Shabbat 71

קצירה גוררת קצירה וטחינה גוררת טחינה אבל נודע לו על קצירה של זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות קצירה גוררת קצירה וטחינה שעמה וטחינה שכנגדה במקומה עומדת

Nevertheless, in that case, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the second unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor, and for which he also was liable to bring a sin-offering. And similarly, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor. Since the offering was sacrificed after he had committed both transgressions, he attains atonement with one sacrifice, even though he performed several forms of the transgression in a single lapse of awareness. However, if the order of events in that case was different in that he became aware of reaping performed when his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, and he set aside an offering to atone for his unwitting transgression, and only afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding when his actions were unwitting with regard to Shabbat, the sin-offering that he brings for the reaping draws with it atonement for the previous reaping and the concomitant grinding. As far as the lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat is concerned, reaping and grinding are considered like one sin, and atonement for one atones for the other. And the parallel grinding that he performed together with the latter reaping remains in its place, i.e., he does not attain atonement for that transgression. When he becomes aware of it, he brings a separate offering for atonement.

אביי אמר טחינה נמי גוררת טחינה שם טחינה אחת היא ומי אית ליה לרבא גרירה והא איתמר אכל שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחד ונודע לו על אחת מהן וחזר ואכל כזית בהעלמו של שני אמר רבא הביא קרבן על ראשון ראשון ושני מתכפרין שלישי אינו מתכפר

Abaye said: Grinding also draws the latter grinding with it, as the designation of grinding is one. Since he attained atonement for one act of grinding, atonement is attained for the second act of grinding as well, as they were performed in one lapse of awareness, and he became aware only after the acts were completed. The Gemara asks: And is Rava of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing? Wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute with regard to that matter in a case where one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he ate two pieces of forbidden fat from different parts of an animal in the belief that they were permitted fat? One is liable to bring a sin-offering for that transgression. And in a case where he became aware that one of the olive-bulks was forbidden fat, and then ate a third olive-bulk while still in the midst of the lapse of awareness of the second piece of forbidden fat, i.e., he had not yet become aware that the second of the original olive-bulks was indeed prohibited and after eating the third olive-bulk, he became aware of both the second and the third pieces of fat. Rava said: If he brought a sacrifice for the first, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the first and second olive-bulks, since he ate both in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the third because awareness of the first olive-bulk interposes.

הביא קרבן על השלישי שלישי ושני מתכפרין ראשון אינו מתכפר הביא קרבן על האמצעי נתכפרו כולן אביי אמר אפילו הביא קרבן על אחד מהן נתכפרו כולן בתר דשמעה מאביי סברה אי הכי טחינה נמי תגרר לטחינה גרירה אית ליה גרירה דגרירה לית ליה

If he brought a sacrifice for the third after he became aware that he had sinned, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the third and second, since both were performed in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the transgression of the first, which occurred in a separate lapse of awareness. If he brought a sacrifice for the middle one, atonement is attained for all, since both the first and third olive-bulks have a lapse of awareness common with the second. Abaye said: Even if he brought a sacrifice for any one of them, atonement is attained for all of them by means of drawing. Since he attained atonement for one of the olive-bulks, that atonement draws with it atonement for the other olive-bulks with which it shared a lapse of awareness. In any case, apparently Rava is not of the opinion that atonement draws with it atonement. How, then, does he say that atonement for reaping draws with it atonement for other acts of reaping? The Gemara answers: After he heard this halakha from Abaye, he adopted it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if Rava accepts the principle of drawing, by that same principle grinding should also draw with it grinding. The Gemara answers: There is a difference. Although he is of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing, he is not of the opinion that atonement that was attained through drawing can draw additional atonement through drawing. Atonement for the initial transgression of grinding was only attained by means of being drawn by the atonement for reaping. Rava holds that it cannot then proceed to draw atonement for the latter act of grinding.

מילתא דפשיטא להו לאביי ורבא מבעיא לרבי זירא דבעי רבי זירא מרבי אסי ואמרי לה בעא מיניה רבי ירמיה מרבי זירא קצר וטחן חצי גרוגרת בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות וחזר וקצר וטחן חצי גרוגרת בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות מהו שיצטרפו אמר ליה חלוקין לחטאות ולא מצטרפין

The Gemara comments: A matter that was obvious to Abaye and Rava was a dilemma for Rabbi Zeira. In a case where one’s action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the labors, and in a case where one’s action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the labors, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for the unwitting violation of Shabbat. This was not obvious to Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi, and others say that Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If one reaped and ground grain in the measure of half a dried fig-bulk, and his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He is certainly not liable by Torah law because he reaped and ground less than the minimum measure for liability. And then he reaped or ground grain in the amount of half a dried fig-bulk and his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, do they join together to constitute the minimum measure that determines liability to bring a sin-offering when he becomes aware that he sinned? He said to him: They are separate with regard to sin-offerings, i.e., if one reaped and ground the minimum measure that determines liability, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and therefore they do not join together to constitute the minimum measure.

וכל היכא דחלוקין לחטאות לא מצטרפי והתנן אכל חלב וחלב בהעלם אחד אינו חייב אלא אחת אכל חלב ודם ונותר ופגול בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת זו חומר במינין הרבה ממין אחד וזו חומר במין אחד ממינין הרבה שאם אכל חצי זית וחזר ואכל חצי זית ממין אחד חייב משני מינין פטור

The Gemara asks: And wherever they are separate with regard to sin-offerings, do they not join together? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If one ate one piece of forbidden fat and then ate another piece of forbidden fat, each larger than the measure for liability, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? In the next case in the mishna, four items are listed. If one eats them unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he ate forbidden fat, and blood, and notar, sacrifices that remained after the time when they may be eaten has expired, and piggul, sacrifices that were invalidated due to inappropriate intent while being offered, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one. That is the stricture that applies to many types of prohibitions relative to one, the same, type. And this is the stricture of one type relative to many types: That if one ate half an olive-bulk, and then ate another half an olive-bulk from one type, he is liable because the two half measures join to constitute a single measure. And if he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, he is exempt.

והוינן בה ממין אחד חייב צריכא למימר ואמר ריש לקיש משום בר תוטני הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שאכלו בשני תמחויין ורבי יהושע היא דאמר תמחויין מחלקין מהו דתימא אמר רבי יהושע בין לקולא בין לחומרא קא משמע לן דלקולא לא אמר לחומרא קאמר

And we discussed this mishna: When we learned of one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. And Reish Lakish said in the name of the Sage, bar Tutni: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes, where each half was prepared separately, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. One who eats two olive-bulks of prohibited food that was prepared in two different dishes in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring a sin-offering for each one. Lest you say that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture, and therefore one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua did not state his opinion as a leniency. He stated his opinion as a stricture.

והא הכא דחלוקין לחטאות וקא מצטרפי אמר ליה מר ארישא מתני לה וקשיא ליה אנן אסיפא מתנינן לה ולא קשיא לן משני מינין פטור צריכה למימר ואמר ריש לקיש משום בר תוטני לעולם ממין אחד ואמאי קרי ליה שני מינין שאכלו בשני תמחויין ורבי יהושע היא דאמר תמחויין מחלקין והא קא משמע לן דאמר רבי יהושע בין לקולא בין לחומרא

But here, where they are separate with regard to the number of sin-offerings, i.e., according to Rabbi Yehoshua one who eats an olive-bulk from each of the two dishes is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and, nevertheless, the two halves of an olive-bulk from the two dishes join together and constitute a full measure and render him liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The Master taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and it is difficult for him. We taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and it is not difficult for us. When we learned in the latter clause of the mishna: One who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, was it necessary to say that he is exempt? That is obvious. Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutni: Actually, it is referring even to a case where the prohibition was from one type of food. And why then does the mishna call it two types? Because he eats it in the two separate dishes in which it was prepared. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. And this teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture.

מדסיפא מין אחד ושני תמחויין

The Gemara asks: From the fact that the latter clause is referring to one type of food and a case where the two halves of an olive-bulk were prepared in two dishes, as explained above,

מכלל דרישא מין אחד ותמחוי אחד מין אחד ותמחוי אחד צריכא למימר אמר רב הונא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהיתה לו ידיעה בינתיים ורבן גמליאל היא דאמר אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור:

by inference, the first clause in the mishna is referring to one type of food and one dish. The problem is then more difficult. In a case where one ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type of food and in one dish, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. Rav Huna said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he had a period of awareness between eating the two half olive-bulks. After eating the first half of an olive-bulk, he became aware that he had eaten food that was prohibited. Then he became unaware again and ate the second half of an olive-bulk. Although, with regard to sacrifices, awareness usually serves as a line of demarcation between unwitting transgressions performed prior to the period of awareness and unwitting transgressions performed thereafter, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel who said: There is no awareness for half a measure. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure, the fact that one became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance and does not demarcate between the two half-measures with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering.

איתמר אכל שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחד ונודע לו על הראשון וחזר ונודע לו על השני רבי יוחנן אמר חייב שתים וריש לקיש אמר אינו חייב אלא אחת רבי יוחנן אמר חייב על חטאתו והביא וריש לקיש אמר פטור מחטאתו ונסלח לו

A dispute between amora’im was stated: With regard to one who ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, and became aware of the transgression of eating the first olive-bulk, and then became aware of the transgression of eating the second, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one offering for each transgression. And Reish Lakish said: He is liable to bring only one. Both Sages cite proofs for their opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable as it is stated: “And he shall offer for his sin that he sinned…and he shall bring the ox” (Leviticus 4:3-4), indicating that he is liable to bring a separate sacrifice for each sin. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the priest shall atone for him from his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that even if he atoned from his sin, i.e., for part of his sin and not all of his sin, the entire transgression is forgiven.

וריש לקיש הכתיב על חטאתו והביא ההוא לאחר כפרה ולרבי יוחנן נמי הכתיב מחטאתו ונסלח לו הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שאכל כזית ומחצה ונודע לו על כזית וחזר ואכל כחצי זית אחר בהעלמו של שני מהו דתימא ליצטרפו קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: And how can Reish Lakish say that one sin-offering is sufficient? Isn’t it written: “For his sin…and he shall bring”? The Gemara answers: That verse refers to a case where he only became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement for the first. However, if he became aware prior to atonement, he is required to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, too, how can he say that one is liable to bring two sin-offerings? Isn’t it written: “From his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half, and he became aware of his transgression of eating a single olive-bulk, and then he ate another half of an olive-bulk in the course of the lapse of awareness of the second half of an olive-bulk that he ate together with the whole olive-bulk. Lest you say that the two halves of an olive-bulk should join together, and he is liable to bring an additional sin-offering, the verse teaches us that in that case he is exempt because he has already atoned for part of his transgression.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי דאיתידע ליה קודם הפרשה פליגי ובהא פליגי דמר סבר ידיעות מחלקות ומר סבר הפרשות מחלקות אבל לאחר הפרשה מודי ליה ריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן דחייב שתים או דילמא דאיתידע ליה לאחר הפרשה פליגי ובהא פליגי דמר סבר הפרשות מחלקות ומר סבר כפרות מחלקות אבל קודם הפרשה מודי ליה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש דאינו חייב אלא אחת או דילמא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, they disagree in a case where one became aware of the second transgression prior to designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that periods of awareness separate. Since one became aware of his sins at two different stages, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only designations of animals for sacrifices separate. However, if one became aware of the second transgression after designation of the animal for the first sin-offering, Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Or, perhaps they are disagreeing in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that designations separate; and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only atonements separate. Only after the sin-offering has been sacrificed on the altar and the sinner has obtained atonement can it be said that the sacrifice’s capacity to atone is spent and cannot atone for a sin of which he became aware afterward. However, if he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of the sacrifice, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Or, perhaps, the dispute between them is both in this case, before designation, and in that case, after designation.

אמר ליה מסתברא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת דאי סלקא דעתך קודם הפרשה פליגי אבל לאחר הפרשה מודה ליה ריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן דחייב שתים אדמוקים ליה קרא לאחר כפרה לוקמיה לאחר הפרשה ואי אחר הפרשה פליגי אבל קודם הפרשה מודה ליה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש דאינו חייב אלא אחת אדמוקי ליה קרא בכזית ומחצה לוקמיה קודם הפרשה

Rav Ashi said to him: It is reasonable to say that the dispute is both in this case and in that case. As, should it enter your mind that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of an animal for the first sin-offering, and in a case where he became aware after designation Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Reish Lakish’s opinion in a case where one became aware of the second sin after atonement for the first, let him establish it in a case where one became aware of the transgression after designation of an animal for the first sin-offering. And similarly, if you say that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, and in a case where he became aware prior to designation Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is only liable to bring one sin-offering, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in a case where he ate an olive-bulk and a half, let him establish it in a case where he became aware of the transgression prior to designation.

ודילמא ספוקי מספקא ליה ואם תימצי לומר קאמר אם תימצי לומר קודם הפרשה פליגי בה רבי יוחנן היכי מוקי ליה לקרא בכזית ומחצה ואם תימצי לומר לאחר הפרשה פליגי ריש לקיש היכי מוקי ליה לקרא בלאחר כפרה:

Ravina does not accept this proof, as, in his opinion, it is flawed: And perhaps there is uncertainty with regard to this matter, and he spoke employing the style of: If you wish to say. If you wish to say that they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation, then how does Rabbi Yoḥanan establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half. And if you wish to say they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, then how does Reish Lakish establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement.

אמר עולא למאן דאמר אשם ודאי לא בעיא ידיעה בתחילה

Ulla said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, a sacrifice brought by one who committed a robbery, misused sacred objects, or had relations with a designated maidservant, one does not require prior knowledge that he definitely sinned,