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Today's Daf Yomi

June 2, 2022 | 讙壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Yevamot 87

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This week鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shira Daniel in loving memory of her father, Shlomo Yosef ben Chaim Shmuel.

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Shira Futornik. 鈥淪hira! All your self-assumed aunts (and a few uncles) are inspired by your daily commitment to learning the Daf and are a bit farklempt watching you sit daily with your dad to do so. You are realizing a dream that so many of us waited years to achieve. In Masekhet Brakhot, R. Michelle taught us the story of R. Elazar Ben Azarya, at a young age already knew as much as a 70-year-old (讛专讬 讗谞讬 讻讘谉 70 砖谞讛), but he was always open to learning more. Our wish is that you enjoy the learning you achieve in your youth, and continue to always find a fresh perspective in your learning. Happy (belated) 18th birthday from your Hadran Zoom Family.鈥

By what rights can a woman married to a kohen and then subsequently married someone else,聽 go back to eating truma at her husband’s house after her second husband’s death (and any sons she had with him), upon condition that she has a child left from the marriage with a kohen? These laws are derived from the laws of a bat kohen who can return to her father’s house to eat truma. A bat kohen cannot go back to eating the breast and thigh if the sacrifice upon her return. Five different drashot are brought that teach this halacha. However, a woman who returns to her husband’s house can eat the breast and thigh. Although there is a debate regarding this point as if the basic law is derived from the bat kohen, how can the law be more inclusive? A bat kohen who is pregnant with a non-kohen or one waiting for yibum cannot return to her father’s house to eat truma. These laws are derived from verses. Why isn’t the law of a pregnant woman obvious from a kal vachomer learned out from laws of yibum? The kal vachomer is rejected and that explains why the verse was needed. Why is there a verse to teach that a bat kohen can’t go back if she has children and another one if she is pregnant? The Gemara suggests many possible kal vachomers that could have been made to teach certain laws by truma or yibum and then shows why a verse was needed as the law is not as one could have concluded from the kal vachomer. If a man goes abroad and the witnesses come and say he died, and she marries someone else and has children. What is the law? On what does it depend? What are the different opinions?

 

讘转 讻讛谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讬砖专讗诇 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 谞讬住转 诇诇讜讬 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 谞讬住转 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛

The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. If the Israelite died and she has a son from him, she may not partake of teruma as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently married a Levite she may partake of tithe. If he died, and she had a son from him, she may still partake of tithe. If she subsequently married a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she had a son from him, she may partake of teruma.

诪转 讘谞讛 诪讻讛谉 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讘谞讛 诪诇讜讬 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 诪转 讘谞讛 诪讬砖专讗诇 讞讜讝专转 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜注诇 讝讜 谞讗诪专 讜砖讘讛 讗诇 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讻谞注讜专讬讛 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇

If her son from the priest also died, she may not partake of teruma, but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If her son from the Levite died, she may no longer partake of tithe. If her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father鈥檚 house and may once again partake of teruma. And with regard to this woman, it is stated: 鈥淎nd she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13).

讙诪壮 诪转 讘谞讛 诪诇讜讬 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讛讚专讗 讗讻诇讛 诪砖讜诐 讘谞讛 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讜讘转

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: If her son from the Levite died she may partake of teruma. The Gemara asks: This halakha with regard to a woman previously married to a priest, who had a child from the priest and was then married to a Levite and separated from him, that she once again may partake due to her son from the priest, from where do we derive it? Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: It states: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). The verse could have stated: If a priest鈥檚 daughter. Instead, it states: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter,鈥 with an extra word, represented by the single Hebrew letter vav, to include this case.

讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讚专讬砖 讜讜讬 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 讻讜诇讗 讜讘转 拽专讗 讬转讬专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: In accordance with the opinion of which Sage is this exposition? Is it only in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the additional letter vav, representing the word 鈥渁nd,鈥 as an inclusive term? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: It can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, who do not usually derive halakhot from an additional vav, as in this case the entire phrase: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter,鈥 is superfluous, as the previous verse had already specified that we are dealing with 鈥渢he daughter of a priest.鈥 Therefore, everyone agrees that in this context the additional letter in the text comes to include the additional case.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻砖讛讬讗 讞讜讝专转 讞讜讝专转 诇转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讘专 砖讬诇讗 诪讗讬 拽专讗 讛讬讗 讘转专讜诪转 讛拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘诪讜专诐 诪谉 讛拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 诪诇讞诐 讜诇讗 讻诇 诇讞诐 驻专讟 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

The Sages taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father鈥檚 house after having been married to a non-priest and then separated from her husband, she returns to partaking of teruma but she does not return to partake of the breast and right hind leg of peace-offerings. Rav 岣sda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: What is the verse that teaches us this halakha? 鈥淪he may not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred things鈥 (Leviticus 22:12). This verse indicates: From that which is separated from the sacred things, i.e., offerings, and given to a priest, she may not eat. Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said that this halakha comes from a different source: We infer from the words 鈥渟he may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), that she may not eat all bread; this comes to exclude the breast and right hind leg.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讗讬诪讗 驻专讟 诇讛驻专转 谞讚专讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讘专 驻住拽讛 转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜谞讚专 讗诇诪谞讛 讜讙专讜砖讛 讬拽讜诐 注诇讬讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讛诇讗 诪讜爪讗讛 诪讻诇诇 讗讘 讜诪讜爪讗讛 诪讻诇诇 讘注诇

Rami bar 岣ma objects to this: But we can say that the verse comes to exclude nullification of vows. The Torah would consequently be teaching us that even after she 鈥渋s returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), she does not return to her youth in all ways, as her father may not nullify her vows. Rava said: The connection between her and her father鈥檚 house with regard to vows has already been severed, as taught by the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: 鈥淏ut the vow of a widow, or of a divorc茅e鈥hall stand against her鈥 (Numbers 30:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? She was removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her father when she married, and she has likewise been removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her husband, as she is no longer married to him.

讗诇讗 讛专讬 砖诪住专 讛讗讘 诇砖诇讜讞讬 讛讘注诇 讗讜 砖诪住专讜 砖诇讜讞讬 讛讗讘 诇砖诇讜讞讬 讛讘注诇 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讘讚专讱 讛讬讗讱 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 砖诇 讝讜 讗讜 讘讬转 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗讛 砖注讛 讗讞转 诪专砖讜转 讛讗讘 砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专

Rather, the verse is referring to a case where the father transferred his daughter to the husband鈥檚 agents for the purpose of marriage, and she consequently left her father鈥檚 house. Or, it is referring to a case where the father鈥檚 agents transferred her to the husband鈥檚 agents and she was widowed or divorced on the way, before she arrived at her husband鈥檚 house. How shall I consider her? Is she in the house of this one, her father, or is she in the house of that one, her husband? Rather, this comes to tell you: Since she has entirely left her father鈥檚 jurisdiction when she was transferred to the husband鈥檚 agents, even if for just one moment, her father is no longer able to nullify her vows. We learn from here that a father cannot annul his daughter鈥檚 vows after she has been married, and there is no need for an additional verse to teach this halakha.

专讘 住驻专讗 讗诪专 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇 诇讞诐 讜诇讗 讘砖专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇 诇讞诐 讛拽谞讜讬 诇讗讘讬讛 驻专讟 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讚诪砖诇讞谉 讙讘讜讛 拽讗 讝讻讜

