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Today's Daf Yomi

June 28, 2022 | 讻状讟 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 113

Different types of marriages that have/do not have validity on a rabbinic level are compared to each other. Why is marriage with a deaf-mute considered marriage while one with a minor male is not? Why can one do mi’un from a marriage when the woman is a minor but not if she is deaf? Why can a minor eat truma if she is married to a kohen while a deaf-mute cannot? Why does a woman get a ketuba when she is a minor but not if she is a deaf-mute? Why does the wife of a deaf-mute male not get a ketuba? Two opposite versions are brought of a statement of Shmuel about whether the wife of a deaf-mute could be made to bring a guilt offering of uncertainty (if for example, she has relations with another man). If she is obligated to bring, that would show that we are uncertain if the marriage has validity on a Torah level or not. If she is not obligated, that would show that the marriage is clearly not valid on a Torah level. The Gemara attempts to either provide support or raise a difficulty with Shmuel from a Mishna in Terumot 1:1 where the truma of a deaf-mute is not considered truma at all. However, this is rejected as Rabbi Elazar disagrees and Shmuel’s statement could be in accordance with that opinion. Rav Ashi raises two possibilities of how to understand how Rabbi Eliezer understands the doubt of Rabbi Eliezer regarding the deaf-mute and why his truma will be considered truma l’chumra? If one’s wife became a shota, one who is not of sound mind, he can divorce her, but the rabbis forbade it so as not to allow others to take advantage of her. The Gemara establishes what type of level of shota this refers to. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri asked why there is a difference between a deaf-mute man and woman in the case where they were competent when they married and later one became a deaf-mute – why can he not divorce his wife but she can get divorced? Which part was clear to him and which part was not? Rabbi Yochanan ben Gudgoda testified about a marriage of a deaf-mute minor whose father enacted betrothal for her and she was able to get divorced by Torah law. Rava infers from his statement that if a man were to trick his wife when giving her a get, leading her to believe he was giving her some other document, and she accepted the get without realizing what it was, it is valid if he told witnesses as he was about to give it to her that they should witness that he is divorcing his wife with this get.

诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 拽讟谞讛 讚讗讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞专砖转 讚诇讗 讗讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚转谞谉 讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 注诇 讛讞专砖转 砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讘讬讛 砖讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 讜注诇 拽讟谞讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞砖讗转 诇讻讛谉 砖讗讜讻诇转 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬诇讜 讞专砖转 诇讗 讗讻诇讛

搂 The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗讻讬诇 讞专砖 讘讞专砖转 讜诇讬讻讜诇 拽讟谉 讗讜讻诇 谞讘诇讜转 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗讻讬诇 讞专砖 讘驻拽讞转 讜讞专砖 讘驻拽讞转 谞诪讬 诇讬讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚专讘谞谉 讙讝讬专讛 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讗讜讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 拽讟谞讛 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞专砖转 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.

讜拽讟谞讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚转谞谉 讛诪诪讗谞转 讜讛砖谞讬讬讛 讜讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讗讘诇 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 讜拽讟谞讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.

讜讞专砖转 诪谞诇谉 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 讞专砖 讜砖讜讟讛 砖谞砖讗讜 驻拽讞讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转驻拽讞 讛讞专砖 讜谞砖转驻讛 讛砖讜讟讛 讗讬谉 诇讛诐 注诇讬讛诐 讻诇讜诐 专爪讜 诇拽讬讬诪谉 讬砖 诇讛诐 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.

讜驻拽讞 砖谞砖讗 讞专砖转 讗讜 砖讜讟讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讘 诇讛 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讻转讜讘转讛 拽讬讬诪转 诪驻谞讬 砖专爪讛 诇讝讜拽 讘谞讻住讬讜 讟注诪讗 讚专爪讛 讛讗 诇讗 专爪讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.

讗讬 讛讻讬 驻拽讞转 诇讞专砖 诇讬转拽谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 诪讬谞住讘讬 讬讜转专 诪砖讛讗讬砖 专讜爪讛 诇讬砖讗 讗砖讛 专讜爪讛 诇讛谞砖讗

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.

