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Today's Daf Yomi

March 9, 2020 | 讬状讙 讘讗讚专 转砖状驻

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Shabbat 3

Today’s shiur is sponsored by Eva Schweber and Rabbi Daniel Schweber in memory of their father, Ken Schweber, Yaakov Kapel ben Moshe and Rivka, z”l.聽

The mishna says there are eight cases – but there seem to be twelve or sixteen, depending on how you count. Which were the eight that the mishna meant – why were only those counted? Shmuel says that whenever the rabbis say exempt (patur) regarding Shabbat issues and it means exempt by the Torah but prohibited by the rabbis, other than three cases. Are there other exceptions? Why if two people do a melacha together, are they each exempt from bringing a sin offering? Abaye asks if when one’s hand is in the airspace of another domain while carrying something, is one’s hand considered in a karmelit and one would be forbidden by rabbinic law to return one’s hand to the original domain? Two contradictory braitot are brought to suggest that perhaps the tannaim debated exactly this issue – however several other possibilities are brought – all of which would not be able to be used to answer the question.

转讜讻谉 讝讛 转讜专讙诐 讙诐 诇: 注讘专讬转

讘讘讗 讚专讬砖讗 驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讘讘讗 讚住讬驻讗 讚驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讗住讜专 拽砖讬讗

the first section of the mishna speaks of cases in which the one performing the actions is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and even by rabbinic law he is ab initio permitted to perform those actions. When the poor person or homeowner neither lifted nor placed the object, i.e., the object was placed into or removed from their hands by others, their role is insignificant. Therefore, it was not taught in the mishna, and those cases were not factored into the total number of acts of carrying from domain to domain. However, with regard to the latter section of the mishna, where the person performing those actions is exempt by Torah law, but his actions are prohibited by rabbinic law, it is difficult. Since the Sages prohibited those actions, they should be included in the total in the mishna, which should be twelve, not eight.

诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讻讜诇讬 砖讘转 驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 讜讛讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻诇 驻讟讜专讬 讚砖讘转 驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讗住讜专 讘专 诪讛谞讬 转诇转 讚驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 爪讬讚转 爪讘讬 讜爪讬讚转 谞讞砖 讜诪驻讬住 诪讜专住讗

Incidentally, the Gemara wonders: Is there, in all the halakhot of Shabbat, an act for which the mishna deems one exempt and the act is permitted? Didn鈥檛 Shmuel say: With regard to all exempt rulings in the halakhot of Shabbat, although one who performs the action is exempt by Torah law, his action is prohibited by rabbinic law. This applies to all cases except for these three cases for which one is exempt and he is permitted to perform the action: Trapping a deer, where he does not actually trap it, rather he sits in the entrance of a house that a deer had previously entered on its own, preventing its exit; and trapping a poisonous snake because of the danger that it poses; and one who drains an abscess, meaning one who lances the boil of pus and drains the liquid from it. If so, the cases in the first section of our mishna, where the ruling is exempt, must be understood as exempt but prohibited.

讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 驻讟讜专讬 讚拽讗 注讘讬讚 诪注砖讛 驻讟讜专讬 讚诇讗 拽讗 注讘讬讚 诪注砖讛 讗讬讻讗 讟讜讘讗

The Gemara answers: In these cases, too, the ruling is: Exempt and permitted. When, though, was it necessary for Shmuel to cite specific cases as exempt and permitted? It was necessary in exempt cases where he performs a defined action. However, there are many exempt cases where he does not perform an action, which are completely permitted.

诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 转专转讬 住专讬 讛讜讬讬谉 驻讟讜专讬 讚讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 拽讗 讞砖讬讘 讚诇讗 讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讗 拽讗 讞砖讬讘

The Gemara returns to Rav Mattana鈥檚 question: In any case, there are twelve actions that should have been enumerated in the mishna. The Gemara answers: The mishna took into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. The mishna did not take into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could not come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Here, only the instances where one lifts an object from its place are taken into consideration. Having lifted an object, if he continued, he could potentially incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Under no circumstances can one who merely places an object come to violate a more serious prohibition.

