Different types of marriages that have/do not have validity on a rabbinic level are compared to each other. Why is marriage with a deaf-mute considered marriage while one with a minor male is not? Why can one do mi’un from a marriage when the woman is a minor but not if she is deaf? Why can a minor eat truma if she is married to a kohen while a deaf-mute cannot? Why does a woman get a ketuba when she is a minor but not if she is a deaf-mute? Why does the wife of a deaf-mute male not get a ketuba? Two opposite versions are brought of a statement of Shmuel about whether the wife of a deaf-mute could be made to bring a guilt offering of uncertainty (if for example, she has relations with another man). If she is obligated to bring, that would show that we are uncertain if the marriage has validity on a Torah level or not. If she is not obligated, that would show that the marriage is clearly not valid on a Torah level. The Gemara attempts to either provide support or raise a difficulty with Shmuel from a Mishna in Terumot 1:1 where the truma of a deaf-mute is not considered truma at all. However, this is rejected as Rabbi Elazar disagrees and Shmuel’s statement could be in accordance with that opinion. Rav Ashi raises two possibilities of how to understand how Rabbi Eliezer understands the doubt of Rabbi Eliezer regarding the deaf-mute and why his truma will be considered truma l’chumra? If one’s wife became a shota, one who is not of sound mind, he can divorce her, but the rabbis forbade it so as not to allow others to take advantage of her. The Gemara establishes what type of level of shota this refers to. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri asked why there is a difference between a deaf-mute man and woman in the case where they were competent when they married and later one became a deaf-mute – why can he not divorce his wife but she can get divorced? Which part was clear to him and which part was not? Rabbi Yochanan ben Gudgoda testified about a marriage of a deaf-mute minor whose father enacted betrothal for her and she was able to get divorced by Torah law. Rava infers from his statement that if a man were to trick his wife when giving her a get, leading her to believe he was giving her some other document, and she accepted the get without realizing what it was, it is valid if he told witnesses as he was about to give it to her that they should witness that he is divorcing his wife with this get.
This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
This week’s learning is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family for the refuah shleima of our dear friend and co-learner, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשא רחל. “Phyllis, you continue to inspire and uplift us with your messages throughout this time. Your emunah is the embodiment of ה’ רועי לא אחסר. May הקב”ה grant you strength, healing and stamina each and every day.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Pnina Lipskier in loving memory of Major Yaniv Kula and Staff-Sgt. Itay Yavetz, both from Modi’in, who were killed in Gaza. “Yaniv brought light, wisdom, and values wherever he went. Throughout his life, he acted to make the country better—and out of a deep sense of mission, he said: ‘Now it is my turn.’ Itay, charismatic and full of strength, left behind words of depth and significance, writing that the world is full of infinite meaning. May their memory be a blessing.”
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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
This week’s learning is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family for the refuah shleima of our dear friend and co-learner, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשא רחל. “Phyllis, you continue to inspire and uplift us with your messages throughout this time. Your emunah is the embodiment of ה’ רועי לא אחסר. May הקב”ה grant you strength, healing and stamina each and every day.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Pnina Lipskier in loving memory of Major Yaniv Kula and Staff-Sgt. Itay Yavetz, both from Modi’in, who were killed in Gaza. “Yaniv brought light, wisdom, and values wherever he went. Throughout his life, he acted to make the country better—and out of a deep sense of mission, he said: ‘Now it is my turn.’ Itay, charismatic and full of strength, left behind words of depth and significance, writing that the world is full of infinite meaning. May their memory be a blessing.”
Yevamot 113
מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דְּאָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלָא אָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה? דִּתְנַן: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט, וְעַל קְטַנָּה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְכֹהֵן שֶׁאוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה, וְאִילּוּ חֵרֶשֶׁת לָא אָכְלָה!
§ The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.
גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַאֲכִיל חֵרֵשׁ בְּחֵרֶשֶׁת. וְלֵיכוֹל, קָטָן אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת הוּא!
The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.
גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַאֲכִיל חֵרֵשׁ בְּפִקַּחַת. וְחֵרֵשׁ בְּפִקַּחַת נָמֵי לֵיכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה דְּרַבָּנַן! גְּזֵירָה דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאוֹכֹלַהּ בִּתְרוּמָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דְּאִם כֵּן — מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.
וּקְטַנָּה מְנָלַן דְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דִּתְנַן: הַמְמָאֶנֶת, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּיה, וְאַיְילוֹנִית — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה. אֲבָל יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט וּקְטַנָּה — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.
וְחֵרֶשֶׁת מְנָלַן דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דְּתַנְיָא: חֵרֵשׁ וְשׁוֹטֶה שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ פִּקְּחוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְפַּקֵּחַ הַחֵרֵשׁ, וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה הַשּׁוֹטֶה — אֵין לָהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם כְּלוּם. רָצוּ לְקַיְּימָן — יֵשׁ לָהֶם כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.
וּפִקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת אוֹ שׁוֹטָה, אֲפִילּוּ כָּתַב לָהּ מֵאָה מָנֶה — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרָצָה לִזּוֹק בִּנְכָסָיו. טַעְמָא דְּרָצָה, הָא לֹא רָצָה — אֵין לָהּ, דְּאִם כֵּן מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.
אִי הָכִי, פִּקַּחַת לְחֵרֵשׁ לִיתַקֵּן לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה, דְּאִם כֵּן מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא מִינַּסְבִי! יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁהָאִישׁ רוֹצֶה לִישָּׂא, אִשָּׁה רוֹצָה לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.
הָהוּא חֵרֵשׁ דַּהֲוָה בְּשִׁבָבוּתֵיהּ דְּרַב מַלְכִּיּוֹ, אַנְסְבֵיהּ אִיתְּתָא וּכְתַב לַהּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי מִנִּכְסֵיהּ. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן חַכִּים כְּרַב מַלְכִּיּוֹ, דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא. קָסָבַר: אִילּוּ רָצָה שִׁפְחָה לְשַׁמְּשׁוֹ מִי לָא זָבְנִינַן לֵיהּ? כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא, דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.
אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת חֵרֵשׁ — אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
§ Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: חֲמִשָּׁה לֹא יִתְרוֹמוּ, וְאִם תָּרְמוּ — אֵין תְּרוּמָתָן תְּרוּמָה. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, וְהַתּוֹרֵם אֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְגוֹי שֶׁתָּרַם שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲפִילּוּ בִּרְשׁוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuel’s opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jew’s permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.
הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תְּרוּמַת חֵרֵשׁ לֹא תֵּצֵא לְחוּלִּין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא סָפֵק. אִי סְבִירָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitzḥak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.
בָּעֵינַן חֲתִיכָה מִשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת.
The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the woman’s marriage.
וּמִי בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר חֲתִיכָה מִשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי — חַיָּיבִין עַל חֶלְבּוֹ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.
שְׁמוּאֵל סָבַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּחֲדָא, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא.
The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת חֵרֵשׁ חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מֵיתִיבִי: חֲמִשָּׁה לֹא יִתְרוֹמוּ! סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.
And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.
בְּעָא רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? מִיפְשָׁט פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּחֵרֵשׁ דַּעְתָּא קְלִישְׁתָּא הוּא, וּמִיהוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא
Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.
אִי לָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא, וּלְעוֹלָם חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא. אוֹ דִלְמָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּדַעְתֵּיהּ קְלִישְׁתָּא וְלָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא הוּא, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּעִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה.
Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ — לְהוֹצִיא אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט. אִי אָמְרַתְּ חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא — כְּקִדּוּשִׁין כָּךְ גֵּירוּשִׁין.
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ עִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה — קַדּוֹשֵׁי מָצֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ, גָּרוֹשֵׁי לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
נִשְׁתַּטֵּית וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַפִּקַּחַת בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת? שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.
§ The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile’s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ — מִי נָהֲגִי בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר? אֶלָּא, דְּאֵין יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר לֹא גִּיטָּהּ וְלֹא עַצְמָהּ.
The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.
דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת? וְהָא אָמַר דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: ״וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ״, מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ, יָצְתָה זוֹ, שֶׁאֵין לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ.
The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn’t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: “He shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.
וְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ״, מִי שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְאֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, יָצְתָה זוֹ, שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְחוֹזֶרֶת.
And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: “And send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ. דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, דְּהָא יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ. וַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן לָא לַיפְּקַהּ, שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.
The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzḥak’s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי גַּבֵּי דִידַהּ ״נִשְׁתַּטֵּית לֹא יוֹצִיא״, וְגַבֵּי דִידֵיהּ ״לֹא יוֹצִיא עוֹלָמִית״. מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״עוֹלָמִית״ וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָתָם דְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״עוֹלָמִית״? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, הָא — דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא — דְּרַבָּנַן.
Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי וְכוּ׳. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי, אִישׁ פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְאִשָּׁה קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: אִשָּׁה פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְאִישׁ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.
תָּא שְׁמַע, מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה יוֹצֵאת לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ, וְהָאִישׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנוֹ — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִישׁ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. אַדְּרַבָּה, מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אַף זוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִשָּׁה קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.
אֶלָּא, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִישׁ לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ — אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא מִיגָּרְשָׁא, אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ, מַאי שְׁנָא אִשָּׁה וּמַאי שְׁנָא אִישׁ! אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת.
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.
הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רָבָא: מֵעֵדוּתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא, אָמַר לְעֵדִים: ״רְאוּ גֵּט זֶה שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.
מִי לָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעְתַּהּ, הָכָא נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעְתַּהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא?
This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada’s statement in the following manner: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that there is no need for the woman’s consent? What is the novel element in Rava’s statement?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדַּאֲמַר לַהּ ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ — בַּטּוֹלֵי בַּטְּלֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. אִי אִיתָא דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ — לְעֵדִים הֲוָה קָאָמַר לְהוּ, וּמִדְּלָא אֲמַר לְעֵדִים — לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר הָכִי — מֵחֲמַת כִּיסּוּפָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לְהוּ.
The Gemara answers that Rava’s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.
רַב יִצְחָק בַּר בִּיסְנָא אִירְכַסוּ לֵיהּ מַפְתְּחֵי דְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּשַׁבְּתָא, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי פְּדָת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל
The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go
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I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Bet Shemesh, Israel
Having never learned Talmud before, I started Daf Yomi in hopes of connecting to the Rabbinic tradition, sharing a daily idea on Instagram (@dafyomiadventures). With Hadran and Sefaria, I slowly gained confidence in my skills and understanding. Now, part of the Pardes Jewish Educators Program, I can’t wait to bring this love of learning with me as I continue to pass it on to my future students.
Pennsylvania, United States
I started learning Jan 2020 when I heard the new cycle was starting. I had tried during the last cycle and didn’t make it past a few weeks. Learning online from old men didn’t speak to my soul and I knew Talmud had to be a soul journey for me. Enter Hadran! Talmud from Rabbanit Michelle Farber from a woman’s perspective, a mother’s perspective and a modern perspective. Motivated to continue!
Brentwood, California, United States
It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.
Northwest Washington, United States
Margo
I started my Talmud journey in 7th grade at Akiba Jewish Day School in Chicago. I started my Daf Yomi journey after hearing Erica Brown speak at the Hadran Siyum about marking the passage of time through Daf Yomi.
Carolyn
I started my Talmud journey post-college in NY with a few classes. I started my Daf Yomi journey after the Hadran Siyum, which inspired both my son and myself.
Merion Station, USA
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!
Maale Adumim, Israel
Yevamot 113
מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דְּאָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלָא אָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה? דִּתְנַן: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט, וְעַל קְטַנָּה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְכֹהֵן שֶׁאוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה, וְאִילּוּ חֵרֶשֶׁת לָא אָכְלָה!
§ The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.
גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַאֲכִיל חֵרֵשׁ בְּחֵרֶשֶׁת. וְלֵיכוֹל, קָטָן אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת הוּא!
The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.
גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַאֲכִיל חֵרֵשׁ בְּפִקַּחַת. וְחֵרֵשׁ בְּפִקַּחַת נָמֵי לֵיכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה דְּרַבָּנַן! גְּזֵירָה דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאוֹכֹלַהּ בִּתְרוּמָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דְּאִם כֵּן — מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.
וּקְטַנָּה מְנָלַן דְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דִּתְנַן: הַמְמָאֶנֶת, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּיה, וְאַיְילוֹנִית — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה. אֲבָל יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט וּקְטַנָּה — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.
וְחֵרֶשֶׁת מְנָלַן דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה? דְּתַנְיָא: חֵרֵשׁ וְשׁוֹטֶה שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ פִּקְּחוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְפַּקֵּחַ הַחֵרֵשׁ, וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה הַשּׁוֹטֶה — אֵין לָהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם כְּלוּם. רָצוּ לְקַיְּימָן — יֵשׁ לָהֶם כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.
וּפִקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת אוֹ שׁוֹטָה, אֲפִילּוּ כָּתַב לָהּ מֵאָה מָנֶה — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרָצָה לִזּוֹק בִּנְכָסָיו. טַעְמָא דְּרָצָה, הָא לֹא רָצָה — אֵין לָהּ, דְּאִם כֵּן מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא נָסְבִי לַהּ.
And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.
אִי הָכִי, פִּקַּחַת לְחֵרֵשׁ לִיתַקֵּן לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה, דְּאִם כֵּן מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא מִינַּסְבִי! יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁהָאִישׁ רוֹצֶה לִישָּׂא, אִשָּׁה רוֹצָה לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.
הָהוּא חֵרֵשׁ דַּהֲוָה בְּשִׁבָבוּתֵיהּ דְּרַב מַלְכִּיּוֹ, אַנְסְבֵיהּ אִיתְּתָא וּכְתַב לַהּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי מִנִּכְסֵיהּ. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן חַכִּים כְּרַב מַלְכִּיּוֹ, דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא. קָסָבַר: אִילּוּ רָצָה שִׁפְחָה לְשַׁמְּשׁוֹ מִי לָא זָבְנִינַן לֵיהּ? כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא, דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.
אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת חֵרֵשׁ — אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
§ Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: חֲמִשָּׁה לֹא יִתְרוֹמוּ, וְאִם תָּרְמוּ — אֵין תְּרוּמָתָן תְּרוּמָה. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, וְהַתּוֹרֵם אֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְגוֹי שֶׁתָּרַם שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲפִילּוּ בִּרְשׁוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuel’s opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jew’s permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.
הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תְּרוּמַת חֵרֵשׁ לֹא תֵּצֵא לְחוּלִּין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא סָפֵק. אִי סְבִירָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitzḥak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.
בָּעֵינַן חֲתִיכָה מִשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת.
The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the woman’s marriage.
וּמִי בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר חֲתִיכָה מִשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי — חַיָּיבִין עַל חֶלְבּוֹ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.
שְׁמוּאֵל סָבַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּחֲדָא, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא.
The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת חֵרֵשׁ חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מֵיתִיבִי: חֲמִשָּׁה לֹא יִתְרוֹמוּ! סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.
And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.
בְּעָא רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? מִיפְשָׁט פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּחֵרֵשׁ דַּעְתָּא קְלִישְׁתָּא הוּא, וּמִיהוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא
Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.
אִי לָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא, וּלְעוֹלָם חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא. אוֹ דִלְמָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּדַעְתֵּיהּ קְלִישְׁתָּא וְלָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא הוּא, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּעִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה.
Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ — לְהוֹצִיא אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט. אִי אָמְרַתְּ חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא — כְּקִדּוּשִׁין כָּךְ גֵּירוּשִׁין.
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ עִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה — קַדּוֹשֵׁי מָצֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ, גָּרוֹשֵׁי לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
נִשְׁתַּטֵּית וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַפִּקַּחַת בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת? שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.
§ The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile’s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ — מִי נָהֲגִי בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר? אֶלָּא, דְּאֵין יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר לֹא גִּיטָּהּ וְלֹא עַצְמָהּ.
The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.
דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת? וְהָא אָמַר דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: ״וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ״, מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ, יָצְתָה זוֹ, שֶׁאֵין לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ.
The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn’t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: “He shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.
וְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ״, מִי שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְאֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, יָצְתָה זוֹ, שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְחוֹזֶרֶת.
And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: “And send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ. דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, דְּהָא יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ. וַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן לָא לַיפְּקַהּ, שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.
The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzḥak’s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי גַּבֵּי דִידַהּ ״נִשְׁתַּטֵּית לֹא יוֹצִיא״, וְגַבֵּי דִידֵיהּ ״לֹא יוֹצִיא עוֹלָמִית״. מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״עוֹלָמִית״ וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָתָם דְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״עוֹלָמִית״? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, הָא — דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא — דְּרַבָּנַן.
Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי וְכוּ׳. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי, אִישׁ פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְאִשָּׁה קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: אִשָּׁה פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְאִישׁ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.
תָּא שְׁמַע, מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה יוֹצֵאת לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ, וְהָאִישׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנוֹ — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִישׁ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. אַדְּרַבָּה, מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אַף זוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִשָּׁה קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.
אֶלָּא, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִישׁ לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ — אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא מִיגָּרְשָׁא, אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ, מַאי שְׁנָא אִשָּׁה וּמַאי שְׁנָא אִישׁ! אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת.
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.
הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רָבָא: מֵעֵדוּתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא, אָמַר לְעֵדִים: ״רְאוּ גֵּט זֶה שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹתֵן״, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.
מִי לָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעְתַּהּ, הָכָא נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעְתַּהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא?
This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada’s statement in the following manner: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that there is no need for the woman’s consent? What is the novel element in Rava’s statement?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדַּאֲמַר לַהּ ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ — בַּטּוֹלֵי בַּטְּלֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. אִי אִיתָא דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ — לְעֵדִים הֲוָה קָאָמַר לְהוּ, וּמִדְּלָא אֲמַר לְעֵדִים — לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר הָכִי — מֵחֲמַת כִּיסּוּפָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לְהוּ.
The Gemara answers that Rava’s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.
רַב יִצְחָק בַּר בִּיסְנָא אִירְכַסוּ לֵיהּ מַפְתְּחֵי דְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּשַׁבְּתָא, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי פְּדָת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל
The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go