讛讛讜讗 讞专砖 讚讛讜讛 讘砖讘讘讜转讬讛 讚专讘 诪诇讻讬讜 讗谞住讘讬讛 讗讬转转讗 讜讻转讘 诇讛 讗专讘注 诪讗讛 讝讜讝讬 诪谞讻住讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 讞讻讬诐 讻专讘 诪诇讻讬讜 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 拽住讘专 讗讬诇讜 专爪讛 砖驻讞讛 诇砖诪砖讜 诪讬 诇讗 讝讘谞讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转专转讬

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗砖讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗砖转 讞专砖 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

Rav 岣yya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讞诪砖讛 诇讗 讬转专讜诪讜 讜讗诐 转专诪讜 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转谉 转专讜诪讛 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讜讛转讜专诐 讗转 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讜讙讜讬 砖转专诐 砖诇 讬砖专讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专砖讜转 讬砖专讗诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛

The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jew鈥檚 permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.

讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 转专讜诪转 讞专砖 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 住驻拽 讗讬 住讘讬专讗 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 谞诪讬 诇讬讞讬讬讘

The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitz岣k said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讘注讬谞谉 讞转讬讻讛 诪砖转讬 讞转讬讻讜转

The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the woman鈥檚 marriage.

讜诪讬 讘注讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞转讬讻讛 诪砖转讬 讞转讬讻讜转 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讻讜讬 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讞诇讘讜 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.

砖诪讜讗诇 住讘专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗

The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗砖讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗砖转 讞专砖 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 诪讬转讬讘讬 讞诪砖讛 诇讗 讬转专讜诪讜 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav 岣yya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

讘注讗 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讬驻砖讟 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬壮 讚讞专砖 讚注转讗 拽诇讬砖转讗 讛讜讗 讜诪讬讛讜 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬壮 讗讬 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.

讗讬 诇讗讜 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗 讜诇注讜诇诐 讞讚讗 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讚注转讬讛 拽诇讬砖转讗 讜诇讗讜 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗 讛讜讗 讜讛讻讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚注转讬诐 讞诇讬诐 讜注转讬诐 砖讜讟讛

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗砖转讜 讘讙讟 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讚讗 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讻拽讚讜砖讬谉 讻讱 讙讬专讜砖讬谉

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 注转讬诐 讞诇讬诐 讜注转讬诐 砖讜讟讛 拽讚讜砖讬 诪爪讬 诪拽讚砖 讙专讜砖讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讙专砖 诪讗讬 转讬拽讜

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

谞砖转讟讬转 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗驻拽讞转 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

搂 The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitz岣k said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile鈥檚 lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 注爪诪讛 诪讬 谞讛讙讬 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专 讗诇讗 讚讗讬谉 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 诇讗 讙讬讟讛 讜诇讗 注爪诪讛

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 讜讛讗 讗诪专 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚讛 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讛 讬讚 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讬讚 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn鈥檛 a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: 鈥淗e shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

讜转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜砖诇讞讛 诪讘讬转讜 诪讬 砖诪砖诇讞讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖诪砖诇讞讛 讜讞讜讝专转

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: 鈥淎nd send her out of his house鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 注爪诪讛 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 讚讛讗 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬驻拽讗 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitz岣k鈥檚 halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 谞砖转讟讬转 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 讜讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 注讜诇诪讬转 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚拽转谞讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讗 讚专讘谞谉

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讜讻讜壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讬砖 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讜讗砖讛 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗砖讛 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讜讗讬砖 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

转讗 砖诪注 诪讚拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 讛讗讬砖 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗砖讛 讛诪转讙专砖转 砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜爪讗转 诇专爪讜谞讛 讜砖诇讗 诇专爪讜谞讛 讜讛讗讬砖 讗讬谞讜 诪讜爪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇专爪讜谞讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗讬砖 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讚专讘讛 诪讚拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗祝 讝讜 讻讬讜爪讗 讘讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗砖讛 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讚讬讚讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬砖 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讙专砖 讗砖讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬讙专砖讗 讗诇讗 诇讚讬讚讻讜 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗砖讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗讬砖 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 讛讗讬砖 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗砖讛 讛诪转讙专砖转

Rather, Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪注讚讜转讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 专讗讜 讙讟 讝讛 砖讗谞讬 谞讜转谉 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讻谞住讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讝讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转讛 驻砖讬讟讗

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada鈥檚 statement in the following manner: Didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that there is no need for the woman鈥檚 consent? What is the novel element in Rava鈥檚 statement?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诪讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻谞住讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讝讛 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗讬 讗讬转讗 讚讘讟诇讬讛 诇注讚讬诐 讛讜讛 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 讜诪讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 诇讗 讘讟诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 讛讻讬 诪讞诪转 讻讬住讜驻讗 讛讜讗 讚拽讗诪专 诇讛讜

The Gemara answers that Rava鈥檚 statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讘讬住谞讗 讗讬专讻住讜 诇讬讛 诪驻转讞讬 讚讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘砖讘转讗 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 驻讚转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitz岣k bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 113: Women Want to Marry More Than Men Do

A deaf-mute woman is not entitled to a ketubah. Why not? What is the rationale? It seems to be left...

Yevamot 113

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Yevamot 113

诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 拽讟谞讛 讚讗讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞专砖转 讚诇讗 讗讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚转谞谉 讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 注诇 讛讞专砖转 砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讘讬讛 砖讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 讜注诇 拽讟谞讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞砖讗转 诇讻讛谉 砖讗讜讻诇转 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬诇讜 讞专砖转 诇讗 讗讻诇讛

搂 The Gemara further asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of an non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗讻讬诇 讞专砖 讘讞专砖转 讜诇讬讻讜诇 拽讟谉 讗讜讻诇 谞讘诇讜转 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗讻讬诇 讞专砖 讘驻拽讞转 讜讞专砖 讘驻拽讞转 谞诪讬 诇讬讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚专讘谞谉 讙讝讬专讛 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讗讜讻诇讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 拽讟谞讛 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞专砖转 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

The Gemara further asks: And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.

讜拽讟谞讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚转谞谉 讛诪诪讗谞转 讜讛砖谞讬讬讛 讜讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讛 讗讘诇 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讙讟 讜拽讟谞讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara asks: And a minor girl, from where do we derive that she has a marriage contract? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 67a): With regard to a minor who refuses her husband and leaves him, and likewise a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative prohibited by rabbinic law, and a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, these women have no marriage contract. The Gemara infers: However, any other woman who can be divorced by means of a bill of divorce, and this includes a minor girl, is entitled to a marriage contract.

讜讞专砖转 诪谞诇谉 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 讞专砖 讜砖讜讟讛 砖谞砖讗讜 驻拽讞讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转驻拽讞 讛讞专砖 讜谞砖转驻讛 讛砖讜讟讛 讗讬谉 诇讛诐 注诇讬讛诐 讻诇讜诐 专爪讜 诇拽讬讬诪谉 讬砖 诇讛诐 讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara asks: And a deaf-mute woman, from where do we derive that she has no marriage contract? As it is taught in a baraita: A deaf-mute and an imbecile who married halakhically competent women, even if the deaf-mute subsequently regained his senses, and the imbecile regained his competence, their wives have no claim of anything against them, even if their wives received marriage contracts from them. However, if the men wish to maintain these women as their wives after they became fully competent, they have a marriage contract from that point onward.

讜驻拽讞 砖谞砖讗 讞专砖转 讗讜 砖讜讟讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讘 诇讛 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讻转讜讘转讛 拽讬讬诪转 诪驻谞讬 砖专爪讛 诇讝讜拽 讘谞讻住讬讜 讟注诪讗 讚专爪讛 讛讗 诇讗 专爪讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 谞住讘讬 诇讛

And in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute or an imbecile, and he decided to write a marriage contract for her, even if he wrote for her one hundred dinars her marriage contract is valid, because he wanted to harm his own property. In other words, as he acted willingly, despite the lack of obligation to do so, this is comparable to one who chooses to harm himself and give away property in any other manner; it is his prerogative. The Gemara infers: The reason for this halakha is that he wanted to write her a marriage contract, from which it may be inferred that if he does not want to write one, she will not have a marriage contract. The logic is as stated above, that if so, men would refrain from marrying her.

讗讬 讛讻讬 驻拽讞转 诇讞专砖 诇讬转拽谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗诐 讻谉 诪讬诪谞注讬 讜诇讗 诪讬谞住讘讬 讬讜转专 诪砖讛讗讬砖 专讜爪讛 诇讬砖讗 讗砖讛 专讜爪讛 诇讛谞砖讗

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case of a halakhically competent woman who was married to a deaf-mute, let the Sages enact a marriage contract for her, for if so, i.e., if women would not receive marriage contracts in this situation, they would refrain from marrying deaf-mute men entirely. The Gemara answers: More than the man wants to get married, a woman wants to be married. Consequently, women will not be too discriminating with regard to marriage with a deaf-mute, even if they are not entitled to a marriage contract.

讛讛讜讗 讞专砖 讚讛讜讛 讘砖讘讘讜转讬讛 讚专讘 诪诇讻讬讜 讗谞住讘讬讛 讗讬转转讗 讜讻转讘 诇讛 讗专讘注 诪讗讛 讝讜讝讬 诪谞讻住讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 讞讻讬诐 讻专讘 诪诇讻讬讜 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 拽住讘专 讗讬诇讜 专爪讛 砖驻讞讛 诇砖诪砖讜 诪讬 诇讗 讝讘谞讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转专转讬

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of Rav Malkiyyu. Rav Malkiyyu married him to a woman, and he wrote four-hundred dinars for her from the property of the deaf-mute as her marriage contract. Rava said: Who is as wise as Rav Malkiyyu, as he is a great man who found a way to achieve a desirable result by giving her a marriage contract, despite the fact that the deaf-mute was not obligated to do so. Rav Malkiyyu reasoned as follows: If that deaf-mute man wanted a maidservant to attend to him, would we not acquire one for him? All the more so here, as there are two advantages, for she will attend to his needs both as a maidservant and as a wife.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗砖讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗砖转 讞专砖 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

Rav 岣yya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, i.e., not knowing that she was married, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account. He is not liable to bring an offering that is brought in cases where one is unsure whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. A man who unwittingly has relations with a married woman must bring a sin-offering, whereas if the woman was doubtfully married, he brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty. However, the marriage of a deaf-mute is not even categorized as a doubtful marriage.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讞诪砖讛 诇讗 讬转专讜诪讜 讜讗诐 转专诪讜 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转谉 转专讜诪讛 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讜讛转讜专诐 讗转 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讜讙讜讬 砖转专诐 砖诇 讬砖专讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专砖讜转 讬砖专讗诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛

The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna (Terumot 1:1) supports Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: There are five categories of people who may not separate teruma ab initio, and if they separated teruma, their teruma is not considered teruma. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, and a gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew even with the Jew鈥檚 permission. In this last case, his teruma is not considered teruma, because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate teruma, and all the more so he cannot separate teruma on his own. This shows that the actions of a deaf-mute have no effect, and are not even considered of doubtful validity.

讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 转专讜诪转 讞专砖 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 住驻拽 讗讬 住讘讬专讗 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 谞诪讬 诇讬讞讬讬讘

The Gemara responds: This is no proof, as with regard to teruma, Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yitz岣k said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute is not released into a non-sacred status, because it is uncertain. Rabbi Elazar does not maintain that the actions of a deaf-mute have no consequence whatsoever. The Gemara asks: If Shmuel maintains, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is competent, let him also obligate a man who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讘注讬谞谉 讞转讬讻讛 诪砖转讬 讞转讬讻讜转

The Gemara answers: We require one piece from two pieces. Shmuel maintains that one is not liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty in every case where there is doubt whether or not there was a transgression, and where one would be liable to bring a sin-offering if it were certain that there was a transgression. Rather, a guilt-offering for uncertainty is brought if, for example, one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, but he does not know with certainty which one he ate. However, when the doubt involves a single item or action, which may or may not have been prohibited, in that situation one does not bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. In the case discussed here, the doubt concerning the wife of a deaf-mute does not involve a choice between an action that is prohibited and one that is permitted. Rather, it depends on the status of the woman鈥檚 marriage.

讜诪讬 讘注讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞转讬讻讛 诪砖转讬 讞转讬讻讜转 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讻讜讬 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讞诇讘讜 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar need a case involving one piece from two pieces to render one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its forbidden fat. Certain fats, which are permitted in the case of a wild animal, are prohibited if they are from a domesticated animal, and one who partakes of them is liable to bring a sin-offering. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty for eating its fat. This shows that Rabbi Elazar maintains that one brings a guilt-offering for uncertainty even for a doubt involving one item or action.

砖诪讜讗诇 住讘专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗

The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in one matter, the status of a deaf-mute, and disagrees with him in one other matter, the halakha of a guilt-offering for uncertainty.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗砖讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗砖转 讞专砖 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 诪讬转讬讘讬 讞诪砖讛 诇讗 讬转专讜诪讜 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

And there are those who say a different version of the above discussion. Rav 岣yya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: If a man had unwitting relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty on her account, due to the doubt. The Gemara raises an objection: Five categories of people may not separate teruma, etc., which indicates that the actions of a deaf-mute have no legal effect. The Gemara answers that Shmuel maintains his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

讘注讗 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讬驻砖讟 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬壮 讚讞专砖 讚注转讗 拽诇讬砖转讗 讛讜讗 讜诪讬讛讜 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬壮 讗讬 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? One possibility is that it is obvious to him that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak. However, he is uncertain as to whether his mind is clear. In other words, although a deaf-mute is weaker intellectually than an average person, and he does not understand everything, nevertheless he is aware of what he is doing with regard to certain undertakings.

讗讬 诇讗讜 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗 讜诇注讜诇诐 讞讚讗 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讚注转讬讛 拽诇讬砖转讗 讜诇讗讜 讚注转讗 爪讬诇讜转讗 讛讜讗 讜讛讻讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚注转讬诐 讞诇讬诐 讜注转讬诐 砖讜讟讛

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗砖转讜 讘讙讟 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讚讗 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讻拽讚讜砖讬谉 讻讱 讙讬专讜砖讬谉

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 注转讬诐 讞诇讬诐 讜注转讬诐 砖讜讟讛 拽讚讜砖讬 诪爪讬 诪拽讚砖 讙专讜砖讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讙专砖 诪讗讬 转讬拽讜

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

谞砖转讟讬转 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗驻拽讞转 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

搂 The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitz岣k said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile鈥檚 lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 注爪诪讛 诪讬 谞讛讙讬 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专 讗诇讗 讚讗讬谉 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 诇讗 讙讬讟讛 讜诇讗 注爪诪讛

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 讜讛讗 讗诪专 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚讛 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讛 讬讚 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讬讚 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn鈥檛 a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: 鈥淗e shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3), that this refers only to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

讜转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜砖诇讞讛 诪讘讬转讜 诪讬 砖诪砖诇讞讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖诪砖诇讞讛 讜讞讜讝专转

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: 鈥淎nd send her out of his house鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 注爪诪讛 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 讚讛讗 讬讜讚注转 诇砖诪讜专 讙讬讟讛 讜讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 诇讗 诇讬驻拽讗 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitz岣k鈥檚 halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 谞砖转讟讬转 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 讜讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 注讜诇诪讬转 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚拽转谞讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讗 讚专讘谞谉

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha, that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讜讻讜壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讬砖 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讜讗砖讛 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗砖讛 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讜讗讬砖 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

转讗 砖诪注 诪讚拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 讛讗讬砖 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗砖讛 讛诪转讙专砖转 砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜爪讗转 诇专爪讜谞讛 讜砖诇讗 诇专爪讜谞讛 讜讛讗讬砖 讗讬谞讜 诪讜爪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇专爪讜谞讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗讬砖 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讚专讘讛 诪讚拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗祝 讝讜 讻讬讜爪讗 讘讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗砖讛 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讚讬讚讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬砖 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讙专砖 讗砖讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬讙专砖讗 讗诇讗 诇讚讬讚讻讜 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗砖讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗讬砖 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讜诪讛 讛讗讬砖 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗砖讛 讛诪转讙专砖转

Rather, Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

讛注讬讚 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪注讚讜转讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 专讗讜 讙讟 讝讛 砖讗谞讬 谞讜转谉 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讻谞住讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讝讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讙讜讚讙讚讗 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转讛 驻砖讬讟讗

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada鈥檚 statement in the following manner: Didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that there is no need for the woman鈥檚 consent? What is the novel element in Rava鈥檚 statement?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诪讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻谞住讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讝讛 讘讟讜诇讬 讘讟诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗讬 讗讬转讗 讚讘讟诇讬讛 诇注讚讬诐 讛讜讛 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 讜诪讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 诇讗 讘讟诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 讛讻讬 诪讞诪转 讻讬住讜驻讗 讛讜讗 讚拽讗诪专 诇讛讜

The Gemara answers that Rava鈥檚 statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讘讬住谞讗 讗讬专讻住讜 诇讬讛 诪驻转讞讬 讚讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘砖讘转讗 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 驻讚转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitz岣k bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go

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