Sukkah 41

בזכרים אבל בנקבות דברי הכל על שחוטין מתחללין על חיין אין מתחללין גזרה שמא יגדל מהן עדרים

is specifically with regard to male animals, which do not bear offspring. However, with regard to female animals, everyone agrees that upon slaughtered animals, produce is deconsecrated, but upon animals that are alive, produce is not deconsecrated. The reason is that a decree was issued lest one raise flocks from the females, as typically they bear offspring. The Sages extended the decree to include males as well. From the fact that the baraita uses the term deconsecrated, and not the term purchased, apparently the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect by means of redemption as well.

אמר רב אשי מחלוקת בפרי ראשון אבל בפרי שני דברי הכל בין דרך מקח בין דרך חילול והא דקתני לקח לקח איידי דתנא רישא לקח תנא נמי סיפא לקח

Rav Ashi said: This dispute whether the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect by means of redemption or only by means of purchase is with regard to the original Sabbatical-Year produce itself. However, with regard to secondary produce purchased in exchange for Sabbatical-Year produce, everyone agrees that its sanctity takes effect both by means of purchase and by means of redemption. And the fact that the baraita cited in support of the opinion of Rabbi Elazar teaches: Purchased, purchased, employing that term even with regard to secondary produce, and not the terms deconsecrated or redeemed, does not prove that sanctity takes effect only by means of purchase. Rather, since the tanna of the baraita taught the first clause of the halakha employing the term purchased, he taught the latter clause employing the term purchased, even though sanctity takes effect even by means of redemption.

איתיביה רבינא לרב אשי מי שיש לו סלע של שביעית וביקש ליקח בו חלוק כיצד יעשה ילך אצל חנווני הרגיל אצלו ואומר לו תן לי בסלע פירות ונותן לו וחוזר ואומר לו הרי פירות הללו נתונים לך במתנה והוא אומר לו הא לך סלע זו במתנה והלה לוקח בהן מה שירצה והא הכא דפרי שני הוא וקתני דרך מקח אין דרך חילול לא

Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi: With regard to one who has a sela coin that has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and seeks to purchase a garment with it, how should he do so? He should go to the storekeeper whose store he typically patronizes and say to him: Give me fruits in exchange for this sela, and the storekeeper gives him fruits. And then he says to the storekeeper: These fruits that you sold me and that assumed the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year are given to you as a gift. The storekeeper may then eat them as one eats Sabbatical-Year produce. And the storekeeper says to him: Here is a sela for you as a gift, and that person purchases with it whatever he wants, as the sela was deconsecrated. Ravina asks: But here, isn’t it secondary produce, as the sela had previously been exchanged for the original Sabbatical-Year produce, and nevertheless the baraita teaches: By means of purchase, yes, it is effective; by means of redemption, no, it is not?

אלא אמר רב אשי מחלוקת בפרי שני אבל בפרי ראשון דברי הכל דרך מקח אין דרך חילול לא והא דקתני אחד שביעית ואחד מעשר שני מאי שביעית דמי שביעית

Rather, Rav Ashi said, contrary to the suggestion above, that the dispute is specifically with regard to secondary produce; however, with regard to original produce, everyone agrees: By means of purchase, yes, it is deconsecrated; by means of redemption, no, it is not deconsecrated. And with regard to that which is taught in the baraita cited in support of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Both Sabbatical-Year produce and second-tithe produce are deconsecrated upon cattle, undomesticated animals, and fowl, indicating that the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect through both purchase and redemption. What is the meaning of Sabbatical-Year produce? It is referring to money exchanged for Sabbatical-Year produce but not to the produce itself.

דאי לא תימא הכי מעשר מעשר ממש והא כתיב וצרת הכסף בידך אלא דמי מעשר הכא נמי דמי שביעית

And the same must be said with regard to the second tithe mentioned in this baraita, as, if you do not say so but say instead that the second tithe referred to in the baraita is actual second-tithe produce, isn’t it written with regard to the second tithe: “Then shall you turn it into money and bind up the money in your hand…and you shall bestow the money for whatsoever your soul desires” (Deuteronomy 14:25–26), indicating that second-tithe produce can be redeemed only with money, with which other food items may be purchased? Rather, the baraita must be referring to money exchanged for second-tithe produce and not to the produce itself. Here, too, with regard to the Sabbatical Year, the baraita is referring to money exchanged for Sabbatical-Year produce and not to the produce itself.

מתני׳ בראשונה היה לולב ניטל במקדש שבעה ובמדינה יום אחד משחרב בית המקדש התקין רבן יוחנן בן זכאי שיהא לולב ניטל במדינה שבעה זכר למקדש

MISHNA: Originally, during the Temple era, the lulav was taken in the Temple for seven days, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple it was taken for one day. Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the lulav should be taken even in the rest of the country for seven days, in commemoration of the Temple.

ושיהא יום הנף כולו אסור

And for similar reasons, he instituted an ordinance that for the entire day of waving the omer offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. It is prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop until the omer offering is brought and waved in the Temple on the sixteenth of Nisan. The offering was sacrificed in the morning; however, after taking potential delays into consideration, the new crop remained prohibited until it was clear that the offering had been sacrificed. Practically speaking, it was prohibited to eat the new grain until the sixteenth of Nisan was over; it was permitted only on the seventeenth. Once the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer an omer offering sacrificed, it was permitted to eat the new crop on the sixteenth. However, Rabban Yoḥanan instituted an ordinance that eating the new grain would remain prohibited until the seventeenth to commemorate the Temple.

גמ׳ מנא לן דעבדינן זכר למקדש אמר רבי יוחנן דאמר קרא כי אעלה ארוכה לך וממכותיך ארפאך נאם ה׳ כי נדחה קראו לך ציון היא דורש אין לה דורש אין לה מכלל דבעיא דרישה

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that we institute ordinances in commemoration of the Temple? Rabbi Yoḥanan said that it is as the verse states: “For I will restore health unto you and I will heal you of your wounds, says the Lord; because they have called you an outcast, she is Zion, there is none that seeks her” (Jeremiah 30:17). From the fact that the verse states: “There is none that seeks her,” it can be learned by inference that it requires seeking, i.e., people should think of and remember the Temple. That is the reason for Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance.

ושיהא יום הנף מאי טעמא מהרה יבנה בית המקדש ויאמרו אשתקד מי לא אכלנו בהאיר מזרח השתא נמי ניכול ואינהו לא ידעי דאשתקד דלא הוה בית המקדש האיר מזרח התיר השתא דאיכא בית המקדש עומר מתיר

§ The mishna continues: Rabban Yoḥanan instituted that for the entire day of waving the Omer offering, it is prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ordinance? It is that soon the Temple will be rebuilt, and people will say: Last year, when the Temple was in ruins, didn’t we eat of the new crop as soon as the eastern horizon was illuminated, as the new crop was permitted immediately with the advent of the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan? Now, too, let us eat the new grain at that time. And they do not know that although last year, when there was no Temple, the illuminating of the eastern sky permitted one to eat the new grain immediately, now that there is a Temple, the omer offering permits one to eat the new grain. Until the omer offering is sacrificed, the new grain is not permitted.

דאיבני אימת אילימא דאיבני בשיתסר הרי התיר האיר מזרח אלא דאיבני בחמיסר מחצות היום ולהלן תשתרי דהא תנן הרחוקים מותרין מחצות היום ולהלן לפי שאין בית דין מתעצלים בו

The Gemara asks: When is it that the Temple will be rebuilt in this scenario? If we say that it will be rebuilt on the sixteenth of Nisan, since in the morning the Temple was not yet built, the illuminating of the eastern sky permitted one to eat the new grain, as the omer offering could not yet be brought. Rather, say that it will be rebuilt on the fifteenth of Nisan or on some earlier date, in which case the new grain would not become permitted by the illuminating of the eastern sky. In that case, from midday and onward let it be permitted to eat the new grain, as we learned in a mishna in tractate Menaḥot: The people distant from Jerusalem, who are unaware of the precise time when the omer was brought, are permitted to eat the new grain from midday and onward because the members of the court are not indolent with regard to the omer and would not postpone bringing the offering after midday.

לא צריכא דאיבני בליליא אי נמי סמוך לשקיעת החמה (אמר) רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי בשיטת רבי יהודה אמרה דאמר מן התורה הוא אסור דכתיב

The Gemara says: No, it is necessary to institute the ordinance only in the case where the Temple will be rebuilt at night, on the evening of the sixteenth, and there was no opportunity to cut the omer that night. Alternatively, it was necessary to institute the ordinance in the case where the Temple was built adjacent to sunset on the fifteenth because there would not be sufficient time to complete all the preparations and sacrifice the offering by noon the next day. Therefore, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the new grain is prohibited for the entire day of the sixteenth. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: That is not the reason; rather, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai stated his ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: It is prohibited by Torah law to eat the new grain until the seventeenth of Nisan, as it is written:

עד עצם היום הזה עד עיצומו של יום וקסבר עד ועד בכלל

“And you shall eat neither bread, nor roasted grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame [etzem] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14), indicating until the essence [itzumo] of the day, and not the night before. And he holds that when the verse states: “Until,” the word until is inclusive, meaning that the grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth.

ומי סבר ליה כוותיה והא מפליג פליג עליה (דתניא) משחרב בית המקדש התקין רבן יוחנן בן זכאי שיהא יום הנף כולו אסור אמר לו רבי יהודה והלא מן התורה הוא אסור דכתיב עד עצם היום הזה עד עיצומו של יום

The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But doesn’t he disagree with him, as it is taught in a baraita: Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the omer offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Isn’t it prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day,” which means: Until the essence of the day? Apparently, they have two divergentopinions.

רבי יהודה הוא דקא טעי הוא סבר מדרבנן קאמר ולא היא מדאורייתא קאמר והא התקין קאמר מאי התקין דרש והתקין

The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Yehuda who is mistaken. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying it is prohibited by rabbinic law. And that is not so; he is saying it is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the mishna say: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, indicating that it is a rabbinic ordinance? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of instituted? It means that he interpreted the verses in the Torah and instituted public notice for the multitudes to conduct themselves accordingly.

מתני׳ יום טוב הראשון של חג שחל להיות בשבת כל העם מוליכין את לולביהן לבית הכנסת למחרת משכימין ובאין כל אחד ואחד מכיר את שלו ונוטלו מפני שאמרו חכמים אין אדם יוצא ידי חובתו ביום טוב הראשון בלולבו של חבירו ושאר ימות החג אדם יוצא ידי חובתו בלולבו של חבירו רבי יוסי אומר יום טוב הראשון של חג שחל להיות בשבת ושכח והוציא את הלולב לרשות הרבים פטור מפני שהוציאו ברשות

MISHNA: If the first day of the festival of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, all of the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Shabbat eve, as it is prohibited to carry in a public domain on Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, everyone rises early and comes to the synagogue. Each and every one recognizes his lulav and takes it. This emphasis that each and every one recognizes his own lulav and takes it is because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation to take the lulav on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another, and on the rest of the days of the Festival a person fulfills his obligation even with the lulav of another. Rabbi Yosei says: If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression because he carried it out with permission, i.e., he was preoccupied with the performance of the mitzva and carried it out.

גמ׳ מנא הני מילי דתנו רבנן ולקחתם שתהא לקיחה ביד כל אחד ואחד לכם משלכם להוציא את השאול ואת הגזול מכאן אמרו חכמים אין אדם יוצא ידי חובתו ביום טוב הראשון של חג בלולבו של חבירו אלא אם כן נתנו לו במתנה

GEMARA: From where are these matters derived, that one does not fulfill his obligation with the lulav of another on the first day of the Festival? It is as the Sages taught that it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). The use of second person plural in the phrase: “And you shall take,” indicates that there should be taking in the hand of each and every person. The word yourselves in the phrase “take for yourselves” means: From your own, to exclude a borrowed or stolen lulav. From here the Sages stated: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another unless the other gave it to him as a full-fledged gift, as in that case it belongs to him.

ומעשה ברבן גמליאל ורבי יהושע ורבי אלעזר בן עזריה ורבי עקיבא שהיו באין בספינה ולא היה לולב אלא לרבן גמליאל בלבד שלקחו באלף זוז נטלו רבן גמליאל ויצא בו ונתנו לרבי יהושע במתנה נטלו רבי יהושע ויצא בו ונתנו לרבי אלעזר בן עזריה במתנה נטלו רבי אלעזר בן עזריה ויצא בו ונתנו במתנה לרבי עקיבא נטלו רבי עקיבא ויצא בו והחזירו לרבן גמליאל

There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were all traveling on a ship during the festival of Sukkot and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav, which he had bought for one thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and then gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift. Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Akiva as a gift. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and returned it to Rabban Gamliel.

למה לי למימר החזירו מלתא אגב אורחיה קא משמע לן מתנה על מנת להחזיר שמה מתנה

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel? The crux of the story is that each of the Sages fulfilled his obligation with the same lulav after receiving it as a gift. The Gemara answers: By including that detail, the tanna teaches us another matter in passing, namely that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a full-fledged gift. Even if the owner stipulates from the outset that the gift would be returned, since he gives it as a gift in the interim, its halakhic status is that of a full-fledged gift.

כי הא דאמר רבא הא לך אתרוג זה על מנת שתחזירהו לי נטלו ויצא בו החזירו יצא לא החזירו לא יצא

This is like that which Rava said, that in the case of one who says to another: Here is an etrog for you on condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, if he returned the etrog, he fulfilled his obligation of taking the etrog. However, if he did not return the etrog, he did not fulfill his obligation. Since he did not fulfill the condition, retroactively he never acquired the gift at all.

למה לי למימר שלקחו באלף זוז להודיעך כמה מצות חביבות עליהן

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabban Gamliel bought this lulav for one thousand zuz? The Gemara answers: It is to inform you how beloved mitzvot were to them to the extent that he was willing to pay an exorbitant sum to purchase a lulav.

אמר ליה מר בר אמימר לרב אשי אבא צלויי קא מצלי ביה מיתיבי לא יאחז אדם תפילין בידו וספר תורה בחיקו ויתפלל ולא ישתין בהן מים ולא יישן בהן לא שינת קבע ולא שינת עראי

§ Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: My father would pray with the four species in his hand in an expression of his love for the mitzva. The Gemara raises an objection: A person should not hold phylacteries in his hand or a Torah scroll in his lap and pray while doing so; neither should he urinate with them in his hand; nor should he sleep with them in his hand, neither a deep sleep nor a brief nap.

ואמר שמואל סכין וקערה ככר ומעות הרי אלו כיוצא בהן התם לאו מצוה נינהו וטריד בהו הכא מצוה נינהו ולא טריד בהו

And Shmuel said: With regard to a knife, a bowl full of food, a loaf of bread, or money, these items are similar to those mentioned above; since he is concerned lest these items fall from his hand, he is distracted and he unable to concentrate on his prayers. Why, then, is that not the case with regard to lulav? It should be prohibited to hold the lulav during prayer for the same reason. The Gemara answers: There, in the cases listed above, they are not related to performance of a mitzva, and he is preoccupied with them. Therefore, that preoccupation distracts his focus from his prayers. Here, in the case of the four species, they are related to performance of a mitzva, so he is not preoccupied with them in a manner that will distract him from his prayers.

תניא רבי אלעזר בר צדוק אומר כך היה מנהגן של אנשי ירושלים אדם יוצא מביתו ולולבו בידו הולך לבית הכנסת לולבו בידו קורא קריאת שמע ומתפלל ולולבו בידו קורא בתורה ונושא את כפיו מניחו על גבי קרקע הולך לבקר חולים ולנחם אבלים לולבו בידו נכנס לבית המדרש משגר לולבו ביד בנו וביד עבדו וביד שלוחו

The Gemara cites support for the custom mentioned above, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: This was the custom of the people of Jerusalem during the festival of Sukkot. A person leaves his house, and his lulav is in his hand; he goes to the synagogue, and his lulav is in his hand; he recites Shema and prays, and his lulav is in his hand; he reads the Torah and a priest lifts his hands to recite the priestly benediction, and he places it on the ground because he cannot perform those tasks while holding the lulav. He goes to visit the ill or to console mourners, and his lulav is in his hand; he enters the study hall to study Torah, and he sends his lulav home in the hands of his son, in the hands of his slave, or in the hands of his agent.

מאי קא משמע לן להודיעך כמה היו זריזין במצות

The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us by relating all these details that appear to establish the same practice? The Gemara explains: It is to inform you how vigilant they were in the performance of mitzvot and how much they cherished them.

רבי יוסי אומר יום טוב אמר אביי

§ The mishna continues: Rabbi Yosei says that if the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering. Abaye said: