Temurah 13

שלש שדות ושתי מענות וכמה מלא מענה מאה אמה כדתניא החורש את הקבר עושה בית הפרס מלא מענה מאה אמה

A beit haperas extends over three fields, the field that was plowed and the two adjacent fields in the direction it was plowed. For example, if one plowed the field from north to south, each of the fields adjacent to it on the north and south is also considered a beit haperas. But whereas the plowed field is a beit haperas in its entirety, the two adjacent fields are a beit haperas only to the extent of two furrows, one furrow on each side. And how much is the full length of a furrow [ma’ana]? It is one hundred cubits, as it is taught in a mishna (Oholot 17:1): One who plows a field containing a grave, and who may have strewn the bones throughout the field, renders the field a beit haperas up to the full length of a furrow, which is one hundred cubits.

ואין תרומה אחר תרומה כו׳ מתניתין מני רבי עקיבא היא דתנן השותפין שתרמו זה אחר זה רבי אליעזר אומר תרומת שניהם תרומה

§ The mishna teaches: And there is no teruma after teruma. Once one designates produce from his crop as teruma, if he then designates additional produce from that crop as teruma, it is not teruma. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:3): In the case of joint owners of produce who separated teruma one after the other, Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma of both of them is teruma, as each is considered to have separated from his share of the produce.

רבי עקיבא אומר אין תרומת שניהם תרומה וחכמים אומרים אם תרם הראשון כשיעור אין תרומת השני תרומה ואם לא תרם כשיעור תרומת השני תרומה

Rabbi Akiva says: The teruma of neither of them is teruma. Since each separated teruma independently, it is clear that neither accepts the separation of the other, and therefore neither is valid. And the Rabbis say: If the first one separated teruma of the correct measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce, the produce is thereby tithed, and therefore the teruma of the second is not teruma; but if the first did not separate teruma of the correct measure, and he separated too little, the teruma of the second is teruma.

ואין תמורה עושה תמורה כו׳ מאי טעמא אמר קרא ותמורתו ולא תמורת תמורתו

§ The mishna teaches: And a substitute animal that was consecrated when it was substituted for a consecrated animal does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute; rather, it remains non-sacred. The Gemara explains: What is the reason, i.e., the source for this halakha in the Torah? The verse states: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). The verse teaches that the halakha of substitution applies only to a consecrated animal and its substitute, but not the substitute of its substitute.

ואין הולד עושה תמורה דאמר קרא הוא הוא ולא ולד

§ The mishna teaches: And the offspring born of a consecrated animal that was not consecrated itself does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains: The reason for this is that the verse states: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which teaches that only it, a consecrated animal, but not its offspring, renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.

רבי יהודה אומר הולד עושה תמורה דאמר קרא יהיה לרבות את הולד ורבנן לרבות שוגג כמזיד

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: The offspring renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda reasons that when the verse states: “Shall be sacred,” this serves to include the offspring. The Gemara adds: And as for the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot substitute for the offspring of a consecrated animal, they maintain that this phrase serves to include one who substitutes unwittingly, so that the substitution is valid as if he had done so intentionally.

מתני׳ העופות והמנחות אין עושין תמורה שלא נאמר אלא בהמה הציבור והשותפין אין עושין תמורה שנאמר לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר יחיד עושה תמורה ואין הצבור והשותפין עושין תמורה קדשי בדק הבית אין עושין תמורה

MISHNA: The birds sacrificed as offerings, i.e., doves and pigeons, and the meal offerings do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes, as only the term “an animal” is stated with regard to substitution, in the verse: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10). A consecrated animal belonging to the community or to partners does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is stated in the same verse: “He shall neither exchange it nor substitute it.” One derives from the singular pronoun in the verse that an individual renders a non-sacred animal a substitute, but the community and partners do not render a non-sacred animal a substitute. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes.

אמר רבי שמעון והרי מעשר בכלל היה ולמה יצא

Rabbi Shimon said: The fact that animals belonging to the community or partners do not render animals exchanged for them substitutes is derived as follows: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out in the verse: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord. He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute for it; and if he substitutes it, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32–33)?

לומר לך מה מעשר קרבן יחיד יצאו קרבנות צבור ומה מעשר קרבן מזבח יצאו קרבנות בדק הבית

Rabbi Shimon explains: It was singled out to juxtapose substitution to the animal tithe, to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is brought exclusively as an individual offering, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are individual offerings, excluding communal offerings and the offerings of partners from the halakha of substitution. And just as the animal tithe is an offering sacrificed on the altar, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are offerings sacrificed on the altar, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance from the halakha of substitution.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן יכול יהו קדשי בדק הבית עושין תמורה תלמוד לומר קרבן מי שנקראו קרבן יצאו קדשי בדק הבית שלא נקראו קרבן

GEMARA: According to the mishna, items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that items consecrated for Temple maintenance render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of which men bring an offering to the Lord…he shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad” (Leviticus 27:9–10). This teaches that the halakha of substitution applies to that which is called an offering, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not called an offering.

ולא והתניא אי קרבן שומע אני אפילו קדשי בדק הבית שנקראו קרבן כענין שנאמר ונקרב את קרבן ה׳ וגו׳

The Gemara asks: And are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). If the verse had mentioned just the word “offering,” I would derive that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies even to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, as they too are called offerings, as is stated in the matter of the spoils of the war against Midian: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.

תלמוד לומר ואל פתח אהל מועד לא הביאו כל הבא אל פתח אהל מועד חייבין עליו משום שחוטי חוץ וכל שאינו בא לפתח אהל מועד אין חייבין עליו משום שחוטי חוץ אלמא איקרו קרבן

The baraita continues: Therefore the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that for any item that is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, i.e., that is fit to be sacrificed, one is liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. And by contrast, for any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. Evidently, as a verse is necessary to exclude items consecrated for Temple maintenance, such items are generally called an offering, contrary to the first baraita cited.

אמר רבי חנינא לא קשיא הא רבי שמעון הא רבנן לרבי שמעון איקרי קרבן לרבנן לא איקרי קרבן

Rabbi Ḥanina said: This is not difficult. This second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, whereas that first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are in fact called an offering, and therefore in the mishna he derives that items consecrated for Temple maintenance are excluded from the halakhot of substitution from the juxtaposition with the animal tithe, not from word “offering.” According to the opinion of the Rabbis, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are not called an offering, and they therefore derive the halakha from the word “offering.”

ולא והכתיב ונקרב את קרבן ה׳ קרבן ה׳ איקרי קרבן לה׳ לא איקרי

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called an offering? But isn’t it written: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” (Numbers 31:50)? The Gemara answers: These items are called: “The Lord’s offering,” but they are not called: “An offering to the Lord,” which is used only with regard to offerings sacrificed upon the altar.

תנו רבנן לא יבקר בין טוב לרע ולא ימירנו למה נאמר והלא כבר נאמר לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אתו טוב ברע וגו׳

§ The mishna teaches that consecrated animals belonging to the community or to partners are not included in the halakha of substitution. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute it; and if he substitute it at all, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33). Why is the issue of substitution stated here in connection to the animal tithe? Isn’t it already stated earlier: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good, and if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10)?

לפי שנאמר לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אתו משמע קרבן יחיד קרבן צבור וקרבן מזבח וקרבן בדק הבית תלמוד לומר לא יבקר

Since it is stated: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it,” the verse apparently indicates that all types of offering are included, whether an individual offering or a communal offering, and whether it is an offering sacrificed on the altar or an offering consecrated for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire.”

אמר רבי שמעון והרי מעשר בכלל היה ולמה יצא לומר לך מה מעשר קרבן יחיד וקרבן מזבח ודבר שבא בחובה ודבר שאינו בשותפות אף כל קרבן יחיד וקרבן מזבח ודבר שבא בחובה

Rabbi Shimon said in explanation: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out? It is to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it is an item that comes only as an obligation, not as a gift offering, and it is an item that is not brought in partnership, but only by an individual, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred must be an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it must be an item that comes only as an obligation,

ודבר שאינו בא בשותפות

and it must be an item that is not brought in partnership.

רבי אומר למה יצאת מעשר מעתה לידון בתמורת שמו ובתמורת גופו

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why was the animal tithe singled out of all offerings as subject to substitution now, after the halakha of substitution was stated in general? It serves to discuss a special halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that of substitution of its name. If, when the animals emerge from the pen to be tithed, the one counting them errs and calls the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, they are both sanctified. The animal that actually emerges tenth is the animal tithe, while the eleventh animal is consecrated as a peace offering. And since this halakha of a substitution of its name applies only to the animal tithe, it is necessary to teach that the general halakha of the substitution of its body, i.e., regular substitution, applies to it as well.

לומר לך תמורת שמו קריבה תמורת גופו אינה קריבה תמורת שמו נגאלת תמורת גופו אינה נגאלת

Furthermore, the verse tells you other halakhot unique to the animal tithe: An animal that is the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is sacrificed upon the altar as a peace offering, whereas the substitute of its body is not sacrificed at all. But for all other offerings, substitutes hold the same status as the animal for which they were substituted. Another difference is that the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is redeemed when it develops a blemish, like a peace offering, and the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury, whereas the substitute of its body is not redeemed, as it is stated with regard to the animal tithe: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33).

תמורת גופו חלה על דבר הראוי ועל דבר שאינו ראוי ותמורת שמו אינה חלה אלא על דבר הראוי בלבד

Finally, the sanctity of the substitution of the body of an animal tithe takes effect upon both an item that is fit for sacrifice upon the altar and upon an item that is unfit for sacrifice, e.g., a blemished animal, as the sanctity of the animal tithe can apply even to a blemished animal, but the substitution of its name takes effect only upon an item that is fit for sacrifice. If the animal that was mistakenly called the tenth is blemished, it is not consecrated.

אמרי משום דרבי רחמנא דאית ביה תמורת שמו איגרועי איגרע אין דאמרינן מאי דרבי רבי ומאי דלא רבי לא רבי

The Sages say in response to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Simply because the Merciful One includes a unique halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that it has the substitution of its name, would one assume that it is diminished, and the halakha of regular substitution does not apply to it? The Gemara answers: Yes, one can make such a claim, as we say: That which the verse included with regard to a particular halakha, it included, and that which it did not include, it did not include. Since the passage initially addresses substitution of name solely with regard to the animal tithe, one could assume that this is the only substitution that applies to it.

והא מהיכא תיתי אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע משום דהוה דבר הבא לידון בדבר החדש ואין בו אלא חידושו בלבד

The Gemara asks: And from where would this be derived, that in this case we should assume only that which is specifically mentioned? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is derived since this is a case of a matter, i.e., the animal tithe, where the Torah comes to discuss a novel matter, i.e., substitution of name, and as a rule, in such cases the object of discussion has only its novelty, and one cannot infer the applicability of additional principles. It was therefore necessary for a verse to teach that substitution of body, which applies to all other offerings, applies to the animal tithe as well.

אמר ליה רב נחמן בר יצחק לרבא לרבי שמעון דאמר דבר הבא בחובה עולת חובה היא דעבדה תמורה הא עולת נדבה לא אמר ליה עולת נדבה נמי כיון דקבלה עליה עבדה תמורה

§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said earlier that the halakha of substitution applies only to offerings that come as an obligation, should one conclude that it is only an obligatory burnt offering that renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute, but a voluntary burnt offering does not? Rava said to him: A voluntary burnt offering also falls under the category of obligatory offerings. Since he accepted upon himself to bring a voluntary burnt offering, it is considered an obligation for him, and therefore it renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.

ולא נצרכה אלא לעולה הבאה מן המותרות

Rava adds: And this qualification mentioned by Rabbi Shimon is necessary only to exclude a burnt offering that came from surplus funds. For example, if one set aside a certain sum of money for a sin offering or a guilt offering, and after purchasing his animal some of the money remained, he must purchase a burnt offering with that money. The halakha of substitution does not apply to such an animal.

מאי קסבר אי קסבר לה כמאן דאמר מותרות לנדבת צבור אזלי פשיטא דלא עבדה תמורה הא אין תמורה בצבור

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The Sages disputed the use of surplus money. Some say that it must go toward the purchase of communal burnt offerings, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the owner himself must purchase a voluntary burnt offering. What does Rabbi Shimon hold in this regard? If he holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward communal gift offerings, then it is obvious that this offering does not render a substitute, as it is explicitly taught that there is no substitution with regard to a communal offering. Rabbi Shimon’s statement would then be redundant.

אלא רבי שמעון סבירא ליה כמאן דאמר מותרות לנדבת יחיד אזלי מאן שמעת ליה האי סברא רבי אליעזר הא שמעינן ליה בהדיא דעבדה תמורה דתניא עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה דברי רבי אליעזר

Rather, say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward the voluntary burnt offering of an individual. But this too is problematic, as whom did you hear who holds this reasoning? It is Rabbi Eliezer, but we heard that Rabbi Eliezer explicitly stated that such an animal renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute. As it is taught in a baraita: A burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it consecrated as a substitute. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

רבי שמעון סבר לה כותיה בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא דרבי אליעזר סבר עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה ואיהו סבר אין עושה תמורה

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one matter, that surplus funds go toward an individual voluntary burnt offering, and disagrees with him with regard to another matter, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and he, Rabbi Shimon, maintains that it does not render it a substitute.

אי הכי דבעיא רבי אבין הפריש אשם להתכפר בו והמיר בו ונתכפר באשם אחר וניתק זה לעולה מהו שיחזור וימיר בו

The Gemara objects: If so, consider that dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin: If one separated an animal as a guilt offering by which to achieve atonement, and he effected substitution for it, and then that original guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which he subsequently lost, and the owner achieved atonement by bringing yet another animal as a guilt offering; and then this lost animal was found and consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, what is the halakha as to whether he can again effect substitution for it? In this case, the animal in question is a burnt offering that came from surplus funds.

אליבא דמאן אילימא אליבא דרבי שמעון הא אמרת רבי שמעון סבירא ליה עולה הבאה מן המותרות אין עושה תמורה

In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you said that Rabbi Shimon maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. There would therefore be no dilemma at all. This is problematic, because the dilemma assumes that one cannot effect substitution twice for the same animal, which is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

רבי אבין הכי קמיבעיא ליה אי משכחת תנא דקאי כרבי שמעון דאמר אין ממירין וחוזרין וממירין וסבירא ליה כרבי אליעזר דאמר עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה מהו שיחזור וימיר בו

The Gemara explains that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Avin was raising: If a tanna is found who holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one cannot effect substitution once and again effect substitution for the same consecrated animal, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, what is his opinion as to whether one can again effect substitution with the animal in question?

בשני גופין וקדושה אחת מאי

As explained earlier (9b), Rabbi Avin’s dilemma was first posed with regard to two bodies, i.e., two different animals, and one type of sanctity, e.g., in a case where one separated an animal as a guilt offering, and he effected substitution for it, and the animal he separated as a guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which assumed the same status of a guilt offering. What is the halakha as to whether one can substitute for this replacement? Do we say that since it is a different animal from the one for which he initially effected substitution, the second substitution is effective? Or perhaps, since it possesses the same sanctity as the original animal, one cannot effect substitution for it.

ואם תימצא לומר קדושה אחת (או לא) אלא שתי קדושות וגוף אחד מאי תיבעי

And then Rabbi Avin further asked: If you say that in the above case one cannot effect substitution for the animal, perhaps this is only because the two animals possess one sanctity. But in a case of two sanctities and one body, what is the halakha? For example, if one consecrated a guilt offering and effected substitution for it, and he subsequently lost it and atoned using another animal, and he then found it again, such that the original animal must now be consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, does one say that since the animal now possesses a different sanctity he can effect further substitution for it? The Gemara concludes: According to that tanna, the dilemma remains unresolved [tiba’ei].

הדרן עלך הכל ממירין