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Today's Daf Yomi

June 5, 2020 | 讬状讙 讘住讬讜谉 转砖状驻

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Shabbat 91

Today’s daf is dedicated by Raie Goodwach in memory of her mother, Rivkah bat Chaim v鈥橮eshka z鈥漧 and聽by Nava Flesh in memory of her father Oriel Pozeilev ben Miriam and Avraham z鈥漧.

How far do we take this issue of obligating one who fulfills one’s intent even if it is atypical? Would it help to exempt someone also? If I consider an item important, would others be obligated for carrying it? What if the intent changed between the moment of removing it from one domain and placing it in the other domain? Rava brings various questions regarding this issue. If one brought an item from one’s house into the threshold which was a karmelit and then to the public space, is one obligated? On what does it depend? If one brought a basket from a private space to a public space but some of the basket was still in the private domain, is one obligated? Is the basket viewed as one whole or not? On what does it depend? How do Chizkia and Rabbi Yochanan each understand the mishna?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讛 诪讞砖讘转讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻诇 讛注讜砖讛 注诇 讚注转 专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛

Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗祝 讘诪讜爪讬讗 讞讟讛 讗讞转 诇讝专讬注讛 驻砖讬讟讗 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 转谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讙专讜讙专转 讜诇注讜诇诐 注讚 讚讗讬讻讗 讻讝讬转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讞讬砖讘 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讻诇 讘讬转讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注讚 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讻讜诇讬讛 讛转诐 讘讟诇讛 讚注转讜 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel鈥檚 statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitz岣k the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

讜讻诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讻砖讬注讜专讜: 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讻砖专 诇讛爪谞讬注 讜讗讬谉 诪爪谞讬注讬谉 讻诪讜讛讜 讜讛讜讻砖专 诇讝讛 讜讛爪谞讬注讜 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘诪讞砖讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讝专讬注讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讝专讬注讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讞讬讬讘 驻砖讬讟讗 讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讜讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讘注讬谞谉 注拽讬专讛 讜讛谞讞讛 讘讞讚讗 诪讞砖讘讛 讜讛讗 诇讬讻讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Na岣an teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讞爪讬 讙专讜讙专转 诇讝专讬注讛 讜转驻讞讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讗讻讬诇讛 诪讛讜 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 讚讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讜讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讗驻拽讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讘讬讛 砖讬注讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜诇讗 讞砖讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗诪讞砖讘讛 讚讝专讬注讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜诇讗 讞砖讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗诪讞砖讘讛 讚讝专讬注讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜爪诪拽讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讝专讬注讛 诪讛讜 讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讻讬 讗讬砖转讬拽 讗诪讞砖讘讛 拽诪讬讬转讗 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘转专 讛砖转讗 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讘转专 讛砖转讗 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜爪诪拽讛 讜讞讝专讛 讜转驻讞讛 诪讛讜 讬砖 讚讬讞讜讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讗讜 讗讬谉 讚讬讞讜讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 转讬拽讜:

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝专拽 讻讝讬转 转专讜诪讛 诇讘讬转 讟诪讗 诪讛讜 诇诪讗讬 讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘注讬谞谉 讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讻讘讬爪讛 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘注讬谞谉 诇注讜诇诐 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讜讻讙讜谉 讚讗讬讻讗 驻讞讜转 诪讻讘讬爪讛 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜讛讗讬 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讘讬爪讛 诪讗讬 诪讚诪爪讟专祝 诇注谞讬谉 讟讜诪讗讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 谞诪讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻诇 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘注讬谞谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讗讘讗 砖讗讜诇 讗讜诪专 砖转讬 讛诇讞诐 讜诇讞诐 讛驻谞讬诐 砖讬注讜专谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讜讗诪讗讬 诇讬诪讗 诪讚诇注谞讬谉

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Na岣an said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of

讬讜爪讗 讘讻讝讬转 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 谞诪讬 讘讻讝讬转 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诪讚讗驻拽讬讛 讞讜抓 诇讞讜诪转 讛注讝专讛 讗讬驻住讬诇 诇讬讛 讘讬讜爪讗 讗砖讘转 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注讚 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讛讻讗 砖讘转 讜讟讜诪讗讛 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 拽讗转讬讬谉:

disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard, the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw teruma into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the teruma come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.

讞讝专 讜讛讻谞讬住讜 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讻砖讬注讜专讜: 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讝专拽讜 诇讗讜爪专 讜诪拽讜诪讜 谞讬讻专 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诪拽讜诪讜 谞讬讻专 讘诪讬诇转讬讛 拽诪讬讬转讗 拽讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪讚讝专拽讬讛 诇讗讜爪专 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讬讛:

We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bringing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that because its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object鈥檚 previous significance.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜爪讬讗 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜谞转谞谉 注诇 讛讗住拽讜驻讛 讘讬谉 砖讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 讘讬谉 砖讛讜爪讬讗谉 讗讞专 驻讟讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪诇讗讻转讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 拽讜驻讛 砖讛讬讗 诪诇讬讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜谞转谞讛 注诇 讗住拽讜驻讛 讛讞讬爪讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 诪讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛:

MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

讙诪壮 讛讗讬 讗住拽讜驻讛 诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讗 拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗诇讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 砖讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 讘讬谉 砖讛讜爪讬讗谉 讗讞专 驻讟讜专 讛讗 拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn鈥檛 he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn鈥檛 he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?

讗诇讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 讻专诪诇讬转 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讟注诪讗 讚谞讞 讘讻专诪诇讬转 讛讗 诇讗 谞讞 讘讻专诪诇讬转 诪讬讞讬讬讘 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘谉 注讝讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞谞讜转 诇驻诇讟讬讗 讚专讱 住讟讬讜 讞讬讬讘 讜讘谉 注讝讗讬 驻讜讟专:

Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

拽讜驻讛 砖讛讬讗 诪诇讬讗讛 讻讜壮: 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘拽讜驻讛 诪诇讬讗讛 拽讬砖讜讗讬谉 讜讚诇讜注讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 讞讬讬讘 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚

We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. 岣zkiya said: They only taught this halakha with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carrying out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though several objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讞讝拽讬讛 讚讬拽讗 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讬拽讗 讻讞讝拽讬讛 诇讗 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讟注诪讗 讚讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讛讗 讻诇 讛驻讬专讜转 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讜抓 讟注诪讗 讚专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讛讗 讻诇 驻讬专讜转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讙讬讚讗 拽讜驻讛 诪讙讜讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚

Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely correspond with the opinion of 岣zkiya, and it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of 岣zkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is outside. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Apparently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.

讜讗诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讞讝拽讬讛 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讞讝拽讬讛 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘拽讜驻讛 诪诇讬讗讛 拽讬砖讜讗讬谉 讜讚诇讜注讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讜讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讜抓 讜诇讗 专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘诇讘讚 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇 驻讬专讜转 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛

The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: 岣zkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yo岣nan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. 岣zkiya resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yo岣nan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛诪讜爪讬讗 拽讜驻转 讛专讜讻诇讬谉 讜谞转谞讛 注诇 讗住拽讜驻讛 讛讞讬爪讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 诪讬谞讬谉 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘爪专专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讞讝拽讬讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讗讜专谞住讬

The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: One who carries out the merchant鈥檚 basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is referring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of 岣zkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara answers: 岣zkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [urnasei]. The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讙讜谞讘 讻讬住 讘砖讘转 讞讬讬讘 砖讻讘专 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 砖讘转 讛讬讛 诪讙专专 讜讬讜爪讗 驻讟讜专 砖讛专讬 讗讬住讜专 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讬住讜专 砖讘转 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 拽讚讬诐 诇讬讛 讗讬住讜专 讙谞讬讘讛 诇讗讬住讜专 砖讘转

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two, in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner鈥檚 property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.

讗讬 讚讗驻拽讬讛 讚专讱 驻讬讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗驻拽讬讛 讚专讱 砖讜诇讬讜 讜讛讗讬讻讗 诪拽讜诐 讞诇诪讛

The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. However, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

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Shabbat 91: Carrying Is Never Just Carrying

Purpose and intent, when it comes to carrying tiny amounts. And how that differs across people, and across plans, which...

Shabbat 91

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Shabbat 91

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讛 诪讞砖讘转讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻诇 讛注讜砖讛 注诇 讚注转 专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛

Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗祝 讘诪讜爪讬讗 讞讟讛 讗讞转 诇讝专讬注讛 驻砖讬讟讗 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 转谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讙专讜讙专转 讜诇注讜诇诐 注讚 讚讗讬讻讗 讻讝讬转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讞讬砖讘 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讻诇 讘讬转讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注讚 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讻讜诇讬讛 讛转诐 讘讟诇讛 讚注转讜 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel鈥檚 statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitz岣k the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

讜讻诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讻砖讬注讜专讜: 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讻砖专 诇讛爪谞讬注 讜讗讬谉 诪爪谞讬注讬谉 讻诪讜讛讜 讜讛讜讻砖专 诇讝讛 讜讛爪谞讬注讜 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘诪讞砖讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讝专讬注讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讝专讬注讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讞讬讬讘 驻砖讬讟讗 讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讜讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讘注讬谞谉 注拽讬专讛 讜讛谞讞讛 讘讞讚讗 诪讞砖讘讛 讜讛讗 诇讬讻讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Na岣an teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讞爪讬 讙专讜讙专转 诇讝专讬注讛 讜转驻讞讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讗讻讬诇讛 诪讛讜 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 讚讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讜讝讬诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讻讗 砖讬注讜专讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讗驻拽讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讘讬讛 砖讬注讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜诇讗 讞砖讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗诪讞砖讘讛 讚讝专讬注讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜诇讗 讞砖讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗诪讞砖讘讛 讚讝专讬注讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜爪诪拽讛 讜谞诪诇讱 注诇讬讛 诇讝专讬注讛 诪讛讜 讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讻讬 讗讬砖转讬拽 讗诪讞砖讘讛 拽诪讬讬转讗 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘转专 讛砖转讗 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讘转专 讛砖转讗 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 讛讜爪讬讗 讻讙专讜讙专转 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讜爪诪拽讛 讜讞讝专讛 讜转驻讞讛 诪讛讜 讬砖 讚讬讞讜讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讗讜 讗讬谉 讚讬讞讜讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 转讬拽讜:

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝专拽 讻讝讬转 转专讜诪讛 诇讘讬转 讟诪讗 诪讛讜 诇诪讗讬 讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘注讬谞谉 讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讻讘讬爪讛 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘注讬谞谉 诇注讜诇诐 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讜讻讙讜谉 讚讗讬讻讗 驻讞讜转 诪讻讘讬爪讛 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜讛讗讬 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讘讬爪讛 诪讗讬 诪讚诪爪讟专祝 诇注谞讬谉 讟讜诪讗讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 谞诪讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻诇 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘注讬谞谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讗讘讗 砖讗讜诇 讗讜诪专 砖转讬 讛诇讞诐 讜诇讞诐 讛驻谞讬诐 砖讬注讜专谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讜讗诪讗讬 诇讬诪讗 诪讚诇注谞讬谉

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Na岣an said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of

讬讜爪讗 讘讻讝讬转 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘转 谞诪讬 讘讻讝讬转 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诪讚讗驻拽讬讛 讞讜抓 诇讞讜诪转 讛注讝专讛 讗讬驻住讬诇 诇讬讛 讘讬讜爪讗 讗砖讘转 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 注讚 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讛讻讗 砖讘转 讜讟讜诪讗讛 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 拽讗转讬讬谉:

disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard, the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw teruma into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the teruma come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.

讞讝专 讜讛讻谞讬住讜 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讻砖讬注讜专讜: 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讝专拽讜 诇讗讜爪专 讜诪拽讜诪讜 谞讬讻专 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诪拽讜诪讜 谞讬讻专 讘诪讬诇转讬讛 拽诪讬讬转讗 拽讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪讚讝专拽讬讛 诇讗讜爪专 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讬讛:

We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bringing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that because its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object鈥檚 previous significance.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜爪讬讗 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜谞转谞谉 注诇 讛讗住拽讜驻讛 讘讬谉 砖讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 讘讬谉 砖讛讜爪讬讗谉 讗讞专 驻讟讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪诇讗讻转讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 拽讜驻讛 砖讛讬讗 诪诇讬讗讛 驻讬专讜转 讜谞转谞讛 注诇 讗住拽讜驻讛 讛讞讬爪讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 诪讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛:

MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

讙诪壮 讛讗讬 讗住拽讜驻讛 诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讗 拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗诇讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 砖讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 讘讬谉 砖讛讜爪讬讗谉 讗讞专 驻讟讜专 讛讗 拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn鈥檛 he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn鈥檛 he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?

讗诇讗 讗住拽讜驻讛 讻专诪诇讬转 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讟注诪讗 讚谞讞 讘讻专诪诇讬转 讛讗 诇讗 谞讞 讘讻专诪诇讬转 诪讬讞讬讬讘 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘谉 注讝讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞谞讜转 诇驻诇讟讬讗 讚专讱 住讟讬讜 讞讬讬讘 讜讘谉 注讝讗讬 驻讜讟专:

Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

拽讜驻讛 砖讛讬讗 诪诇讬讗讛 讻讜壮: 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘拽讜驻讛 诪诇讬讗讛 拽讬砖讜讗讬谉 讜讚诇讜注讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 讞讬讬讘 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚

We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. 岣zkiya said: They only taught this halakha with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carrying out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though several objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讞讝拽讬讛 讚讬拽讗 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讬拽讗 讻讞讝拽讬讛 诇讗 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讟注诪讗 讚讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讛讗 讻诇 讛驻讬专讜转 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讜抓 讟注诪讗 讚专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讛讗 讻诇 驻讬专讜转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讙讬讚讗 拽讜驻讛 诪讙讜讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚

Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely correspond with the opinion of 岣zkiya, and it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of 岣zkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is outside. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Apparently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.

讜讗诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讞讝拽讬讛 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讞讝拽讬讛 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘拽讜驻讛 诪诇讬讗讛 拽讬砖讜讗讬谉 讜讚诇讜注讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇讬讗讛 讞专讚诇 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 讜讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪转专抓 诇讟注诪讬讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讜抓 讜诇讗 专讜讘 驻讬专讜转 讘诇讘讚 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇 驻讬专讜转 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛

The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: 岣zkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yo岣nan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. 岣zkiya resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yo岣nan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛诪讜爪讬讗 拽讜驻转 讛专讜讻诇讬谉 讜谞转谞讛 注诇 讗住拽讜驻讛 讛讞讬爪讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专讜讘 诪讬谞讬谉 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讗转 讻诇 讛拽讜驻讛 拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘爪专专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讞讝拽讬讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讗讜专谞住讬

The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: One who carries out the merchant鈥檚 basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is referring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of 岣zkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara answers: 岣zkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [urnasei]. The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讛讙讜谞讘 讻讬住 讘砖讘转 讞讬讬讘 砖讻讘专 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 诇讬讚讬 讗讬住讜专 砖讘转 讛讬讛 诪讙专专 讜讬讜爪讗 驻讟讜专 砖讛专讬 讗讬住讜专 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讬住讜专 砖讘转 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗讙讚 讻诇讬 砖诪讬讛 讗讙讚 拽讚讬诐 诇讬讛 讗讬住讜专 讙谞讬讘讛 诇讗讬住讜专 砖讘转

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two, in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner鈥檚 property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.

讗讬 讚讗驻拽讬讛 讚专讱 驻讬讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗驻拽讬讛 讚专讱 砖讜诇讬讜 讜讛讗讬讻讗 诪拽讜诐 讞诇诪讛

The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. However, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,

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