Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

March 10, 2020 | 讬状讚 讘讗讚专 转砖状驻

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Shabbat 4

Today’s shiur is sponsored by Rebecca Schwarzmer in honor of her beloved grandmother Frances Rabitz Brauner, Fruma Malka bat Avraham v’Penina z”l.

Why in our mishna are they obligating even if the space where the object is placed and also uprooted from is not 4×4 tefachim? Rabba suggests that the mishna is authored by Rabbi Akiva who does not need it to rest in a place that is 4×4 tefachim as Rabbi Akiva holds if one throws and object from a private domain to another private domain through the public domain, one is obligated since going through airspace is as if it rested there. From here one can say he does not hold that it needs to rest on a space of 4×4. Two questions are raised against this answer. Rav Yosef suggests the mishna is authored by Rebbi and the gemara tries to figure out which opinion of Rebbi is he referring to. They bring two suggestions but each is rejected.

转讜讻谉 讝讛 转讜专讙诐 讙诐 诇: 注讘专讬转

讻讗谉 诇讞爪专 讗讞专转 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讬转讛 讬讚讜 诪诇讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜讛讜爪讬讗讛 诇讞讜抓 诪讛讜 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 诇讗讜转讛 讞爪专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讜转专 诇讞爪专 讗讞专转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗住讜专

There, the baraita that prohibits returning the object, is referring to bringing it to a different courtyard, as Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: One who was standing in a courtyard on Shabbat, and his hand was filled with fruits, and he extended it outside into the public domain, what is the ruling with regard to whether or not he is allowed to bring it back into the same courtyard where he is standing? Rav Na岣an said to him: It is permitted. And he asked him further: What is the ruling with regard to bringing it from the public domain to a different courtyard? He said to him: It is prohibited.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诇讻讬 转讬讻讜诇 注诇讛 讻讜专讗 讚诪讬诇讞讗 讛转诐 诇讗 讗讬转注讘讬讚讗 诪讞砖讘转讜 讛讻讗 讗讬转注讘讬讚讗 诪讞砖讘转讜:

Rava asked about this: And in what way is one case different from the other? By definition, both courtyards are private domains, and there is no apparent halakhic difference between them in terms of Shabbat. Rav Na岣an answered jokingly: When you eat a kor of salt while thinking it over, you will know the answer. Actually, the answer is simple: There, the baraita that taught that it is permitted to bring it back to the same courtyard, said so because his planned objective was not realized. Since he sought to take an object out of his courtyard, requiring him to bring the object back to its original place is a penalty of sorts. However, here, the baraita that taught that it is prohibited to bring it back to a different courtyard, said so because his planned objective was realized. Therefore, it is prohibited to bring it back there.

讙讜驻讗 讘注讬 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讜讗 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 讗讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讜

Since Rav Beivai bar Abaye鈥檚 dilemma was mentioned in passing, the Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a dilemma: One who erred and stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘砖讜讙讙 讜诇讗 讗讬讚讻专 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讛转讬专讜

Rav A岣 bar Abaye said to Ravina: What are the circumstances? If you say that he stuck the bread to the oven unwittingly and did not remember either that today was Shabbat or that it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat, to whom did they permit to remove it? If he remains unaware that a prohibition is involved, it will not occur to him to ask whether or not he is permitted to remove the bread before it bakes.

讜讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚讗讬讛讚专 讜讗讬讚讻专 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛转谞谉 讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讞讟讗讜转 讗讬谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注讚 砖转讛讗 转讞诇转谉 砖讙讙讛 讜住讜驻谉 砖讙讙讛

But rather, is it not a case where he then, before it baked, remembered that it is prohibited? In that case, is he liable to bring a sin-offering? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: All those who sin unwittingly and are therefore liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action was unwitting and the end of their action was unwitting. This means that throughout the entire action until its completion, the person remains unaware that his action is prohibited. Consequently, in our case, since he became aware that his action is prohibited while the bread was still baking, his very awareness exempts him from a sin-offering and removing the bread is no longer necessary to prevent him from incurring liability to bring a sin-offering.

讗诇讗 讘诪讝讬讚 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Rather, say that that person stuck the bread in the oven intentionally, but afterward regrets having done so and does not want to violate the prohibition. However, if that is the case, the formulation of the dilemma is inaccurate. It should have said: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. One who desecrates Shabbat intentionally is liable to be stoned, he is not merely liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讘砖讜讙讙 讜诇诪讗谉 讛转讬专讜 诇讗讞专讬诐

Rav Sheila said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he did so unwittingly, and the dilemma whether or not they permitted removing the bread is not with regard to the person who stuck it in the oven, as he remains unaware of his transgression. Rather, with regard to whom is Rav Beivai raising a dilemma whether or not the Sages permitted him to remove the bread? It is with regard to others who wish to spare the unwitting sinner from violating a Torah prohibition.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讜讻讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讞讟讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讻讛 讞讘讬专讱

Rav Sheshet strongly objected to this. And does one tell another person: Sin so that another will benefit? Permitting one to violate a prohibition, even one prohibited by rabbinic law, in order to help another perform a mitzva is inconceivable. The same is true with regard to preventing another from violating a more severe prohibition.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诇注讜诇诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讜讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛:

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he stuck the bread in the oven intentionally. And say, emend the text as follows: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. Indeed, Rav A岣, son of Rava, would teach it explicitly in that manner; not as a dilemma, but rather, as a halakhic ruling. According to his version, Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: With regard to one who stuck bread in an oven on Shabbat eve, the Sages permitted him to remove it from the oven on Shabbat before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning.

驻砖讟 讛注谞讬 讗转 讬讚讜: 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 注拽讬专讛 讜讛谞讞讛 诪注诇 讙讘讬 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 讜诇讬讻讗

We learned in the mishna several examples where the poor person extended his hand: One, when he placed an object into the hand of the homeowner and one, when he took an object from the hand of the homeowner. In those cases, we learned that he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Don鈥檛 we require that halakhic lifting and placing be performed from and onto the surface of an area that is four by four handbreadths? A smaller area is not considered a defined place, and it is as if the object were not there at all; and a person鈥檚 hand is not that size. Why, then, is he liable?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 讚转谞谉 讛讝讜专拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘讗诪爪注 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

Rabba said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who said that we do not require a place of four by four handbreadths. According to his opinion, even a smaller area is considered a significant place in terms of carrying out on Shabbat. As we learned in a mishna: One who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain and there is the public domain in the middle, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying out into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt because the object merely passed through the public domain and did not come to rest in it.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

This dispute can be explained as follows: Rabbi Akiva holds that we say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In his opinion, an object that passed, even briefly, through the airspace of the public domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain. Therefore, one who threw the object has, for all intents and purposes, lifted the object from the private domain and placed it in the public domain, and he is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In their opinion, although he lifted the object from the private domain, it never came to rest in the public domain. Since he never placed it in the public domain, he is not liable. Regardless, according to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion, placing does not require a defined area. The mere presence of an object in the public domain accords it the legal status of having been placed there. Apparently, there is no requirement that an object be placed on a surface with an area of four by four handbreadths.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讛 讚讘拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

Initially, the Gemara wonders about the substance of Rabba鈥檚 opinion: Is that to say that it is obvious to Rabba that, with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest,

讜讘转讜讱 注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讘注讬 诇讛 专讘讛 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讘诇 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻讟讜专 讜讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟

and it is in a case where the object passed within ten handbreadths of the ground that they disagree? And wasn鈥檛 it raised as a dilemma by Rabba, as it was unclear to him whether or not that is the correct explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis? As Rabba raised a dilemma: Do those who dispute the matter of one who throws from a private domain to a private domain with a public domain in the middle disagree with regard to a case where the object was thrown below ten handbreadths off the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest, and the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest? However, if the object passed more than ten handbreadths above the public domain, everyone agrees that he is exempt and everyone agrees that we do not derive the halakha of throwing from the halakha of passing. There is a special halakha with regard to passing objects: One standing in a private domain who passes an object through a public domain to another private domain, even though the object did not come to rest in the public domain, his action is considered to have carried out. However, the halakha with regard to throwing is different.

讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟 讗讘诇 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

Or, perhaps they disagree with regard to a case where the object passed ten handbreadths above the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive the halakha of throwing from the halakha of passing and considers them details of one halakha. And the Rabbis hold that we do not derive throwing from passing, and, although one who passes the object in that case is liable, one who throws it is not. The halakha with regard to passing is a unique halakha, a Torah decree, and other cases cannot be derived from it. However, with regard to one who throws from one private domain to another via a public domain, if the object passed below ten handbreadths off the ground, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for this? Everyone agrees that an object in airspace is considered at rest. Since Rabba himself is uncertain as to the point of the dispute in that mishna with regard to one who throws an object, how can he determine Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion in the matter of our mishna?

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬 讛讚专 讗讬驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚住讘专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. It can be explained that, after he raised the dilemma, it was later resolved for him that the correct understanding is that Rabbi Akiva alone holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest.

讜讚讬诇诪讗 讛谞讞讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 注拽讬专讛 讘注讬讗

However, there is room to question the parallel between Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion and the case in our mishna. Perhaps placing alone does not require an area of four by four in order to be considered halakhic placing, but lifting does require a minimum of four by four handbreadths to be considered halakhic lifting. Perhaps placing, which is merely the conclusion of the prohibited labor, does not require the same conditions as lifting, which is the beginning and the essence of the labor of carrying out (Rashba). From Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion, a conclusion may be drawn that an object in airspace is considered placed even without the surface area of four by four handbreadths. But, a conclusion may not be drawn that an object lifted from a surface lacking that area is considered lifted.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗

Rather, Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讛讬 专讘讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讝专拽 讜谞讞 注诇 讙讘讬 讝讬讝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉

The Gemara asks: To which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 halakhot is Rav Yosef referring? If you say that he is referring to this halakha, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat in the public domain from the beginning to the end of four cubits, and it, the object, came to rest atop a projection of any size, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Apparently, this proves that, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there is no minimum area required for lifting and placing. This is the halakha to which Rav Yosef referred.

讛转诐 讻讚讘注讬谞谉 诇诪讬诪专 诇拽诪谉 讻讚讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讗 讘讗讬诇谉 讛注讜诪讚 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜谞讜驻讜 谞讜讟讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讝专拽 讜谞讞 讗谞讜驻讜

The Gemara rejects this: There, the explanation is according to what we will need to say later in accordance with the statement of Abaye, as Abaye said: Here, the baraita is not dealing with just any situation. Rather, it is dealing with a special case where there is a tree standing in the private domain and its boughs lean into the public domain, and one threw an object from the public domain and it rested upon the boughs of the tree.

讚专讘讬 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讚讬 谞讜驻讜 讘转专 注讬拽专讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讚讬 谞讜驻讜 讘转专 注讬拽专讜

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. The tree鈥檚 branches are considered an extension of its trunk. Therefore, the entire tree is considered as a private domain, and one who throws onto it is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. Therefore, the boughs themselves are not considered to be a private domain, and one who throws atop them from the public domain is not liable. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi considers the boughs of the tree like part of the trunk, something thrown atop the tree is considered as if it were placed on the trunk, which is four by four handbreadths. If so, one cannot conclude from here that there is no need for a significant area according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗诇讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讝专拽 诪专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讗诪爪注 专讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉

Rather, it is possible that Rav Yosef referred to this halakha of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the public domain and the private domain was in the middle, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying out from domain to domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 砖转讬诐 讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讛讜爪讗讛 讜讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讛讻谞住讛 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讘注讬 注拽讬专讛 讜诇讗 讛谞讞讛 注诇 讙讘讬 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In that case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the one who threw the object is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as he violated two prohibitions: One, due to carrying from the public domain into the private domain, when the object passed through the airspace of the private domain; and one, due to carrying from the private domain out to the public domain. Apparently, he requires neither lifting from nor placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths, as not only is he liable for carrying the object into a private domain and placing it by means of passing through its airspace, but he is also liable for lifting the object from that private domain and bringing it to the public domain. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, neither lifting nor placing requires a significant area.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜

The Gemara rejects this proof. Wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav and Shmuel both said:

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time

Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time- Daf 3-11

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VVV4BSVPlg&t= For audio only:   Join Rabbanit Dr. Tamara Spitz each week as she reviews the key topics...
talking talmud_square

Shabbat 4: When Is Flying through the Air Like Resting on the Ground?

The Gemara wants to know why the transfer of items between domains via people's hands would make them chayav. Rabbi...

Shabbat 4

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shabbat 4

讻讗谉 诇讞爪专 讗讞专转 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讬转讛 讬讚讜 诪诇讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜讛讜爪讬讗讛 诇讞讜抓 诪讛讜 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 诇讗讜转讛 讞爪专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讜转专 诇讞爪专 讗讞专转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗住讜专

There, the baraita that prohibits returning the object, is referring to bringing it to a different courtyard, as Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: One who was standing in a courtyard on Shabbat, and his hand was filled with fruits, and he extended it outside into the public domain, what is the ruling with regard to whether or not he is allowed to bring it back into the same courtyard where he is standing? Rav Na岣an said to him: It is permitted. And he asked him further: What is the ruling with regard to bringing it from the public domain to a different courtyard? He said to him: It is prohibited.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诇讻讬 转讬讻讜诇 注诇讛 讻讜专讗 讚诪讬诇讞讗 讛转诐 诇讗 讗讬转注讘讬讚讗 诪讞砖讘转讜 讛讻讗 讗讬转注讘讬讚讗 诪讞砖讘转讜:

Rava asked about this: And in what way is one case different from the other? By definition, both courtyards are private domains, and there is no apparent halakhic difference between them in terms of Shabbat. Rav Na岣an answered jokingly: When you eat a kor of salt while thinking it over, you will know the answer. Actually, the answer is simple: There, the baraita that taught that it is permitted to bring it back to the same courtyard, said so because his planned objective was not realized. Since he sought to take an object out of his courtyard, requiring him to bring the object back to its original place is a penalty of sorts. However, here, the baraita that taught that it is prohibited to bring it back to a different courtyard, said so because his planned objective was realized. Therefore, it is prohibited to bring it back there.

讙讜驻讗 讘注讬 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讜讗 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 讗讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讜

Since Rav Beivai bar Abaye鈥檚 dilemma was mentioned in passing, the Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a dilemma: One who erred and stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘砖讜讙讙 讜诇讗 讗讬讚讻专 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讛转讬专讜

Rav A岣 bar Abaye said to Ravina: What are the circumstances? If you say that he stuck the bread to the oven unwittingly and did not remember either that today was Shabbat or that it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat, to whom did they permit to remove it? If he remains unaware that a prohibition is involved, it will not occur to him to ask whether or not he is permitted to remove the bread before it bakes.

讜讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚讗讬讛讚专 讜讗讬讚讻专 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛转谞谉 讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讞讟讗讜转 讗讬谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注讚 砖转讛讗 转讞诇转谉 砖讙讙讛 讜住讜驻谉 砖讙讙讛

But rather, is it not a case where he then, before it baked, remembered that it is prohibited? In that case, is he liable to bring a sin-offering? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: All those who sin unwittingly and are therefore liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action was unwitting and the end of their action was unwitting. This means that throughout the entire action until its completion, the person remains unaware that his action is prohibited. Consequently, in our case, since he became aware that his action is prohibited while the bread was still baking, his very awareness exempts him from a sin-offering and removing the bread is no longer necessary to prevent him from incurring liability to bring a sin-offering.

