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Today's Daf Yomi

May 17, 2020 | כ״ג באייר תש״פ

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

Shabbat 72

Today’s shiur is dedicated for a refuah shleima to Leah Naomi bat Rachel by Deborah Dickson. We are pleased to be part of International Women’s Talmud Day that is taking place today with Talmud learning events throughout the day. 

What is the law regarding the guilt offering for one who has relations with a designated maidservant numerous times – does one bring a separate guilt offering for each time if he was made aware of his sin in between each act? On what does it depend? If someone intends to perform a permitted act on Shabbat and ends up doing a forbidden act instead – like for example, one wanted to pick up something off the ground that was detached but instead lifted up and detached something from the ground, one is not obligated – this is called mitasek. What if one intended to cut something that was detached and in the end cut something that was attached (or according to Tosafot – one thought it was detached but it was attached)? Rava and Abaye disagree as to whether this person is obligated or not. Rava brings proof from a braita comparing Shabbat to other mitzvot and explaining that Shabbat is both more lenient and more stringent than other mitzvot. What is the “other mitzvot” referring to in these comparisons?

 

בעל חמש בעילות בשפחה חרופה אינו חייב אלא אחת מתקיף לה רב המנונא אלא מעתה בעל וחזר ובעל והפריש קרבן ואמר המתינו לי עד שאבעול הכי נמי דאינו חייב אלא אחת אמר ליה מעשה דלאחר הפרשה קאמרת מעשה דלאחר הפרשה לא קאמינא

one who had relations with a designated maidservant five times is only liable to bring one guilt-offering, even if he became aware of his transgression between each instance of relations with her. Because awareness is insignificant with regard to this sacrifice, it does not demarcate in terms of the number of guilt-offerings that he is liable to bring. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this halakha: But if what you say is so, one who had relations with a designated maidservant, and again had relations, and designated an animal for the offering, and said: Wait for me before sacrificing the offering until I have relations again, so that the guilt-offering will atone for this transgression as well, would you say that the same applies in that case too, that he is only liable to bring one guilt-offering? Ulla said to him: You referred to an action performed after designation of an animal for the guilt-offering. I did not say that halakha with regard to an action that was performed after designation.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר למאן דאמר אשם ודאי בעי ידיעה בתחלה בעל חמש בעילות בשפחה חרופה חייב על כל אחת ואחת אמר ליה אביי הרי חטאת דבעינן ידיעה בתחלה ופליגי רבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אישתיק אמר ליה דלמא במעשה דלאחר הפרשה קאמרת וכדרב המנונא אמר ליה אין

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned, one who had relations five times with a designated maidservant is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every one. Because awareness is significant with regard to guilt-offerings, the awareness between the acts of cohabitation renders each a separate transgression. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: That is not so, as with regard to a sin-offering for which we require prior knowledge, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagree whether or not awareness following an unwitting sin demarcates one transgression from another. Rav Dimi was silent and had no response. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Abaye said to him: Perhaps you said your statement with regard to an act that the sinner seeks to commit after designating an animal as a guilt-offering but wants to attain atonement for by means of that same designated sacrifice. That statement is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. Rav Dimi remembered and said to Abaye: Yes, that was what was originally stated.

כי אתא רבין אמר הכל מודים בשפחה חרופה והכל מודים בשפחה חרופה ומחלוקת בשפחה חרופה הכל מודים בשפחה חרופה דאינו חייב אלא אחת כדעולא והכל מודים בשפחה חרופה דחייב על כל אחת ואחת כרב המנונא ומחלוקת בשפחה חרופה למאן דאמר אשם ודאי בעי ידיעה בתחלה מחלוקת דרבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש:

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he cited several disputes concerning the halakhot of guilt-offerings and said: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant. The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable to bring only one guilt-offering, even for many acts of cohabitation, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. Ulla said that since prior knowledge is not required for liability to bring a guilt-offering, even if one became aware of his transgression between each time he had relations, he brings only one sacrifice. And everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable for each and every act of cohabitation, if it occurred after designation of an animal for a guilt-offering for the previous transgression, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. And there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant; this refers to the one who said that, in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned. In that case, the legal status of the guilt-offering is equal to that of the sin-offering and is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who disagree whether awareness between two unwitting transgressions demarcates and requires two offerings.

איתמר

It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to the halakha in the following case:

נתכוין להגביה את התלוש וחתך את המחובר פטור לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר רבא אמר פטור אביי אמר חייב רבא אמר פטור דהא לא נתכוון לחתיכה דאיסורא אביי אמר חייב דהא קמיכוין לחתיכה בעלמא

One who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground on Shabbat and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, which under other circumstances constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of reaping, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his mistaken act, since he did not intend to perform an act of cutting. One who performs an action unawares [mitasek], i.e., he had no intention to perform the act at all, incurs no liability whatsoever. One who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground, Rava said: He too is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said that he is exempt because he did not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He intended to perform an action completely permitted on Shabbat. He had no misconception with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. It was merely a mistaken act. And Abaye said that he is liable because he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Since he intended to perform that act, and he carried out his intent, the Torah characterizes it as unwitting and not as unawares.

אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דתניא חומר שבת משאר מצות וחומר שאר מצות משבת חומר שבת משאר מצות שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות וחומר שאר מצות משבת שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת:

Rava said: From where do I derive to say this opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: There is a stricture with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot, and a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even if he did so in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case in other mitzvot. In other mitzvot, if an individual commits a transgression several times in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. Apparently, the phrase unwittingly without intent refers to the case disputed by Abaye and Rava. Therefore, this is proof for Rava’s opinion that, with regard to Shabbat, one who acts unawares, i.e., whose action resulted from involvement in another matter and who had no intention to perform an action that is prohibited, is not considered to have performed an unwitting act.

אמר מר חומר שבת משאר מצות שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות היכי דמי אילימא דעבד קצירה וטחינה דכוותה גבי שאר מצות אכל חלב ודם הכא תרתי מיחייב והכא תרתי מיחייב אלא שאר מצות דלא מיחייב אלא חדא היכי דמי דאכל חלב וחלב דכוותה גבי שבת דעבד קצירה וקצירה הכא חדא מיחייב והכא חדא מיחייב

Before the Gemara discusses the baraita in the context of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, the Gemara analyzes its text. The Master said in the baraita: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If you say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where he ate forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings and here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances in other mitzvot where he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? It is in a case where he ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. However, in that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring one sin-offering, and here one is liable to bring one sin-offering.

לעולם דעבד קצירה וטחינה ומאי מה שאין כן בשאר מצות אעבודה זרה וכדרבי אמי דאמר רבי אמי זיבח וקיטר וניסך בהעלמה אחת אינו חייב אלא אחת

The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot? It is not referring to all mitzvot in general. It is referring to the prohibition of idolatry, which is comprised of separate component prohibitions, each of which incurs independent liability. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: One who sacrificed to idolatry, and burned incense before it, and poured wine as a libation before it in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin-offering. That is the ruling, even though, had he performed those rites separately, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering for each. That, then, is the stricture of other mitzvot relative to Shabbat.

במאי אוקימתא בעבודה זרה אימא סיפא חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת האי שגג בלא מתכוין דעבודה זרה היכי דמי אילימא כסבור בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לה הרי לבו לשמים ואלא דחזי אנדרטא וסגיד לה היכי דמי אי דקבלה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא ואי דלא קבלה עליה באלוה לאו כלום הוא

The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish the baraita, in the case of idolatry? If so, state the latter clause and determine whether that explanation applies there as well. The latter clause states: A stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. One who acts unawares with no intent to perform a prohibited act is not considered to have performed an unwitting act. That case of performing an act unwittingly without intent with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances? If you say that it is referring to a case where he thought that it was a synagogue and bowed to it, and it turned out that he bowed to idolatry, he committed no transgression. Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. What are the circumstances? If the baraita is referring to a case in which he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he worshipped idolatry intentionally and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is meaningless and is not an act of idolatry.

אלא מאהבה ומיראה הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב אלא לרבא דאמר פטור מאי איכא למימר אלא באומר מותר מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור לגמרי

Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed due to love of someone who requested that he bow before the statue and due to fear of someone coercing him to do so. He is under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol, there is no prohibition involved. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is liable to bring a sin-offering. However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, what can be said? According to Rava’s opinion, the problem remains. There is no case in which there is a difference between the ruling in the case of idolatry and the ruling in the case of Shabbat. Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idolatry is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. The statement in the baraita: Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labors on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labors under those circumstances is completely exempt.

