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Today's Daf Yomi

March 31, 2022 | ื›ืดื— ื‘ืื“ืจ ื‘ืณ ืชืฉืคืดื‘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 24

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The Gemara compares the case of the Mishna where after chalitza is performed with one sister, the other can do yibum and also if they both married the two sisters, we let them stay married, to the case of the Mishna in chapter 3 where both sisters can only do chalitza and if they do get marry the brothers, they must get divorced. The case here is one of doubt whereas the other is a case where each sister needs to do yibum, therefore we are stricter there as the connection of the yabam to the wives is stronger. A kohen is forbidden by rabbinic law to marry a woman who went through chalitza. Since it is only by rabbinic law, in our case, if he married the woman who underwent chalitza with the other husbandโ€™s brother, he can stay married. Preference is given to the older brother to do yibum. From where is this derived? Drashot on other parts of that verse are brought as well, such as the brother who does yibum inherits his brotherโ€™s property, one who is castrated is exempt from yibum. Why is the verse about the firstborn not used to derive other possible things, such as, only when there is a firstborn is yibum performed? If there is suspicion that one had a sexual relationship with a female slave or non-Jewish woman and the slave is freed or the non-Jewish woman converted, one cannot marry them. But if they did, they can stay married. However if one is suspected of having had a sexual relationship with a married woman, she needs to get divorced from her husband and if she marries the other man, she is forced to get divorced. Is this in a case where there were witnesses and it is clear that she committed adultery or not? Is it affected by whether or not she had children from her first marriage? Why?

 

ื”ืชื ืื™ ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื™ืฉ ื–ื™ืงื” ื™ืฉ ื–ื™ืงื” ื•ืื™ ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืืกื•ืจ ืœื‘ื˜ืœ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ืžื™ืŸ ืืกื•ืจ ืœื‘ื˜ืœ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ืžื™ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื›ืœ ื—ื“ ื•ื—ื“ ืื™ืžื•ืจ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ืžืชืจืžื™ื ืœื™ื”

There, in that mishna, if it is according to the one who said that the levirate bond is substantial, then there is a bond in that case, as two sisters were certainly married to the brothers and require levirate marriage. And if it is according to the one who said that it is prohibited to nullify the levirate mitzva through marrying the sister of the yevama, then the explanation of that mishna is that it is prohibited to nullify the levirate mitzva and for this reason they must perform แธฅalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. However, here, in this mishna, there is uncertainty concerning the betrothal such that with regard to each one of the brothers, one could say that possibly he encountered his own yevama. Perhaps each brother took his own brotherโ€™s wife in levirate marriage, and for this reason the Sages did not issue a decree.

ืงื“ืžื• ื•ื›ื ืกื• ืื™ืŸ ืžื•ืฆื™ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืณ ืชื ื™ ืฉื™ืœื ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ื›ื”ื ื™ื ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ืกืคืง ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ืœื ื’ื–ืจื• ื‘ื”ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ

ยง The mishna states that if they married their wives before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage. Sheila teaches a baraita that clarifies the mishna: And this is the case even if both of the brothers were priests. A woman who performed แธฅalitza is normally forbidden to a priest, yet in this case, although the brother of the other man performed แธฅalitza, they are not required to divorce. What is the reason for this halakha? It is as follows: A แธฅalutza is forbidden to a priest by rabbinic law because her status is similar to that of a divorcรฉe, who is forbidden to a priest by Torah law. And in a case of uncertainty as to whether she is a แธฅalutza, since it may not have been her yavam who performed the ceremony, the Sages did not issue a decree.

ื•ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืืฉื” ืžื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืงืจื ืืกืžื›ืชื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื

The Gemara asks: And is the prohibition against a แธฅalutza marrying a priest really by rabbinic law? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: โ€œThey shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband; for he is holy unto his Godโ€ (Leviticusย 21:7). I have derived only a divorcรฉe; from where do I derive that a priest may not marry a แธฅalutza? The verse states: โ€œNeither shall they take a woman.โ€ The repetition of the word โ€œwomanโ€ extends the halakha to include a แธฅalutza. The Gemara answers: This prohibition is by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ื•ืื ืงื“ื ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื–ื›ื”

MISHNA: It is a mitzva for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage, i.e., the eldest takes precedence over the other brothers, though they too are obligated. But if the younger brother consummated the levirate marriage first, he acquires the yevama as his wife.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ื”ื™ื” ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืžื™ื›ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืืฉืจ ืชืœื“ ืคืจื˜ ืœืื™ืœื•ื ื™ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืœื“ืช ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ืœื ื—ืœื”

GEMARA: The Sages taught the following interpretation of the verse: โ€œAnd it shall be that the firstborn that she bears shall be established in the name of his dead brother and his name will not be blotted out of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6). From here the Sages derive that the mitzva to consummate the levirate marriage is upon the eldest. The next phrase: โ€œThat she bears,โ€ is interpreted to exclude levirate marriage in the case of a widow who is an aylonit, who cannot bear children. From the next phrase: โ€œShall be established in the name of his dead brother,โ€ it is derived that the same brother who performs the mitzva of levirate marriage is established in his brotherโ€™s name with regard to inheritance, i.e., he inherits his brotherโ€™s property.

ืืชื” ืื•ืžืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ืื• ืื™ื ื• ืืœื ืœืฉื ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืงื•ืจื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืงื•ืจื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื”ื ื™ืงืจืื• ื‘ื ื—ืœืชื ืžื” ืฉื ื”ืืžื•ืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื ื—ืœื” ืืฃ ืฉื ื”ืืžื•ืจ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ื—ืœื”

The baraita continues and asks: Do you say that he succeeds in the name of his brother for inheritance, or perhaps it is only to inherit his name? If, e.g., the deceased brother was named Yosef, they must call the son born from levirate marriage Yosef, or if his name was Yoแธฅanan, then they must call him Yoแธฅanan. The baraita answers: It is stated here: โ€œHe shall succeed in the name of his brother,โ€ and it is stated there: โ€œThey shall be called after the name of their brothers in their inheritanceโ€ (Genesis 48:6). Just as the word โ€œnameโ€ stated there in Genesis is referring explicitly to inheritance, so too, the word โ€œnameโ€ stated here in Leviticus means with regard to inheritance.

ื•ืœื ื™ืžื—ื” ืฉืžื• ืคืจื˜ ืœืกืจื™ืก ืฉืฉืžื• ืžื—ื•ื™

The baraita continues to expound the next phrase of the verse: โ€œAnd his name will not be blotted out of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6). This excludes the case where the deceased was a eunuch, as his name is already blotted out, since it is impossible for him to have children.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืชื•ืจื” ื›ื•ืœื” ืื™ืŸ ืžืงืจื ื™ื•ืฆื ืžื™ื“ื™ ืคืฉื•ื˜ื• ื”ื›ื ืืชืื™ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืืคื™ืงืชื™ื” ืžืคืฉื˜ื™ื” ืœื’ืžืจื™

Rava said: Even though in the entire Torah a verse does not depart from its literal meaning, and even if the Sages offer a homiletical interpretation of the verses, the literal meaning remains intact, here the verbal analogy teaching that the word โ€œnameโ€ is referring to inheritance comes to remove the verse from its literal meaning altogether.

ื•ืื™ ืœืื• ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืฉื ืฉื ืžืžืฉ ืœืžืืŸ ืงืžื–ื”ืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื‘ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ืš ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืœื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ ืื‘ื™ื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื”

The Gemara asks: Were it not for the verbal analogy, would I have said that the meaning of the word โ€œnameโ€ is the actual name? The verse would be incomprehensible according to the literal reading. Whom is the Merciful One instructing in this verse? To whom does the possessive pronoun in the phrase โ€œhis brotherโ€ apply? If He is speaking to the yavam, He should have stated: Shall succeed in the name of your dead brother. And if the verse is instructing the court about the halakha in general, it should have said: Shall succeed in the name of his fatherโ€™s brother.

ื•ื“ืœืžื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืœื™ื‘ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ืืœื ืืชืื™ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืืคื™ืงืชื™ื” ืœื’ืžืจื™

The Gemara rejects this question: And perhaps this is what the Merciful One is saying to the court: Say to the yavam that the child born to him shall be established in the name of his brother. Were it not for the verbal analogy, the verse could have been understood according to its literal meaning. Rather, the verbal analogy comes to remove it from its literal meaning altogether.

ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืื™ืžื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื

The Gemara challenges the baraita: Now that you say that the verse: โ€œAnd it shall be that the firstborn that she bearsโ€ is written in reference to the eldest brother, say that the firstborn brother consummates the levirate marriage but that an ordinary brother, i.e., not the firstborn, may not consummate the levirate marriage, and that if the firstborn son is unable to enter into levirate marriage or is no longer alive, no one else may perform the mitzva.

ืื ื›ืŸ ืืฉืช ืื—ื™ื• ืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ื‘ืขื•ืœืžื• ื“ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœืžื” ืœื™

The Gemara answers: If so that the mitzva of levirate marriage applies only to the firstborn, then in the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, which the Merciful One excluded by the verse: โ€œIf brothers dwell together,โ€ why do I need such an exclusion? If only the firstborn is obligated to perform levirate marriage, then there is no need to separately exclude the case of a wife of oneโ€™s brother with whom one did not coexist, because by definition one in that position cannot be the firstborn.

ืคืจื™ืš ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ื‘ื•ื›ืจื ื“ืืžื ื”ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžืฆื™ืช ืืžืจืช ื“ื™ื‘ื•ื ื‘ื ื—ืœื” ืชืœื” ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื ื—ืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ืื‘ ื•ืœื ืžืŸ ื”ืื

Rav Aแธฅa refutes the Gemaraโ€™s answer: But say that the verse comes to exclude the case of a brother with whom one did not coexist when one is nevertheless the firstborn of the mother, e.g., if the father had two wives. The Gemara rejects this: You cannot say that, as the Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent upon inheritance, and inheritance comes from the father and not from the mother.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืชืชืงื™ื™ื ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ืชืชืงื™ื™ื ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ืžืช ืื—ื“ ืžื”ื ืžื™ ืœื ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื“ืžื™ืช ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืงื˜ืŸ

The Gemara again challenges the baraita: Then say that when there is a firstborn the mitzva of levirate marriage can be fulfilled by any of the brothers, but that when there is no firstborn, e.g., if he had already died, the mitzva of levirate marriage may not be fulfilled by any of the younger brothers. The Gemara answers: The verse states: โ€œAnd one of them diesโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), without specifying which brother dies. Are we not dealing even with the case where the firstborn died, and yet the Merciful One states that the younger brother should consummate the levirate marriage?

ื•ืื™ืžื ื“ืžื™ืช ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื”ื ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ืืฉืช ืื—ื™ื• ืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ื‘ืขื•ืœืžื•

The Gemara refutes this answer: Say that the case in the Torah is referring to when the younger brother died, and only then the Merciful One states that the firstborn must consummate the levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: Didnโ€™t the Merciful One explicitly exclude the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, which can apply only to a brother who was not the firstborn?

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืงื“ื ืงื˜ืŸ ื–ื›ื” ื•ืื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืงื“ื ืงื˜ืŸ ืœื ื–ื›ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ืฉื‘ื• ืื—ื™ื ื™ื—ื“ื• ื”ื•ืงืฉื” ื™ืฉื™ื‘ืช ืื—ื™ื ื–ื” ืœื–ื”

The Gemara challenges the halakha: Say that when there is no firstborn brother, if a younger brother went ahead and consummated the levirate marriage, then he acquires his yevama as a wife. But if there is a firstborn, and the younger brother went ahead and performed levirate marriage first, then he does not acquire his yevama as a wife, because the Torah specifies that the firstborn brother must perform the mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: The verse states: โ€œIf brothers dwell togetherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), implying that the brothersโ€™ dwellings were equated one with the other, and all the brothers are equally obligated in this mitzva.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ื”ื“ืจ ืื’ื“ื•ืœ ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ื—ื•ื–ืจื™ืŸ ืืฆืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืืœืžื” ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืงืฉื™ืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืœื ืจืฆื” ื”ื•ืœื›ื™ื ืืฆืœ ืื—ื™ื• ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ืœื ืจืฆื” ื—ื•ื–ืจื™ืŸ ืืฆืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœ

The Gemara challenges the halakha again: Then say: When there is a firstborn, let the mitzva return to the eldest brother if the other brothers refuse to perform levirate marriage. But when there is no firstborn, the court does not return to the eldest, as the mitzva primarily applies specifically to the firstborn, and if there is no firstborn, none of the brothers take precedence. Why did Abaye the Elder teach: It is a mitzva for the eldest of the brothers to consummate the levirate marriage? If the eldest did not wish to do so, then the court goes to his younger brother. If he also did not wish to do so, the court returns again to the eldest. This implies that the eldest, even if he is not the firstborn, has a greater mitzva than the younger brothers.

ื›ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืžื” ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื‘ื›ื•ืจืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ืืฃ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื•

The Gemara answers: Since it is derived that the eldest brother takes precedence from the verse about the firstborn, then just as with regard to the firstborn, his status as firstborn causes him to take precedence, so too, with regard to the eldest, his status as eldest causes him to take precedence.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ื‘ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ืฉืงื•ืœ ื ื—ืœื” ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ื‘ื ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื ืœื™ืฉืงื•ืœ ื ื—ืœื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ื•ื”ืจื™ ืงื

The Gemara challenges the halakha again: Then say that if the firstborn consummates the levirate marriage he receives his deceased brotherโ€™s inheritance, but if an ordinary brother consummates the levirate marriage he does not receive the inheritance. The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œThe firstborn that she bears shall be established in the name of his dead brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6), and if the younger brother performs levirate marriage he has established his brotherโ€™s name and thereby earns the inheritance.

ื•ืืœื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื“ืงืจื™ื™ื” ืจื—ืžื ื

The Gemara asks: But if there is no difference between the firstborn and the eldest, why does the Merciful One call the brother who enters levirate marriage the firstborn?

ืœืžืื™ ื”ืœื›ืชื ืœื’ืจื™ืขื•ืชื ืžื” ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื‘ืจืื•ื™ ื›ื‘ืžื•ื—ื–ืง ืืฃ ื”ืื™ ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื‘ืจืื•ื™ ื›ื‘ืžื•ื—ื–ืง

With regard to what halakha was that word written in the Torah? This is in order to limit the inheritance. Just as a firstborn does not take in inheritance property due as he does property possessed, but instead receives a double inheritance only from that property already in actual possession of their father, so too, this one who enters levirate marriage, whether firstborn or younger, does not take in inheritance property due as he does property possessed.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฉืคื—ื” ื•ื ืฉืชื—ืจืจื” ืื• ืขืœ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื” ื•ื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืœื ื™ื›ื ื•ืก ื•ืื ื›ื ืก ืื™ืŸ ืžื•ืฆื™ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื• ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืžืชื—ืช ื™ื“ื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื›ื ืก ื™ื•ืฆื™ื

MISHNA: One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. With regard to one who is suspected of illicit relations with a married woman and they, the judges of the court, removed her from her husband, i.e., required them to divorce due to this, even if the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently married her, he must divorce her.

ื’ืžืณ ื”ื ื’ื™ื•ืจืช ืžื™ื”ื ื”ื•ื™ื ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืื—ื“ ืื™ืฉ ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืืฉื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืืฉื” ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื” ืœืฉื•ื ืื™ืฉ ื•ื›ืŸ ืžื™ ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืฉื•ืœื—ืŸ ืžืœื›ื™ื ืœืฉื•ื ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืฉืœืžื” ืื™ื ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื ื—ืžื™ื”

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who is suspected of relations with a gentile woman who later converted may never marry her. This implies that she is, however, a convert, although it appears that she converted only in order that he might marry her. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: Both a man who converted for the sake of a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of a man, and similarly, one who converted for the sake of the kingโ€™s table, so that he could serve in a prestigious capacity, or for the sake of Solomonโ€™s servants, who were also considered prestigious, in all of these cases they are not converts; this is the statement of Rabbi Neแธฅemya.

ืฉื”ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื ื—ืžื™ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืจื™ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ื—ืœื•ืžื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ื•ืืกืชืจ ืื™ื ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื• ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื”

As Rabbi Neแธฅemya would say: With regard to converts by lions, i.e., forced converts such as the Samaritans [Kutim] described in IIย Kings (17:24โ€“25); and converts who convert based on their dreams; and converts of the time of Mordecai and Esther described in the verse, โ€œAnd many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen upon themโ€ (Esther 8:17); all of these are not converts until they are converted at this present time.

ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื” ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืืœื ืื™ืžื ื›ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื”

The Gemara clarifies the meaning of the words: Could it enter your mind to say only at this present time? Since he mentioned the converts of Mordecai and Esther, who were deceased before Rabbi Neแธฅemya made this statement, he therefore cannot possibly mean this phrase literally. Rather, say: Like at this present time, when the Jewish people are in exile and there is no material benefit to conversion.

