

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda address this proof? The Gemara answers: There, that is a case of a constructive labor in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ashi. For Rav Ashi said: What difference is there to me between repairing the child through circumcision and repairing a vessel? They are both constructive acts. And what difference is there to me between cooking a lead wick, as a melted lead wick was poured down the throat of the criminal sentenced to execution by burning, and cooking herbs used to produce dyes in the Tabernacle? The Torah addressed these cases specifically because they are constructive, and nothing can be derived from them with regard to liability for performance of destructive labors.

שיעור המלבן כו׳: רב יוסף מחוי כפול רב חייא בר אמי מחוי פשוט:

We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for one who whitens and for similar prohibited labors is the full width of a double sit. Rav Yosef would demonstrate the width of a double sit by indicating the distance between the index and middle fingers and instructing the onlookers to double the measure. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami would demonstrate in a simple manner, as he calculated that the distance between the thumb and the forefinger is equal to a double sit.

מתני׳ רבי יהודה אומר הצד צפור למגדל וצבי לבית חייב וחכמים אומרים צפור למגדל

MISHNA: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who traps a bird into a closet or cage, and one who traps a deer into a house is liable. The Rabbis say: One is liable for trapping a bird into a closet

וצבי לגינה ולחצר ולביברין [חייב] רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לא כל הביברין שוין זה הכלל מחוסר צידה פטור שאינו מחוסר צידה חייב:

and for trapping a deer into a garden, or into a courtyard, or into an enclosure [bivar], he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. This is the principle: If the trapping of the animal is inadequate and it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend it, one is not liable. However, if one trapped a deer into an enclosure in which the trapping is not inadequate, he is liable.

גמ׳ תנן התם אין צדין דגים מן הביברין ביום טוב ואין נותנין לפניהם מזונות אבל צדין חיה ועוף ונותנין לפניהם מזונות ורמינהו ביברין של חיות ושל עופות ושל דגים אין צדין מהם ביום טוב ואין נותנין לפניהם מזונות קשיא חיה אחיה קשיא עופות אעופות

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna there in tractate Beitza: One may not trap fish from the enclosures on a Festival, nor may one place food before them, because it is prohibited to feed an animal that may not be eaten on the Festival. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from its enclosures and slaughter them, and one may also place food before them. The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in the Tosefta: From enclosures of animals, of birds, and of fish, one may not trap on a Festival, nor may one place food before them. This is difficult due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the Tosefta. This is similarly difficult due to the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta.

בשלמא חיה אחיה לא קשיא הא רבי יהודה הא רבנן

The Gemara says: Granted, with regard to the contradiction between the ruling concerning an animal in the mishna and the ruling concerning an animal in the Tosefta, it is not difficult, because this, the Tosefta that prohibits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda cited in the mishna that an animal trapped into an enclosure whose trapping is inadequate, i.e., it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend the animal, is not considered trapped. That, i.e., the mishna in Beitza, which permits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that animals in an enclosure are considered trapped.

אלא עופות אעופות קשיא וכי תימא עופות אעופות נמי לא קשיא הא ביבר מקורה הא ביבר שאינו מקורה והא בית דמקורה הוא ובין לרבי יהודה ובין לרבנן צפור למגדל אין לבית לא

However, concerning the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta, it is difficult. And if you say that the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta is also not difficult because this, the mishna, which permits trapping, is referring to a roofed enclosure, in which a bird is considered trapped, and therefore there is no prohibition against apprehending it on Shabbat; and that the Tosefta, which prohibits trapping, is referring to an unroofed enclosure in which a bird is not considered trapped and apprehending it is prohibited, that does not resolve the contradiction. As with regard to a house, which is roofed, there is no dispute, and according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, trapping a bird into a closet, yes, it is considered trapped, while trapping it into a house, no, it is not considered trapped.

אמר רבה בר רב הונא הכא בצפור דרור עסקינן לפי שאינה מקבלת מרות דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל למה נקרא שמה צפור דרור מפני שדרה בבית כבשדה השתא דאתית להכי חיה אחיה נמי לא קשיא הא בביבר גדול הא בביבר קטן

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Here, in the mishna, according to which a bird in a house is not considered trapped, we are dealing with a free bird, a sparrow, because it does not accept authority. That bird is not intimidated and evades capture even in a house, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Why is it called a free bird [tzippor dror]? Because it dwells [dara] in a house as it does in a field. Therefore, the distinction between a roofed and unroofed enclosure resolves the apparent contradiction between the mishna and the Tosefta. The Gemara says: Now that you have arrived at this understanding, that the difference between the rulings in the two sources is predicated on different circumstances and not on a tannaitic dispute, the apparent contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the Tosefta is also not difficult. This, the ruling in the Tosefta which prohibits apprehending the animal, is referring to a large enclosure from which the animal cannot escape, but it can still avoid being apprehended. Therefore, the trapping is considered inadequate, and apprehending the animal constitutes trapping. That, the ruling in the mishna that permits apprehending the animal, is referring to a small enclosure in which the animal cannot evade its pursuers and requires no further trapping.

היכי דמי ביבר גדול היכי דמי ביבר קטן אמר רב אשי כל היכא דרהיט בתריה ומטי לה בחד שיחייא ביבר קטן ואידך ביבר גדול אי נמי כל היכא דנפיל טולא דכתלים אהדדי ביבר קטן ואידך ביבר גדול ואי נמי כל היכא דליכא עוקצי עוקצי ביבר קטן ואידך ביבר גדול:

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a large enclosure and what are the circumstances of a small enclosure? Rav Ashi said: Any enclosure where one can run after an animal and reach it in one lunge is a small enclosure. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure where the shadows from the different walls fall upon each other is a small enclosure, as all enclosures had a uniform height. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure that does not have a series of corners in which the animal could evade capture is a small enclosure, and any other is a large enclosure.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר וכו׳: אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל אמר ליה אביי הלכה מכלל דפליגי אמר ליה מאי נפקא לך מינה אמר ליה גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא

We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. It depends whether the trapping of the animal is inadequate, in which case one is liable for trapping, or whether the trapping is not inadequate, in which case one is exempt. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this matter. Abaye said to him: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean by inference that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps there is no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. He answered him using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.

תנו רבנן הצד צבי סומא וישן חייב חיגר וזקן וחולה פטור אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף מאי שנא הני ומאי שנא הני הני עבידי לרבויי הני לא עבידי לרבויי והתניא חולה חייב אמר רב ששת לא קשיא הא בחולה מחמת אישתא הא בחולה מחמת אובצנא

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who traps a deer on Shabbat that is blind or sleeping is liable. One who traps a lame, old, or sick deer is exempt. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is different about these cases and what is different about those cases? Rav Yosef answered: These, the blind or sleeping deer, are likely to run away when they feel that they are being touched; therefore, they require trapping. However, these, the crippled, old, and sick deer, are not likely to run away and are therefore considered to be already trapped. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that one who traps a sick deer is liable? Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult. This baraita, in which a sick deer is not considered trapped and one who traps it is liable is referring to a deer that is sick due to a fever, which can still flee; that baraita, in which the deer is considered trapped and one who traps it is exempt is referring to a deer that is sick with fatigue and is incapable of fleeing.

תנו רבנן הצד חגבין גזין צרעין ויתושין בשבת חייב דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים כל שבמינו ניצוד חייב וכל שאין במינו ניצוד פטור תניא אידך הצד חגבים בשעת הטל פטור בשעת השרב חייב אלעזר בן מהבאי אומר אם היו מקלחות ובאות פטור איבעיא להו אלעזר בן מהבאי ארישא קאי או אסיפא קאי תא שמע הצד חגבין בשעת הטל פטור בשעת השרב חייב אלעזר בן מהבאי אומר אפילו בשעת השרב אם היו מקלחות ובאות פטור:

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who traps locusts, cicadas, hornets, or mosquitoes on Shabbat is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Not every insect is the same in this matter. If one traps any insect whose species is typically trapped for personal use, he is liable, and if one traps any insect whose species is typically not trapped for personal use, he is exempt. It was taught in another baraita: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt. Since it is cold at that time, the locusts are paralyzed. If one traps them when it is hot, he is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: If the locusts were swarming, one is exempt for trapping them, because no effort is necessary to apprehend them. A dilemma was raised before them: Does the statement of Elazar ben Mehavai apply to the first clause of the baraita, ruling stringently that one is liable for trapping locusts even when there is dew unless they are swarming; or does it apply to the latter clause of the baraita, ruling leniently that one is exempt when trapping locusts, even in the heat when they are swarming? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma based on a source that addresses the point explicitly: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt; one who traps locusts when it is hot is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: Even when it is hot, if they were swarming, one is exempt.

מתני׳ צבי שנכנס לבית ונעל אחד בפניו חייב נעלו שנים פטורין לא יכול אחד לנעול ונעלו שנים חייבין ורבי שמעון פוטר:

MISHNA: If a deer entered a house on its own and one locked the door before it, he is liable for trapping. If two people locked the door, they are exempt, because neither performed a complete labor. If one person is incapable of locking the door and two people locked it, they are liable because that is the typical manner of performing that labor. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt as he holds that two people who perform a single labor are never liable by Torah law.

גמ׳ אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא אמר שמואל הצד ארי בשבת אינו חייב עד שיכניסנו לגורזקי שלו:

GEMARA: Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Shmuel said: One who traps a lion on Shabbat is not liable for trapping unless he traps it in its cage, and until that point it is not considered trapped.

מתני׳ ישב האחד על הפתח ולא מילאהו ישב השני ומילאהו השני חייב ישב הראשון על הפתח ומילאהו ובא השני וישב בצידו אף על פי שעמד הראשון והלך לו הראשון חייב והשני פטור הא למה זה דומה לנועל את ביתו לשומרו ונמצא צבי שמור בתוכו:

MISHNA: If one person sat in the entrance of a courtyard in which there is a deer, but did not fill the entire doorway, and a second person sat and filled it, the second person is liable because he completed the labor of trapping. However, if the first person sat in the doorway and filled it, and a second person came and sat next to him, the first person is liable and the second is exempt even if the first person stood and went away, leaving the second one to secure the deer. The mishna explains: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it, and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. In that case, he is exempt even though he enhances security on the deer, because he did not trap the animal.