Yevamot 51
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — דִּמְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ גֵּט אִי דָּחֵי אִי לָא דָּחֵי. מַאֲמָר — אִי קָנֵי אִי לָא קָנֵי. גֵּט — אִי דָּחֵי אִי לָא דָּחֵי. אִי קַמָּא דָּחֵי — בָּתְרָא מַאי קָעָבֵיד. אִי קַמָּא לָא דָּחֵי — בָּתְרָא נָמֵי לָא דָּחֵי.
What is the reason for the ruling of Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? It is because he is uncertain with regard to a bill of divorce whether it effectively precludes levirate marriage or whether it does not preclude levirate marriage. Similarly, he is uncertain with regard to levirate betrothal, whether it effectively acquires the yevama or does not acquire her at all. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to a bill of divorce, he is uncertain as to whether it precludes levirate marriage or does not preclude it. If the first bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, what did he do by giving the latter bill of divorce, as it has no substance? Alternatively, if the first bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, neither does the latter preclude levirate marriage.
מַאֲמָר אִי קָנֵי אִי לָא קָנֵי, אִי קַמָּא קָנֵי — בָּתְרָא מַאי קָעָבֵיד, וְאִי קַמָּא לָא קָנֵי — בָּתְרָא נָמֵי לָא קָנֵי.
Likewise, with regard to levirate betrothal, he is uncertain as to whether it acquires the yevama or does not acquire her. If the first levirate betrothal effectively acquires the yevama, what does the last one accomplish? And if the first one does not acquire her, the last one also does not acquire her. For this reason Rabban Gamliel maintains that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce was given, and similarly levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal was performed.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ גֵּט אַחַר מַאֲמָר, וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר הַגֵּט. וְגֵט אַחַר בִּיאָה וּמַאֲמָר, וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר בִּיאָה וְגֵט.
Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita: And Rabban Gamliel concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after levirate betrothal and levirate betrothal is effective after a bill of divorce. If a yavam gave a bill of divorce to one yevama and then performed levirate betrothal with the other, or the reverse, both actions would be effective. And he also concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after intercourse and levirate betrothal such that if the yavam engaged in levirate betrothal with one yevama, engaged in intercourse with a second, and gave a bill of divorce to a third, the bill of divorce is effective and he is prohibited from marrying the relatives of the third yevama. And he concedes that levirate betrothal is effective after intercourse and a bill of divorce, such that if he gave a bill of divorce to one woman, engaged in intercourse with a second, and performed levirate betrothal with a third, the levirate betrothal is effective and the third woman requires a bill of divorce.
וְאִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — תִּהְוֵי כְּבִיאָה דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְתִקְנֵי. דְּהָא תְּנַן: הַבְּעִילָה, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהִיא בַּתְּחִלָּה — אֵין אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם.
And if Rabban Gamliel is uncertain with regard to the efficacy of levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, then the third action should never be effective. Either the initial levirate betrothal or bill of divorce was completely effective, in which case any subsequent action is not effective, or these actions are not effective at all and the intercourse that followed them should be like intercourse performed at the beginning, and it should serve to acquire the yevama completely, and any actions performed afterward with the rival wife should be of no account. For we learned in the mishna: With regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning, nothing is effective after it. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel’s ruling is difficult.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, לְעוֹלָם פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּגֵט דְּדָחֵי וּמַאֲמָר דְּקָנֵי. מִיהוּ, אֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: הָא יְבָמָה — בְּחַד צַד מַהֲנֵי בַּהּ גֵּט, וּבְחַד צַד מַהֲנֵי בַּהּ מַאֲמָר. גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט לָא דָּחֵי — דְּהָא דְּחָה לֵיהּ קַמָּא. וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר לָא קָנֵי — דְּהָא קְנָא לֵיהּ קַמָּא. גֵּט אַחַר מַאֲמָר וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר הַגֵּט, הַאי מִילְּתָא קָא דָחֵי וְהַאי מִילְּתָא קָא קָנֵי.
