Yevamot 43

וכי רבי לא שנאה רבי חייא מנין לו

If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had not taught that ruling in the Mishna, from where would Rabbi Ḥiyya, his disciple and redactor of the baraitot, have known it? Since the source of the unattributed ruling in the baraita is certainly the dispute recorded in the mishna, its lack of attribution in the baraita only reflects the fact that Rabbi Ḥiyya ruled in accordance with that opinion, but that cannot be used to indicate that it is the accepted halakha.

אמר ליה והא תנן מסרק של פשתן שניטלו שיניו ונשתיירו בו שתים טמאות ואחת טהורה וכולן שניטלו אחת אחת בפני עצמן טמאות

Rabbi Naḥum questioned the principle that the halakha is always in accordance with an unattributed ruling in a mishna and said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kelim 13:8): A comb made for combing beaten flax in preparation for spinning, from which its teeth were removed and only two of its teeth remained in it, is still suitable for combing. It is therefore considered a utensil and will become ritually impure if it comes in contact with ritual impurity. However, if only one tooth remained, so that the comb was no longer suitable for combing, it is no longer considered a utensil and so will remain ritually pure even if it comes in contact with ritual impurity. And with regard to any of the teeth that were individually removed on their own, since they do serve a purpose, e.g., they may be embedded and used as hooks, they are considered utensils and can become ritually impure.

של צמר שניטלו שיניו אחת מבינתים טהור נשתיירו בו שלש במקום אחד טמא היתה החיצונה אחת מהן טהור ניטלו שנים ועשאן למלקט טמאות אחת והתקינה לנר או למיתוח טמאה

A comb made for combing wool from which every other one of its teeth were removed, so that no two consecutive teeth remained in place, is no longer suitable for combing and so will remain ritually pure. If three teeth remained in it in a single place so that it could still be used for combing, then it could become ritually impure. However, if one of those teeth was the external frame of the comb itself, then it could not function as a comb, and so it will remain ritually pure. If two of the teeth were removed and made into small pincers, then they could become ritually impure. Alternatively, if one of the teeth was removed, and it was prepared in a manner that made it suitable for use in cleaning an oil lamp or for stretching ropes, then it would be considered a utensil and could become ritually impure.

וקיימא לן דאין הלכה כאותה משנה אמר ליה בר מינה דההיא דרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו זו אינה משנה

Rabbi Naḥum posed his question: But we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with that mishna. This would seem to contradict the principle that the halakha is always in accordance with an unattributed opinion. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Naḥum that the principle applies to all cases apart from this mishna, as with regard to this particular mishna there are Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish who both say: This is not an authoritative mishna, and so it cannot be relied upon for a halakhic ruling.

מאי טעמא אמר רב הונא בר מנוח משמיה דרב אידי בריה דרב איקא משום דקשיא רישא לסיפא דקתני של צמר שניטלו שיניו אחת מבינתים טהור הא נשתיירו בו שתים במקום אחד טמא והדר תני נשתיירו בו שלש טמא שלש אין שתים לא

The Gemara asks: What is the reason to say that the mishna is not authoritative? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Idi, son of Rav Ika: It is because the first clause of that mishna contradicts the latter clause, as it teaches: A comb used for wool from which every other one of its teeth were removed is no longer considered a utensil, and so it will remain ritually pure. This implies that were two teeth to remain in it in one place, it could become ritually impure. And then the mishna continues and teaches: If three teeth remained in it in a single place it is still considered a utensil and so it could become ritually impure. This indicates that if there are three, yes, it could become ritually impure, but if there are two, no, it would not become ritually impure.

ומאי קושיא דלמא הא בגווייתא הא בברייתא

The Gemara asks: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling that if two teeth remain it is considered a utensil is referring to the internal teeth, found in the middle of the frame, while that ruling that it is not considered a utensil is referring to the outer teeth, which are adjacent to the frame of the comb, which makes them unsuitable for use.

אלא מהכא דקתני וכולן שניטלו אחת אחת בפני עצמן טמאות ואף על גב דלא התקינה אימא סיפא אחת והתקינה לנר או למיתוח טמאה התקינה אין לא התקינה לא

Rather, the difficulty with the mishna is from here, as it teaches: And any of the teeth that were individually removed on their own, since they can serve a useful purpose they are considered utensils and can become ritually impure. And the implication is that this is true even though the tooth was not prepared for that purpose. But say the latter clause as follows: If one of the teeth was removed, and it was prepared in a manner that rendered it suitable for use in cleaning an oil lamp or for stretching ropes, then it would be considered a utensil and could become ritually impure. The implication is that if it was prepared for use, then yes, it would be considered a utensil, but if it was not prepared for use, then no, it would not be considered a utensil.

אמר אביי ומאי קושיא דלמא הא בקתייהו הא בלא קתייהו

Abaye said: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling, that further preparation is not required before it is considered a utensil, is referring to a case where the teeth were removed with their base, which allows them to be used immediately for various functions, whereas that ruling, that it is considered a utensil only once it is prepared for use, is referring to a case where the teeth were removed without their base and therefore require further preparation before they can be used.

אמר רב פפא ומאי קושיא ודלמא הא בקטינתא הא באלימתא

Rav Pappa stated an alternative resolution: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling that further preparation is not required is referring to a case where the teeth were narrow, whereas that ruling that it is considered a utensil only once it is prepared for use is referring to a case where the teeth were thick.

אלא משום דמסיימי בה דווקני זו רבי שמעון

Rather, the reason that the mishna is not accepted as authoritative is not due to some difficulty in the formulation of the mishna, but because those who are exact in their rendition of the tradition conclude this mishna with: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. In other words, this mishna is not unattributed but presents the minority opinion of a single Sage, and it is for this reason that it is not accepted as authoritative.

שלח רבי חייא בר אבין מארסין תוך שלשה וכן עושים מעשה

§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin sent a message from Eretz Yisrael with regard to the halakha cited in the mishna: One may betroth a woman, but not marry her, within three months of her previous marriage; and so one acts in practice.

וכן היה רבי אלעזר מלמדנו משום רבי חנינא הגדול רובו של ראשון ורובו של שלישי ואמצעי שלם

And so Rabbi Elazar would teach us in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina the Great that the three months are counted as follows: One counts the majority of the days of the first month, and the majority of the third month, and the entire middle month.

אמימר שרא ליארס ביום תשעים אמר ליה רב אשי לאמימר והא רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו צריכה להמתין שלשה חדשים חוץ מיום שמת בו וחוץ מיום שנתארסה בו ההוא לענין מינקת איתמר דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו צריכה להמתין עשרים וארבעה חדש חוץ מיום שנולד בו וחוץ מיום שנתארסה בו

Ameimar permitted one to betroth a woman on the ninetieth day itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel both say that she needs to wait three full months, excluding the day on which the husband died and excluding the day on which she is betrothed? It is apparent that it is still prohibited to betroth a woman on the ninetieth day itself. Ameimar said to him: That which you heard, that the days of the husband’s death and of the betrothal are not included, was stated only with regard to a nursing woman, as it was Rav and Shmuel who both said: A nursing woman needs to wait twenty-four months before being betrothed, excluding the day on which the baby was born and excluding the day on which she is betrothed.

והא ההוא דעבד סעודת אירוסין ביום תשעים ואפסדיה רבא לסעודתיה ההיא סעודת נשואין הואי

The Gemara asks: Wasn’t there an incident concerning a certain person who prepared a betrothal feast on the ninetieth day following the death of the woman’s first husband, and Rava caused him to forfeit his feast by prohibiting the betrothal on that day? The Gemara answers: That feast was actually a marriage feast, but had it been a betrothal feast it would have been permitted.

והלכתא צריכה להמתין עשרים וארבעה חודש חוץ מיום שנולד בו וחוץ מיום שנתארסה בו וצריכה להמתין שלשה חדשים חוץ מיום שמת בו וחוץ מיום שנתארסה בו

The Gemara summarizes: The halakha is that a nursing mother needs to wait twenty-four months, excluding the day on which the baby was born and excluding the day on which she is betrothed. And if she was widowed but was not nursing, then she needs to wait only three months, excluding the day on which her previous husband died and excluding the day on which she is betrothed.

חוץ מן האלמנה וכו׳ אמר רב חסדא קל וחומר ומה במקום שאסור לכבס מותר ליארס מקום שמותר לכבס אינו דין שמותר ליארס

§ The mishna states that Rabbi Yosei says: All women may be betrothed within three months except for a widow, due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband. Rav Ḥisda questioned the mishna’s ruling and said: Based on an a fortiori inference, it should be permitted for a woman to be betrothed during the thirty-day mourning period for her husband: If during another period of mourning, which the Gemara will specify, when it is prohibited to launder clothes, it is permitted to be betrothed, then during the thirty-day morning period for a husband, when it is permitted to launder clothes, isn’t it logical that it should also be permitted to be betrothed?

מאי היא דתנן שבת שחל תשעה באב בתוכה אסור לספר ולכבס ובחמישי מותר מפני כבוד השבת ותניא קודם הזמן הזה העם ממעטין בעסקיהם מלישא ומליתן מלבנות ולנטוע ומארסין אבל לא כונסין ואין עושין סעודת אירוסין

The Gemara explains the cases involved: What is the period of mourning to which Rav Ḥisda is referring? As we learned in a mishna (Ta’anit 26b): During the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs, it is prohibited to cut hair and to launder clothes, but on Thursday it is permitted in deference to Shabbat. And it is taught in a baraita: Prior to this time the public reduce their activities, refraining from business transactions, from building and planting, and they may betroth women but may not marry them, and they may not make a betrothal feast. The Gemara assumes that the baraita is referring to the days immediately preceding the Ninth of Av. Accordingly, during the days prior to the Ninth of Av it is prohibited to launder clothes, but it is permitted to be betrothed. It was upon this period of time that Rav Ḥisda based his a fortiori inference.

כי תניא ההיא קודם דקודם (תניא)

To defend Rav Yosei’s ruling in the mishna, the Gemara explains: When that baraita is taught, it is taught with regard to the period prior to the period that is prior to the Ninth of Av, i.e., the days prior to the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs. It is only then that it is permitted to be betrothed, but during the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs it is prohibited. Therefore, the basis of Rav Ḥisda’s a fortiori inference is undermined.

אמר רבא וקודם דקודם נמי קל וחומר ומה במקום שאסור לישא וליתן מותר ליארס מקום שמותר לישא וליתן אינו דין שמותר ליארס

Rava said: From the period prior to the period that is prior to the Ninth of Av, a challenge to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling can also be advanced based on an a fortiori inference, as follows: If in a period of mourning when it is prohibited to conduct business transactions, it is permitted to be betrothed, then during the thirty-day morning period for a husband, when it is permitted to conduct business transactions, isn’t it logical that it should also be permitted to be betrothed?

לא תימא דרבי יוסי אומר כל הנשים יתארסו אלא אימא כל הנשים ינשאו

The Gemara accepts the conclusion of this a fortiori inference and therefore concludes: Do not say that Rabbi Yosei says: All women may be betrothed within three months; rather, emend his statement to say: All women may be married within three months except for a widow. However, even Rabbi Yosei agrees that it is permitted for a widow to be betrothed during this period.

ולית ליה לרבי יוסי להבחין

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yosei not accept that there is a decree to wait three months in order to distinguish between the seed of the first and second husbands? According to the Gemara’s emendation of his statement, it would appear there is no case in which Rabbi Yosei applies the decree.

לית ליה ואיבעית אימא לעולם אית ליה ואימא רבי יוסי אומר כל ארוסות גרושות ינשאו

The Gemara answers: Indeed, he does not accept the decree. And if you wish, say that actually, he does accept the decree and applies it in the case of a married woman who was divorced. And with regard to the challenge to his opinion from the a fortiori inference, emend the mishna and say: Rabbi Yosei says that all women who were only betrothed to their previous husbands and then divorced may be married within three months, since the reason to wait does not apply in this case.

אי הכי היינו רבי יהודה איכא בינייהו נשואה ליארס רבי יהודה סבר נשואה מותרת ליארס ורבי יוסי סבר נשואה אסורה ליארס

The Gemara asks: If so, then this opinion of Rabbi Yosei is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. What difference is there between them? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case of a woman who was married to her previous husband and seeks to be betrothed. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is permitted to betroth a woman who was married to her previous husband without first waiting three months. And Rabbi Yosei holds that it is prohibited to betroth a woman who was married to her previous husband without first waiting three months.

וסבר רבי יוסי נשואה אסורה ליארס והתניא רבי יוסי אומר כל הנשים יתארסו חוץ מן האלמנה מפני האיבול וכמה איבול שלה שלשים יום וכולן לא ינשאו עד שיהו להן שלשה חדשים

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yosei really hold that it is prohibited to betroth a woman who was married to her previous husband without first waiting three months? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says that all women may be betrothed without waiting except for a widow, due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband; and how long is her mourning period? It is thirty days. And none of them may be married until they have waited three months.

האי מאי קושיא אילימא דקתני רבי יוסי אומר כל הנשים יתארסו מי אלימא ממתניתין דאוקימנא בארוסות גרושות ינשאו הכא נמי כל ארוסות גרושות ינשאו

The Gemara clarifies the question: What difficulty does this baraita pose? If we say that the baraita teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that all women may be betrothed without waiting, is the baraita stronger than the mishna that was established as teaching that women who were only betrothed to their previous husbands and then divorced may be married within three months? Here, too, the baraita could be established as teaching that all women who were only betrothed to their previous husbands and then divorced may be married within three months.

אלא מסיפא דקתני וכולן לא ינשאו עד שיהו להן שלשה חדשים אינסובי הוא דלא הא איתרוסי שפיר דמי

Rather, the difficulty arises from the latter clause that teaches: And none of them may marry until they have waited three months. This implies that Rabbi Yosei holds that it is specifically marrying that is not permitted, but betrothing seems well and is permitted. This challenges the Gemara’s original claim that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda on this point.

אמר רבא תריץ ואימא הכי רבי יוסי אומר כל ארוסות גרושות ינשאו חוץ מן האלמנה מפני האיבול וכמה איבול שלה שלשים יום ונשואות לא יתארסו עד שיהא להן שלשה חדשים

Rava said: Resolve the difficulty and emend Rabbi Yosei’s statement to say this: Rabbi Yosei says that all women who were only betrothed to their previous husbands and then divorced may marry within three months except for a widow, due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband. And how long is her mourning period? It is thirty days. And women who were married to their previous husbands may not be betrothed until they have waited three months.

ואלמנה מן האירוסין מי אית לה איבול והתני רבי חייא בר אמי אשתו ארוסה לא אונן ולא מיטמא לה וכן היא לא אוננת ולא מיטמאה לו מתה אינו יורשה מת הוא גובה כתובתה

The Gemara asks: But does a woman who became a widow from betrothal have to observe a mourning period for her husband? Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami teach in a baraita: If one’s wife to whom he was betrothed died, he does not observe a period of acute mourning for her, and if he is a priest he is not permitted to become ritually impure for her. And similarly, if he dies, she does not observe a period of acute mourning for him and she does not become ritually impure for him. If she dies, he does not inherit from her. If he dies, she collects payment of her marriage contract. The baraita demonstrates that a widow is required to mourn her husband only if she was married to him and not merely betrothed. If so, clearly Rabbi Yosei’s ruling in the mishna is referring to married women. Accordingly, all of the Gemara’s emendations of Rabbi Yosei’s statement, in order to defend his statement from Rav Ḥisda’s a fortiori inference, are refuted.

אלא תנאי היא דתניא מראש חדש ועד התענית העם ממעטין מעסקיהן מלישא ומליתן מלבנות ולנטוע ומליארס ומלישא שבת שחל תשעה באב בתוכה אסור לספר ולכבס (ואסור ליארס) ויש אומרים כל החדש אסור

Rather, it must be that the question of whether it is permitted to betroth a woman during the period prior to the week of the Ninth of Av is subject to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: From the New Moon of Av and until the fast on the ninth, the public reduces its activities, refraining from business transactions, from building and planting, and from betrothing and marrying. During the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs, it is prohibited to cut hair and to launder clothes, and it is prohibited to be betrothed. And some say: It is prohibited for the entire month. The Gemara’s challenge to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that it is prohibited for a widow to be betrothed during her mourning period was based on an a fortiori inference that assumes that it is permitted to be betrothed during the mourning period preceding the week of the Ninth of Av. However, since this ruling is subject to a dispute, Rabbi Yosei could reject the a fortiori inference by stating that he holds in accordance with the opinion that it is in fact prohibited to be betrothed during that period.

מתקיף לה רב אשי ממאי דליארס ליארס ממש דלמא למיעבד סעודת אירוסין הוא דאסור הא ליארס שפיר דמי

Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: From where is it known that when the baraita prohibits one to be betrothed, it is referring to actually betrothing? Perhaps it is only to make a betrothal feast that is prohibited, but merely to be betrothed seems well and is permitted.

אי הכי מלישא לינשא נמי למיעבד סעודת נשואין הוא דאסור הא לישא שפיר דמי הכי השתא בשלמא נשואין בלא סעודה איכא שמחה אלא אירוסין בלא סעודה מי איכא שמחה

The Gemara questions Rav Ashi’s objection: If so, then with regard to the prohibition against marrying as well one could make the same claim: With regard to the prohibition to marry, too, it is only to make a marriage feast that is prohibited, but merely to marry seems well and is permitted. The Gemara rejects its question: How can these cases be compared? Granted, from a marriage, even without a feast, there is joy, but from a betrothal without a feast, is there any joy? It is merely a legal ceremony.

אלא אמר רב אשי שאני אבילות חדשה מאבילות ישנה ושאני אבילות דרבים מאבילות דיחיד

Rather, Rav Ashi stated a different resolution of Rav Yosei’s opinion: New mourning, i.e., the mourning for a relative who has just passed away, is different from old mourning, i.e., the mourning over historic events such as the destruction of the Temple, and it is appropriate to be more lenient in the latter. And the mourning of the public is different from the private mourning of the individual, and it is appropriate to be more stringent in the latter. As such, it is not possible to form an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of mourning for the Temple to those of a wife mourning for her husband.

מתני׳ ארבעה אחין נשואין ארבע נשים ומתו אם רצה הגדול שבהם לייבם את כולן הרשות בידו

MISHNA: In a case of four brothers married to four women and some of the brothers died childless, their wives thereby become yevamot. If the eldest of the brothers who survived wished to consummate the levirate marriage with all of his yevamot, he has permission to do so.

מי שהיה נשוי לשתי נשים ומת ביאתה או חליצתה של אחת מהן פוטרת צרתה

In the case of one who was married to two women and died childless, the intercourse or ḥalitza of either one of the wives with the yavam releases her rival wife from the levirate bond, and the rival wife need not enter into levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza.