Temurah 27

ואם תחתיה תעמד הבהרת

“But if the white leprous spot stays in its place [taḥteha]” (Leviticus 13:23). In this verse, the word “taḥteha” indicates that the white leprous spot remains in its place. This usage of the word is fitting for substitution, since when sanctity is transferred by substitution from a consecrated animal to a non-sacred animal, the sanctity of the consecrated animal remains in place, despite the fact that the non-sacred animal is also consecrated.

דאחולי דכתיב תחת הנחשת אביא זהב והלכך גבי קדשי מזבח דעבדין תמורה לישנא דאתפוסי הוא גבי קדשי בדק הבית דלא עבדין תמורה לישנא דאחולי הוא

Yet taḥat is also a term that indicates desacralization, as it is written: “In place of [taḥat] brass I will bring gold, and in place of iron I will bring silver, and in place of wood brass, and in place of stones iron” (Isaiah 60:17). In this verse, taḥat means replacement, which is what occurs in desacralization, where one item is replaced by another. And therefore, the term should be understood in accordance with the context: With regard to animals consecrated for sacrifice upon the altar, which render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, taḥat is a term that indicates the associating of one sanctity with another. With regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, which do not render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization.

אמר רבא אפילו בקדשי מזבח משכחת לה לישנא דאחולי הוא כגון שהיה הקדש בעל מום

Rava said: Even with regard to animals consecrated for sacrifice upon the altar, which render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, you can find that taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization. For example, in a case where a consecrated animal was blemished and can be desacralized because it is unfit to be sacrificed, and one placed that consecrated animal next to a non-sacred animal and said: This animal is in place of [taḥat] that animal. Although the blemished sacred animal can render a non-sacred animal for which it is exchanged consecrated as a substitute, in this context the term taḥat means desacralization.

אמר רבי אשי אפילו בבעל מום נמי משכחת לה לישנא דאחולי ומשכחת לישנא דאתפוסי ידו אקודש חול הוי ידו אחול קודש הוה

Rabbi Ashi said: Even in the case of a blemished animal, mentioned by Rava, sometimes you find that taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization and sometimes you find that taḥat is a term that indicates the associating of one sanctity with another. If the owner’s hand is resting on the consecrated animal and he says: This animal is in place of [taḥat] that animal, it is a term of desacralization, as the placement of his hand indicates that his intention is to desacralize the consecrated animal, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal. If the owner’s hand is resting on the non-sacred animal when he says: This animal is in place of that animal, then taḥat is a term of substitution, as the placement of his hand indicates that his intention is for the non-sacred animal to be consecrated with the same sanctity as the consecrated animal.

בעי אביי היו לפניו שתי בהמות של קדש בעלות מום ושתי בהמות של חולין תמימות ואמר הרי אלו תחת אלו מהו

Abaye raises a dilemma: If there were standing before him two sacrificial animals that were blemished and two non-sacred animals that were unblemished,and, without placing his hands on any animal, he says: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

מי אמר לאתפוסי ולקי או דלמא כל היכא דאיכא היתרא לא שביק איניש היתרא ועביד איסורא

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Did he intend to say taḥat as association, i.e., to consecrate the two non-sacred animals as substitutes, and therefore he is flogged two sets of lashes for the two violations of the prohibition against consecrating an animal as a substitute? Or perhaps, does one say that since anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition? If so, here too his intention was to desacralize the two blemished animals, and therefore he is not flogged.

ואם תמצי לומר כל היכא דאיכא היתרא לא שביק איניש ועביד איסורא היו לפניו שתי בהמות של קודש ואחת מהן בעלת מום ושתי בהמות של חולין ואחת מהן בעלת מום ואמר הרי אלו תחת אלו מהו

And if you say that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition, in a case where there were standing before him two sacrificial animals, one of which was blemished and one of which was unblemished, and two non-sacred animals, one of which was blemished and one of which was unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha? Although he certainly intended to transfer the sanctity of the unblemished sacrificial animal to a non-sacred animal by substitution, it is unclear which of the two non-sacred animals he intended to consecrate as a substitute.

מי אמר תמימה תחת תמימה לאתפוסי בעלת מום תחת בעלת מום לאחולי

Once again, the Gemara explains the dilemma: Did he intend to say that the unblemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the unblemished consecrated animal, and with regard to this pairing he intended to associate the sanctity by substitution, while the blemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated in place of the blemished consecrated animal, and for this pairing he intended to desacralize the consecrated animal. If so, he is flogged only for the first pairing and not for the second pairing.