ื”ื ืื™ืชืžืจ ืขืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืžืจืชื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื ื’ืจื™ื ื”ื

Returning to the question above: How could a woman who converted for the sake of a man be considered a true convert? The Gemara answers: But wasnโ€™t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that they are all converts.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื›ืชื—ืœื” ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ื”ืกืจ ืžืžืš ืขืงืฉื•ืช ืคื” ื•ืœื–ื•ืช ืฉืคืชื™ื ื•ื’ื•ืณ

The Gemara asks: If so, why is one suspected of relations with such a woman not permitted to enter into marriage with her ab initio as well? The Gemara answers: The reason for the prohibition is due to the following statement of Rav Asi. As Rav Asi said with regard to such cases: โ€œPut away from yourself a twisted mouth, and perverse lips put far from youโ€ (Proverbsย 4:24). If they were to marry, they would give substance to the prior suspicions.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื‘ืœื™ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ืœื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื™ื— ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื• ืœื ืงื‘ืœื• ื’ืจื™ื ืœื ื‘ื™ืžื™ ื“ื•ื“ ื•ืœื ื‘ื™ืžื™ ืฉืœืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืื™ ืงืจื ื”ืŸ ื’ื•ืจ ื™ื’ื•ืจ ืืคืก ืžืื•ืชื™ ืžื™ ื’ืจ ืืชืš ืขืœื™ืš ื™ืคื•ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืื™ื“ืš ืœื

The Sages taught: Converts are not accepted in the days of the Messiah. Similarly, they did not accept converts in the days of King David or in the days of King Solomon. Rabbi Eliezer said: What is the verse that hints at this halakha? โ€œBehold, they may gather together [gor yagur], but without Me; whosoever shall gather together [gar] with you shall fall on yoursโ€ (Isaiah 54:15). The word gor implies that only a convert [ger] who becomes part of the Jewish people when the Jews are living in exile, at a time when God is not clearly revealed, i.e., โ€œwithout Me,โ€ are considered part of the Jewish people. But another who wishes to convert in a time when God is clearly revealed shall not be accepted.

ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื•ื‘ืขื“ื™ื

ยง The mishna states that one who was suspected of relations with a married woman may not marry her even after she divorces her husband. Even if they marry without permission, they must divorce. Rav said: This is only in a case when there were witnesses to her infidelity, and because of their testimony the court required her first husband divorce her. However, if her first husband divorced her due to suspicion and rumors but without witnesses, her second husband would not be obligated to divorce her.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžื™ื ื ื›ื™ ื ื™ื™ื ื•ืฉื›ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื”ืื™ ืฉืžืขืชืชื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื• ื•ื ืชื’ืจืฉื” ืžืชื—ืช ื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจ ืื ื›ื ืก ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื

Rav Sheshet said: I say that when Rav was dozing or sleeping he said that halakha, and it is mistaken. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who was suspected of adultery with a married woman and as a result the court requires her husband to divorce her, and later she married someone else and was then divorced by this other, if the one who had been suspected of illicit relations with her then married her, he need not divorce her.

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ื›ื™ ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื™ ืืœื ืœืื• ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ื”ื ืœืื• ื”ื›ื™ ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara clarifies this: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a case where there are witnesses to their adultery, when another came and put an end to the rumor of her misconduct by marrying her, what of it? If there were witnesses, the adulterers may never marry each other. Rather, is it not referring to a case where there were no witnesses to the adultery, and the reason she does not have to be divorced from her third husband, with whom she committed adultery while married to her first husband, is specifically because another came and, by marrying her, put an end to the rumor? This implies that were it not so, i.e., had she not married someone else before marrying the man suspected of committing adultery with her, the court would have removed her from him and required them to divorce, even without witnesses to their adultery. This contradicts Ravโ€™s statement above that they must divorce only if there were witnesses to the infidelity.

ืืžืจ ืœืš ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ืื™ ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืœื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ื“ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืœื›ืชื—ืœื” ืœื ื™ื›ื ื•ืก

The Gemara responds: Rav could have said to you that the same is true even if another did not come and put an end to the rumor by marrying her. The same principle applies: If there were witnesses to the adultery the court removes her and requires them to divorce, but if there were no witnesses, the court does not remove her. And this is what the baraita is saying: The novelty in this baraita is that even though another came and put an end to the rumor by marrying her, nevertheless, the suspected adulterer may not marry her ab initio due to the original suspicions.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื‘ืžื” ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืืžื•ืจื™ื ื›ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ืชืฆื ื•ืื ื‘ืื• ืขื“ื™ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื›ืžื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืชืฆื

The Gemara raises an objection from a different baraita that qualifies the previous one: In what case is this statement, that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer, said? It is when she has no children from her first husband. But if she has children from him, she is not required to be divorced from the suspected adulterer. On the contrary, if they were required to divorce, it could strengthen the original rumor and others might suspect that her children are mamzerim. However, if witnesses to her impurity, i.e., her adultery, came and testified that she had relations with this man while she was married, then even if she has several children from the first husband, she is required to be divorced. This implies that a woman without children from her first husband must separate from a man suspected of illicit relations with her on strength of suspicion alone.

ืจื‘ ืžื•ืงื™ ืœื” ืœืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื” ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืžืื™ ื“ื•ื—ืงื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืœืื•ืงืžื™ ืœืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื” ืขื“ื™ื ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืœื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ืœื•ืงืžื” ื‘ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื

The Gemara answers and explains that Rav establishes the mishna as referring only to a case where she has children by her first husband and there are witnesses to her adultery. In such a situation, she and the adulterer must divorce, but without witnesses they are not required to divorce. The Gemara asks: What forced Rav to establish the mishna as referring to a case where she has children and there are witnesses and explain that the reason that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer is because there were witnesses, but that if there were no witnesses they do not remove her? Why does he not establish the mishna as referring to a case where there were no children and that they must divorce even if there were no witnesses?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืงืฉื™ืชื™ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื” ืืœื ื›ืœ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื‘ืขื“ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืžืคืงื™

Rava said: The language of the mishna was difficult for him; due to that he deemed it necessary to interpret it as he did. Why does the tanna specifically teach: They remove her from him [hotziuha]? Let it teach: He divorces her [hotziah] in the singular. Rather, every time the plural form: They remove her, is used, it is referring to the judges of the court. And a court removes a woman from her suspected adulterer only if there were witnesses, and not due to suspicion alone.