Rather, Abaye said: Actually, it is obvious to Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, and that levirate betrothal acquires the yevama. Nevertheless, the Sages said that with regard to this yevama, in one respect a bill of divorce is effective for her, and in another respect levirate betrothal is effective for her, but they are not effective in the same manner. Therefore, a bill of divorce given after a bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, as the first bill of divorce has already precluded it for him as much as he can preclude it by means of a bill of divorce. And levirate betrothal performed after levirate betrothal does not acquire her, as the first levirate betrothal has acquired her for him as much as possible. However, with regard to a bill of divorce after levirate betrothal, and levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce, this action precludes levirate marriage and that action acquires the yevama. Since the acquisition of levirate betrothal and the nullification of a bill of divorce work in different ways, there can be both an acquisition and a nullification, and therefore one can be effective after the other.
וְרַבָּנַן: כֹּל חַד וְחַד תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן גֵּט וּמַאֲמָר בִּיבָמָה.
However, the Rabbis maintain that the Sages instituted for each and every one of the brothers-in-law both the nullification of a bill of divorce and the acquisition of levirate betrothal for a yevama, and they decreed that these should be effective for each of the yevamot. Therefore the strength of the first bill of divorce or levirate betrothal is equal to that of the second one, and both are effective.
וְהַאי בִּיאָה פְּסוּלָה — עֲדִיפָא מִמַּאֲמָר וּגְרִיעָא מִמַּאֲמָר. עֲדִיפָא מִמַּאֲמָר: דְּאִילּוּ מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר לָא מַהֲנֵי, וְאִילּוּ בִּיאָה אַחַר מַאֲמָר מַהֲנֵי. וּגְרִיעָא מִמַּאֲמָר: דְּאִילּוּ מַאֲמָר אַחַר הַגֵּט קָנֵי לְכוּלֵּיהּ שִׁיּוּרָא דְגֵט, וְאִילּוּ בִּיאָה אַחַר הַגֵּט לָא קָנְיָא לֵיהּ לְכוּלֵּיהּ שִׁיּוּרָא דְגֵט.
Abaye proceeds to explain the rest of Rabban Gamliel’s teaching in the baraita: And this invalid intercourse, i.e., intercourse that was performed after a disqualifying action, such as levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, is superior to levirate betrothal and also inferior to levirate betrothal: It is preferable to levirate betrothal in the following respect: whereas levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal is not effective at all, intercourse after levirate betrothal is effective, because intercourse acquires a yevama according to Torah law. And it is inferior to levirate betrothal, for whereas levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce according to Rabban Gamliel acquires the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, such that any further levirate betrothal would be ineffective, intercourse after a bill of divorce does not acquire the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, as it is not considered valid intercourse, and a subsequent levirate betrothal is effective.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אֵין גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט? שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לִפְנֵי יָבָם אֶחָד, וְנָתַן גֵּט לָזוֹ וְגֵט לָזוֹ. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: חוֹלֵץ לָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וּמוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁנִיָּה.
§ The Sages taught: How, i.e., in what case, did Rabban Gamliel say that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? In the case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam and he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, as she is his ḥalutza, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. Because the bill of divorce he gave the second woman is of no consequence at all, she is merely the rival wife of his ḥalutza, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נָתַן גֵּט לָזוֹ וְגֵט לָזוֹ — אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן, וַחֲלִיצָה לְאַחַת מֵהֶן. וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִים וִיבָמָה אַחַת.
But the Rabbis say: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one, he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the two yevamin gave one yevama a bill of divorce, one after the other, Rabban Gamliel maintains that the bill of divorce of the second yavam is of no account, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives, whereas the Rabbis hold that it is effective in that it renders him forbidden to her relatives.
כֵּיצַד אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אֵין מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר? שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לִפְנֵי יָבָם אֶחָד, וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר בָּזוֹ וּמַאֲמָר בָּזוֹ, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן גֵּט לָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְחוֹלֵץ לָהּ, וְאָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וּמוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁנִיָּה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נוֹתֵן גֵּט לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן, וְאָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן, וַחֲלִיצָה לְאַחַת מֵהֶן. וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִים וִיבָמָה אַחַת.
How, with regard to what circumstance, did Rabban Gamliel say that there is no levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal? In a case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam, and he performed levirate betrothal with this one and levirate betrothal with that one, Rabban Gamliel says: He gives a bill of divorce to the first one and performs ḥalitza with her, and is forbidden to her relatives, but he is permitted to the relatives of the second one, as the levirate betrothal performed with the rival wife is ineffective. But the Rabbis say: He gives a bill of divorce to both of them, as the levirate betrothal is effective for both women, and he is forbidden to the relatives of both of them; and as for ḥalitza, he must perform it with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the first yavam performed levirate betrothal with the yevama, and the second yavam consequently performed levirate betrothal with her, they are both required to give her a bill of divorce and both are forbidden to marry her relatives.
אָמַר מָר: נוֹתֵן גֵּט לָזוֹ וְגֵט לָזוֹ, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: חוֹלֵץ לְרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וּמוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁנִיָּה. לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: חָלַץ לְבַעֲלַת הַגֵּט — לֹא נִפְטְרָה צָרָה!
The Master said above in the baraita: He gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Shmuel? For Shmuel said: If he performed ḥalitza with the woman who received a bill of divorce, the rival wife is not exempted by this invalid ḥalitza. The yavam must therefore repeat the ḥalitza with the rival wife as well. This appears to contradict the baraita, where Rabban Gamliel rules that he has to perform ḥalitza with only one of the yevamot.
אָמַר לְךָ שְׁמוּאֵל: כִּי אֲמַרִי אֲנָא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ זִיקָּה. וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר אֵין זִיקָּה,
The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: When I said my above teaching, it was in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the levirate bond is substantial, and he must therefore perform a valid ḥalitza in order to cancel this bond. A ḥalitza performed with a woman who received a bill of divorce is not powerful enough to completely cancel the bond of the rival wife who did not perform ḥalitza. But Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial, and therefore any ḥalitza that releases one of the women also serves to release the other.
וּמִדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר אֵין זִיקָּה,
The Gemara asks: But if so, from the fact that Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial,
רַבָּנַן סָבְרִי יֵשׁ זִיקָּה, וְקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין וִיבָמָה אַחַת. לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה — צְרִיכָה לַחֲזוֹר עַל כׇּל הָאַחִין.
it can be inferred that the Rabbis hold that the levirate bond is substantial, as it is assumed that they disagree with Rabban Gamliel in this regard as well. And the latter clause of that baraita teaches: And you would say the same with regard to two yevamin and one yevama such that if the two yevamin gave one yevama a bill of divorce, she is exempted by the ḥalitza of one of them. If so, let us say that it is a conclusive refutation of the statement that Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said. For Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: In cases of invalid ḥalitza, the yevama is required to repeat the ḥalitza with all the brothers. If the ḥalitza was invalid for some reason, all the brothers must perform ḥalitza with the yevama, as her bond with them is not canceled by an invalid ḥalitza.
אָמַר לָךְ רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: בֵּין לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי אֵין זִיקָּה, וְהָכָא בְּגֵט אַחַר גֵּט וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
The Gemara responds: Rabba bar Rav Huna could have said to you: Both Rabban Gamliel and the Rabbis hold that the levirate bond is not substantial, whereas my statement is in accordance with the opinion that the levirate bond is substantial. And here the dispute does not concern the topic of the levirate bond at all, but rather it only involves the explicitly mentioned issue: They disagree with regard to the efficacy of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal.
אָמַר מָר: עָשָׂה מַאֲמָר בָּזוֹ וּמַאֲמָר בָּזוֹ, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן גֵּט לָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְחוֹלֵץ לָהּ, וְאָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וּמוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁנִיָּה. מִכְּדֵי קָסָבַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אֵין מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר, רִאשׁוֹנָה נָמֵי תִּתְיַיבֵּם? גְּזֵירָה דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְיַיבּוֹמֵי לִשְׁנִיָּה.
The Master said above in the baraita: If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and levirate betrothal with that one, Rabban Gamliel says: He gives a bill of divorce to the first one and performs ḥalitza with her and is forbidden to her relatives, but he is permitted to the relatives of the second one. The Gemara poses a question: Since Rabban Gamliel holds that levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal, and the second levirate betrothal is of no consequence, the first woman should also be permitted to enter into levirate marriage. Why must he perform ḥalitza with her? The Gemara answers: It is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree lest he perform levirate marriage with the second woman. The Sages were concerned that in cases where the yavam performed levirate betrothal with both women, if he were permitted to consummate the levirate marriage with the first woman, he might do so with the second woman as well.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וּבֶן עַזַּאי וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה — כּוּלְּהוּ סְבִירָא לְהוּ מַאֲמָר קוֹנֶה קִנְיָן גָּמוּר. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — הָא דַּאֲמַרַן.
§ Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabban Gamliel, and Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Shimon, and ben Azzai, and Rabbi Neḥemya, they all hold that levirate betrothal acquires the yevama as a full-fledged acquisition, like a regular betrothal. The source for Rabban Gamliel’s opinion is that which we said above, that levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal. Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the second levirate betrothal is not effective because she was already fully acquired by the first one.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי — דִּתְנַן: שְׁלֹשָׁה אַחִין, שְׁנַיִם מֵהֶם נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, וְאֶחָד מוּפְנֶה, מֵת אֶחָד מִבַּעֲלֵי אֲחָיוֹת, וְעָשָׂה בָּהּ מוּפְנֶה מַאֲמָר, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת אָחִיו הַשֵּׁנִי, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ, וְהַלֵּזוּ — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה.
The source for the opinion of Beit Shammai is as we learned in a mishna: In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and one who was single, the following occurred: The husband of one of the sisters died childless, leaving behind his wife, and the single brother performed levirate betrothal with this wife. Afterward, the second brother died, whereby the second brother’s wife, the sister of the betrothed, happened before him for levirate marriage as well. In this case, Beit Shammai say: His wife remains with him, i.e., the woman he betrothed is considered like his wife, and he is not required to divorce her. And this other leaves the yavam and is exempt from levirate marriage due to the fact that she is the sister of a wife. This indicates that Beit Shammai hold that the levirate betrothal performed with the first woman makes her fully betrothed, thereby nullifying the levirate bond with her sister.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — דְּתַנְיָא: אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לַחֲכָמִים: אִם בִּיאַת רִאשׁוֹן בִּיאָה — בִּיאַת שֵׁנִי אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה. אִם בִּיאַת רִאשׁוֹן אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה — בִּיאַת שֵׁנִי נָמֵי אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה. וְהָא בִּיאַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע, דִּכְמַאֲמָר שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן, וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה.
The source for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is based on the following case cited in a mishna (96b): In the case of a boy aged nine years and one day old who had relations with his yevama, and afterward his brother, who is also nine years and one day old, had relations with her, the second brother disqualifies her from performing levirate marriage with the first one. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If the intercourse of the first brother is considered effective intercourse, the intercourse of the second brother is not considered effective intercourse such that it would disqualify her from performing levirate marriage with the first brother, as the first brother has already acquired her through his intercourse. If the intercourse of the first brother is not considered effective intercourse, the intercourse of the second brother is also not effective intercourse. And the Sages considered the intercourse of a nine-year-old boy to be like levirate betrothal, and Rabbi Shimon says that the intercourse of the second boy is not considered intercourse. This proves that in his opinion the intercourse of a nine-year-old fully acquires the yevama, and similarly, so does levirate betrothal.
בֶּן עַזַּאי — דְּתַנְיָא, בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין וִיבָמָה אַחַת, וְאֵין מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת וְיָבָם אֶחָד. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה — דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: אַחַת בְּעִילָה, וְאַחַת חֲלִיצָה, בֵּין בַּתְּחִלָּה בֵּין בָּאֶמְצַע בֵּין בַּסּוֹף — אֵין אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם. וְהָא בִּיאָה פְּסוּלָה, דִּכְמַאֲמָר שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן, וְקָתָנֵי: אֵין אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם.
This source for ben Azzai’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: Levirate betrothal is effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamin and one yevama, but levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamot and one yavam. Because the latter case involves only one yavam, his levirate betrothal fully acquires the yevama, and therefore the levirate betrothal he performs with the second woman is of no account, as he is already betrothed to the first yevama. The source for Rabbi Neḥemya’s opinion is as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Neḥemya says: With regard to both intercourse and ḥalitza, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, nothing is effective after it. And the Sages considered invalid intercourse to be like levirate betrothal, and Rabbi Neḥemya teaches that nothing is effective after it. This indicates that he maintains that no form of acquisition is effective after levirate betrothal, as levirate betrothal completely acquires the yevama.
כֵּיצַד? עָשָׂה מַאֲמָר כּוּ׳.
§ The mishna states: How so? If he performed levirate betrothal with his yevama and gave her a bill of divorce, etc.
