Today's Daf Yomi
August 6, 2021 | כ״ח באב תשפ״א
Masechet Sukkah is sponsored by Jonathan Katz in memory of his mother Margaret Katz (Ruth bat Avraham).
A month of shiurim are sponsored by Terri Krivosha for a refuah shleima for her beloved husband Rabbi Hayim Herring.
And for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah.
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This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in honor of Shoshana Keats Jaskoll and Chochmat Nashim.
Sukkah 30
Today’s daf is sponsored by Jennifer and Daniel Geretz in memory of Rachel “Chela” Geretz, ob”m, on the occasion of her second yahrtzeit.
The law that one cannot perform a mitzva through a transgression is learned from verses relating to sacrifices. From there, Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai learned that a stolen lulav is disqualified all the days of Sukkot. But Rabbi Yitzchak disagrees and holds that it is only disqualified for one day and because it is not considered one’s own and the verse says “One should take for oneself on the first day” – from one’s own. Due to the disqualification of a stolen lulav, Rav Huna suggested to those middlemen who buy from idol worshippers, who were known to steal land from others, to have the idol worshippers cut the myrtle branches to put on the lulav to ensure that the middlemen wouldn’t be using stolen items. Since one who land is stolen from never gives up hope on getting back the land, stolen land is still considered owned by the original owner (no yeush) Therefore if they would cut it themselves, the owner would give up hopes of getting it back after it was cut and the middlemen would be considered to have stolen them. If it is cut by the idol worshipped, the theft happens in their hands and then when ownership rights are transferred to the middlemen, that is enough to have it no longer considered stolen property. The gemara raises a few questions on this – why would binding it not be considered a change through action and changing the name from myrtle to hoshana? If those would be considered significant changes, then also it would help to remove it from being considered stolen property.
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משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה שנאמר והבאתם גזול ואת הפסח ואת החולה גזול דומיא דפסח מה פסח לית ליה תקנתא אף גזול לית ליה תקנתא לא שנא לפני יאוש ולא שנא לאחר יאוש
It is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes to be fulfilled by means of a transgression, which renders the mitzva unfulfilled, as it is stated: “And you have brought that which was stolen and the lame, and the sick; that is how you bring the offering; should I accept this of your hand? says the Lord” (Malachi 1:13). Based on the juxtaposition in the verse, it is derived that the legal status of a stolen animal is equivalent to that of a lame animal. Just as a lame animal, because it is blemished, has no remedy and is unfit for use, so too, a stolen animal has no remedy. There is no difference before the owners reach a state of despair of recovering the stolen animal, and there is no difference after despair. In both cases there is no remedy.
בשלמא לפני יאוש אדם כי יקריב מכם אמר רחמנא ולאו דידיה הוא אלא לאחר יאוש הא קנייה ביאוש אלא לאו משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה
The Gemara elaborates: Granted, before the despair of the owner, the robber may not sacrifice the animal because the animal does not belong to him. The Merciful One says: “When a person sacrifices from yours an offering” (Leviticus 1:2). The term “from yours” indicates that the animal must belong to the one sacrificing it, and this stolen animal is not his. However, after the despair of the owner, didn’t the robber acquire the animal with the despair? Once the owner despairs, the animal belongs to the robber, despite the fact that he incurs a debt that he must repay the owner. Since the animal is legally his, why is it prohibited for the robber to sacrifice it as an offering? Rather, is it not because the offering is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression? Since the animal came into his possession by means of a transgression, it is unfit for use in fulfilling a mitzva.
ואמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחי מאי דכתיב כי אני ה׳ אוהב משפט שונא גזל בעולה משל למלך בשר ודם שהיה עובר על בית המכס אמר לעבדיו תנו מכס למוכסים אמרו לו והלא כל המכס כולו שלך הוא אמר להם ממני ילמדו כל עוברי דרכים ולא יבריחו עצמן מן המכס אף הקדוש ברוך הוא אמר אני ה׳ שונא גזל בעולה ממני ילמדו בני ויבריחו עצמן מן הגזל
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For I the Lord love justice, I hate robbery in a burnt-offering” (Isaiah 61:8)? The Gemara cites a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who was passing by a customs house. He said to his servants: Pay the levy to the taxmen. They said to him: Doesn’t all the tax in its entirety belong to you? If the taxes will ultimately reach the royal treasury, what is the point of paying the levy? He said to them: From my conduct, all travelers will learn and will not evade payment of the tax. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “I the Lord… hate robbery in a burnt-offering.” Although the whole world is His and the acquisitions of man have no impact upon Him, God says: From My conduct, My children will learn and distance themselves from robbery, even from robbery unrelated to the needs of offerings.
אתמר נמי אמר רבי אמי יבש פסול מפני שאין הדר גזול פסול משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה
It was also stated: Rabbi Ami said: A dry lulav is unfit because it does not meet the criterion of beauty, and a stolen lulav is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression.
ופליגא דרבי יצחק דאמר רבי יצחק בר נחמני אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא ביום טוב ראשון אבל ביום טוב שני מתוך שיוצא בשאול יוצא נמי בגזול
The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Ami disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzhak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that the halakha that a stolen lulav is unfit applies only with regard to the first day of the festival of Sukkot. However, beginning on the second day of the Festival, there is no longer a Torah requirement to use a lulav from one’s own property. Since one fulfills his obligation with a borrowed lulav, one fulfills his obligation with a stolen one as well.
מתיב רב נחמן בר יצחק לולב הגזול והיבש פסול הא שאול כשר אימת אילימא ביום טוב ראשון הא כתיב לכם משלכם והאי לאו דידיה הוא אלא לאו ביום טוב שני וקתני גזול פסול
Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raises an objection from the mishna: A lulav that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. By inference, one concludes that a borrowed lulav is fit for use. The Gemara asks: When does this halakha apply? If you say that it applies only on the first day of the Festival, isn’t it written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day,” indicating that the four species must be taken from your own property, and this borrowed lulav is not his? Clearly, the mishna is not referring to the first day. Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to the second day of the Festival, and the mishna teaches that a stolen lulav is unfit on this day too, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion?
(רבא אמר) לעולם ביום טוב ראשון ולא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא שאול דלאו דידיה הוא אבל גזול אימא סתם גזילה יאוש בעלים הוא וכדידיה דמי קא משמע לן
Rava said: Actually, the mishna can be explained as referring to the first day of the Festival, and the tanna is stating the halakha employing the didactic style: It was not necessary. It was not necessary to state that one does not fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav, as it is not his. However, with regard to a stolen lulav, say: Barring extraordinary circumstances, standard robbery is a case that leads to despair of the owners, and despite the fact that a stolen lulav was acquired by means of a transgression, its legal status is like the robber’s own property. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not so. One does not fulfill his obligation with a stolen lulav. The mishna is not a refutation of Shmuel’s opinion.
אמר להו רב הונא להנהו אוונכרי כי זבניתו אסא מגוים לא תגזזו אתון אלא לגזזוה אינהו ויהבו לכו מאי טעמא סתם גוים גזלני ארעתא נינהו
§ Apropos the unfitness of four species acquired through robbery, the Gemara relates: Rav Huna said to the merchants [avankarei] selling the four species: When you purchase myrtle branches from gentiles, don’t you cut them off the tree? Rather, let the gentiles cut them and give them to you. What is the reason for this advice? It is because typical gentiles are land robbers,
וקרקע אינה נגזלת הלכך לגזזוה אינהו כי היכי דליהוו יאוש בעלים בידייהו דידהו ושינוי הרשות בידייכו
and land is not stolen. When one seizes land, the land remains the property of its original owner, even if that owner has despaired. In this case, there is concern that these myrtle branches were stolen from Jews. Therefore, let the gentiles cut the myrtle branches, so that the despair of the owners will be when the myrtle branches are still in the hands of the gentiles and the change of possession will be accomplished through their purchase and transfer into your hands. The combination of owner’s despair and change of possession will render the myrtle branches the property of the merchants, and it will not be a mitzva fulfilled by means of a transgression.
סוף סוף כי גזזו אוונכרי ליהוי יאוש בעלים בידייהו ושינוי הרשות בידן לא צריכא בהושענא דאוונכרי גופייהו
The Gemara asks: Ultimately, even when the merchants cut the myrtle branches, let it be a case of despair in their hands, and the change of possession is accomplished through the purchase and transfer of the myrtle branches into the hands of the buyers. Why did Rav Huna advise them to have the gentiles cut the myrtle branches? The same result is achieved through their sale. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rav Huna to advise the merchants to allow the gentiles to cut the myrtle branches only with regard to the myrtle branches of the merchants themselves, which will not undergo another change of possession. The only way to ensure that the merchants are fulfilling the mitzva with myrtle branches that belong to them is to have the gentiles cut them and have the change of possession accomplished through the purchase from the gentiles.
וליקניוה בשינוי מעשה קא סבר לולב אין צריך אגד
The Gemara asks: And let them acquire the myrtle branches with a physical change accomplished by the action of binding them with the lulav and the willow branch. Just as despair followed by a change in possession effects acquisition, despair followed by a physical change effects acquisition for the one who implements that change. In that case, too, the myrtle branches no longer belong to the original owner. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna holds: A lulav does not require binding. There is no mitzva to bind the four species together. One need only hold them unbound in his hand; therefore, the myrtle branches undergo no action that effects physical change.
ואם תמצי לומר לולב צריך אגד שינוי החוזר לברייתו הוא ושינוי החוזר לברייתו לא שמיה שינוי
And even if you want to say that a lulav requires binding, and therefore the myrtle branches undergo a physical change, it is a change after which the object reverts to its original state. Binding the species effects no change in the myrtle branches themselves. Once the binding is removed, the myrtle branches are restored to their original state. And the principle is: A change after which the object reverts to its original state is not considered a change. It is of no significance with regard to effecting acquisition.
וליקניוה בשינוי השם דמעיקרא הוה ליה אסא והשתא
The Gemara asks: And let the merchants acquire a myrtle branch with a change of name that it underwent, as initially it was called a myrtle branch, and now that it is designated for use in fulfilling the mitzva,
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This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in honor of Shoshana Keats Jaskoll and Chochmat Nashim.
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Sukkah 30
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה שנאמר והבאתם גזול ואת הפסח ואת החולה גזול דומיא דפסח מה פסח לית ליה תקנתא אף גזול לית ליה תקנתא לא שנא לפני יאוש ולא שנא לאחר יאוש
It is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes to be fulfilled by means of a transgression, which renders the mitzva unfulfilled, as it is stated: “And you have brought that which was stolen and the lame, and the sick; that is how you bring the offering; should I accept this of your hand? says the Lord” (Malachi 1:13). Based on the juxtaposition in the verse, it is derived that the legal status of a stolen animal is equivalent to that of a lame animal. Just as a lame animal, because it is blemished, has no remedy and is unfit for use, so too, a stolen animal has no remedy. There is no difference before the owners reach a state of despair of recovering the stolen animal, and there is no difference after despair. In both cases there is no remedy.
בשלמא לפני יאוש אדם כי יקריב מכם אמר רחמנא ולאו דידיה הוא אלא לאחר יאוש הא קנייה ביאוש אלא לאו משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה
The Gemara elaborates: Granted, before the despair of the owner, the robber may not sacrifice the animal because the animal does not belong to him. The Merciful One says: “When a person sacrifices from yours an offering” (Leviticus 1:2). The term “from yours” indicates that the animal must belong to the one sacrificing it, and this stolen animal is not his. However, after the despair of the owner, didn’t the robber acquire the animal with the despair? Once the owner despairs, the animal belongs to the robber, despite the fact that he incurs a debt that he must repay the owner. Since the animal is legally his, why is it prohibited for the robber to sacrifice it as an offering? Rather, is it not because the offering is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression? Since the animal came into his possession by means of a transgression, it is unfit for use in fulfilling a mitzva.
ואמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחי מאי דכתיב כי אני ה׳ אוהב משפט שונא גזל בעולה משל למלך בשר ודם שהיה עובר על בית המכס אמר לעבדיו תנו מכס למוכסים אמרו לו והלא כל המכס כולו שלך הוא אמר להם ממני ילמדו כל עוברי דרכים ולא יבריחו עצמן מן המכס אף הקדוש ברוך הוא אמר אני ה׳ שונא גזל בעולה ממני ילמדו בני ויבריחו עצמן מן הגזל
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For I the Lord love justice, I hate robbery in a burnt-offering” (Isaiah 61:8)? The Gemara cites a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who was passing by a customs house. He said to his servants: Pay the levy to the taxmen. They said to him: Doesn’t all the tax in its entirety belong to you? If the taxes will ultimately reach the royal treasury, what is the point of paying the levy? He said to them: From my conduct, all travelers will learn and will not evade payment of the tax. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “I the Lord… hate robbery in a burnt-offering.” Although the whole world is His and the acquisitions of man have no impact upon Him, God says: From My conduct, My children will learn and distance themselves from robbery, even from robbery unrelated to the needs of offerings.
אתמר נמי אמר רבי אמי יבש פסול מפני שאין הדר גזול פסול משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירה
It was also stated: Rabbi Ami said: A dry lulav is unfit because it does not meet the criterion of beauty, and a stolen lulav is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression.
ופליגא דרבי יצחק דאמר רבי יצחק בר נחמני אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא ביום טוב ראשון אבל ביום טוב שני מתוך שיוצא בשאול יוצא נמי בגזול
The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Ami disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzhak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that the halakha that a stolen lulav is unfit applies only with regard to the first day of the festival of Sukkot. However, beginning on the second day of the Festival, there is no longer a Torah requirement to use a lulav from one’s own property. Since one fulfills his obligation with a borrowed lulav, one fulfills his obligation with a stolen one as well.
מתיב רב נחמן בר יצחק לולב הגזול והיבש פסול הא שאול כשר אימת אילימא ביום טוב ראשון הא כתיב לכם משלכם והאי לאו דידיה הוא אלא לאו ביום טוב שני וקתני גזול פסול
Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raises an objection from the mishna: A lulav that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. By inference, one concludes that a borrowed lulav is fit for use. The Gemara asks: When does this halakha apply? If you say that it applies only on the first day of the Festival, isn’t it written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day,” indicating that the four species must be taken from your own property, and this borrowed lulav is not his? Clearly, the mishna is not referring to the first day. Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to the second day of the Festival, and the mishna teaches that a stolen lulav is unfit on this day too, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion?
(רבא אמר) לעולם ביום טוב ראשון ולא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא שאול דלאו דידיה הוא אבל גזול אימא סתם גזילה יאוש בעלים הוא וכדידיה דמי קא משמע לן
Rava said: Actually, the mishna can be explained as referring to the first day of the Festival, and the tanna is stating the halakha employing the didactic style: It was not necessary. It was not necessary to state that one does not fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav, as it is not his. However, with regard to a stolen lulav, say: Barring extraordinary circumstances, standard robbery is a case that leads to despair of the owners, and despite the fact that a stolen lulav was acquired by means of a transgression, its legal status is like the robber’s own property. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not so. One does not fulfill his obligation with a stolen lulav. The mishna is not a refutation of Shmuel’s opinion.
אמר להו רב הונא להנהו אוונכרי כי זבניתו אסא מגוים לא תגזזו אתון אלא לגזזוה אינהו ויהבו לכו מאי טעמא סתם גוים גזלני ארעתא נינהו
§ Apropos the unfitness of four species acquired through robbery, the Gemara relates: Rav Huna said to the merchants [avankarei] selling the four species: When you purchase myrtle branches from gentiles, don’t you cut them off the tree? Rather, let the gentiles cut them and give them to you. What is the reason for this advice? It is because typical gentiles are land robbers,
וקרקע אינה נגזלת הלכך לגזזוה אינהו כי היכי דליהוו יאוש בעלים בידייהו דידהו ושינוי הרשות בידייכו
and land is not stolen. When one seizes land, the land remains the property of its original owner, even if that owner has despaired. In this case, there is concern that these myrtle branches were stolen from Jews. Therefore, let the gentiles cut the myrtle branches, so that the despair of the owners will be when the myrtle branches are still in the hands of the gentiles and the change of possession will be accomplished through their purchase and transfer into your hands. The combination of owner’s despair and change of possession will render the myrtle branches the property of the merchants, and it will not be a mitzva fulfilled by means of a transgression.
סוף סוף כי גזזו אוונכרי ליהוי יאוש בעלים בידייהו ושינוי הרשות בידן לא צריכא בהושענא דאוונכרי גופייהו
The Gemara asks: Ultimately, even when the merchants cut the myrtle branches, let it be a case of despair in their hands, and the change of possession is accomplished through the purchase and transfer of the myrtle branches into the hands of the buyers. Why did Rav Huna advise them to have the gentiles cut the myrtle branches? The same result is achieved through their sale. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rav Huna to advise the merchants to allow the gentiles to cut the myrtle branches only with regard to the myrtle branches of the merchants themselves, which will not undergo another change of possession. The only way to ensure that the merchants are fulfilling the mitzva with myrtle branches that belong to them is to have the gentiles cut them and have the change of possession accomplished through the purchase from the gentiles.
וליקניוה בשינוי מעשה קא סבר לולב אין צריך אגד
The Gemara asks: And let them acquire the myrtle branches with a physical change accomplished by the action of binding them with the lulav and the willow branch. Just as despair followed by a change in possession effects acquisition, despair followed by a physical change effects acquisition for the one who implements that change. In that case, too, the myrtle branches no longer belong to the original owner. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna holds: A lulav does not require binding. There is no mitzva to bind the four species together. One need only hold them unbound in his hand; therefore, the myrtle branches undergo no action that effects physical change.
ואם תמצי לומר לולב צריך אגד שינוי החוזר לברייתו הוא ושינוי החוזר לברייתו לא שמיה שינוי
And even if you want to say that a lulav requires binding, and therefore the myrtle branches undergo a physical change, it is a change after which the object reverts to its original state. Binding the species effects no change in the myrtle branches themselves. Once the binding is removed, the myrtle branches are restored to their original state. And the principle is: A change after which the object reverts to its original state is not considered a change. It is of no significance with regard to effecting acquisition.
וליקניוה בשינוי השם דמעיקרא הוה ליה אסא והשתא
The Gemara asks: And let the merchants acquire a myrtle branch with a change of name that it underwent, as initially it was called a myrtle branch, and now that it is designated for use in fulfilling the mitzva,
