Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

June 5, 2020 | י״ג בסיון תש״פ

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Shabbat 91

Today’s daf is dedicated by Raie Goodwach in memory of her mother, Rivkah bat Chaim v’Peshka z”l and by Nava Flesh in memory of her father Oriel Pozeilev ben Miriam and Avraham z”l.

How far do we take this issue of obligating one who fulfills one’s intent even if it is atypical? Would it help to exempt someone also? If I consider an item important, would others be obligated for carrying it? What if the intent changed between the moment of removing it from one domain and placing it in the other domain? Rava brings various questions regarding this issue. If one brought an item from one’s house into the threshold which was a karmelit and then to the public space, is one obligated? On what does it depend? If one brought a basket from a private space to a public space but some of the basket was still in the private domain, is one obligated? Is the basket viewed as one whole or not? On what does it depend? How do Chizkia and Rabbi Yochanan each understand the mishna?

מהו דתימא בטולי בטלה מחשבתו קא משמע לן כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה

Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מחייב היה רבי מאיר אף במוציא חטה אחת לזריעה פשיטא כל שהוא תנן מהו דתימא כל שהוא לאפוקי מגרוגרת ולעולם עד דאיכא כזית קא משמע לן מתקיף לה רב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה אלא מעתה חישב להוציא כל ביתו הכי נמי דלא מיחייב עד דמפיק לכוליה התם בטלה דעתו אצל כל אדם:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitzḥak the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

וכל אדם אין חייבין עליו אלא כשיעורו: מתניתין דלא כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר דתניא כלל אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר כל שאינו כשר להצניע ואין מצניעין כמוהו והוכשר לזה והצניעו ובא אחר והוציא נתחייב זה במחשבתו של זה

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה ונמלך עליה לזריעה אי נמי לזריעה ונמלך עליה לאכילה חייב פשיטא זיל הכא איכא שיעורא וזיל הכא איכא שיעורא מהו דתימא בעינן עקירה והנחה בחדא מחשבה והא ליכא קא משמע לן

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naḥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naḥman teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

בעי רבא הוציא חצי גרוגרת לזריעה ותפחה ונמלך עליה לאכילה מהו אם תמצי לומר התם הוא דמיחייב דזיל הכא איכא שיעורא וזיל הכא איכא שיעורא הכא כיון דבעידנא דאפקה לא הוה ביה שיעור אכילה לא מיחייב או דילמא כיון דאילו אישתיק ולא חשיב עליה מיחייב אמחשבה דזריעה השתא נמי מיחייב

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

ואם תמצי לומר כיון דאילו אישתיק ולא חשיב עליה מיחייב אמחשבה דזריעה השתא נמי מיחייב הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה וצמקה ונמלך עליה לזריעה מהו הכא ודאי כי אישתיק אמחשבה קמייתא לא מיחייב או דילמא בתר השתא אזלינן ומיחייב ואם תמצי לומר בתר השתא אזלינן ומיחייב הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה וצמקה וחזרה ותפחה מהו יש דיחוי לענין שבת או אין דיחוי לענין שבת תיקו:

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן זרק כזית תרומה לבית טמא מהו למאי אי לענין שבת כגרוגרת בעינן אי לענין טומאה כביצה אוכלין בעינן לעולם לענין שבת וכגון דאיכא פחות מכביצה אוכלין והאי משלימו לביצה מאי מדמצטרף לענין טומאה מיחייב נמי לענין שבת או דילמא כל לענין שבת כגרוגרת בעינן אמר ליה תניתוה אבא שאול אומר שתי הלחם ולחם הפנים שיעורן כגרוגרת ואמאי לימא מדלענין

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Naḥman said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of

יוצא בכזית לענין שבת נמי בכזית הכי השתא התם מדאפקיה חוץ לחומת העזרה איפסיל ליה ביוצא אשבת לא מיחייב עד דמפיק ליה לרשות הרבים הכא שבת וטומאה בהדי הדדי קאתיין:

disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard, the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw teruma into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the teruma come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.

חזר והכניסו אינו חייב אלא כשיעורו: פשיטא אמר אביי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שזרקו לאוצר ומקומו ניכר מהו דתימא כיון דמקומו ניכר במילתיה קמייתא קאי קא משמע לן מדזרקיה לאוצר בטולי בטליה:

We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bringing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that because its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object’s previous significance.

מתני׳ המוציא אוכלין ונתנן על האסקופה בין שחזר והוציאן בין שהוציאן אחר פטור מפני שלא עשה מלאכתו בבת אחת קופה שהיא מליאה פירות ונתנה על אסקופה החיצונה אף על פי שרוב פירות מבחוץ פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה:

MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

גמ׳ האי אסקופה מאי אילימא אסקופה לרשות הרבים פטור הא קא מפיק מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים אלא אסקופה רשות היחיד בין שחזר והוציאן בין שהוציאן אחר פטור הא קא מפיק מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים

GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?

אלא אסקופה כרמלית והא קא משמע לן טעמא דנח בכרמלית הא לא נח בכרמלית מיחייב מתניתין דלא כבן עזאי דתניא המוציא מחנות לפלטיא דרך סטיו חייב ובן עזאי פוטר:

Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

קופה שהיא מליאה כו׳: אמר חזקיה לא שנו אלא בקופה מליאה קישואין ודלועין אבל מליאה חרדל חייב אלמא קסבר אגד כלי לא שמיה אגד ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו מליאה חרדל פטור אלמא קסבר אגד כלי שמיה אגד

We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. Ḥizkiya said: They only taught this halakha with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carrying out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though several objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.

אמר רבי זירא מתניתין דלא כחזקיה דיקא ודלא כרבי יוחנן דיקא כחזקיה לא דיקא דקתני עד שיוציא את כל הקופה טעמא דכל הקופה הא כל הפירות פטור אלמא קסבר אגד כלי שמיה אגד כרבי יוחנן לא דיקא דקתני אף על פי שרוב פירות בחוץ טעמא דרוב פירות הא כל פירות אף על גב דאגידא קופה מגואי חייב אלמא קסבר אגד כלי לא שמיה אגד

Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, and it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is outside. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Apparently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.

ואלא קשיא חזקיה מתרץ לטעמיה ורבי יוחנן מתרץ לטעמיה חזקיה מתרץ לטעמיה עד שיוציא את כל הקופה במה דברים אמורים בקופה מליאה קישואין ודלועין אבל מליאה חרדל נעשה כמי שהוציא את כל הקופה וחייב רבי יוחנן מתרץ לטעמיה אף על פי שרוב פירות בחוץ ולא רוב פירות בלבד אלא אפילו כל פירות פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה

The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.

מיתיבי המוציא קופת הרוכלין ונתנה על אסקופה החיצונה אף על פי שרוב מינין בחוץ פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה קא סלקא דעתך בצררי קשיא לחזקיה אמר לך חזקיה הכא במאי עסקינן באורנסי

The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: One who carries out the merchant’s basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is referring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara answers: Ḥizkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [urnasei]. The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.

מתיב רב ביבי בר אביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שכבר נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת היה מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור גניבה ואיסור שבת באין כאחד ואי סלקא דעתך אגד כלי שמיה אגד קדים ליה איסור גניבה לאיסור שבת

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two, in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.

אי דאפקיה דרך פיו הכי נמי הכא במאי עסקינן דאפקיה דרך שוליו והאיכא מקום חלמה

The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. However, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

One week at a time

Daf Yomi One Week at a Time – Shabbat 89-95

https://youtu.be/uRqRSVp0l6s Join Rabbanit Dr. Tamara Spitz each week as she reviews the key topics of the previous week’s seven pages....
talking talmud_square

Shabbat 91: Carrying Is Never Just Carrying

Purpose and intent, when it comes to carrying tiny amounts. And how that differs across people, and across plans, which...

Shabbat 91

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shabbat 91

מהו דתימא בטולי בטלה מחשבתו קא משמע לן כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה

Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מחייב היה רבי מאיר אף במוציא חטה אחת לזריעה פשיטא כל שהוא תנן מהו דתימא כל שהוא לאפוקי מגרוגרת ולעולם עד דאיכא כזית קא משמע לן מתקיף לה רב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה אלא מעתה חישב להוציא כל ביתו הכי נמי דלא מיחייב עד דמפיק לכוליה התם בטלה דעתו אצל כל אדם:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitzḥak the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

וכל אדם אין חייבין עליו אלא כשיעורו: מתניתין דלא כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר דתניא כלל אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר כל שאינו כשר להצניע ואין מצניעין כמוהו והוכשר לזה והצניעו ובא אחר והוציא נתחייב זה במחשבתו של זה

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה ונמלך עליה לזריעה אי נמי לזריעה ונמלך עליה לאכילה חייב פשיטא זיל הכא איכא שיעורא וזיל הכא איכא שיעורא מהו דתימא בעינן עקירה והנחה בחדא מחשבה והא ליכא קא משמע לן

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naḥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naḥman teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

בעי רבא הוציא חצי גרוגרת לזריעה ותפחה ונמלך עליה לאכילה מהו אם תמצי לומר התם הוא דמיחייב דזיל הכא איכא שיעורא וזיל הכא איכא שיעורא הכא כיון דבעידנא דאפקה לא הוה ביה שיעור אכילה לא מיחייב או דילמא כיון דאילו אישתיק ולא חשיב עליה מיחייב אמחשבה דזריעה השתא נמי מיחייב

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

ואם תמצי לומר כיון דאילו אישתיק ולא חשיב עליה מיחייב אמחשבה דזריעה השתא נמי מיחייב הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה וצמקה ונמלך עליה לזריעה מהו הכא ודאי כי אישתיק אמחשבה קמייתא לא מיחייב או דילמא בתר השתא אזלינן ומיחייב ואם תמצי לומר בתר השתא אזלינן ומיחייב הוציא כגרוגרת לאכילה וצמקה וחזרה ותפחה מהו יש דיחוי לענין שבת או אין דיחוי לענין שבת תיקו:

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן זרק כזית תרומה לבית טמא מהו למאי אי לענין שבת כגרוגרת בעינן אי לענין טומאה כביצה אוכלין בעינן לעולם לענין שבת וכגון דאיכא פחות מכביצה אוכלין והאי משלימו לביצה מאי מדמצטרף לענין טומאה מיחייב נמי לענין שבת או דילמא כל לענין שבת כגרוגרת בעינן אמר ליה תניתוה אבא שאול אומר שתי הלחם ולחם הפנים שיעורן כגרוגרת ואמאי לימא מדלענין

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Naḥman said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of

יוצא בכזית לענין שבת נמי בכזית הכי השתא התם מדאפקיה חוץ לחומת העזרה איפסיל ליה ביוצא אשבת לא מיחייב עד דמפיק ליה לרשות הרבים הכא שבת וטומאה בהדי הדדי קאתיין:

disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard, the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw teruma into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the teruma come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.

חזר והכניסו אינו חייב אלא כשיעורו: פשיטא אמר אביי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שזרקו לאוצר ומקומו ניכר מהו דתימא כיון דמקומו ניכר במילתיה קמייתא קאי קא משמע לן מדזרקיה לאוצר בטולי בטליה:

We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bringing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that because its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object’s previous significance.

מתני׳ המוציא אוכלין ונתנן על האסקופה בין שחזר והוציאן בין שהוציאן אחר פטור מפני שלא עשה מלאכתו בבת אחת קופה שהיא מליאה פירות ונתנה על אסקופה החיצונה אף על פי שרוב פירות מבחוץ פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה:

MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

גמ׳ האי אסקופה מאי אילימא אסקופה לרשות הרבים פטור הא קא מפיק מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים אלא אסקופה רשות היחיד בין שחזר והוציאן בין שהוציאן אחר פטור הא קא מפיק מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים

GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?

אלא אסקופה כרמלית והא קא משמע לן טעמא דנח בכרמלית הא לא נח בכרמלית מיחייב מתניתין דלא כבן עזאי דתניא המוציא מחנות לפלטיא דרך סטיו חייב ובן עזאי פוטר:

Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

קופה שהיא מליאה כו׳: אמר חזקיה לא שנו אלא בקופה מליאה קישואין ודלועין אבל מליאה חרדל חייב אלמא קסבר אגד כלי לא שמיה אגד ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו מליאה חרדל פטור אלמא קסבר אגד כלי שמיה אגד

We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. Ḥizkiya said: They only taught this halakha with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carrying out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though several objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.

אמר רבי זירא מתניתין דלא כחזקיה דיקא ודלא כרבי יוחנן דיקא כחזקיה לא דיקא דקתני עד שיוציא את כל הקופה טעמא דכל הקופה הא כל הפירות פטור אלמא קסבר אגד כלי שמיה אגד כרבי יוחנן לא דיקא דקתני אף על פי שרוב פירות בחוץ טעמא דרוב פירות הא כל פירות אף על גב דאגידא קופה מגואי חייב אלמא קסבר אגד כלי לא שמיה אגד

Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, and it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is outside. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Apparently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.

ואלא קשיא חזקיה מתרץ לטעמיה ורבי יוחנן מתרץ לטעמיה חזקיה מתרץ לטעמיה עד שיוציא את כל הקופה במה דברים אמורים בקופה מליאה קישואין ודלועין אבל מליאה חרדל נעשה כמי שהוציא את כל הקופה וחייב רבי יוחנן מתרץ לטעמיה אף על פי שרוב פירות בחוץ ולא רוב פירות בלבד אלא אפילו כל פירות פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה

The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.

מיתיבי המוציא קופת הרוכלין ונתנה על אסקופה החיצונה אף על פי שרוב מינין בחוץ פטור עד שיוציא את כל הקופה קא סלקא דעתך בצררי קשיא לחזקיה אמר לך חזקיה הכא במאי עסקינן באורנסי

The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: One who carries out the merchant’s basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is referring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara answers: Ḥizkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [urnasei]. The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.

מתיב רב ביבי בר אביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שכבר נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת היה מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור גניבה ואיסור שבת באין כאחד ואי סלקא דעתך אגד כלי שמיה אגד קדים ליה איסור גניבה לאיסור שבת

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two, in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.

אי דאפקיה דרך פיו הכי נמי הכא במאי עסקינן דאפקיה דרך שוליו והאיכא מקום חלמה

The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. However, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,

More Ways to Learn with Hadran

Join Hadran Communities! Connect with women learning in your area.

Scroll To Top