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Today's Daf Yomi

May 13, 2020 | 讬状讟 讘讗讬讬专 转砖状驻

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Shabbat 68

Today’s daf is sponsored by Natalie Taylor in memory of Rabbanit Rachel Taylor z”l whose 90th birthday would have been on Lag Baomer and for all her descendants to continue learning Torah. It is also sponsored by Ruti Amal for a refuah shleima for Rachel Permouth who is ungergoing a serious surgery today.

How many sin offerings is one obligated in the case where one forgot that there was a concept of Shabbat and did “work” on Shabbat over a course of many weeks/years? What if one forgot that today was Shabbat? What if one knew it was Shabbat but forgot that one cannot do melacha? The mishna details the laws in each case and calls it “a big rule.” Why does it use that language? Where else is that language used? Rav anf Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the case of a tinok shenishba (a young child taken captive by non Jews) or a convert who lived only among non Jews (or possibly converted among non Jews) and never knew abotu the concept of Shabbat. The gemara grapples with each opinion. Basic issues underly the discussion such as where is the border between shogeg (unwitting)聽and ones (entirely not responsible)? Why is knowledge so important?

讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讞讟讗转 讗讞转:

and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 注讜讚 讻诇诇 讗讞专 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜讙讘讬 砖讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 注讜讚 讻诇诇 讗讞专 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜讛讗 讙讘讬 诪注砖专 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇诇 讗讞专 讜诇讗 转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇

GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.
Here, because the tanna wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two halakhot employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of halakhot, he taught employing the term: A significant principle.
And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (Shevi鈥檌t 7:2) the tanna wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood.
However, with regard to the halakhot of tithes, where the mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the tanna taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the tanna did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 砖讘转 讜砖讘讬注讬转 讚讗讬转 讘讛讜 讗讘讜转 讜转讜诇讚讜转 转谞讗 讙讚讜诇 诪注砖专 讚诇讬转 讘讛 讗讘讜转 讜转讜诇讚讜转 诇讗 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜诇讘专 拽驻专讗 讚转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讘诪注砖专 诪讗讬 讗讘讜转 讜诪讗讬 转讜诇讚讜转 讗讬讻讗

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the tanna taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the halakhot of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its halakhot are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讜 砖诇 砖讘转 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讚讗讬诇讜 砖讘转 讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 讘转诇讜砖 讘讬谉 讘诪讞讜讘专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讘讬注讬转 讘转诇讜砖 诇讬转讗 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讬转讗 讜讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讛 砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 讚讗讬诇讜 砖讘讬注讬转 讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 讘诪讗讻诇 讗讚诐 讘讬谉 讘诪讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 讜讗讬诇讜 诪注砖专 讘诪讗讻诇 讗讚诐 讗讬转讗 讘诪讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 诇讬转讗

Rather, isn鈥檛 this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the halakhot of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecration of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes. As, by Torah law, the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the halakhot of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.

讜诇讘专 拽驻专讗 讚转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讘诪注砖专 讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讜 砖诇 诪注砖专 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 驻讬讗讛 讚讗讬诇讜 诪注砖专 讗讬转讗 讘转讗谞讛 讜讬专拽 讜讗讬诇讜 驻讬讗讛 诇讬转讗 讘转讗谞讛 讜讬专拽 讚转谞谉 讻诇诇 讗诪专讜 讘驻讬讗讛 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜谞砖诪专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 讜诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 讞讬讬讘 讘驻讬讗讛

And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of pe鈥檃. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of pe鈥檃 is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃: They stated a principle with regard to pe鈥檃: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in pe鈥檃.

讗讜讻诇 诇诪注讜讟讬 住驻讬讞讬 住讟讬住 讜拽讜爪讛 讜谞砖诪专 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻拽专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 诇诪注讜讟讬 讻诪讬讛讬谉 讜驻讟专讬讜转 讜诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 诇诪注讜讟讬 转讗谞讛 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 诇诪注讜讟讬 讬专拽

The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [satis] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of pe鈥檃 does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

讜讗讬诇讜 讙讘讬 诪注砖专 转谞谉 讻诇诇 讗诪专讜 讘诪注砖专 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜谞砖诪专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 讞讬讬讘 讘诪注砖专 讜讗讬诇讜 诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 诇讗 转谞谉:

While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in pe鈥檃.

专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 转谞谉 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讬讚讬注讛 诪注讬拽专讗 诇讗 诪讗讬 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讚讛讬转讛 砖讻讜讞 诪诪谞讜 注讬拽专讛 砖诇 砖讘转

The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the halakhot of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn鈥檛 this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.

讗讘诇 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 讗讚转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 诇讬转谞讬 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 诪讗讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 讬讜讚注 注讬拽专讛 砖诇 砖讘转 讜砖讻讞讛

The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the halakha? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.

讗讘诇 诇讗 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 讗讚转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 砖讛讜讗 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 诇讬转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻砖讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讜讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讻讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讚诪讬 讜讛讻讬 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讻讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讚诪讬 讜讞讬讬讘

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the halakha be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the halakha: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讗讘诇 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪讬转讬讘讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗诪专讜 讘砖讘转 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讻讬爪讚 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讞讟讗转 讗讞转 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讚诐 讗讞转 讜注诇 讛讞诇讘 讗讞转 讜注诇 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗讞转 讜诪讜谞讘讝 驻讜讟专

And it was Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: They stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.

讜讻讱 讛讬讛 诪讜谞讘讝 讚谉 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪讝讬讚 拽专讜讬 讞讜讟讗 讜砖讜讙讙 拽专讜讬 讞讜讟讗 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛专讬谞讬 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 讚讘专讬讱 讗讬 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 讛讬讚讬注讛 讘砖注转 诪注砖讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讘砖注转 诪注砖讛

And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.

讗诪专 诇讜 讛谉 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖讛讜住驻转 讗诪专 诇讜 诇讚讘专讬讱 讗讬谉 讝讛 拽专讜讬 砖讜讙讙 讗诇讗 诪讝讬讚

Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转讬谞讜拽 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专讬 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讜谞讘讝 讚驻讟专 讗谞谉 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讻诪讜谞讘讝

Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn鈥檛 there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讜谞讘讝 讚讻转讬讘 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜住诪讬讱 诇讬讛 讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转注砖讛 讘讬讚 专诪讛 讛拽讬砖 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛

The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: 鈥淭he native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly鈥 (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: 鈥淎nd the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people鈥 (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 转讜专讛 讗讞转 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讚诪拽专讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 诇讘专讬讛 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜讻转讬讘

The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: 鈥淭here shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.鈥 And it is written:

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Shabbat 68-74 – Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time

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Shabbat 68: When You Forget What Day It Is — and That Day Is Shabbat

Back to basics: The categories (avot) of prohibited labor on Shabbat, their sub-categories (toladot), and the significance of having both...

Shabbat 68

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shabbat 68

讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讞讟讗转 讗讞转:

and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 注讜讚 讻诇诇 讗讞专 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜讙讘讬 砖讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 注讜讚 讻诇诇 讗讞专 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜讛讗 讙讘讬 诪注砖专 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇诇 讗讞专 讜诇讗 转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇

GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.
Here, because the tanna wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two halakhot employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of halakhot, he taught employing the term: A significant principle.
And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (Shevi鈥檌t 7:2) the tanna wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood.
However, with regard to the halakhot of tithes, where the mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the tanna taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the tanna did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 砖讘转 讜砖讘讬注讬转 讚讗讬转 讘讛讜 讗讘讜转 讜转讜诇讚讜转 转谞讗 讙讚讜诇 诪注砖专 讚诇讬转 讘讛 讗讘讜转 讜转讜诇讚讜转 诇讗 转谞讗 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讜诇讘专 拽驻专讗 讚转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讘诪注砖专 诪讗讬 讗讘讜转 讜诪讗讬 转讜诇讚讜转 讗讬讻讗

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the tanna taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the halakhot of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its halakhot are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讜 砖诇 砖讘转 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讚讗讬诇讜 砖讘转 讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 讘转诇讜砖 讘讬谉 讘诪讞讜讘专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讘讬注讬转 讘转诇讜砖 诇讬转讗 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讬转讗 讜讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讛 砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 讚讗讬诇讜 砖讘讬注讬转 讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 讘诪讗讻诇 讗讚诐 讘讬谉 讘诪讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 讜讗讬诇讜 诪注砖专 讘诪讗讻诇 讗讚诐 讗讬转讗 讘诪讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 诇讬转讗

Rather, isn鈥檛 this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the halakhot of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecration of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes. As, by Torah law, the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the halakhot of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.

讜诇讘专 拽驻专讗 讚转谞讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讘诪注砖专 讙讚讜诇 注讜谞砖讜 砖诇 诪注砖专 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 驻讬讗讛 讚讗讬诇讜 诪注砖专 讗讬转讗 讘转讗谞讛 讜讬专拽 讜讗讬诇讜 驻讬讗讛 诇讬转讗 讘转讗谞讛 讜讬专拽 讚转谞谉 讻诇诇 讗诪专讜 讘驻讬讗讛 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜谞砖诪专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 讜诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 讞讬讬讘 讘驻讬讗讛

And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of pe鈥檃. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of pe鈥檃 is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃: They stated a principle with regard to pe鈥檃: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in pe鈥檃.

讗讜讻诇 诇诪注讜讟讬 住驻讬讞讬 住讟讬住 讜拽讜爪讛 讜谞砖诪专 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻拽专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 诇诪注讜讟讬 讻诪讬讛讬谉 讜驻讟专讬讜转 讜诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 诇诪注讜讟讬 转讗谞讛 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 诇诪注讜讟讬 讬专拽

The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [satis] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of pe鈥檃 does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

讜讗讬诇讜 讙讘讬 诪注砖专 转谞谉 讻诇诇 讗诪专讜 讘诪注砖专 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜谞砖诪专 讜讙讬讚讜诇讜 诪谉 讛讗专抓 讞讬讬讘 讘诪注砖专 讜讗讬诇讜 诇拽讬讟转讜 讻讗讞转 讜诪讻谞讬住讜 诇拽讬讜诐 诇讗 转谞谉:

While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in pe鈥檃.

专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 转谞谉 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讬讚讬注讛 诪注讬拽专讗 诇讗 诪讗讬 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讚讛讬转讛 砖讻讜讞 诪诪谞讜 注讬拽专讛 砖诇 砖讘转

The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the halakhot of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn鈥檛 this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.

讗讘诇 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 讗讚转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 诇讬转谞讬 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 诪讗讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 讬讜讚注 注讬拽专讛 砖诇 砖讘转 讜砖讻讞讛

The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the halakha? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.

讗讘诇 诇讗 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 讗讚转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 砖讛讜讗 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛 诇讬转谞讬 讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻砖讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讜讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讻讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讚诪讬 讜讛讻讬 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讻讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讚诪讬 讜讞讬讬讘

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the halakha be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the halakha: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗 讛讻讬专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讞 讗讘诇 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪讬转讬讘讬 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗诪专讜 讘砖讘转 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讻讬爪讚 转讬谞讜拽 砖谞砖讘讛 诇讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜讙专 砖谞转讙讬讬专 讘讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讞讟讗转 讗讞转 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讚诐 讗讞转 讜注诇 讛讞诇讘 讗讞转 讜注诇 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗讞转 讜诪讜谞讘讝 驻讜讟专

And it was Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: They stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.

讜讻讱 讛讬讛 诪讜谞讘讝 讚谉 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜诪讝讬讚 拽专讜讬 讞讜讟讗 讜砖讜讙讙 拽专讜讬 讞讜讟讗 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛专讬谞讬 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 讚讘专讬讱 讗讬 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 讛讬讚讬注讛 讘砖注转 诪注砖讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讘砖注转 诪注砖讛

And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.

讗诪专 诇讜 讛谉 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖讛讜住驻转 讗诪专 诇讜 诇讚讘专讬讱 讗讬谉 讝讛 拽专讜讬 砖讜讙讙 讗诇讗 诪讝讬讚

Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转讬谞讜拽 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专讬 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讜谞讘讝 讚驻讟专 讗谞谉 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讻诪讜谞讘讝

Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn鈥檛 there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讜谞讘讝 讚讻转讬讘 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜住诪讬讱 诇讬讛 讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转注砖讛 讘讬讚 专诪讛 讛拽讬砖 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 诪讛 诪讝讬讚 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛 讗祝 砖讜讙讙 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讬讚讬注讛

The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: 鈥淭he native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly鈥 (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: 鈥淎nd the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people鈥 (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 转讜专讛 讗讞转 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讚诪拽专讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 诇讘专讬讛 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜讻转讬讘

The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: 鈥淭here shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.鈥 And it is written:

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