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Today's Daf Yomi

April 14, 2022 | 讬状讙 讘谞讬住谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 38

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Elisa Hartstein in honor of her oldest daughter finishing her army service today “also in tremendous appreciation for all of our Chayalot and Chayalim, present and past, who make our lives here in Israel possible every single day.”

Today’s daf is sponsored by Mona & David Schwartz and family in loving memory of Mary Horowitz, Miriam Etel bat Aharon Halevi & Mirel Meltzer on her 28th yahrzeit. “She was a woman whose home exemplified hachanasat orchim.”聽

Today’s daf is sponsored by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her maternal grandmother, Betty Egert Landesman, Baila Toibe bat Avraham Aryeh ve-Tsirel Devorah, and her paternal grandfather, Jacob Katchen, Yaakov ben Meyer Zev ve-Malka Rashe, on their 40th yahrzeit. “Though we lost them too soon, and did not have an official shiva period that snowy Erev Pesach in 1982, their legacy of the centrality of family, commitment to community, tradition, and so much more, has stayed with us all these years. Yehi zichram baruch.”聽

In a case where the child was potentially born to the first husband or to the yabam (if yibum was performed within three months of the death and she was pregnant soon after), in what cases can the child inherit from one father or the other or the grandfather? Mostly his claims are unsubstantiated, however, in cases where he has a definitive claim, he can collect. When a woman is waiting for yibum, what is the status of her property? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that she can sell her property at her will as her potential yabam has no rights to her possessions. But if she dies, they disagree about who inherits her property 鈥 does it go back to her family or does it go to the yabam? Four different explanations are brought to explain the Mishna and the difference between the two parts of the Mishna 鈥 why do they both agree about the first case that the woman has clear rights to the property, but disagree about the second? According to Ulla, they are each referring to a different situation 鈥 the first part is a woman who was only engaged to the man who died and the second part is one who is married. Her relationship to the yabam in the first part is considered safek (a case of doubt) engaged to her and in the second part, safek married. According to Raba, in both cases she was married; the difference is that in the first part she was still alive, in which case her claim to the property is stronger than in the second part when she is no longer alive and the people claiming rights to it each don鈥檛 have a clear claim to the property (even though the yabam is the one with a better claim on it as it is in his possession). Therefore, in the second part, Beit Shamai rules that they split the property. Abaye questions Raba – does Beit Shamai really hold that in a case where one has a definitive claim and the other鈥檚 claim is not definitive (safek), does the one with a definitive claim have full rights to the object in question? This question is strengthened by a Mishna in Bava Batra 157 regarding a house that falls and kills a man and his father, and it is unclear who died first and a dispute ensues between the heirs of the son and those to who he owes money. Beit Shamai rules that they split it. Why wouldn鈥檛 the heirs be considered as if they have a definitive claim while the creditors do not? Beit Shamai gives them rights to it for a different reason, which is proven by laws of a Sotah whose husband dies before drinking the Sotah waters. Beit Shamai rules that she can collect her ketuba聽even though she does not have a definitive claim. It seems it can be collected because a document that is ready to be collected is considered as if it is already collected. Why didn鈥檛 Abaye question Raba from the Sotah case? Perhaps a ketuba聽is different as it was instituted to protect the women in order to encourage them to get married and therefore it is able to be collected even without a definitive claim. Why didn鈥檛 Abaye question Raba from the ketuba聽in our Mishna where the woman鈥檚 family has a non-definitive claim to her money while the yabam has a definitive claim (as the property is in his possession) and yet they split the proceeds according to Beit Shamai? To answer that question, they reread the Mishna and claim that Beit Shamai wasn鈥檛 relating to that case. 聽Abaye brings a third explanation of the two parts of the Mishna by distinguishing between when the property came to the woman. The first part is referring to property given to her when she was waiting for yibum, therefore the yabam has no claim to the property. The second was referring to property that was given to her when she was married to the first husband, which would then go by default to the yabam upon the husband鈥檚 death.

讚专讻讬 讞讚 讙讘讱 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬

my one path is with you in one of your pieces of land. Since his claim is based on facts that are clear and certain, his claim is successful. However, here, in the dispute over the inheritance, is the son of uncertain descent able to state a claim like this? Although the son of uncertain descent claims that ultimately, whatever the nature of his relationship with the deceased is, he should have the right to inherit, nevertheless, since it is not actually known what that relationship is, his claim in reality is merely a composite of uncertain claims.

讜专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 砖转拽转 砖转拽转 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪讛讚专谞讗 砖讟专讗 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讜诇讗 诪爪讬转 诇讗砖转注讜讬讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讬讛讜 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬

And Rabbi Yirmeya could have said to you: I stated my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, since perhaps the Rabbis state their ruling only there, in the case of the lost path, because the owner of the surrounding land said to the field owner: If you do not press your claim and are silent, then be silent and I will sell you the path at a reasonable price; but if not, then I will return the bills of purchase of the pieces of land to their previous owners and then you will not be able to successfully engage in a legal dispute with them. He is successful with this claim because it is within his power to return the fields and thereby recreate the original circumstances in which the owner of the field would forfeit the path. However, here, are the sons of the yavam able to state a claim like this? The original circumstance, in which the inheritance of the deceased had still not been divided, cannot be recreated. Therefore, a claim based on that circumstance will be unsuccessful.