עד כאן לא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן אלא אי לחיובי חדא אי לחיובי תרתי אבל מפטרי לגמרי לא

That conclusion contradicts another statement of Rava. With regard to one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the individual prohibited labors, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman only whether to deem him liable to bring one or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings. However, the possibility to exempt him completely did not enter Rava’s mind. That explanation of the baraita is incompatible with Rava’s opinion.

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

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Shabbat 72: My Mitzvah Can Beat Up Your Mitzvah

The Gemara claims: Shabbat is a more stringent area of halakhah than other mitzvot - and where it is less...

Shabbat 72

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Shabbat 72

בעל חמש בעילות בשפחה חרופה אינו חייב אלא אחת מתקיף לה רב המנונא אלא מעתה בעל וחזר ובעל והפריש קרבן ואמר המתינו לי עד שאבעול הכי נמי דאינו חייב אלא אחת אמר ליה מעשה דלאחר הפרשה קאמרת מעשה דלאחר הפרשה לא קאמינא

one who had relations with a designated maidservant five times is only liable to bring one guilt-offering, even if he became aware of his transgression between each instance of relations with her. Because awareness is insignificant with regard to this sacrifice, it does not demarcate in terms of the number of guilt-offerings that he is liable to bring. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this halakha: But if what you say is so, one who had relations with a designated maidservant, and again had relations, and designated an animal for the offering, and said: Wait for me before sacrificing the offering until I have relations again, so that the guilt-offering will atone for this transgression as well, would you say that the same applies in that case too, that he is only liable to bring one guilt-offering? Ulla said to him: You referred to an action performed after designation of an animal for the guilt-offering. I did not say that halakha with regard to an action that was performed after designation.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר למאן דאמר אשם ודאי בעי ידיעה בתחלה בעל חמש בעילות בשפחה חרופה חייב על כל אחת ואחת אמר ליה אביי הרי חטאת דבעינן ידיעה בתחלה ופליגי רבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אישתיק אמר ליה דלמא במעשה דלאחר הפרשה קאמרת וכדרב המנונא אמר ליה אין

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned, one who had relations five times with a designated maidservant is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every one. Because awareness is significant with regard to guilt-offerings, the awareness between the acts of cohabitation renders each a separate transgression. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: That is not so, as with regard to a sin-offering for which we require prior knowledge, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagree whether or not awareness following an unwitting sin demarcates one transgression from another. Rav Dimi was silent and had no response. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Abaye said to him: Perhaps you said your statement with regard to an act that the sinner seeks to commit after designating an animal as a guilt-offering but wants to attain atonement for by means of that same designated sacrifice. That statement is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. Rav Dimi remembered and said to Abaye: Yes, that was what was originally stated.

כי אתא רבין אמר הכל מודים בשפחה חרופה והכל מודים בשפחה חרופה ומחלוקת בשפחה חרופה הכל מודים בשפחה חרופה דאינו חייב אלא אחת כדעולא והכל מודים בשפחה חרופה דחייב על כל אחת ואחת כרב המנונא ומחלוקת בשפחה חרופה למאן דאמר אשם ודאי בעי ידיעה בתחלה מחלוקת דרבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש:

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he cited several disputes concerning the halakhot of guilt-offerings and said: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant. The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable to bring only one guilt-offering, even for many acts of cohabitation, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. Ulla said that since prior knowledge is not required for liability to bring a guilt-offering, even if one became aware of his transgression between each time he had relations, he brings only one sacrifice. And everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable for each and every act of cohabitation, if it occurred after designation of an animal for a guilt-offering for the previous transgression, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. And there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant; this refers to the one who said that, in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned. In that case, the legal status of the guilt-offering is equal to that of the sin-offering and is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who disagree whether awareness between two unwitting transgressions demarcates and requires two offerings.

איתמר

It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to the halakha in the following case:

נתכוין להגביה את התלוש וחתך את המחובר פטור לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר רבא אמר פטור אביי אמר חייב רבא אמר פטור דהא לא נתכוון לחתיכה דאיסורא אביי אמר חייב דהא קמיכוין לחתיכה בעלמא

One who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground on Shabbat and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, which under other circumstances constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of reaping, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his mistaken act, since he did not intend to perform an act of cutting. One who performs an action unawares [mitasek], i.e., he had no intention to perform the act at all, incurs no liability whatsoever. One who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground, Rava said: He too is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said that he is exempt because he did not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He intended to perform an action completely permitted on Shabbat. He had no misconception with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. It was merely a mistaken act. And Abaye said that he is liable because he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Since he intended to perform that act, and he carried out his intent, the Torah characterizes it as unwitting and not as unawares.

אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דתניא חומר שבת משאר מצות וחומר שאר מצות משבת חומר שבת משאר מצות שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות וחומר שאר מצות משבת שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת:

Rava said: From where do I derive to say this opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: There is a stricture with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot, and a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even if he did so in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case in other mitzvot. In other mitzvot, if an individual commits a transgression several times in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. Apparently, the phrase unwittingly without intent refers to the case disputed by Abaye and Rava. Therefore, this is proof for Rava’s opinion that, with regard to Shabbat, one who acts unawares, i.e., whose action resulted from involvement in another matter and who had no intention to perform an action that is prohibited, is not considered to have performed an unwitting act.

אמר מר חומר שבת משאר מצות שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות היכי דמי אילימא דעבד קצירה וטחינה דכוותה גבי שאר מצות אכל חלב ודם הכא תרתי מיחייב והכא תרתי מיחייב אלא שאר מצות דלא מיחייב אלא חדא היכי דמי דאכל חלב וחלב דכוותה גבי שבת דעבד קצירה וקצירה הכא חדא מיחייב והכא חדא מיחייב

Before the Gemara discusses the baraita in the context of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, the Gemara analyzes its text. The Master said in the baraita: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If you say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where he ate forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings and here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances in other mitzvot where he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? It is in a case where he ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. However, in that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring one sin-offering, and here one is liable to bring one sin-offering.

לעולם דעבד קצירה וטחינה ומאי מה שאין כן בשאר מצות אעבודה זרה וכדרבי אמי דאמר רבי אמי זיבח וקיטר וניסך בהעלמה אחת אינו חייב אלא אחת

The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot? It is not referring to all mitzvot in general. It is referring to the prohibition of idolatry, which is comprised of separate component prohibitions, each of which incurs independent liability. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: One who sacrificed to idolatry, and burned incense before it, and poured wine as a libation before it in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin-offering. That is the ruling, even though, had he performed those rites separately, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering for each. That, then, is the stricture of other mitzvot relative to Shabbat.

במאי אוקימתא בעבודה זרה אימא סיפא חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת האי שגג בלא מתכוין דעבודה זרה היכי דמי אילימא כסבור בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לה הרי לבו לשמים ואלא דחזי אנדרטא וסגיד לה היכי דמי אי דקבלה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא ואי דלא קבלה עליה באלוה לאו כלום הוא

The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish the baraita, in the case of idolatry? If so, state the latter clause and determine whether that explanation applies there as well. The latter clause states: A stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. One who acts unawares with no intent to perform a prohibited act is not considered to have performed an unwitting act. That case of performing an act unwittingly without intent with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances? If you say that it is referring to a case where he thought that it was a synagogue and bowed to it, and it turned out that he bowed to idolatry, he committed no transgression. Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. What are the circumstances? If the baraita is referring to a case in which he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he worshipped idolatry intentionally and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is meaningless and is not an act of idolatry.

אלא מאהבה ומיראה הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב אלא לרבא דאמר פטור מאי איכא למימר אלא באומר מותר מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור לגמרי

Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed due to love of someone who requested that he bow before the statue and due to fear of someone coercing him to do so. He is under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol, there is no prohibition involved. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is liable to bring a sin-offering. However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, what can be said? According to Rava’s opinion, the problem remains. There is no case in which there is a difference between the ruling in the case of idolatry and the ruling in the case of Shabbat. Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idolatry is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. The statement in the baraita: Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labors on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labors under those circumstances is completely exempt.

עד כאן לא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן אלא אי לחיובי חדא אי לחיובי תרתי אבל מפטרי לגמרי לא

That conclusion contradicts another statement of Rava. With regard to one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the individual prohibited labors, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman only whether to deem him liable to bring one or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings. However, the possibility to exempt him completely did not enter Rava’s mind. That explanation of the baraita is incompatible with Rava’s opinion.

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