ื•ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื”ื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ื™ืชื ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื•ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืฆื ื•ืืฉื” ื—ื•ื’ืจืช ื‘ืกื™ื ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื›ื•ืขืจ ื”ื“ื‘ืจ ืชืฆื ืจื•ืง ืœืžืขืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ื›ื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื›ื•ืขืจ ื”ื“ื‘ืจ ืชืฆื

If you wish, say a different answer for Ravโ€™s explanation: Those baraitot that require the wife and the suspected adulterer to divorce even without witnesses to the adultery are taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a husband saw a peddler leaving the house, and when he entered he found his wife retying her smock [sinar], i.e., putting her clothes back on, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter because it looks as though she committed adultery with the peddler, she must be divorced by her husband. Alternatively, if the husband entered after the peddler had left and found saliva above the netting of the bed, implying that someone had lain on the bed and spit upward, although no actual act was witnessed, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 24

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Yevamot 24

ื”ืชื ืื™ ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื™ืฉ ื–ื™ืงื” ื™ืฉ ื–ื™ืงื” ื•ืื™ ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืืกื•ืจ ืœื‘ื˜ืœ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ืžื™ืŸ ืืกื•ืจ ืœื‘ื˜ืœ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ืžื™ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื›ืœ ื—ื“ ื•ื—ื“ ืื™ืžื•ืจ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ืžืชืจืžื™ื ืœื™ื”

There, in that mishna, if it is according to the one who said that the levirate bond is substantial, then there is a bond in that case, as two sisters were certainly married to the brothers and require levirate marriage. And if it is according to the one who said that it is prohibited to nullify the levirate mitzva through marrying the sister of the yevama, then the explanation of that mishna is that it is prohibited to nullify the levirate mitzva and for this reason they must perform แธฅalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. However, here, in this mishna, there is uncertainty concerning the betrothal such that with regard to each one of the brothers, one could say that possibly he encountered his own yevama. Perhaps each brother took his own brotherโ€™s wife in levirate marriage, and for this reason the Sages did not issue a decree.

ืงื“ืžื• ื•ื›ื ืกื• ืื™ืŸ ืžื•ืฆื™ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืณ ืชื ื™ ืฉื™ืœื ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ื›ื”ื ื™ื ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ืกืคืง ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ืœื ื’ื–ืจื• ื‘ื”ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ

ยง The mishna states that if they married their wives before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage. Sheila teaches a baraita that clarifies the mishna: And this is the case even if both of the brothers were priests. A woman who performed แธฅalitza is normally forbidden to a priest, yet in this case, although the brother of the other man performed แธฅalitza, they are not required to divorce. What is the reason for this halakha? It is as follows: A แธฅalutza is forbidden to a priest by rabbinic law because her status is similar to that of a divorcรฉe, who is forbidden to a priest by Torah law. And in a case of uncertainty as to whether she is a แธฅalutza, since it may not have been her yavam who performed the ceremony, the Sages did not issue a decree.

ื•ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ื—ืœื•ืฆื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืืฉื” ืžื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืงืจื ืืกืžื›ืชื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื

The Gemara asks: And is the prohibition against a แธฅalutza marrying a priest really by rabbinic law? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: โ€œThey shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband; for he is holy unto his Godโ€ (Leviticusย 21:7). I have derived only a divorcรฉe; from where do I derive that a priest may not marry a แธฅalutza? The verse states: โ€œNeither shall they take a woman.โ€ The repetition of the word โ€œwomanโ€ extends the halakha to include a แธฅalutza. The Gemara answers: This prohibition is by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ื•ืื ืงื“ื ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ื–ื›ื”

MISHNA: It is a mitzva for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage, i.e., the eldest takes precedence over the other brothers, though they too are obligated. But if the younger brother consummated the levirate marriage first, he acquires the yevama as his wife.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ื”ื™ื” ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืžื™ื›ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืืฉืจ ืชืœื“ ืคืจื˜ ืœืื™ืœื•ื ื™ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืœื“ืช ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ืœื ื—ืœื”

GEMARA: The Sages taught the following interpretation of the verse: โ€œAnd it shall be that the firstborn that she bears shall be established in the name of his dead brother and his name will not be blotted out of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6). From here the Sages derive that the mitzva to consummate the levirate marriage is upon the eldest. The next phrase: โ€œThat she bears,โ€ is interpreted to exclude levirate marriage in the case of a widow who is an aylonit, who cannot bear children. From the next phrase: โ€œShall be established in the name of his dead brother,โ€ it is derived that the same brother who performs the mitzva of levirate marriage is established in his brotherโ€™s name with regard to inheritance, i.e., he inherits his brotherโ€™s property.

ืืชื” ืื•ืžืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ืื• ืื™ื ื• ืืœื ืœืฉื ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืงื•ืจื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืงื•ืจื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื”ื ื™ืงืจืื• ื‘ื ื—ืœืชื ืžื” ืฉื ื”ืืžื•ืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื ื—ืœื” ืืฃ ืฉื ื”ืืžื•ืจ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ื—ืœื”

The baraita continues and asks: Do you say that he succeeds in the name of his brother for inheritance, or perhaps it is only to inherit his name? If, e.g., the deceased brother was named Yosef, they must call the son born from levirate marriage Yosef, or if his name was Yoแธฅanan, then they must call him Yoแธฅanan. The baraita answers: It is stated here: โ€œHe shall succeed in the name of his brother,โ€ and it is stated there: โ€œThey shall be called after the name of their brothers in their inheritanceโ€ (Genesis 48:6). Just as the word โ€œnameโ€ stated there in Genesis is referring explicitly to inheritance, so too, the word โ€œnameโ€ stated here in Leviticus means with regard to inheritance.

ื•ืœื ื™ืžื—ื” ืฉืžื• ืคืจื˜ ืœืกืจื™ืก ืฉืฉืžื• ืžื—ื•ื™

The baraita continues to expound the next phrase of the verse: โ€œAnd his name will not be blotted out of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6). This excludes the case where the deceased was a eunuch, as his name is already blotted out, since it is impossible for him to have children.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืชื•ืจื” ื›ื•ืœื” ืื™ืŸ ืžืงืจื ื™ื•ืฆื ืžื™ื“ื™ ืคืฉื•ื˜ื• ื”ื›ื ืืชืื™ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืืคื™ืงืชื™ื” ืžืคืฉื˜ื™ื” ืœื’ืžืจื™

Rava said: Even though in the entire Torah a verse does not depart from its literal meaning, and even if the Sages offer a homiletical interpretation of the verses, the literal meaning remains intact, here the verbal analogy teaching that the word โ€œnameโ€ is referring to inheritance comes to remove the verse from its literal meaning altogether.

ื•ืื™ ืœืื• ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืฉื ืฉื ืžืžืฉ ืœืžืืŸ ืงืžื–ื”ืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื‘ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ืš ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืœื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ ืื‘ื™ื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื”

The Gemara asks: Were it not for the verbal analogy, would I have said that the meaning of the word โ€œnameโ€ is the actual name? The verse would be incomprehensible according to the literal reading. Whom is the Merciful One instructing in this verse? To whom does the possessive pronoun in the phrase โ€œhis brotherโ€ apply? If He is speaking to the yavam, He should have stated: Shall succeed in the name of your dead brother. And if the verse is instructing the court about the halakha in general, it should have said: Shall succeed in the name of his fatherโ€™s brother.

ื•ื“ืœืžื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืœื™ื‘ื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ืืœื ืืชืื™ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืืคื™ืงืชื™ื” ืœื’ืžืจื™

The Gemara rejects this question: And perhaps this is what the Merciful One is saying to the court: Say to the yavam that the child born to him shall be established in the name of his brother. Were it not for the verbal analogy, the verse could have been understood according to its literal meaning. Rather, the verbal analogy comes to remove it from its literal meaning altogether.

ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืงืจื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืื™ืžื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื

The Gemara challenges the baraita: Now that you say that the verse: โ€œAnd it shall be that the firstborn that she bearsโ€ is written in reference to the eldest brother, say that the firstborn brother consummates the levirate marriage but that an ordinary brother, i.e., not the firstborn, may not consummate the levirate marriage, and that if the firstborn son is unable to enter into levirate marriage or is no longer alive, no one else may perform the mitzva.

ืื ื›ืŸ ืืฉืช ืื—ื™ื• ืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ื‘ืขื•ืœืžื• ื“ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœืžื” ืœื™

The Gemara answers: If so that the mitzva of levirate marriage applies only to the firstborn, then in the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, which the Merciful One excluded by the verse: โ€œIf brothers dwell together,โ€ why do I need such an exclusion? If only the firstborn is obligated to perform levirate marriage, then there is no need to separately exclude the case of a wife of oneโ€™s brother with whom one did not coexist, because by definition one in that position cannot be the firstborn.

ืคืจื™ืš ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ื‘ื•ื›ืจื ื“ืืžื ื”ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžืฆื™ืช ืืžืจืช ื“ื™ื‘ื•ื ื‘ื ื—ืœื” ืชืœื” ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื ื—ืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ืื‘ ื•ืœื ืžืŸ ื”ืื

Rav Aแธฅa refutes the Gemaraโ€™s answer: But say that the verse comes to exclude the case of a brother with whom one did not coexist when one is nevertheless the firstborn of the mother, e.g., if the father had two wives. The Gemara rejects this: You cannot say that, as the Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent upon inheritance, and inheritance comes from the father and not from the mother.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืชืชืงื™ื™ื ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ืชืชืงื™ื™ื ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ืžืช ืื—ื“ ืžื”ื ืžื™ ืœื ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื“ืžื™ืช ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืงื˜ืŸ

The Gemara again challenges the baraita: Then say that when there is a firstborn the mitzva of levirate marriage can be fulfilled by any of the brothers, but that when there is no firstborn, e.g., if he had already died, the mitzva of levirate marriage may not be fulfilled by any of the younger brothers. The Gemara answers: The verse states: โ€œAnd one of them diesโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), without specifying which brother dies. Are we not dealing even with the case where the firstborn died, and yet the Merciful One states that the younger brother should consummate the levirate marriage?

ื•ืื™ืžื ื“ืžื™ืช ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื”ื ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ืืฉืช ืื—ื™ื• ืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ื‘ืขื•ืœืžื•

The Gemara refutes this answer: Say that the case in the Torah is referring to when the younger brother died, and only then the Merciful One states that the firstborn must consummate the levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: Didnโ€™t the Merciful One explicitly exclude the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, which can apply only to a brother who was not the firstborn?

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืงื“ื ืงื˜ืŸ ื–ื›ื” ื•ืื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืงื“ื ืงื˜ืŸ ืœื ื–ื›ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ืฉื‘ื• ืื—ื™ื ื™ื—ื“ื• ื”ื•ืงืฉื” ื™ืฉื™ื‘ืช ืื—ื™ื ื–ื” ืœื–ื”

The Gemara challenges the halakha: Say that when there is no firstborn brother, if a younger brother went ahead and consummated the levirate marriage, then he acquires his yevama as a wife. But if there is a firstborn, and the younger brother went ahead and performed levirate marriage first, then he does not acquire his yevama as a wife, because the Torah specifies that the firstborn brother must perform the mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: The verse states: โ€œIf brothers dwell togetherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), implying that the brothersโ€™ dwellings were equated one with the other, and all the brothers are equally obligated in this mitzva.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ื”ื“ืจ ืื’ื“ื•ืœ ื›ื™ ืœื™ื›ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ื—ื•ื–ืจื™ืŸ ืืฆืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืืœืžื” ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืงืฉื™ืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœื™ื™ื‘ื ืœื ืจืฆื” ื”ื•ืœื›ื™ื ืืฆืœ ืื—ื™ื• ื”ืงื˜ืŸ ืœื ืจืฆื” ื—ื•ื–ืจื™ืŸ ืืฆืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœ

The Gemara challenges the halakha again: Then say: When there is a firstborn, let the mitzva return to the eldest brother if the other brothers refuse to perform levirate marriage. But when there is no firstborn, the court does not return to the eldest, as the mitzva primarily applies specifically to the firstborn, and if there is no firstborn, none of the brothers take precedence. Why did Abaye the Elder teach: It is a mitzva for the eldest of the brothers to consummate the levirate marriage? If the eldest did not wish to do so, then the court goes to his younger brother. If he also did not wish to do so, the court returns again to the eldest. This implies that the eldest, even if he is not the firstborn, has a greater mitzva than the younger brothers.

