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Today's Daf Yomi

May 13, 2020 | י״ט באייר תש״פ

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

Shabbat 68

Today’s daf is sponsored by Natalie Taylor in memory of Rabbanit Rachel Taylor z”l whose 90th birthday would have been on Lag Baomer and for all her descendants to continue learning Torah. It is also sponsored by Ruti Amal for a refuah shleima for Rachel Permouth who is ungergoing a serious surgery today.

How many sin offerings is one obligated in the case where one forgot that there was a concept of Shabbat and did “work” on Shabbat over a course of many weeks/years? What if one forgot that today was Shabbat? What if one knew it was Shabbat but forgot that one cannot do melacha? The mishna details the laws in each case and calls it “a big rule.” Why does it use that language? Where else is that language used? Rav anf Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the case of a tinok shenishba (a young child taken captive by non Jews) or a convert who lived only among non Jews (or possibly converted among non Jews) and never knew abotu the concept of Shabbat. The gemara grapples with each opinion. Basic issues underly the discussion such as where is the border between shogeg (unwitting) and ones (entirely not responsible)? Why is knowledge so important?

אב מלאכה ומלאכה העושה מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת:

and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

גמ׳ מאי טעמא תנא כלל גדול אילימא משום דקבעי למיתני עוד כלל אחר תנא כלל גדול וגבי שביעית נמי משום דקבעי למיתני עוד כלל אחר תנא כלל גדול והא גבי מעשר דקתני כלל אחר ולא תני כלל גדול

GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.
Here, because the tanna wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two halakhot employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of halakhot, he taught employing the term: A significant principle.
And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (Shevi’it 7:2) the tanna wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood.
However, with regard to the halakhot of tithes, where the mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the tanna taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the tanna did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.

אמר רבי יוסי בר אבין שבת ושביעית דאית בהו אבות ותולדות תנא גדול מעשר דלית בה אבות ותולדות לא תנא כלל גדול ולבר קפרא דתני כלל גדול במעשר מאי אבות ומאי תולדות איכא

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the tanna taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the halakhot of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its halakhot are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?

אלא לאו היינו טעמא גדול עונשו של שבת יותר משל שביעית דאילו שבת איתא בין בתלוש בין במחובר ואילו שביעית בתלוש ליתא במחובר איתא וגדול עונשה של שביעית יותר מן המעשר דאילו שביעית איתא בין במאכל אדם בין במאכל בהמה ואילו מעשר במאכל אדם איתא במאכל בהמה ליתא

Rather, isn’t this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the halakhot of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecration of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes. As, by Torah law, the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the halakhot of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.

ולבר קפרא דתני כלל גדול במעשר גדול עונשו של מעשר יותר משל פיאה דאילו מעשר איתא בתאנה וירק ואילו פיאה ליתא בתאנה וירק דתנן כלל אמרו בפיאה כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ ולקיטתו כאחת ומכניסו לקיום חייב בפיאה

And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of pe’a. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of pe’a is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Pe’a: They stated a principle with regard to pe’a: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in pe’a.

אוכל למעוטי ספיחי סטיס וקוצה ונשמר למעוטי הפקר וגידולו מן הארץ למעוטי כמיהין ופטריות ולקיטתו כאחת למעוטי תאנה ומכניסו לקיום למעוטי ירק

The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [satis] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of pe’a does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

ואילו גבי מעשר תנן כלל אמרו במעשר כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ חייב במעשר ואילו לקיטתו כאחת ומכניסו לקיום לא תנן:

While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in pe’a.

רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו מתניתין בתינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים אבל הכיר ולבסוף שכח חייב על כל שבת ושבת תנן השוכח עיקר שבת לאו מכלל דהויא ליה ידיעה מעיקרא לא מאי כל השוכח עיקר שבת דהיתה שכוח ממנו עיקרה של שבת

The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the halakhot of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn’t this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.

אבל הכיר ולבסוף שכח מאי חייב על כל שבת ושבת אדתני היודע עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל שבת ושבת ליתני הכיר ולבסוף שכח וכל שכן הא מאי היודע עיקר שבת מי שהיה יודע עיקרה של שבת ושכחה

The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the halakha? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.

אבל לא שכחה מאי חייב על כל מלאכה ומלאכה אדתני היודע שהוא שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל מלאכה ומלאכה ליתני היודע עיקר שבת וכל שכן הא אלא מתניתין כשהכיר ולבסוף שכח ודרב ושמואל נמי כהכיר ולבסוף שכח דמי והכי איתמר רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו אפילו תינוק שנשבה בין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים כהכיר ולבסוף שכח דמי וחייב

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the halakha be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the halakha: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.

ורבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו דוקא הכיר ולבסוף שכח אבל תינוק שנשבה בין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים פטור מיתיבי כלל גדול אמרו בשבת כל השוכח עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת כיצד תינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים וגר שנתגייר בין הגוים ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת וחייב על הדם אחת ועל החלב אחת ועל עבודה זרה אחת ומונבז פוטר

And it was Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: They stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.

וכך היה מונבז דן לפני רבי עקיבא הואיל ומזיד קרוי חוטא ושוגג קרוי חוטא מה מזיד שהיתה לו ידיעה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה אמר לו רבי עקיבא הריני מוסיף על דבריך אי מה מזיד שהיתה הידיעה בשעת מעשה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה בשעת מעשה

And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one’s control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.

אמר לו הן וכל שכן שהוספת אמר לו לדבריך אין זה קרוי שוגג אלא מזיד

Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.

קתני מיהא כיצד תינוק בשלמא לרב ושמואל ניחא אלא לרבי יוחנן ולרבי שמעון בן לקיש קשיא אמרי לך רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש לא מי איכא מונבז דפטר אנן דאמרינן כמונבז

Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn’t there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.

מאי טעמא דמונבז דכתיב תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעשה בשגגה וסמיך ליה והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה הקיש שוגג למזיד מה מזיד שהיתה לו ידיעה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה

The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: “The native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: “And the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.

ורבנן האי תורה אחת מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי להו לכדמקרי ליה רבי יהושע בן לוי לבריה תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעשה בשגגה וכתיב

The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: “There shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.” And it is written:

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

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Shabbat 68

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Shabbat 68

אב מלאכה ומלאכה העושה מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת:

and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

גמ׳ מאי טעמא תנא כלל גדול אילימא משום דקבעי למיתני עוד כלל אחר תנא כלל גדול וגבי שביעית נמי משום דקבעי למיתני עוד כלל אחר תנא כלל גדול והא גבי מעשר דקתני כלל אחר ולא תני כלל גדול

GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.
Here, because the tanna wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two halakhot employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of halakhot, he taught employing the term: A significant principle.
And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (Shevi’it 7:2) the tanna wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood.
However, with regard to the halakhot of tithes, where the mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the tanna taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the tanna did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.

אמר רבי יוסי בר אבין שבת ושביעית דאית בהו אבות ותולדות תנא גדול מעשר דלית בה אבות ותולדות לא תנא כלל גדול ולבר קפרא דתני כלל גדול במעשר מאי אבות ומאי תולדות איכא

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the tanna taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the halakhot of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its halakhot are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?

אלא לאו היינו טעמא גדול עונשו של שבת יותר משל שביעית דאילו שבת איתא בין בתלוש בין במחובר ואילו שביעית בתלוש ליתא במחובר איתא וגדול עונשה של שביעית יותר מן המעשר דאילו שביעית איתא בין במאכל אדם בין במאכל בהמה ואילו מעשר במאכל אדם איתא במאכל בהמה ליתא

Rather, isn’t this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the halakhot of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecration of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes. As, by Torah law, the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the halakhot of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.

ולבר קפרא דתני כלל גדול במעשר גדול עונשו של מעשר יותר משל פיאה דאילו מעשר איתא בתאנה וירק ואילו פיאה ליתא בתאנה וירק דתנן כלל אמרו בפיאה כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ ולקיטתו כאחת ומכניסו לקיום חייב בפיאה

And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of pe’a. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of pe’a is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Pe’a: They stated a principle with regard to pe’a: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in pe’a.

אוכל למעוטי ספיחי סטיס וקוצה ונשמר למעוטי הפקר וגידולו מן הארץ למעוטי כמיהין ופטריות ולקיטתו כאחת למעוטי תאנה ומכניסו לקיום למעוטי ירק

The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [satis] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of pe’a does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

ואילו גבי מעשר תנן כלל אמרו במעשר כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ חייב במעשר ואילו לקיטתו כאחת ומכניסו לקיום לא תנן:

While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in pe’a.

רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו מתניתין בתינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים אבל הכיר ולבסוף שכח חייב על כל שבת ושבת תנן השוכח עיקר שבת לאו מכלל דהויא ליה ידיעה מעיקרא לא מאי כל השוכח עיקר שבת דהיתה שכוח ממנו עיקרה של שבת

The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the halakhot of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn’t this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.

אבל הכיר ולבסוף שכח מאי חייב על כל שבת ושבת אדתני היודע עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל שבת ושבת ליתני הכיר ולבסוף שכח וכל שכן הא מאי היודע עיקר שבת מי שהיה יודע עיקרה של שבת ושכחה

The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the halakha? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.

אבל לא שכחה מאי חייב על כל מלאכה ומלאכה אדתני היודע שהוא שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל מלאכה ומלאכה ליתני היודע עיקר שבת וכל שכן הא אלא מתניתין כשהכיר ולבסוף שכח ודרב ושמואל נמי כהכיר ולבסוף שכח דמי והכי איתמר רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו אפילו תינוק שנשבה בין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים כהכיר ולבסוף שכח דמי וחייב

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the halakha be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the halakha: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.

ורבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו דוקא הכיר ולבסוף שכח אבל תינוק שנשבה בין הגוים וגר שנתגייר לבין הגוים פטור מיתיבי כלל גדול אמרו בשבת כל השוכח עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת כיצד תינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים וגר שנתגייר בין הגוים ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת וחייב על הדם אחת ועל החלב אחת ועל עבודה זרה אחת ומונבז פוטר

And it was Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: They stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.

וכך היה מונבז דן לפני רבי עקיבא הואיל ומזיד קרוי חוטא ושוגג קרוי חוטא מה מזיד שהיתה לו ידיעה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה אמר לו רבי עקיבא הריני מוסיף על דבריך אי מה מזיד שהיתה הידיעה בשעת מעשה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה בשעת מעשה

And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one’s control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.

אמר לו הן וכל שכן שהוספת אמר לו לדבריך אין זה קרוי שוגג אלא מזיד

Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.

קתני מיהא כיצד תינוק בשלמא לרב ושמואל ניחא אלא לרבי יוחנן ולרבי שמעון בן לקיש קשיא אמרי לך רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש לא מי איכא מונבז דפטר אנן דאמרינן כמונבז

Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn’t there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.

מאי טעמא דמונבז דכתיב תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעשה בשגגה וסמיך ליה והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה הקיש שוגג למזיד מה מזיד שהיתה לו ידיעה אף שוגג שהיתה לו ידיעה

The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: “The native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: “And the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.

ורבנן האי תורה אחת מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי להו לכדמקרי ליה רבי יהושע בן לוי לבריה תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעשה בשגגה וכתיב

The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: “There shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.” And it is written:

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