או דלמא תמימה דחולין תחת בעלת מום דהקדש בעלת מום דחולין תחת תמימה דהקדש ותרוייהו לקי

Or perhaps, he intended that the unblemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, and the blemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the unblemished consecrated animal, and since he intended to perform substitution in both cases he is flogged for both pairings.

ואם תמצי לומר כל היכא דאיכא היתירא לא עביד איסורא ולאחולי הוא ולא לקי היו לפניו שלש בהמות של קדש ואחת מהן בעלת מום ושלשה בהמות של חולין תמימות ואמר הרי אלו תחת אלו

And if you say that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, one does not perform the prohibition, this would resolve the previous dilemma, as his intention must have been to desacralize the blemished consecrated animal, and therefore he is not flogged two sets of lashes, one can raise the following dilemma: In a case where there were three sacrificial animals before him, one of which was blemished while the other two were unblemished, and three non-sacred animals, all of which were unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

מי אמרינן מדתמימות תחת תמימות לאתפוסי תמימות נמי תחת בעלת מום לאתפוסי או דלמא הכא נמי כל היכא דאיכא היתירא לא עביד איסורא וההיא בתרייתא לאחולי הוי

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Do we say that since he intended for the unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as substitutes in place of the unblemished consecrated animals, i.e., to associate their sanctity, so too he intended to consecrate the unblemished non-sacred animal as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, i.e., to associate its sanctity, and he therefore is flogged three sets of lashes? Or perhaps, here too one applies the principle that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not perform the prohibition. If so, his intention with regard to this latter blemished consecrated animal was to desacralize it, and therefore he is not flogged for transferring its sanctity to a substitute.

ואם תימצי לומר הכא נמי כיון דאכתי גברא לא איתחזק באיסורי לא שביק התירא ועביד איסורא בעי רב אשי היו לפניו ארבע בהמות של קדש ואחת מהן בעלת מום וארבע בהמות של חולין ואמר הרי אלו תחת אלו מהו

And if you say that here too, since this man has not yet been established as one who regularly transgresses a prohibition, until he has done so three times, therefore it is assumed that he does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition, Rav Ashi therefore raises the following dilemma: If there were four sacrificial animals standing before him, one of which was blemished and the other three were unblemished, and four non-sacred animals, all of which were unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

הכא ודאי כיון דאיתחזק גברא באיסורי (בכולן) לקי בארבע מלקיות

Again, the Gemara clarifies the dilemma: Here, since it is certain that he intended for three unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as substitutes in place of the three unblemished consecrated animals, this man has been established as one who regularly transgresses a prohibition. Therefore, it is assumed that he also intended for one of the unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, which means he is liable to be flogged four sets of lashes for the four substitutions.

או דלמא אף על גב דאיתחזק באיסורא לא שביק איניש היתירא ועביד איסורא והוי בתרייתא לאחולי הוי תיקו

Or perhaps, even though in this case he has been established as one who transgresses the prohibition, nevertheless even such a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition. And if so, his intention with regard to this latter blemished animal was to desacralize it. The Gemara concludes that all of these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

אם היתה הקדש בעל מום יצא לחולין כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: If the consecrated animal was blemished, and he said: This consecrated animal is desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal, the consecrated animal is desacralized. The owner is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals, and if the consecrated animal was worth more than the non-sacred animal, he must pay the difference to the Temple treasury.

אמר רבי יוחנן יצא לחולין דבר תורה וצריך לעשות דמים מדבריהם וריש לקיש אמר אף צריך לעשות דמים דבר תורה

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The consecrated animal is desacralized by Torah law even if the consecrated animal was worth one hundred dinars and the non-sacred animal was worth only one peruta. But by rabbinic law, the owner is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, so that the Temple treasury not suffer a loss. And Reish Lakish says: Even the requirement to conduct an appraisal, to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, applies by Torah law.

במאי עסקינן אי נימא אאונאה בהא נימא ריש לקיש אף צריך לעשות דמים דבר תורה

What are we dealing with here, i.e., what is the case that is subject to the disagreement between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? If we say that they disagree in a case where the difference in value between the two animals was exactly one-sixth, which is the difference in value that constitutes exploitation by Torah law, and the halakha is that such a transaction is valid but one must return the difference in value, would Reish Lakish say that even in such a case the requirement to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals applies by Torah law?

והא תנן אלו דברים שאין להם אונאה העבדים והשטרות והקרקעות וההקדשות

But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Metzia 56a): These are matters that, even if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth, are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation: Slaves, documents, lands, and consecrated property.Since consecrated property is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, why would Reish Lakish say that one must repay the difference in value between the two animals to the Temple treasury by Torah law?

אלא אבטול מקח בהא נימא רבי יוחנן צריך לעשות דמים מדבריהם

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to a case of nullification of a transaction, i.e., where the difference in value between the two animals was greater than one-sixth. Would Rabbi Yoḥanan say in such a case that one is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals by rabbinic law?

והאמר רבי ירמיה אקרקעות דחולין ורבי יונה אמר אהקדשות תרווייהו משמיה דרבי יוחנן אמרי אונאה אין להן ביטול מקח יש להם

But didn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say this ruling with regard to non-sacred lands, and Rabbi Yona said it with regard to consecrated property, and both of them said it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: They are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, in the case of a disparity of one-sixth. But they are subject to nullification of a transaction, in the case of a greater disparity. If so, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yona, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that when the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth, the transaction is nullified by Torah law. But in that case, why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule here that only by rabbinic law is he required to calculate the difference and pay its value?

לעולם אביטול מקח ואיפוך

The Gemara answers: Actually, they disagree in a case of nullification of a transaction, i.e., more than one-sixth, and one should reverse attribution of the opinions; the opinion previously attributed to Rabbi Yoḥanan is actually that of Reish Lakish, and the opinion attributed to Reish Lakish is the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

ומי מצית אמרת איפוך הניחא למאן דאמר אהקדשות וכל שכן אקרקעות

The Gemara asks: But how can you say that one should reverse the attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? This works out well according to the one who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that consecrated property is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth, but it is subject to nullification of the transaction if the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth. According to this opinion, that of Rabbi Yona, it is apparent all the more so that lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth.

אלא למאן דאמר אקרקעות אבל הקדשות אין להן ביטול מקח היכי איפוך להא

But according to the one who said that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that only lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth, but with regard to consecrated property there is no nullification of a transaction, i.e., Rabbi Yirmeya, how can he reverse attribution of that opinion, and claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by Torah law?

אמר רבי ירמיה לא תיפוך

Rabbi Yirmeya said: According to my opinion, do not reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. In other words, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law. This is consistent with Rabbi Yirmeya’s ruling that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is no nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property. Only Rabbi Yona would reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in order for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion to be consistent with his statement, as cited by Rabbi Yona, that there is nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property.

לימא בדשמואל קא מיפלגי דאמר שמואל הקדש שוה מנה שחיללו על שוה פרוטה מחולל דרבי יונה לית ליה דשמואל ורבי ירמיה אית ליה דשמואל

It has been established that Rabbi Yona maintains that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan consecrated property is subject to nullification of a transaction, whereas Rabbi Yirmeya disputes that claim. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Consecrated property worth one hundred dinars [maneh] that one desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to a coin worth one peruta, is desacralized. Since consecrated property is not subject to nullification of a transaction, it is desacralized by coins worth any sum. The suggestion is that Rabbi Yona is not of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel, and Rabbi Yirmeya is of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel.

לא בין דמר ובין דמר אית ליה דשמואל דרבי יונה סבר כי אמר שמואל דיעבד אבל לכתחלה לא אמר ורבי ירמיה סבר אפילו לכתחלה

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; both this Sage and that Sage are of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel. The difference between them is that Rabbi Yona maintains that when Shmuel stated his halakha, he was referring to consecrated property that one desacralized after the fact, but he did not say that one may do so ab initio; and Rabbi Yirmeya maintains that Shmuel rules that it is permitted to desacralize consecrated property with coins worth any sum, even ab initio.

ואיבעית אימא לעולם לא תיפוך ודקא קשיא לך מתניתין אלו דברים הקדשות כדרב חסדא

If you wish, say instead, with regard to the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, do not reverse the attribution of their respective opinions. In fact, they disagree with regard to a disparity of one-sixth, and Reish Lakish holds that one is required to pay the difference value by Torah law. And as for that which poses a difficulty for you with regard to the opinion of Reish Lakish, that it is taught in the mishna: These are matters that are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation: Slaves, documents, lands, and consecrated property, which indicates that one is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law, that mishna should be understood in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ḥisda.

דאמר רב חסדא אין להן אונאה אינן בתורת אונאה דאפילו פחות מכדי אונאה חוזר

As Rav Ḥisda said: What is the meaning of the phrase: Are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? This means that they are not subject to the standard principles of exploitation at all; rather, more stringent halakhot apply in these cases. As, even if the disparity is less than the measure of exploitation, i.e., less than one-sixth, one may renege on the transaction, and in the case of consecrated property he is required to pay the value of the disparity.

אמר עולא לא אמרו אלא בשמוי בתרי אבל בשמוי בתלתא ואף על גב דאתי במאה לא הדר

§ With regard to a case in which there was a disparity between the assessed value of property and its actual value, where one must pay the difference to the Temple treasury, Ulla said: The Sages said that one must pay the value of the disparity to the Temple treasury only if the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by only two people and afterward three other people determined that the consecrated property was worth more. But in a case where the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by three people, as required by halakha, and that amount was paid to the Temple treasury, even if afterward one hundred people came and assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value, one need not return the disparity of value to the Temple treasury.

איני והאמר רב ספרא היכא אמר מאה כתרי ותרי כמאה לענין עדות אבל לענין אומדנא בתר דעות אזלינן

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Safra say: Where did one say the ruling that one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, and two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses? That principle applies specifically to the matter of testimony. But with regard to the matter of assessments, we follow the majority of opinions. If so, in Ulla’s case, one should follow the assessment of the one hundred and pay the disparity to the Temple treasury.

ותו תלתא ותלתא לא אזלינן בתר בתרא דיד הקדש על העליונה

And furthermore, even in a case where three people initially assessed the value of the consecrated property, and afterward three other people assessed the consecrated property at a higher value, don’t we follow the latter assessment? Isn’t there is a principle that the Temple treasury of consecrated property always has the advantage?

קסבר עולא צריך לעשות דמים מדבריהם וכל דרבנן אקילו בה רבנן

The Gemara answers: Ulla holds that the halakha that the owner is required to conduct an appraisal, to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law, and the Sages were lenient with regard to all rabbinic laws. Therefore, even if one hundred people assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value than the earlier assessment, one is not required to pay the disparity in value to the Temple treasury.

מתני׳ הרי זו תחת עולה תחת חטאת לא אמר כלום תחת חטאת זו ותחת עולה זו תחת חטאת ותחת עולה שיש לי בבית היה לו דבריו קיימים

MISHNA: If one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, or: It is in place of a sin offering, he has said nothing, as he did not say that it was in place of a specific offering. If he said: It is in place of this sin offering, or: It is in place of this burnt offering, or if he said: It is in place of a sin offering that I have in the house, or: It is in place of a burnt offering that I have in the house, and he had that offering in his house, his statement stands, i.e., is effective.

אמר על הבהמה טמאה ועל בעלת מום הרי אלו עולה לא אמר כלום הרי אלו לעולה ימכרו ויביא בדמיהם עולה

If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated as a burnt offering, he has said nothing. If he said: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale.

גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מתניתין דלא כרבי מאיר דאי כרבי מאיר הא אין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, he has said nothing. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t Rabbi Meir say: A person does not utter a statement for naught. In other words, if one issues a statement that cannot be fulfilled as stated, it is interpreted in a manner that renders it relevant. Consequently, when he said: This non-sacred animal is in place of a burnt offering, he must have been referring to a burnt offering that he had in his house.

הרי אלו לעולה ימכרו ויביא בדמיו עולה טעמא דבהמה טמאה ובעלת מום דלא חזיין לא בעיין מומא אבל מפריש נקבה לאשם או לעולה בעיין מומא

§ The mishna teaches: If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale. The Gemara infers: The reason that these animals are sold is that they are non-kosher and blemished animals, which are not fit to be sacrificed, and therefore they do not require the development of a blemish for them to be sold. But in the case of one who separates a female animal for a guilt offering or for a burnt offering, which may be brought only from males, since a female animal is fit to be sacrificed as a different type of offering, the animal does require the development of a blemish for it to be sold.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מתניתין דלא כרבי שמעון דתנן רבי שמעון אומר תימכר שלא במום

Consequently, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (19b) that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who designates a female animal for a guilt offering, since a female is unfit to be sacrificed as that offering, its halakhic status is like that of a blemished animal in the sense that it does not become inherently sacred; rather, only its value is sacred. Therefore, it may be sold without it having developed a blemish, and a guilt offering is purchased with the money received from its sale.

הדרן עלך כיצד מערימין