ื›ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืžื” ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื‘ื›ื•ืจืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ืืฃ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื’ื“ื•ืœืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื•

The Gemara answers: Since it is derived that the eldest brother takes precedence from the verse about the firstborn, then just as with regard to the firstborn, his status as firstborn causes him to take precedence, so too, with regard to the eldest, his status as eldest causes him to take precedence.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ื‘ื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื™ืฉืงื•ืœ ื ื—ืœื” ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ื‘ื ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื ืœื™ืฉืงื•ืœ ื ื—ืœื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื™ืงื•ื ืขืœ ืฉื ืื—ื™ื• ื•ื”ืจื™ ืงื

The Gemara challenges the halakha again: Then say that if the firstborn consummates the levirate marriage he receives his deceased brotherโ€™s inheritance, but if an ordinary brother consummates the levirate marriage he does not receive the inheritance. The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œThe firstborn that she bears shall be established in the name of his dead brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:6), and if the younger brother performs levirate marriage he has established his brotherโ€™s name and thereby earns the inheritance.

ื•ืืœื ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื“ืงืจื™ื™ื” ืจื—ืžื ื

The Gemara asks: But if there is no difference between the firstborn and the eldest, why does the Merciful One call the brother who enters levirate marriage the firstborn?

ืœืžืื™ ื”ืœื›ืชื ืœื’ืจื™ืขื•ืชื ืžื” ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื‘ืจืื•ื™ ื›ื‘ืžื•ื—ื–ืง ืืฃ ื”ืื™ ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื‘ืจืื•ื™ ื›ื‘ืžื•ื—ื–ืง

With regard to what halakha was that word written in the Torah? This is in order to limit the inheritance. Just as a firstborn does not take in inheritance property due as he does property possessed, but instead receives a double inheritance only from that property already in actual possession of their father, so too, this one who enters levirate marriage, whether firstborn or younger, does not take in inheritance property due as he does property possessed.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฉืคื—ื” ื•ื ืฉืชื—ืจืจื” ืื• ืขืœ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื” ื•ื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืœื ื™ื›ื ื•ืก ื•ืื ื›ื ืก ืื™ืŸ ืžื•ืฆื™ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื• ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืžืชื—ืช ื™ื“ื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื›ื ืก ื™ื•ืฆื™ื

MISHNA: One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. With regard to one who is suspected of illicit relations with a married woman and they, the judges of the court, removed her from her husband, i.e., required them to divorce due to this, even if the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently married her, he must divorce her.

ื’ืžืณ ื”ื ื’ื™ื•ืจืช ืžื™ื”ื ื”ื•ื™ื ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืื—ื“ ืื™ืฉ ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืืฉื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืืฉื” ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื” ืœืฉื•ื ืื™ืฉ ื•ื›ืŸ ืžื™ ืฉื ืชื’ื™ื™ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืฉื•ืœื—ืŸ ืžืœื›ื™ื ืœืฉื•ื ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืฉืœืžื” ืื™ื ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื ื—ืžื™ื”

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who is suspected of relations with a gentile woman who later converted may never marry her. This implies that she is, however, a convert, although it appears that she converted only in order that he might marry her. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: Both a man who converted for the sake of a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of a man, and similarly, one who converted for the sake of the kingโ€™s table, so that he could serve in a prestigious capacity, or for the sake of Solomonโ€™s servants, who were also considered prestigious, in all of these cases they are not converts; this is the statement of Rabbi Neแธฅemya.

ืฉื”ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื ื—ืžื™ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืจื™ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ื—ืœื•ืžื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ื™ืจื™ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ื•ืืกืชืจ ืื™ื ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื’ื™ื™ืจื• ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื”

As Rabbi Neแธฅemya would say: With regard to converts by lions, i.e., forced converts such as the Samaritans [Kutim] described in IIย Kings (17:24โ€“25); and converts who convert based on their dreams; and converts of the time of Mordecai and Esther described in the verse, โ€œAnd many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen upon themโ€ (Esther 8:17); all of these are not converts until they are converted at this present time.

ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื” ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืืœื ืื™ืžื ื›ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ื–ื”

The Gemara clarifies the meaning of the words: Could it enter your mind to say only at this present time? Since he mentioned the converts of Mordecai and Esther, who were deceased before Rabbi Neแธฅemya made this statement, he therefore cannot possibly mean this phrase literally. Rather, say: Like at this present time, when the Jewish people are in exile and there is no material benefit to conversion.

ื”ื ืื™ืชืžืจ ืขืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืžืจืชื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื ื’ืจื™ื ื”ื

Returning to the question above: How could a woman who converted for the sake of a man be considered a true convert? The Gemara answers: But wasnโ€™t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rav Yitzแธฅak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that they are all converts.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื›ืชื—ืœื” ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ื”ืกืจ ืžืžืš ืขืงืฉื•ืช ืคื” ื•ืœื–ื•ืช ืฉืคืชื™ื ื•ื’ื•ืณ

The Gemara asks: If so, why is one suspected of relations with such a woman not permitted to enter into marriage with her ab initio as well? The Gemara answers: The reason for the prohibition is due to the following statement of Rav Asi. As Rav Asi said with regard to such cases: โ€œPut away from yourself a twisted mouth, and perverse lips put far from youโ€ (Proverbsย 4:24). If they were to marry, they would give substance to the prior suspicions.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื‘ืœื™ืŸ ื’ืจื™ื ืœื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื™ื— ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื• ืœื ืงื‘ืœื• ื’ืจื™ื ืœื ื‘ื™ืžื™ ื“ื•ื“ ื•ืœื ื‘ื™ืžื™ ืฉืœืžื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืื™ ืงืจื ื”ืŸ ื’ื•ืจ ื™ื’ื•ืจ ืืคืก ืžืื•ืชื™ ืžื™ ื’ืจ ืืชืš ืขืœื™ืš ื™ืคื•ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืื™ื“ืš ืœื

The Sages taught: Converts are not accepted in the days of the Messiah. Similarly, they did not accept converts in the days of King David or in the days of King Solomon. Rabbi Eliezer said: What is the verse that hints at this halakha? โ€œBehold, they may gather together [gor yagur], but without Me; whosoever shall gather together [gar] with you shall fall on yoursโ€ (Isaiah 54:15). The word gor implies that only a convert [ger] who becomes part of the Jewish people when the Jews are living in exile, at a time when God is not clearly revealed, i.e., โ€œwithout Me,โ€ are considered part of the Jewish people. But another who wishes to convert in a time when God is clearly revealed shall not be accepted.

ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื•ื‘ืขื“ื™ื

ยง The mishna states that one who was suspected of relations with a married woman may not marry her even after she divorces her husband. Even if they marry without permission, they must divorce. Rav said: This is only in a case when there were witnesses to her infidelity, and because of their testimony the court required her first husband divorce her. However, if her first husband divorced her due to suspicion and rumors but without witnesses, her second husband would not be obligated to divorce her.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžื™ื ื ื›ื™ ื ื™ื™ื ื•ืฉื›ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื”ืื™ ืฉืžืขืชืชื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืขืœ ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื• ื•ื ืชื’ืจืฉื” ืžืชื—ืช ื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจ ืื ื›ื ืก ืœื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื

Rav Sheshet said: I say that when Rav was dozing or sleeping he said that halakha, and it is mistaken. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who was suspected of adultery with a married woman and as a result the court requires her husband to divorce her, and later she married someone else and was then divorced by this other, if the one who had been suspected of illicit relations with her then married her, he need not divorce her.

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ื›ื™ ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื™ ืืœื ืœืื• ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ื”ื ืœืื• ื”ื›ื™ ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara clarifies this: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a case where there are witnesses to their adultery, when another came and put an end to the rumor of her misconduct by marrying her, what of it? If there were witnesses, the adulterers may never marry each other. Rather, is it not referring to a case where there were no witnesses to the adultery, and the reason she does not have to be divorced from her third husband, with whom she committed adultery while married to her first husband, is specifically because another came and, by marrying her, put an end to the rumor? This implies that were it not so, i.e., had she not married someone else before marrying the man suspected of committing adultery with her, the court would have removed her from him and required them to divorce, even without witnesses to their adultery. This contradicts Ravโ€™s statement above that they must divorce only if there were witnesses to the infidelity.

ืืžืจ ืœืš ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ืื™ ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืœื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ื“ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืืชื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืคืกืงื™ื” ืœืงืœื ืœื›ืชื—ืœื” ืœื ื™ื›ื ื•ืก

The Gemara responds: Rav could have said to you that the same is true even if another did not come and put an end to the rumor by marrying her. The same principle applies: If there were witnesses to the adultery the court removes her and requires them to divorce, but if there were no witnesses, the court does not remove her. And this is what the baraita is saying: The novelty in this baraita is that even though another came and put an end to the rumor by marrying her, nevertheless, the suspected adulterer may not marry her ab initio due to the original suspicions.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื‘ืžื” ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืืžื•ืจื™ื ื›ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ืชืฆื ื•ืื ื‘ืื• ืขื“ื™ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื›ืžื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืชืฆื

The Gemara raises an objection from a different baraita that qualifies the previous one: In what case is this statement, that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer, said? It is when she has no children from her first husband. But if she has children from him, she is not required to be divorced from the suspected adulterer. On the contrary, if they were required to divorce, it could strengthen the original rumor and others might suspect that her children are mamzerim. However, if witnesses to her impurity, i.e., her adultery, came and testified that she had relations with this man while she was married, then even if she has several children from the first husband, she is required to be divorced. This implies that a woman without children from her first husband must separate from a man suspected of illicit relations with her on strength of suspicion alone.

ืจื‘ ืžื•ืงื™ ืœื” ืœืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื” ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืžืื™ ื“ื•ื—ืงื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืœืื•ืงืžื™ ืœืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืฉ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื” ืขื“ื™ื ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื ืœื ืžืคืงื™ื ืŸ ืœื•ืงืžื” ื‘ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื‘ื ื™ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื“ื™ื

The Gemara answers and explains that Rav establishes the mishna as referring only to a case where she has children by her first husband and there are witnesses to her adultery. In such a situation, she and the adulterer must divorce, but without witnesses they are not required to divorce. The Gemara asks: What forced Rav to establish the mishna as referring to a case where she has children and there are witnesses and explain that the reason that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer is because there were witnesses, but that if there were no witnesses they do not remove her? Why does he not establish the mishna as referring to a case where there were no children and that they must divorce even if there were no witnesses?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืงืฉื™ืชื™ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื” ืืœื ื›ืœ ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื•ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื‘ืขื“ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืžืคืงื™

Rava said: The language of the mishna was difficult for him; due to that he deemed it necessary to interpret it as he did. Why does the tanna specifically teach: They remove her from him [hotziuha]? Let it teach: He divorces her [hotziah] in the singular. Rather, every time the plural form: They remove her, is used, it is referring to the judges of the court. And a court removes a woman from her suspected adulterer only if there were witnesses, and not due to suspicion alone.

ื•ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื”ื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ื™ืชื ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื•ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืฆื ื•ืืฉื” ื—ื•ื’ืจืช ื‘ืกื™ื ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื›ื•ืขืจ ื”ื“ื‘ืจ ืชืฆื ืจื•ืง ืœืžืขืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ื›ื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื›ื•ืขืจ ื”ื“ื‘ืจ ืชืฆื

If you wish, say a different answer for Ravโ€™s explanation: Those baraitot that require the wife and the suspected adulterer to divorce even without witnesses to the adultery are taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a husband saw a peddler leaving the house, and when he entered he found his wife retying her smock [sinar], i.e., putting her clothes back on, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter because it looks as though she committed adultery with the peddler, she must be divorced by her husband. Alternatively, if the husband entered after the peddler had left and found saliva above the netting of the bed, implying that someone had lain on the bed and spit upward, although no actual act was witnessed, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced.

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