砖谞讬讛谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讛讗 讗转注讘讬讚讗 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪注诐 讛讗专抓 讘注砖讜转讛 讛注讜砖讛 讗转 讻讜诇讛 讜诇讗 讛注讜砖讛 讗转 诪拽爪转讛 讬讞讬讚 讜注砖讛 讗讜转讛 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 讜注砖讜 讗讜转讛 驻讟讜专讬谉 讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讙诪讚讗 谞讝专拽讛 诪驻讬 讞讘讜专讛 讜讗诪专讜 讘注砖转讛 讬讞讬讚 砖注砖讗讛 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 砖注砖讗讜讛 驻讟讜专讬谉:

The Gemara asks about the mishna itself: In the latter section of the mishna, instances in which they are both exempt are enumerated. However, wasn鈥檛 a prohibited labor performed between the two of them? Since together they performed an act prohibited by a severe Torah prohibition, how is it possible that their partnership will result in both being exempt? The Gemara answers that it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is written: 鈥淎nd if one soul sins unwittingly from the people of the land when he does it, one of the laws of God that should not be done and he is responsible鈥 (Leviticus 4:27). The verse鈥檚 emphasis on the words 鈥渨hen he does it鈥 means: One who does all of it, i.e., the entire transgression, is liable and not one who does part of it. Therefore, an individual, and he performed an action in its entirety, is liable. However, two people, and they performed an action together, are not liable, as each one performed only part of the action. The Gemara comments: It was also stated in support of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion: Rabbi 岣yya bar Gamda said: Amidst a discussion of these matters, it emanated from the group of Sages and they said: From the verse鈥檚 emphasis on 鈥渨hen he does it鈥 it is derived: An individual who performed it is liable. However, two who performed it are not liable.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 诪专讘讬 讛讟注讬谞讜 讞讘讬专讜 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜诪砖拽讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讜抓 诪讛讜 注拽讬专转 讙讜驻讜 讻注拽讬专转 讞驻抓 诪诪拽讜诪讜 讚诪讬 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诇讬讚讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讜驻讜 谞讬讬讞 讬讚讜 诇讗 谞讬讬讞

Rav raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: One whom another person loaded with food and drink on his back in the private domain on Shabbat, and he carried them out while they were still on his back, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of carrying out on Shabbat? Clearly, one who lifts an object with his hand in the private domain, and carries it out into the public domain is liable, as he performed the complete act of carrying out. However, in the case of one who is laden with an object; is moving his body from its place in the private domain considered like lifting the object itself from its place? In that case, he would be liable. Or, perhaps it is not considered like lifting the object from its place, and therefore he would not be liable. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He is liable, and it is not similar to the halakha of one who had an object placed in his hand and carried it out to the public domain, with regard to which we learned in the mishna that he is not liable by Torah law. What is the reason for the distinction between these two apparently similar cases? His body is at rest, in a defined place. However, his hand is not at rest. Since a hand is not generally fixed in one place, moving it and even transferring it to a different domain without a bona fide act of lifting is not considered lifting. However, the body is generally fixed in one place. Moving it from its place is considered lifting in terms of Shabbat, and he is liable for doing so.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇专讘 讘专 驻讞转讬 诇讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讻讬 拽讗讬 专讘讬 讘讛讗 诪住讻转讗 诇讗 转砖讬讬诇讬讛 讘诪住讻转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讚讬诇诪讗 诇讗讜 讗讚注转讬讛 讚讗讬 诇讗讜 讚专讘讬 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 讻住驻转讬讛 讚诪砖谞讬 诇讱 砖讬谞讜讬讗 讚诇讗讜 砖讬谞讜讬讗 讛讜讗

Rabbi 岣yya said to Rav, his sister鈥檚 son: Son of great men, didn鈥檛 I tell you that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is involved in this tractate do not ask him questions in another tractate, as perhaps it will not be on his mind and he will be unable to answer? The dilemma that Rav asked was not related to the subject matter of the tractate which they were studying. As, had it not been for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a great man, you would have shamed him, as he would have been forced to give you an answer that is not an appropriate answer.

讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 砖驻讬专 诪砖谞讬 诇讱 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 讟注讜谉 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜诪砖拽讬谉 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讜抓 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讞讬讬讘 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诇讬讚讜:

Now, he was involved in another tractate. Nevertheless, he answered you well, as it was taught in a baraita: One who was laden with food and drink while it was still day, before Shabbat began, and, consequently, did not perform the act of lifting on Shabbat, and he carried them out into the public domain after dark on Shabbat is liable. Since, as a rule, his body is fixed in one place, moving it is considered like lifting an object, and he is liable. It is not similar to lifting his hand and moving it from place to place. Since his hand is not fixed in one place, moving it is not considered lifting.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬 讬讚讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谞讛 诇讗 讻专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 讻专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讻专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诪讬讚讜 讚注谞讬 讻专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诪讬讚讜 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转

Abaye said: It is obvious to me that the hand of a person in and of itself, when he moves it out of the domain where he is located, is considered to be neither like the public domain nor like the private domain, even if it is the hand of someone standing in one of those domains. Proof that the hand is not considered like the public domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the poor person. As we learned with regard to the poor person who brought his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the public domain into the private domain and the homeowner took the object from his hand; the homeowner is not liable. Apparently, the hand of the poor person is not considered part of the public domain, even though he himself is located in the public domain. Proof that it is not considered like the private domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the homeowner. As we learned with regard to the homeowner who moved his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the private domain into the public domain and the poor person took the object from his hand; the poor person is not liable for carrying out from a private domain.

讘注讬 讗讘讬讬 讬讚讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 诪讛讜 砖转注砖讛 讻讻专诪诇讬转 诪讬 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讗讛讚讜专讬 诇讙讘讬讛 讗讜 诇讗

However, Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the ruling with regard to the hand of a person with an object in it, when that person reached his hand into a different domain? Does it assume karmelit status? A karmelit is an intermediate domain established by the Sages that is neither a private nor a public domain. This dilemma is based on the fact that his hand left one domain and did not yet enter a second domain. In terms of practical halakha, the two sides of this dilemma are: Did the Sages penalize him and issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting him from bringing his hand with the object back to the domain where he is standing or not?

转讗 砖诪注 讛讬转讛 讬讚讜 诪诇讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜讛讜爪讬讗讛 诇讞讜抓 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讗住讜专 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 讜转谞讬 讗讬讚讱 诪讜转专 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara says: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which we learned elsewhere, with regard to the question: What must one in the private domain do in a case where his hand was filled with fruits and he extended it outside, into the public domain? It was taught in one baraita that it is prohibited for him to bring it back into his house, and it was taught in another baraita that it is permitted for him to bring it back. Is it not with regard to this that they disagree; that the Sage in one baraita holds that his hand is like a karmelit, and the Sage in the other baraita holds that it is not like a karmelit?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讻讗谉 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, everyone agrees that it is like a karmelit, and yet, this is not difficult, as the difference between the baraitot can be explained in the following manner: Here, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height below ten handbreadths off the ground, within the airspace of the public domain. And there, the baraita permitting him to bring his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height above ten handbreadths off the ground, outside the airspace of the public domain. Consequently, the object is considered to be neither in the public domain nor in a karmelit.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讜诇讗讜 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讻讗谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

And if you wish, say instead that this baraita and that baraita are both referring to a case where he took his hand out to the public domain at a height below ten handbreadths, and his hand is not considered a karmelit. And yet, this is not difficult. As here, the baraita permitting him to bring it back, is referring to a case where he took it out while it was still day on Shabbat eve. Since he extended his hand before Shabbat and, in doing so, did nothing wrong, the Sages did not penalize him and permitted him to bring his hand back on Shabbat itself. However, there, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing it back, is referring to a case where he took it out after dark, and Shabbat had already begun. Since there is an element of prohibition involved, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.

讗讚专讘讛 讗讬驻讻讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讚讗讬 砖讚讬 诇讬讛 诇讗 讗转讬 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讚讗讬 砖讚讬 诇讬讛 讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讗 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara comments that this explanation is difficult. On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. In the case where he extended his hand while it was still day, when even were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would not incur liability to bring a sin-offering because the object was lifted from its place on a weekday, let the Sages penalize him. However, in the case where he extended his hand after dark, where were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would thereby incur liability to bring a sin-offering, let the Sages not penalize him. Were the Sages to penalize him by prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, he is liable to drop the object in the public domain, and by doing so he would violate a Torah prohibition.