住驻拽 讜讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 住讘讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讗讬 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讬讘诐 讗诪专 讗转 讘专讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗转 讜诇讬转 诇讱 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬

The Gemara brings another case, that of one of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, and the yavam who came to divide up the possessions of the grandfather, i.e., the father of the yavam and the deceased, and each one made a claim to the inheritance. The son of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore half of the possessions are mine because the inheritance should be split between the two sons, i.e., the deceased and the yavam, and since I am the sole heir of the deceased, I should receive his portion. The yavam said to him: You are my son, and therefore you have absolutely no rights to the possessions; rather, I should receive all the inheritance. One half is mine because I am the grandfather鈥檚 son, and the other half, which would have gone to my deceased brother, I should receive by virtue of the fact that I consummated the levirate marriage with his widow.

讛讜讬 讬讘诐 讜讚讗讬 讜住驻拽 住驻拽 讜讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

The Gemara rules on this case: This is a case in which the yavam has a definite claim because he is the grandfather鈥檚 son, and the son of uncertain descent has only an uncertain claim, and the halakha is that one with an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it. Therefore, the yavam receives all the inheritance.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 住讘讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜诪谞转讗 讗讬转 诇讱 讘讛讚谉

The Gemara raises yet another case, that of one of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, and the sons of the yavam who came to divide up the possessions of the grandfather, and each one made a claim to the inheritance. The son of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore half of the possessions are mine because the inheritance should be split between the two sons, i.e., the deceased and the yavam, and since I am the lone heir of the deceased I should receive his portion. And the sons of the yavam said: You are our brother, and therefore you should receive only a portion together with us.

驻诇讙讗 讚拽诪讜讚讬 诇讛讜 砖拽诇讬 转讬诇转讗 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 砖拽诇 驻砖 诇讛讜 讚谞拽讗 讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜讞讜诇拽讬谉

The Gemara rules on this case: The half of the grandfather鈥檚 possessions that the son of uncertain descent concedes belongs to them, the sons of the yavam, they take for themselves. By claiming to be the son of the brother who died first, he forfeits any rights to the other brother鈥檚 portion. The third of the grandfather鈥檚 possessions that the sons of the yavam concede belong to him, the son of uncertain descent, he takes for himself. By claiming he is their brother, they admit that he should at least receive an equal portion to them, which would mean one-third if they are three. This leaves them with one-sixth [danka] of the possessions that is property of uncertain ownership, and so they should divide it up between them.

住讘讗 讜讬讘诐 讘谞讻住讬 住驻拽 讗讜 住讘讗 讜住驻拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐

The Gemara presents two additional cases. One is a case where a son of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, died, and the grandfather and the yavam come to divide up the possessions of the son of uncertain descent. In the absence of any children, a father inherits from his son. The grandfather claims that the son of uncertain descent was actually the son of the deceased, and since the deceased has already died, the grandfather should be next in line to inherit from him. The yavam claims that the son of uncertain descent was his own son, and therefore he should inherit from him. Or, the second case is one in which the yavam died and the grandfather and the son of uncertain descent come to divide up the possessions of the yavam. The son of uncertain descent claims to be the lone son of the yavam and therefore he should inherit, whereas the grandfather claims that the son of uncertain descent was the son of the deceased and that the yavam died childless, and therefore the grandfather, who is the father of the yavam, should inherit from him.

讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜讞讜诇拽讬谉

The Gemara rules in these cases: This is a case of property of uncertain ownership, and so they should divide up the possessions between them.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐

MISHNA: With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam to either consummate a levirate marriage or perform 岣litza with her, i.e., a yevama, to whom property was bequeathed: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both agree that she may sell or give away that property ab initio, and that if she did, the transfer is valid. Since she has only a levirate bond with the yavam, she retains total control of the property. This is in contrast to a betrothed woman, concerning whom Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell such property because her betrothed also has rights to it (Ketubot 78a).

诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜讘谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉 讻转讜讘讛 讘讞讝拽转 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讞讝拽转 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘

If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract by her deceased husband and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her, in which a husband only ever has a usufructuary interest? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs, i.e., the yavam, who stands to inherit from the husband when he consummates the levirate marriage, should divide up the property together with her father鈥檚 heirs, i.e., the woman鈥檚 family. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status. Therefore, money assured to her in her marriage contract remains in the possession of the husband鈥檚 heirs. Since it was to be paid from the husband鈥檚 own property, the money is retained by his estate and passes to his heirs. And her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her remains in the possession of the father鈥檚 heirs. Since those properties belonged to her, upon her death they are inherited by her father or his heirs.

讻谞住讛 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讜讘诇讘讚 砖转讛讗 讻转讜讘讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

If the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with her, then her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, and therefore the yavam has the same rights to her property as in a regular marriage. And the only exception to this is that her marriage contract will still be payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the yavam.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the first clause, concerning a yevama who is still alive, that Beit Shammai do not disagree with Beit Hillel that the woman has full possession of the property since there is only a levirate bond but no marriage, and what is different about the latter clause that Beit Shammai disagree with Beit Hillel and rule that the yavam does take a share of the property, which would imply that the levirate bond alone is sufficient to afford the yavam rights over her property?

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 专讬砖讗 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 讗专讜住讛 讜住讬驻讗 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛

Ulla said: The two clauses concern different cases: The first clause concerns a case where she happened before her yavam for levirate marriage at a time when she was a betrothed woman and only then did she come into the possession of property. Since when she was betrothed her husband did not have any rights to the property, neither does the yavam. And the latter clause concerns a case where she happened before her yavam at a time when she was a married woman. In such a case, were her husband still alive, he would have full rights to the property; therefore, so does the yavam.

讜拽住讘专 注讜诇讗 讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛

The Gemara explains: And Ulla holds that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to a woman about whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed,

讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛

and a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married, i.e., when her husband dies, the same level of relationship that existed with the first husband is created with the yavam. However, since the new relationship exists only by virtue of a levirate bond, it exists to a lower degree, and so the rights afforded to the yavam are more limited than those the first husband would have enjoyed; the rights granted to the yavam are equivalent to the rights of husband in a case where there is uncertainty whether that level of relationship exists at all.

讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讜讚讗讬 讗专讜住讛 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐

The Gemara proceeds to demonstrate this: It must be that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed, because if it enters your mind to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of a definitely betrothed woman, would Beit Hillel concede that she may sell or give away her property ab initio, and that if she does the transfer is valid?

讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 78a): If property was bequeathed to a woman after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell that property, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell that property. However, both agree that if she sold it or gave it away, the transfer is valid. The mishna clearly states that according to Beit Hillel, a woman who is definitely betrothed may not sell the property ab initio. Rather, conclude from here, from the fact that here Beit Hillel permit the yevama to sell her property ab initio, that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed.

讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讜讚讗讬 谞砖讜讗讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘

Similarly, it must be that a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married, because if it enters your mind to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of a definitely married woman, would Beit Shammai say that the husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs?

讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞讬砖讗转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 78a): If property was bequeathed to a woman after she was married, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, then the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. Rather, conclude from here, from the fact that here Beit Shammai assume the rights of the yavam are limited, that a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讗讚诪驻诇讙讬 讘讙讜驻讛 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇驻诇讙讜 讘讞讬讬讛 讜诇驻讬专讜转

Rabba challenges Ulla鈥檚 understanding of the mishna: Rabba said to him: If your explanation is correct, then in the latter clause, instead of disagreeing with regard to who has the rights to the property itself, which necessitates considering the case after her death, let Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree with regard to the more immediate case when she is still alive and dispute who has the rights to the use and produce of the property.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛 讜讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬讛讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讛 诇讛 讗讬讛讬 讜讚讗讬 讜讗讬谞讛讜 住驻拽 讜讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

Rather, Rabba said a different resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai鈥檚 rulings: Both this first clause and that latter clause of the mishna concern a case in which she happened before her yavam for levirate marriage once she was already a married woman, and a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman about whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married. The distinction between the two clauses is as follows: In the first clause, where she is alive, she has a certain claim to the property, while they, i.e., the yavam, are considered to have only an uncertain claim to the property, as she has the status of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married. And since one who has an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it, she therefore retains full possession of the property.

住讬驻讗 讚诪转讛 讛诇诇讜 讘讗讬谉 诇讬专砖 讜讛诇诇讜 讘讗讬谉 诇讬专砖 讜讬讞诇讜拽讜

In the latter clause, however, where she died, neither party has a definite claim; rather, these heirs of the father come to inherit, and those heirs of the husband come to inherit, and therefore they should divide up the property.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬 讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇 讛讘讬转 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 讗讘讬讜 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 诪讜专讬砖讬讜 讜讛讬讜 注诇讬讜 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 opinion: But is it true that according to Beit Shammai, one with an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 157a): In a case where a house collapsed upon a person and upon his father, or upon him and upon those from whom he stood to inherit, and there were outstanding debts against that person from his wife鈥檚 marriage contract and to a creditor, but he had no money with which to pay those debts, and it is not known who died first, the following situation arises: If the father died first, then before the son died he had already inherited the father鈥檚 property and therefore the son鈥檚 creditors gained a lien over that property and have the rights to collect their debts from that property even after the son鈥檚 death.

讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛讘谉 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讛讗讘 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘 讗讜诪专 讛讗讘 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讛讘谉

Accordingly, the father鈥檚 heirs and the creditor offer opposing claims: The father鈥檚 heirs say: The son died first and only afterward the father died. Therefore, the creditor never gained any rights to collect from the property. And the creditor says: The father died first and only afterward the son died. Therefore, the father鈥檚 property was liened to the son鈥檚 debts, and the creditor has a right to collect.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The mishna continues: Beit Shammai say: They should divide up the property between them. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status, which in this case means that since the last known possessor was the father, so the father鈥檚 heirs gain full rights to it.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讚讗讬 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘 住驻拽 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

Abaye explains his proof: Isn鈥檛 it the case here that the father鈥檚 heirs have a definite claim and the creditor has only an uncertain claim? Therefore, since Beit Shammai rule that the property should be divided up, it is apparent that they hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it.

拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

Rabba rejects the proof: Beit Shammai鈥檚 ruling in this case cannot be adduced as a proof because Beit Shammai hold: A debt recorded in a bill of debt that is awaiting collection is as though it was already collected to the extent that the creditor is considered to be in possession of the debt. Therefore, the creditor is considered to be in possession of the property to the same extent as the father鈥檚 heirs; consequently, the property is divided between them.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞谉 诪转讜 讘注诇讬讛谉 注讚 砖诇讗 砖转讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉 讜讗讬谞谉 砖讜转讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讗讜 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉

And from where do you say that Beit Shammai hold this opinion? As we learned in a mishna (Sota 24a): A married woman who secluded herself with another man after her husband had warned her not to do so is suspected of having committed adultery. To establish her guilt or innocence she is brought to the Temple, where she drinks the bitter waters. With regard to such women, if their husbands died before they drank the bitter waters, Beit Shammai say: They collect the money assured to them in their marriage contracts and do not drink the waters. And Beit Hillel say: Either they drink, and if they survive they collect their marriage contracts, or they do not drink and they cannot collect their marriage contracts, and all the husband鈥檚 property passes to his heirs.

讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讜讛讘讬讗 讛讗讬砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诪转讜讱 砖诇讗 砖讜转讜转 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉

The Gemara clarifies the statement of Beit Hillel: Did Beit Hillel really mean: Either they drink, which implies they may actually choose to drink? But doesn鈥檛 the Merciful One state: 鈥淎nd the man shall bring his wife鈥 (Numbers 5:15), which indicates that the ritual of drinking the bitter waters applies only when the husband is still alive, and in this case there is no husband to do so; consequently, she should not be able to drink. Rather, Beit Hillel鈥檚 intent is as follows: The only means by which a suspected adulteress is able to collect her marriage contract is by drinking the bitter waters and proving her innocence. Therefore, where this is not possible due to the death of the husband, since the wives do not drink, they cannot collect their marriage contracts.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚住驻拽 讛讜讗 住驻拽 讝谞讗讬 住驻拽 诇讗 讝谞讗讬 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

Rabba explains his proof from this mishna: Isn鈥檛 it the case here that the wife鈥檚 claim to her marriage contract is uncertain because there is uncertainty whether she was unfaithful or whether she was not unfaithful, and so it would appear that one with an uncertain claim is coming and undermining the definite claim of the husband鈥檚 heirs? This is untenable, as even were one to hold that someone with an uncertain claim can extract property from someone who has a definite claim to it, that would only allow for the money to be divided between the two sides, whereas in this case Beit Shammai rule that the creditor collects the entire debt. Rather, conclude from that mishna that Beit Shammai hold that a debt recorded in a bill of debt that is awaiting collection is considered as though it were already collected to the extent that the one who is owed the money is considered to be in possession of the debt. It is due to this reason that she is empowered to be able to collect her marriage contract.

讜讗讘讬讬 诇讜转讘讬讛 诪讛讗 讚诇诪讗 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 砖讗谞讬 诪砖讜诐 讞讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: And why did Abaye object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the mishna in tractate Bava Batra? Let him object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on this mishna in tractate Sota since based on Abaye鈥檚 assumption that a bill of debt is not considered as though it were already collected, this mishna perforce demonstrates that Beit Shammai hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it. The Gemara answers: Abaye did not object based on this mishna because he reasoned that perhaps a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is different from a regular bill of debt in that the Sages uniquely reinforced a woman鈥檚 hold over the debt in her marriage contract due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry. This would ensure that she would bring some money with her into a new marriage.

讜诇讜转讘讬讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉

The Gemara asks again concerning Abaye鈥檚 decision to object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the mishna in Bava Batra: Let him object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the case of the marriage contract in the mishna here (38a). In its latter clause, the mishna states that if a widow waiting for her yavam dies, Beit Shammai rule that her marriage contract and other property are divided between her father鈥檚 heirs and the yavam. In that case, the yavam has certain possession of that property, and the father鈥檚 heirs come with an uncertain claim to collect the value of the marriage contract. The fact that Beit Shammai rule that they should divide up the value of the marriage contract between them demonstrates that they hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it.

诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诇讗 讜讛讗 拽转谞讬 诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜讘谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The Gemara responds: In truth, Beit Shammai do not disagree on that point. The Gemara challenges this claim: Do they not disagree? But it is explicitly taught in the mishna that they disagree in that case: If the widow waiting for her yavam died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract, and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜砖讘拽讛 谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗讬诐 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The Gemara answers: This is what that mishna is saying: If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract? And the tanna then left this question unanswered, and addressed an additional case: What should be done with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: Beit Shammai say that the husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs, which implies that the father鈥檚 heirs had de facto possession of the property and the husband鈥檚 heirs then came and divided that property with them. This is true with regard to her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her. And the mishna does not teach using the reverse formulation: Beit Shammai say that the father鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the husband鈥檚 heirs, which would imply that the husband鈥檚 heirs had de facto possession of the property; this is true with regard to the payment of the marriage contract. Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not rule what should be done with the payment of the marriage contract, as the Gemara claimed.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 专讬砖讗 讚谞驻诇讜 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 住讬驻讗 讚谞驻诇讜 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讚讘注诇

The Gemara presents a third resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai鈥檚 rulings in the mishna: Abaye said: The first clause concerns a case in which property was bequeathed to her when she was still a widow waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage or 岣litza, and the latter clause concerns a case in which property was bequeathed to her when she was still under, i.e., married to, her first husband, before he died.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot: 37-43 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will learn about Inheritance in Jewish Law and how it relates to Yibum. The Gemara will discuss...

Yevamot 38

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 38

讚专讻讬 讞讚 讙讘讱 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬

my one path is with you in one of your pieces of land. Since his claim is based on facts that are clear and certain, his claim is successful. However, here, in the dispute over the inheritance, is the son of uncertain descent able to state a claim like this? Although the son of uncertain descent claims that ultimately, whatever the nature of his relationship with the deceased is, he should have the right to inherit, nevertheless, since it is not actually known what that relationship is, his claim in reality is merely a composite of uncertain claims.

讜专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 砖转拽转 砖转拽转 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪讛讚专谞讗 砖讟专讗 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讜诇讗 诪爪讬转 诇讗砖转注讜讬讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讬讛讜 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬

And Rabbi Yirmeya could have said to you: I stated my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, since perhaps the Rabbis state their ruling only there, in the case of the lost path, because the owner of the surrounding land said to the field owner: If you do not press your claim and are silent, then be silent and I will sell you the path at a reasonable price; but if not, then I will return the bills of purchase of the pieces of land to their previous owners and then you will not be able to successfully engage in a legal dispute with them. He is successful with this claim because it is within his power to return the fields and thereby recreate the original circumstances in which the owner of the field would forfeit the path. However, here, are the sons of the yavam able to state a claim like this? The original circumstance, in which the inheritance of the deceased had still not been divided, cannot be recreated. Therefore, a claim based on that circumstance will be unsuccessful.

住驻拽 讜讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 住讘讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讗讬 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讬讘诐 讗诪专 讗转 讘专讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗转 讜诇讬转 诇讱 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬

The Gemara brings another case, that of one of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, and the yavam who came to divide up the possessions of the grandfather, i.e., the father of the yavam and the deceased, and each one made a claim to the inheritance. The son of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore half of the possessions are mine because the inheritance should be split between the two sons, i.e., the deceased and the yavam, and since I am the sole heir of the deceased, I should receive his portion. The yavam said to him: You are my son, and therefore you have absolutely no rights to the possessions; rather, I should receive all the inheritance. One half is mine because I am the grandfather鈥檚 son, and the other half, which would have gone to my deceased brother, I should receive by virtue of the fact that I consummated the levirate marriage with his widow.

讛讜讬 讬讘诐 讜讚讗讬 讜住驻拽 住驻拽 讜讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

The Gemara rules on this case: This is a case in which the yavam has a definite claim because he is the grandfather鈥檚 son, and the son of uncertain descent has only an uncertain claim, and the halakha is that one with an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it. Therefore, the yavam receives all the inheritance.

住驻拽 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讞诇讜拽 讘谞讻住讬 住讘讗 住驻拽 讗诪专 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讘专 诪讬转谞讗 讛讜讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讜讘谞讬 讬讘诐 讗诪专讬 讗讞讜谞讗 讗转 讜诪谞转讗 讗讬转 诇讱 讘讛讚谉

The Gemara raises yet another case, that of one of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, and the sons of the yavam who came to divide up the possessions of the grandfather, and each one made a claim to the inheritance. The son of uncertain descent said: That man, referring to himself, is the son of the deceased, and therefore half of the possessions are mine because the inheritance should be split between the two sons, i.e., the deceased and the yavam, and since I am the lone heir of the deceased I should receive his portion. And the sons of the yavam said: You are our brother, and therefore you should receive only a portion together with us.

驻诇讙讗 讚拽诪讜讚讬 诇讛讜 砖拽诇讬 转讬诇转讗 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 砖拽诇 驻砖 诇讛讜 讚谞拽讗 讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜讞讜诇拽讬谉

The Gemara rules on this case: The half of the grandfather鈥檚 possessions that the son of uncertain descent concedes belongs to them, the sons of the yavam, they take for themselves. By claiming to be the son of the brother who died first, he forfeits any rights to the other brother鈥檚 portion. The third of the grandfather鈥檚 possessions that the sons of the yavam concede belong to him, the son of uncertain descent, he takes for himself. By claiming he is their brother, they admit that he should at least receive an equal portion to them, which would mean one-third if they are three. This leaves them with one-sixth [danka] of the possessions that is property of uncertain ownership, and so they should divide it up between them.

住讘讗 讜讬讘诐 讘谞讻住讬 住驻拽 讗讜 住讘讗 讜住驻拽 讘谞讻住讬 讬讘诐

The Gemara presents two additional cases. One is a case where a son of uncertain descent, who is either the son of the deceased or the son of the yavam, died, and the grandfather and the yavam come to divide up the possessions of the son of uncertain descent. In the absence of any children, a father inherits from his son. The grandfather claims that the son of uncertain descent was actually the son of the deceased, and since the deceased has already died, the grandfather should be next in line to inherit from him. The yavam claims that the son of uncertain descent was his own son, and therefore he should inherit from him. Or, the second case is one in which the yavam died and the grandfather and the son of uncertain descent come to divide up the possessions of the yavam. The son of uncertain descent claims to be the lone son of the yavam and therefore he should inherit, whereas the grandfather claims that the son of uncertain descent was the son of the deceased and that the yavam died childless, and therefore the grandfather, who is the father of the yavam, should inherit from him.

讛讜讬 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讜讞讜诇拽讬谉

The Gemara rules in these cases: This is a case of property of uncertain ownership, and so they should divide up the possessions between them.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐

MISHNA: With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam to either consummate a levirate marriage or perform 岣litza with her, i.e., a yevama, to whom property was bequeathed: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both agree that she may sell or give away that property ab initio, and that if she did, the transfer is valid. Since she has only a levirate bond with the yavam, she retains total control of the property. This is in contrast to a betrothed woman, concerning whom Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell such property because her betrothed also has rights to it (Ketubot 78a).

诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜讘谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉 讻转讜讘讛 讘讞讝拽转 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讞讝拽转 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘

If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract by her deceased husband and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her, in which a husband only ever has a usufructuary interest? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs, i.e., the yavam, who stands to inherit from the husband when he consummates the levirate marriage, should divide up the property together with her father鈥檚 heirs, i.e., the woman鈥檚 family. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status. Therefore, money assured to her in her marriage contract remains in the possession of the husband鈥檚 heirs. Since it was to be paid from the husband鈥檚 own property, the money is retained by his estate and passes to his heirs. And her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her remains in the possession of the father鈥檚 heirs. Since those properties belonged to her, upon her death they are inherited by her father or his heirs.

讻谞住讛 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讜讘诇讘讚 砖转讛讗 讻转讜讘讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

If the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with her, then her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, and therefore the yavam has the same rights to her property as in a regular marriage. And the only exception to this is that her marriage contract will still be payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the yavam.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the first clause, concerning a yevama who is still alive, that Beit Shammai do not disagree with Beit Hillel that the woman has full possession of the property since there is only a levirate bond but no marriage, and what is different about the latter clause that Beit Shammai disagree with Beit Hillel and rule that the yavam does take a share of the property, which would imply that the levirate bond alone is sufficient to afford the yavam rights over her property?

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 专讬砖讗 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 讗专讜住讛 讜住讬驻讗 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛

Ulla said: The two clauses concern different cases: The first clause concerns a case where she happened before her yavam for levirate marriage at a time when she was a betrothed woman and only then did she come into the possession of property. Since when she was betrothed her husband did not have any rights to the property, neither does the yavam. And the latter clause concerns a case where she happened before her yavam at a time when she was a married woman. In such a case, were her husband still alive, he would have full rights to the property; therefore, so does the yavam.

讜拽住讘专 注讜诇讗 讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛

The Gemara explains: And Ulla holds that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to a woman about whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed,

讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛

and a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married, i.e., when her husband dies, the same level of relationship that existed with the first husband is created with the yavam. However, since the new relationship exists only by virtue of a levirate bond, it exists to a lower degree, and so the rights afforded to the yavam are more limited than those the first husband would have enjoyed; the rights granted to the yavam are equivalent to the rights of husband in a case where there is uncertainty whether that level of relationship exists at all.

讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讜讚讗讬 讗专讜住讛 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐

The Gemara proceeds to demonstrate this: It must be that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed, because if it enters your mind to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of a definitely betrothed woman, would Beit Hillel concede that she may sell or give away her property ab initio, and that if she does the transfer is valid?

讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讬拽转 讗专讜住讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 讗专讜住讛

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 78a): If property was bequeathed to a woman after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell that property, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell that property. However, both agree that if she sold it or gave it away, the transfer is valid. The mishna clearly states that according to Beit Hillel, a woman who is definitely betrothed may not sell the property ab initio. Rather, conclude from here, from the fact that here Beit Hillel permit the yevama to sell her property ab initio, that a levirate bond formed with a betrothed woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is betrothed.

讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讜讚讗讬 谞砖讜讗讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘

Similarly, it must be that a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married, because if it enters your mind to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of a definitely married woman, would Beit Shammai say that the husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs?

讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞讬砖讗转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 78a): If property was bequeathed to a woman after she was married, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, then the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. Rather, conclude from here, from the fact that here Beit Shammai assume the rights of the yavam are limited, that a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讗讚诪驻诇讙讬 讘讙讜驻讛 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇驻诇讙讜 讘讞讬讬讛 讜诇驻讬专讜转

Rabba challenges Ulla鈥檚 understanding of the mishna: Rabba said to him: If your explanation is correct, then in the latter clause, instead of disagreeing with regard to who has the rights to the property itself, which necessitates considering the case after her death, let Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree with regard to the more immediate case when she is still alive and dispute who has the rights to the use and produce of the property.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚谞驻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛 讜讝讬拽转 谞砖讜讗讛 注讜砖讛 住驻拽 谞砖讜讗讛 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬讛讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讛 诇讛 讗讬讛讬 讜讚讗讬 讜讗讬谞讛讜 住驻拽 讜讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

Rather, Rabba said a different resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai鈥檚 rulings: Both this first clause and that latter clause of the mishna concern a case in which she happened before her yavam for levirate marriage once she was already a married woman, and a levirate bond formed with a married woman affords her a status equivalent to that of a woman about whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married. The distinction between the two clauses is as follows: In the first clause, where she is alive, she has a certain claim to the property, while they, i.e., the yavam, are considered to have only an uncertain claim to the property, as she has the status of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married. And since one who has an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it, she therefore retains full possession of the property.

住讬驻讗 讚诪转讛 讛诇诇讜 讘讗讬谉 诇讬专砖 讜讛诇诇讜 讘讗讬谉 诇讬专砖 讜讬讞诇讜拽讜

In the latter clause, however, where she died, neither party has a definite claim; rather, these heirs of the father come to inherit, and those heirs of the husband come to inherit, and therefore they should divide up the property.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬谉 住驻拽 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬 讜讛转谞谉 谞驻诇 讛讘讬转 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 讗讘讬讜 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 诪讜专讬砖讬讜 讜讛讬讜 注诇讬讜 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 opinion: But is it true that according to Beit Shammai, one with an uncertain claim cannot extract property from one who has a definite claim to it? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 157a): In a case where a house collapsed upon a person and upon his father, or upon him and upon those from whom he stood to inherit, and there were outstanding debts against that person from his wife鈥檚 marriage contract and to a creditor, but he had no money with which to pay those debts, and it is not known who died first, the following situation arises: If the father died first, then before the son died he had already inherited the father鈥檚 property and therefore the son鈥檚 creditors gained a lien over that property and have the rights to collect their debts from that property even after the son鈥檚 death.

讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛讘谉 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讛讗讘 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘 讗讜诪专 讛讗讘 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讛讘谉

Accordingly, the father鈥檚 heirs and the creditor offer opposing claims: The father鈥檚 heirs say: The son died first and only afterward the father died. Therefore, the creditor never gained any rights to collect from the property. And the creditor says: The father died first and only afterward the son died. Therefore, the father鈥檚 property was liened to the son鈥檚 debts, and the creditor has a right to collect.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The mishna continues: Beit Shammai say: They should divide up the property between them. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status, which in this case means that since the last known possessor was the father, so the father鈥檚 heirs gain full rights to it.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讚讗讬 讜讘注诇 讞讜讘 住驻拽 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬

Abaye explains his proof: Isn鈥檛 it the case here that the father鈥檚 heirs have a definite claim and the creditor has only an uncertain claim? Therefore, since Beit Shammai rule that the property should be divided up, it is apparent that they hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it.

拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

Rabba rejects the proof: Beit Shammai鈥檚 ruling in this case cannot be adduced as a proof because Beit Shammai hold: A debt recorded in a bill of debt that is awaiting collection is as though it was already collected to the extent that the creditor is considered to be in possession of the debt. Therefore, the creditor is considered to be in possession of the property to the same extent as the father鈥檚 heirs; consequently, the property is divided between them.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞谉 诪转讜 讘注诇讬讛谉 注讚 砖诇讗 砖转讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉 讜讗讬谞谉 砖讜转讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讗讜 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉

And from where do you say that Beit Shammai hold this opinion? As we learned in a mishna (Sota 24a): A married woman who secluded herself with another man after her husband had warned her not to do so is suspected of having committed adultery. To establish her guilt or innocence she is brought to the Temple, where she drinks the bitter waters. With regard to such women, if their husbands died before they drank the bitter waters, Beit Shammai say: They collect the money assured to them in their marriage contracts and do not drink the waters. And Beit Hillel say: Either they drink, and if they survive they collect their marriage contracts, or they do not drink and they cannot collect their marriage contracts, and all the husband鈥檚 property passes to his heirs.

讗讜 砖讜转讜转 讜讛讘讬讗 讛讗讬砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诪转讜讱 砖诇讗 砖讜转讜转 诇讗 谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘转谉

The Gemara clarifies the statement of Beit Hillel: Did Beit Hillel really mean: Either they drink, which implies they may actually choose to drink? But doesn鈥檛 the Merciful One state: 鈥淎nd the man shall bring his wife鈥 (Numbers 5:15), which indicates that the ritual of drinking the bitter waters applies only when the husband is still alive, and in this case there is no husband to do so; consequently, she should not be able to drink. Rather, Beit Hillel鈥檚 intent is as follows: The only means by which a suspected adulteress is able to collect her marriage contract is by drinking the bitter waters and proving her innocence. Therefore, where this is not possible due to the death of the husband, since the wives do not drink, they cannot collect their marriage contracts.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚住驻拽 讛讜讗 住驻拽 讝谞讗讬 住驻拽 诇讗 讝谞讗讬 讜拽讗转讬 住驻拽 讜诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖讟专 讛注讜诪讚 诇讙讘讜转 讻讙讘讜讬 讚诪讬

Rabba explains his proof from this mishna: Isn鈥檛 it the case here that the wife鈥檚 claim to her marriage contract is uncertain because there is uncertainty whether she was unfaithful or whether she was not unfaithful, and so it would appear that one with an uncertain claim is coming and undermining the definite claim of the husband鈥檚 heirs? This is untenable, as even were one to hold that someone with an uncertain claim can extract property from someone who has a definite claim to it, that would only allow for the money to be divided between the two sides, whereas in this case Beit Shammai rule that the creditor collects the entire debt. Rather, conclude from that mishna that Beit Shammai hold that a debt recorded in a bill of debt that is awaiting collection is considered as though it were already collected to the extent that the one who is owed the money is considered to be in possession of the debt. It is due to this reason that she is empowered to be able to collect her marriage contract.

讜讗讘讬讬 诇讜转讘讬讛 诪讛讗 讚诇诪讗 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 砖讗谞讬 诪砖讜诐 讞讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: And why did Abaye object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the mishna in tractate Bava Batra? Let him object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on this mishna in tractate Sota since based on Abaye鈥檚 assumption that a bill of debt is not considered as though it were already collected, this mishna perforce demonstrates that Beit Shammai hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it. The Gemara answers: Abaye did not object based on this mishna because he reasoned that perhaps a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is different from a regular bill of debt in that the Sages uniquely reinforced a woman鈥檚 hold over the debt in her marriage contract due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry. This would ensure that she would bring some money with her into a new marriage.

讜诇讜转讘讬讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉

The Gemara asks again concerning Abaye鈥檚 decision to object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the mishna in Bava Batra: Let him object to Rabba鈥檚 opinion based on the case of the marriage contract in the mishna here (38a). In its latter clause, the mishna states that if a widow waiting for her yavam dies, Beit Shammai rule that her marriage contract and other property are divided between her father鈥檚 heirs and the yavam. In that case, the yavam has certain possession of that property, and the father鈥檚 heirs come with an uncertain claim to collect the value of the marriage contract. The fact that Beit Shammai rule that they should divide up the value of the marriage contract between them demonstrates that they hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it.

诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诇讗 讜讛讗 拽转谞讬 诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜讘谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讬讜爪讗讬谉 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The Gemara responds: In truth, Beit Shammai do not disagree on that point. The Gemara challenges this claim: Do they not disagree? But it is explicitly taught in the mishna that they disagree in that case: If the widow waiting for her yavam died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract, and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪转讛 诪讛 讬注砖讛 讘讻转讜讘转讛 讜砖讘拽讛 谞讻住讬诐 讛谞讻谞住讬诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗讬诐 注诪讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讘讞讝拽转谉

The Gemara answers: This is what that mishna is saying: If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract? And the tanna then left this question unanswered, and addressed an additional case: What should be done with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 注诐 讬讜专砖讬 讛讘注诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: Beit Shammai say that the husband鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the father鈥檚 heirs, which implies that the father鈥檚 heirs had de facto possession of the property and the husband鈥檚 heirs then came and divided that property with them. This is true with regard to her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her. And the mishna does not teach using the reverse formulation: Beit Shammai say that the father鈥檚 heirs should divide up the property together with the husband鈥檚 heirs, which would imply that the husband鈥檚 heirs had de facto possession of the property; this is true with regard to the payment of the marriage contract. Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not rule what should be done with the payment of the marriage contract, as the Gemara claimed.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 专讬砖讗 讚谞驻诇讜 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 住讬驻讗 讚谞驻诇讜 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讚讘注诇

The Gemara presents a third resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai鈥檚 rulings in the mishna: Abaye said: The first clause concerns a case in which property was bequeathed to her when she was still a widow waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage or 岣litza, and the latter clause concerns a case in which property was bequeathed to her when she was still under, i.e., married to, her first husband, before he died.

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