Yevamot 113

מימנעי ולא נסבי לה

others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.

ומאי שנא קטנה דאכלה בתרומה ומאי שנא חרשת דלא אכלה בתרומה דתנן העיד רבי יוחנן בן גודגדא על החרשת שהשיאה אביה שיוצאה בגט ועל קטנה בת ישראל שנשאת לכהן שאוכלת בתרומה ואילו חרשת לא אכלה

§ The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

גזירה שמא יאכיל חרש בחרשת וליכול קטן אוכל נבלות הוא

The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

גזירה שמא יאכיל חרש בפקחת וחרש בפקחת נמי ליכול בתרומה דרבנן גזירה דלמא אתי לאוכלה בתרומה דאורייתא

Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.

ומאי שנא קטנה דאית לה כתובה ומאי שנא חרשת דלית לה כתובה דאם כן מימנעי ולא נסבי לה

The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.

וקטנה מנלן דאית לה כתובה דתנן הממאנת והשנייה ואיילונית אין להן כתובה אבל יוצאה בגט וקטנה יש לה כתובה

The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.

וחרשת מנלן דלית לה כתובה דתניא חרש ושוטה שנשאו פקחות אף על פי שנתפקח החרש ונשתפה השוטה אין להם עליהם כלום רצו לקיימן יש להם כתובה

The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.

ופקח שנשא חרשת או שוטה אפילו כתב לה מאה מנה כתובתה קיימת מפני שרצה לזוק בנכסיו טעמא דרצה הא לא רצה אין לה דאם כן מימנעי ולא נסבי לה

And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.

אי הכי פקחת לחרש ליתקן לה כתובה דאם כן מימנעי ולא מינסבי יותר משהאיש רוצה לישא אשה רוצה להנשא

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.

ההוא חרש דהוה בשבבותיה דרב מלכיו אנסביה איתתא וכתב לה ארבע מאה זוזי מנכסיה אמר רבא מאן חכים כרב מלכיו דגברא רבה הוא קסבר אילו רצה שפחה לשמשו מי לא זבנינן ליה כל שכן הכא דאיכא תרתי

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.

אמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר שמואל אשת חרש אין חייבין עליה אשם תלוי

§ Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.

לימא מסייע ליה חמשה לא יתרומו ואם תרמו אין תרומתן תרומה ואלו הן חרש שוטה וקטן והתורם את שאינו שלו וגוי שתרם של ישראל אפילו ברשות ישראל אין תרומתו תרומה

The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuel’s opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jew’s permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.

הוא דאמר כרבי אלעזר דתניא רבי יצחק אומר משום רבי אלעזר תרומת חרש לא תצא לחולין מפני שהוא ספק אי סבירא כרבי אלעזר אשם תלוי נמי ליחייב

The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitzḥak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

בעינן חתיכה משתי חתיכות

The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the woman’s marriage.

ומי בעי רבי אלעזר חתיכה משתי חתיכות והתניא רבי אלעזר אומר כוי חייבין על חלבו אשם תלוי

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.

שמואל סבר כרבי אלעזר בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא

The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר שמואל אשת חרש חייבין עליה אשם תלוי מיתיבי חמשה לא יתרומו סבר לה כרבי אלעזר

And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

בעא רב אשי מאי טעמא דרבי אלעזר מיפשט פשיטא לי׳ דחרש דעתא קלישתא הוא ומיהו מספקא לי׳ אי דעתא צילותא

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.

אי לאו דעתא צילותא ולעולם חדא דעתא הוא או דלמא פשיטא ליה דדעתיה קלישתא ולאו דעתא צילותא הוא והכא היינו טעמא כיון דעתים חלים ועתים שוטה

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

למאי נפקא מינה להוציא אשתו בגט אי אמרת חדא דעתא הוא כקדושין כך גירושין

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

ואי אמרת עתים חלים ועתים שוטה קדושי מצי מקדש גרושי לא מצי מגרש מאי תיקו:

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

נשתטית וכו׳: אמר רבי יצחק דבר תורה שוטה מתגרשת מידי דהוה אפקחת בעל כרחה ומה טעם אמרו אינה מגורשת שלא ינהגו בה מנהג הפקר

§ The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile’s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

היכי דמי אילימא דיודעת לשמור גיטה ויודעת לשמור עצמה מי נהגי בה מנהג הפקר אלא דאין יודעת לשמור לא גיטה ולא עצמה

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

דבר תורה שוטה מתגרשת והא אמר דבי רבי ינאי ונתן בידה מי שיש לה יד לגרש עצמה יצתה זו שאין לה יד לגרש עצמה

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn’t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: “He shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

ותנא דבי רבי ישמעאל ושלחה מביתו מי שמשלחה ואינה חוזרת יצתה זו שמשלחה וחוזרת

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: “And send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

לא צריכא דיודעת לשמור גיטה ואינה יודעת לשמור עצמה דבר תורה שוטה מתגרשת דהא יודעת לשמור גיטה ואמור רבנן לא ליפקא שלא ינהגו בה מנהג הפקר

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzḥak’s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

אמר אביי דיקא נמי דקתני גבי דידה נשתטית לא יוציא וגבי דידיה לא יוציא עולמית מאי שנא הכא דקתני עולמית ומאי שנא התם דלא קתני עולמית אלא שמע מינה הא דאורייתא הא דרבנן:

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

אמר רבי יוחנן בן נורי וכו׳: איבעיא להו רבי יוחנן בן נורי איש פשיטא ליה ואשה קמיבעיא ליה או דלמא אשה פשיטא ליה ואיש קמיבעיא ליה

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

תא שמע מדקאמרו ליה אינו דומה האיש המגרש לאשה המתגרשת שהאשה יוצאת לרצונה ושלא לרצונה והאיש אינו מוציא אלא לרצונו שמע מינה איש קמיבעיא ליה אדרבה מדקאמרו ליה אף זו כיוצא בה שמע מינה אשה קמיבעיא ליה

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

אלא רבי יוחנן בן נורי לדבריהם קאמר להו לדידי כי היכי דאיש לא מצי מגרש אשה נמי לא מיגרשא אלא לדידכו מאי שנא אשה ומאי שנא איש אמרו ליה אינו דומה האיש המגרש לאשה המתגרשת:

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

העיד רבי יוחנן וכו׳: אמר רבא מעדותו של רבי יוחנן בן גודגדא אמר לעדים ראו גט זה שאני נותן ואמר לה כנסי שטר חוב זה הרי זו מגורשת

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

מי לא אמר רבי יוחנן בן גודגדא לא בעינן דעתה הכא נמי לא בעינן דעתה פשיטא

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada’s statement in the following manner: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that there is no need for the woman’s consent? What is the novel element in Rava’s statement?

מהו דתימא מדאמר לה כנסי שטר חוב זה בטולי בטליה קא משמע לן אי איתא דבטליה לעדים הוה קאמר להו ומדלא אמר לעדים לא בטליה ולא מידי והאי דקאמר הכי מחמת כיסופא הוא דקאמר להו

The Gemara answers that Rava’s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

רב יצחק בר ביסנא אירכסו ליה מפתחי דבי מדרשא ברשות הרבים בשבתא אתא לקמיה דרבי פדת אמר ליה זיל

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go