讜诪讚诇讗 拽讗 诪砖谞讬谞谉 讛讻讬 转驻砖讜讟 讚专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讚讘注讬 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 讗讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讜

And from the fact that we did not explain it that way, but preferred the contrary distinction, resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Beivai bar Abaye, whose dilemma is predicated on the same fundamental issue. As Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised the dilemma: One who unwittingly stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, as bread was baked by sticking the dough to the sides of a heated oven, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it from the oven before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so? Removing the bread is also prohibited on Shabbat. However, its prohibition is only by rabbinic law. The fundamental dilemma is: May one violate a rabbinical prohibition in order to avoid violating a Torah prohibition or not?

转驻砖讜讟 讚诇讗 讛转讬专讜 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讜转驻砖讜讟

Based on the above, resolve that the Sages did not permit one to do so. In resolving Abaye鈥檚 dilemma, the concern that one would likely throw the object from his hand, and thereby violate a Torah prohibition, was not taken into consideration. The one who extended his hand into the public domain was penalized by the Sages and prohibited to bring his hand back. Here too, resolve the dilemma and say that he may not remove the bread, even though he will thereby violate a Torah prohibition. The dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, which was thought to be unresolved, is thereby resolved. As a result, there is room for uncertainty whether or not the resolution of the previous dilemma, through which Rav Beivai鈥檚 dilemma would also be resolved, is valid. The Gemara rejects this difficulty: That is not difficult. It is possible that even though a resolution had not been previously found for the dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, that does not mean that it cannot be resolved And, indeed, as proof can be brought from the resolution of the other dilemma, resolve this dilemma as well.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 转驻砖讜讟 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讻讗谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讘砖讜讙讙 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 讘诪讝讬讚 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, do not resolve the dilemma, but, nevertheless, resolve the contradiction between the baraitot in the following manner. Here, the baraita that taught that it is permitted to bring one鈥檚 hand back is referring to a case where he extended it unwittingly. There, the baraita that taught that it is prohibited for one to bring it back is referring to a case where he took it out intentionally. When he took it out unwittingly, the Sages did not penalize him. When he took it out intentionally, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘砖讜讙讙 讜讛讻讗 讘拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚

And if you wish, say instead, in order to resolve the contradiction that this baraita and that baraita are both referring to a case where he took his hand out unwittingly. And here they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? The Sage who prohibits him from bringing his hand back holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, even though he took his hand out unwittingly, they penalized him and prohibited him from bringing the object back so that he would not come to do so intentionally. The Sage who permits him to bring it back holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, they did not prohibit him from bringing it back.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 拽谞住讜 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇讗讜转讛 讞爪专

And if you wish, say instead that, actually, they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender, and still, this is not difficult, and there is no contradiction. Here, the baraita that permits bringing it back, is referring to bringing it back to the same courtyard where he is standing.

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Shabbat 3

讘讘讗 讚专讬砖讗 驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讘讘讗 讚住讬驻讗 讚驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讗住讜专 拽砖讬讗

the first section of the mishna speaks of cases in which the one performing the actions is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and even by rabbinic law he is ab initio permitted to perform those actions. When the poor person or homeowner neither lifted nor placed the object, i.e., the object was placed into or removed from their hands by others, their role is insignificant. Therefore, it was not taught in the mishna, and those cases were not factored into the total number of acts of carrying from domain to domain. However, with regard to the latter section of the mishna, where the person performing those actions is exempt by Torah law, but his actions are prohibited by rabbinic law, it is difficult. Since the Sages prohibited those actions, they should be included in the total in the mishna, which should be twelve, not eight.

诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讻讜诇讬 砖讘转 驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 讜讛讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻诇 驻讟讜专讬 讚砖讘转 驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讗住讜专 讘专 诪讛谞讬 转诇转 讚驻讟讜专 讜诪讜转专 爪讬讚转 爪讘讬 讜爪讬讚转 谞讞砖 讜诪驻讬住 诪讜专住讗

Incidentally, the Gemara wonders: Is there, in all the halakhot of Shabbat, an act for which the mishna deems one exempt and the act is permitted? Didn鈥檛 Shmuel say: With regard to all exempt rulings in the halakhot of Shabbat, although one who performs the action is exempt by Torah law, his action is prohibited by rabbinic law. This applies to all cases except for these three cases for which one is exempt and he is permitted to perform the action: Trapping a deer, where he does not actually trap it, rather he sits in the entrance of a house that a deer had previously entered on its own, preventing its exit; and trapping a poisonous snake because of the danger that it poses; and one who drains an abscess, meaning one who lances the boil of pus and drains the liquid from it. If so, the cases in the first section of our mishna, where the ruling is exempt, must be understood as exempt but prohibited.

讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 驻讟讜专讬 讚拽讗 注讘讬讚 诪注砖讛 驻讟讜专讬 讚诇讗 拽讗 注讘讬讚 诪注砖讛 讗讬讻讗 讟讜讘讗

The Gemara answers: In these cases, too, the ruling is: Exempt and permitted. When, though, was it necessary for Shmuel to cite specific cases as exempt and permitted? It was necessary in exempt cases where he performs a defined action. However, there are many exempt cases where he does not perform an action, which are completely permitted.

诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 转专转讬 住专讬 讛讜讬讬谉 驻讟讜专讬 讚讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 拽讗 讞砖讬讘 讚诇讗 讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讗 拽讗 讞砖讬讘

The Gemara returns to Rav Mattana鈥檚 question: In any case, there are twelve actions that should have been enumerated in the mishna. The Gemara answers: The mishna took into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. The mishna did not take into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could not come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Here, only the instances where one lifts an object from its place are taken into consideration. Having lifted an object, if he continued, he could potentially incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Under no circumstances can one who merely places an object come to violate a more serious prohibition.

砖谞讬讛谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讛讗 讗转注讘讬讚讗 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诪注诐 讛讗专抓 讘注砖讜转讛 讛注讜砖讛 讗转 讻讜诇讛 讜诇讗 讛注讜砖讛 讗转 诪拽爪转讛 讬讞讬讚 讜注砖讛 讗讜转讛 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 讜注砖讜 讗讜转讛 驻讟讜专讬谉 讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讙诪讚讗 谞讝专拽讛 诪驻讬 讞讘讜专讛 讜讗诪专讜 讘注砖转讛 讬讞讬讚 砖注砖讗讛 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 砖注砖讗讜讛 驻讟讜专讬谉:

The Gemara asks about the mishna itself: In the latter section of the mishna, instances in which they are both exempt are enumerated. However, wasn鈥檛 a prohibited labor performed between the two of them? Since together they performed an act prohibited by a severe Torah prohibition, how is it possible that their partnership will result in both being exempt? The Gemara answers that it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is written: 鈥淎nd if one soul sins unwittingly from the people of the land when he does it, one of the laws of God that should not be done and he is responsible鈥 (Leviticus 4:27). The verse鈥檚 emphasis on the words 鈥渨hen he does it鈥 means: One who does all of it, i.e., the entire transgression, is liable and not one who does part of it. Therefore, an individual, and he performed an action in its entirety, is liable. However, two people, and they performed an action together, are not liable, as each one performed only part of the action. The Gemara comments: It was also stated in support of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion: Rabbi 岣yya bar Gamda said: Amidst a discussion of these matters, it emanated from the group of Sages and they said: From the verse鈥檚 emphasis on 鈥渨hen he does it鈥 it is derived: An individual who performed it is liable. However, two who performed it are not liable.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 诪专讘讬 讛讟注讬谞讜 讞讘讬专讜 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜诪砖拽讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讜抓 诪讛讜 注拽讬专转 讙讜驻讜 讻注拽讬专转 讞驻抓 诪诪拽讜诪讜 讚诪讬 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诇讬讚讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讜驻讜 谞讬讬讞 讬讚讜 诇讗 谞讬讬讞

Rav raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: One whom another person loaded with food and drink on his back in the private domain on Shabbat, and he carried them out while they were still on his back, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of carrying out on Shabbat? Clearly, one who lifts an object with his hand in the private domain, and carries it out into the public domain is liable, as he performed the complete act of carrying out. However, in the case of one who is laden with an object; is moving his body from its place in the private domain considered like lifting the object itself from its place? In that case, he would be liable. Or, perhaps it is not considered like lifting the object from its place, and therefore he would not be liable. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He is liable, and it is not similar to the halakha of one who had an object placed in his hand and carried it out to the public domain, with regard to which we learned in the mishna that he is not liable by Torah law. What is the reason for the distinction between these two apparently similar cases? His body is at rest, in a defined place. However, his hand is not at rest. Since a hand is not generally fixed in one place, moving it and even transferring it to a different domain without a bona fide act of lifting is not considered lifting. However, the body is generally fixed in one place. Moving it from its place is considered lifting in terms of Shabbat, and he is liable for doing so.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇专讘 讘专 驻讞转讬 诇讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讻讬 拽讗讬 专讘讬 讘讛讗 诪住讻转讗 诇讗 转砖讬讬诇讬讛 讘诪住讻转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讚讬诇诪讗 诇讗讜 讗讚注转讬讛 讚讗讬 诇讗讜 讚专讘讬 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 讻住驻转讬讛 讚诪砖谞讬 诇讱 砖讬谞讜讬讗 讚诇讗讜 砖讬谞讜讬讗 讛讜讗

Rabbi 岣yya said to Rav, his sister鈥檚 son: Son of great men, didn鈥檛 I tell you that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is involved in this tractate do not ask him questions in another tractate, as perhaps it will not be on his mind and he will be unable to answer? The dilemma that Rav asked was not related to the subject matter of the tractate which they were studying. As, had it not been for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a great man, you would have shamed him, as he would have been forced to give you an answer that is not an appropriate answer.

讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 砖驻讬专 诪砖谞讬 诇讱 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 讟注讜谉 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜诪砖拽讬谉 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讜抓 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讞讬讬讘 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 诇讬讚讜:

Now, he was involved in another tractate. Nevertheless, he answered you well, as it was taught in a baraita: One who was laden with food and drink while it was still day, before Shabbat began, and, consequently, did not perform the act of lifting on Shabbat, and he carried them out into the public domain after dark on Shabbat is liable. Since, as a rule, his body is fixed in one place, moving it is considered like lifting an object, and he is liable. It is not similar to lifting his hand and moving it from place to place. Since his hand is not fixed in one place, moving it is not considered lifting.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬 讬讚讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谞讛 诇讗 讻专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 讻专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讻专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诪讬讚讜 讚注谞讬 讻专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诪讬讚讜 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转

Abaye said: It is obvious to me that the hand of a person in and of itself, when he moves it out of the domain where he is located, is considered to be neither like the public domain nor like the private domain, even if it is the hand of someone standing in one of those domains. Proof that the hand is not considered like the public domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the poor person. As we learned with regard to the poor person who brought his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the public domain into the private domain and the homeowner took the object from his hand; the homeowner is not liable. Apparently, the hand of the poor person is not considered part of the public domain, even though he himself is located in the public domain. Proof that it is not considered like the private domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the homeowner. As we learned with regard to the homeowner who moved his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the private domain into the public domain and the poor person took the object from his hand; the poor person is not liable for carrying out from a private domain.

讘注讬 讗讘讬讬 讬讚讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 诪讛讜 砖转注砖讛 讻讻专诪诇讬转 诪讬 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讗讛讚讜专讬 诇讙讘讬讛 讗讜 诇讗

However, Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the ruling with regard to the hand of a person with an object in it, when that person reached his hand into a different domain? Does it assume karmelit status? A karmelit is an intermediate domain established by the Sages that is neither a private nor a public domain. This dilemma is based on the fact that his hand left one domain and did not yet enter a second domain. In terms of practical halakha, the two sides of this dilemma are: Did the Sages penalize him and issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting him from bringing his hand with the object back to the domain where he is standing or not?

转讗 砖诪注 讛讬转讛 讬讚讜 诪诇讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜讛讜爪讬讗讛 诇讞讜抓 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讗住讜专 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 讜转谞讬 讗讬讚讱 诪讜转专 诇讛讞讝讬专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara says: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which we learned elsewhere, with regard to the question: What must one in the private domain do in a case where his hand was filled with fruits and he extended it outside, into the public domain? It was taught in one baraita that it is prohibited for him to bring it back into his house, and it was taught in another baraita that it is permitted for him to bring it back. Is it not with regard to this that they disagree; that the Sage in one baraita holds that his hand is like a karmelit, and the Sage in the other baraita holds that it is not like a karmelit?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讻讗谉 诇诪注诇讛 诪注砖专讛

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, everyone agrees that it is like a karmelit, and yet, this is not difficult, as the difference between the baraitot can be explained in the following manner: Here, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height below ten handbreadths off the ground, within the airspace of the public domain. And there, the baraita permitting him to bring his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height above ten handbreadths off the ground, outside the airspace of the public domain. Consequently, the object is considered to be neither in the public domain nor in a karmelit.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇诪讟讛 诪注砖专讛 讜诇讗讜 讻讻专诪诇讬转 讚诪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讻讗谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

And if you wish, say instead that this baraita and that baraita are both referring to a case where he took his hand out to the public domain at a height below ten handbreadths, and his hand is not considered a karmelit. And yet, this is not difficult. As here, the baraita permitting him to bring it back, is referring to a case where he took it out while it was still day on Shabbat eve. Since he extended his hand before Shabbat and, in doing so, did nothing wrong, the Sages did not penalize him and permitted him to bring his hand back on Shabbat itself. However, there, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing it back, is referring to a case where he took it out after dark, and Shabbat had already begun. Since there is an element of prohibition involved, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.

讗讚专讘讛 讗讬驻讻讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讚讗讬 砖讚讬 诇讬讛 诇讗 讗转讬 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讚讗讬 砖讚讬 诇讬讛 讗转讬 讘讛讜 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 诇讗 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara comments that this explanation is difficult. On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. In the case where he extended his hand while it was still day, when even were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would not incur liability to bring a sin-offering because the object was lifted from its place on a weekday, let the Sages penalize him. However, in the case where he extended his hand after dark, where were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would thereby incur liability to bring a sin-offering, let the Sages not penalize him. Were the Sages to penalize him by prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, he is liable to drop the object in the public domain, and by doing so he would violate a Torah prohibition.

讜诪讚诇讗 拽讗 诪砖谞讬谞谉 讛讻讬 转驻砖讜讟 讚专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讚讘注讬 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讚讘讬拽 驻转 讘转谞讜专 讛转讬专讜 诇讜 诇专讚讜转讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讞讬讜讘 讞讟讗转 讗讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讜

And from the fact that we did not explain it that way, but preferred the contrary distinction, resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Beivai bar Abaye, whose dilemma is predicated on the same fundamental issue. As Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised the dilemma: One who unwittingly stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, as bread was baked by sticking the dough to the sides of a heated oven, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it from the oven before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so? Removing the bread is also prohibited on Shabbat. However, its prohibition is only by rabbinic law. The fundamental dilemma is: May one violate a rabbinical prohibition in order to avoid violating a Torah prohibition or not?

转驻砖讜讟 讚诇讗 讛转讬专讜 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讜转驻砖讜讟

Based on the above, resolve that the Sages did not permit one to do so. In resolving Abaye鈥檚 dilemma, the concern that one would likely throw the object from his hand, and thereby violate a Torah prohibition, was not taken into consideration. The one who extended his hand into the public domain was penalized by the Sages and prohibited to bring his hand back. Here too, resolve the dilemma and say that he may not remove the bread, even though he will thereby violate a Torah prohibition. The dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, which was thought to be unresolved, is thereby resolved. As a result, there is room for uncertainty whether or not the resolution of the previous dilemma, through which Rav Beivai鈥檚 dilemma would also be resolved, is valid. The Gemara rejects this difficulty: That is not difficult. It is possible that even though a resolution had not been previously found for the dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, that does not mean that it cannot be resolved And, indeed, as proof can be brought from the resolution of the other dilemma, resolve this dilemma as well.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 转驻砖讜讟 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讻讗谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讘砖讜讙讙 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 讘诪讝讬讚 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, do not resolve the dilemma, but, nevertheless, resolve the contradiction between the baraitot in the following manner. Here, the baraita that taught that it is permitted to bring one鈥檚 hand back is referring to a case where he extended it unwittingly. There, the baraita that taught that it is prohibited for one to bring it back is referring to a case where he took it out intentionally. When he took it out unwittingly, the Sages did not penalize him. When he took it out intentionally, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘砖讜讙讙 讜讛讻讗 讘拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚

And if you wish, say instead, in order to resolve the contradiction that this baraita and that baraita are both referring to a case where he took his hand out unwittingly. And here they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? The Sage who prohibits him from bringing his hand back holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, even though he took his hand out unwittingly, they penalized him and prohibited him from bringing the object back so that he would not come to do so intentionally. The Sage who permits him to bring it back holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, they did not prohibit him from bringing it back.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 拽谞住讜 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇讗讜转讛 讞爪专

And if you wish, say instead that, actually, they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender, and still, this is not difficult, and there is no contradiction. Here, the baraita that permits bringing it back, is referring to bringing it back to the same courtyard where he is standing.

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