讗诇讗 讘诪讝讬讚 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Rather, say that that person stuck the bread in the oven intentionally, but afterward regrets having done so and does not want to violate the prohibition. However, if that is the case, the formulation of the dilemma is inaccurate. It should have said: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. One who desecrates Shabbat intentionally is liable to be stoned, he is not merely liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讘砖讜讙讙 讜诇诪讗谉 讛转讬专讜 诇讗讞专讬诐

Rav Sheila said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he did so unwittingly, and the dilemma whether or not they permitted removing the bread is not with regard to the person who stuck it in the oven, as he remains unaware of his transgression. Rather, with regard to whom is Rav Beivai raising a dilemma whether or not the Sages permitted him to remove the bread? It is with regard to others who wish to spare the unwitting sinner from violating a Torah prohibition.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讜讻讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讞讟讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讻讛 讞讘讬专讱

Rav Sheshet strongly objected to this. And does one tell another person: Sin so that another will benefit? Permitting one to violate a prohibition, even one prohibited by rabbinic law, in order to help another perform a mitzva is inconceivable. The same is true with regard to preventing another from violating a more severe prohibition.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诇注讜诇诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讜讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 住拽讬诇讛:

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he stuck the bread in the oven intentionally. And say, emend the text as follows: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. Indeed, Rav A岣, son of Rava, would teach it explicitly in that manner; not as a dilemma, but rather, as a halakhic ruling. According to his version, Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: With regard to one who stuck bread in an oven on Shabbat eve, the Sages permitted him to remove it from the oven on Shabbat before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning.

驻砖讟 讛注谞讬 讗转 讬讚讜: 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 注拽讬专讛 讜讛谞讞讛 诪注诇 讙讘讬 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 讜诇讬讻讗

We learned in the mishna several examples where the poor person extended his hand: One, when he placed an object into the hand of the homeowner and one, when he took an object from the hand of the homeowner. In those cases, we learned that he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Don鈥檛 we require that halakhic lifting and placing be performed from and onto the surface of an area that is four by four handbreadths? A smaller area is not considered a defined place, and it is as if the object were not there at all; and a person鈥檚 hand is not that size. Why, then, is he liable?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 讚转谞谉 讛讝讜专拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘讗诪爪注 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

Rabba said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who said that we do not require a place of four by four handbreadths. According to his opinion, even a smaller area is considered a significant place in terms of carrying out on Shabbat. As we learned in a mishna: One who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain and there is the public domain in the middle, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying out into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt because the object merely passed through the public domain and did not come to rest in it.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

This dispute can be explained as follows: Rabbi Akiva holds that we say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In his opinion, an object that passed, even briefly, through the airspace of the public domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain. Therefore, one who threw the object has, for all intents and purposes, lifted the object from the private domain and placed it in the public domain, and he is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In their opinion, although he lifted the object from the private domain, it never came to rest in the public domain. Since he never placed it in the public domain, he is not liable. Regardless, according to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion, placing does not require a defined area. The mere presence of an object in the public domain accords it the legal status of having been placed there. Apparently, there is no requirement that an object be placed on a surface with an area of four by four handbreadths.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讛 讚讘拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

Initially, the Gemara wonders about the substance of Rabba鈥檚 opinion: Is that to say that it is obvious to Rabba that, with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest,

讜讘转讜讱 注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讘注讬 诇讛 专讘讛 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讘诇 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻讟讜专 讜讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟

and it is in a case where the object passed within ten handbreadths of the ground that they disagree? And wasn鈥檛 it raised as a dilemma by Rabba, as it was unclear to him whether or not that is the correct explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis? As Rabba raised a dilemma: Do those who dispute the matter of one who throws from a private domain to a private domain with a public domain in the middle disagree with regard to a case where the object was thrown below ten handbreadths off the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest, and the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest? However, if the object passed more than ten handbreadths above the public domain, everyone agrees that he is exempt and everyone agrees that we do not derive the halakha of throwing from the halakha of passing. There is a special halakha with regard to passing objects: One standing in a private domain who passes an object through a public domain to another private domain, even though the object did not come to rest in the public domain, his action is considered to have carried out. However, the halakha with regard to throwing is different.

讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讝讜专拽 诪诪讜砖讬讟 讗讘诇 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

Or, perhaps they disagree with regard to a case where the object passed ten handbreadths above the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive the halakha of throwing from the halakha of passing and considers them details of one halakha. And the Rabbis hold that we do not derive throwing from passing, and, although one who passes the object in that case is liable, one who throws it is not. The halakha with regard to passing is a unique halakha, a Torah decree, and other cases cannot be derived from it. However, with regard to one who throws from one private domain to another via a public domain, if the object passed below ten handbreadths off the ground, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for this? Everyone agrees that an object in airspace is considered at rest. Since Rabba himself is uncertain as to the point of the dispute in that mishna with regard to one who throws an object, how can he determine Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion in the matter of our mishna?

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬 讛讚专 讗讬驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚住讘专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 拽诇讜讟讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜谞讞讛 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. It can be explained that, after he raised the dilemma, it was later resolved for him that the correct understanding is that Rabbi Akiva alone holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest.

讜讚讬诇诪讗 讛谞讞讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 注拽讬专讛 讘注讬讗

However, there is room to question the parallel between Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion and the case in our mishna. Perhaps placing alone does not require an area of four by four in order to be considered halakhic placing, but lifting does require a minimum of four by four handbreadths to be considered halakhic lifting. Perhaps placing, which is merely the conclusion of the prohibited labor, does not require the same conditions as lifting, which is the beginning and the essence of the labor of carrying out (Rashba). From Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion, a conclusion may be drawn that an object in airspace is considered placed even without the surface area of four by four handbreadths. But, a conclusion may not be drawn that an object lifted from a surface lacking that area is considered lifted.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗

Rather, Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讛讬 专讘讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讝专拽 讜谞讞 注诇 讙讘讬 讝讬讝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉

The Gemara asks: To which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 halakhot is Rav Yosef referring? If you say that he is referring to this halakha, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat in the public domain from the beginning to the end of four cubits, and it, the object, came to rest atop a projection of any size, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Apparently, this proves that, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there is no minimum area required for lifting and placing. This is the halakha to which Rav Yosef referred.

讛转诐 讻讚讘注讬谞谉 诇诪讬诪专 诇拽诪谉 讻讚讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讗 讘讗讬诇谉 讛注讜诪讚 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜谞讜驻讜 谞讜讟讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讝专拽 讜谞讞 讗谞讜驻讜

The Gemara rejects this: There, the explanation is according to what we will need to say later in accordance with the statement of Abaye, as Abaye said: Here, the baraita is not dealing with just any situation. Rather, it is dealing with a special case where there is a tree standing in the private domain and its boughs lean into the public domain, and one threw an object from the public domain and it rested upon the boughs of the tree.

讚专讘讬 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讚讬 谞讜驻讜 讘转专 注讬拽专讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讚讬 谞讜驻讜 讘转专 注讬拽专讜

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. The tree鈥檚 branches are considered an extension of its trunk. Therefore, the entire tree is considered as a private domain, and one who throws onto it is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. Therefore, the boughs themselves are not considered to be a private domain, and one who throws atop them from the public domain is not liable. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi considers the boughs of the tree like part of the trunk, something thrown atop the tree is considered as if it were placed on the trunk, which is four by four handbreadths. If so, one cannot conclude from here that there is no need for a significant area according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗诇讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讝专拽 诪专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讗诪爪注 专讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉

Rather, it is possible that Rav Yosef referred to this halakha of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the public domain and the private domain was in the middle, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying out from domain to domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 砖转讬诐 讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讛讜爪讗讛 讜讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讛讻谞住讛 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讘注讬 注拽讬专讛 讜诇讗 讛谞讞讛 注诇 讙讘讬 诪拽讜诐 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In that case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the one who threw the object is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as he violated two prohibitions: One, due to carrying from the public domain into the private domain, when the object passed through the airspace of the private domain; and one, due to carrying from the private domain out to the public domain. Apparently, he requires neither lifting from nor placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths, as not only is he liable for carrying the object into a private domain and placing it by means of passing through its airspace, but he is also liable for lifting the object from that private domain and bringing it to the public domain. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, neither lifting nor placing requires a significant area.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜

The Gemara rejects this proof. Wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav and Shmuel both said:

Scroll To Top