Rav Safra said: The halakha that she does not return to her father鈥檚 house with regard to the breast and the right hind leg is derived from the verse: 鈥淔rom her father鈥檚 bread she may eat,鈥 which indicates that she partakes of the 鈥渂read鈥 of teruma but not of the meat of the breast and hind leg. Rav Pappa said a different interpretation: 鈥淔rom her father鈥檚 bread she may eat鈥 is referring to bread owned by her father, such as teruma, which is the property of the priest, which excludes the breast and right hind leg, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Unlike teruma, the breast and right hind leg do not belong to the priests. Rather, after the offering is sacrificed to God, they eat these portions but are not considered to own them.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讜讗转 讞讝讛 讛转谞讜驻讛 讜讗转 砖讜拽 讛转专讜诪讛 转讗讻诇讜 讗转讛 讜讘谞讬讱 讜讘谞讜转讬讱 讗转讱 讘讝诪谉 砖讗转讱

And Rava said: It states: 鈥淎nd the breast of waving and the hind leg of heaving you shall eat鈥ou, and your sons and your daughters with you鈥 (Leviticus 10:14). This indicates that daughters of priests may eat at a time when they are 鈥渨ith you,鈥 but once they have left the priest鈥檚 domain, e.g., by marrying an ordinary Israelite, they may no longer partake of these gifts even if they subsequently return to his household.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 转谞讗 讻砖讛讬讗 讞讜讝专转 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讞讜讝专转 诇转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讘砖讘讬诇 讘谞讛 讞讜讝专转 讗祝 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It was taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father鈥檚 house, after marrying and separating from her husband without a child, she returns for the purposes of eating teruma, but she does not return for the purposes of eating the breast and right hind leg. By contrast, if an Israelite woman ate on account of her son from a priest, if she later married an Israelite and he died, she returns to partake even of the breast and right hind leg.

讗讝诇 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 讗诪专讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪转专讘讬讗 诪讜讘转 诪讬 注讚讬驻讗 诇讛 诪讬谞讛 讛转诐 讻转讬讘讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讛讻讗 诇讗 讻转讬讘讬 诪讬注讜讟讬

Rav Mordekhai went and stated this halakha before Rav Ashi, who said to him: From where does he include the case of a woman who partakes of teruma on account of her son? From the verse 鈥渂ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). Is the Israelite woman preferable to her, the daughter of a priest herself, who does not return to eating the breast and hind leg? The Gemara answers: There, the Torah writes exclusions, as we learned above, which teach us that she does not return in all regards, whereas here it does not write exclusions. Consequently, although the halakha of a woman who has a son from a priest is itself derived from the case of the daughter of a priest returning to her father鈥檚 house, she has more abilities than the latter.

讘转 讻讛谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讬砖专讗诇 讜讻讜壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜砖讘讛 讗诇 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 驻专讟 诇砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讻谞注讜专讬讛 驻专讟 诇诪注讜讘专转

搂 The Gemara returns to the mishna. The mishna taught: The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. The Sages taught: 鈥淎nd she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house鈥 (Leviticus 22:13); this excludes a widow awaiting her yavam, for she cannot go back to her father鈥檚 house as long as she is still waiting for the yavam to perform levirate marriage. 鈥淎s in her youth鈥; this excludes a pregnant woman, as her pregnancy has changed her, and she is no longer as she was in her youth.

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚

But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, without the need for a special exposition of a verse? If in a place, i.e., a case, where the Torah did not make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to exempt her from levirate marriage; this is the case of a woman who married a man, had a son with him, was widowed, remarried, and her second husband died childless. She requires levirate marriage despite the fact that she has a child, as the first husband鈥檚 child is irrelevant with regard to her need for levirate marriage for the second husband. Despite this limitation, the Torah made the status of a fetus like that of a child who was born, as a pregnant woman does not perform levirate marriage.

诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚

If this is so, then in a place where the Torah did make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to disqualify her from teruma; this is the case of a daughter of a priest who married an Israelite, had a son with him, was widowed, and afterward married another Israelite, who died childless. She may not partake of teruma on account of her son from the first husband. Is it not, therefore, right that we should make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, that would prevent her from returning to partake of teruma if she is pregnant? If this reasoning is correct, there is no need for the biblical exposition.

诇讗 诪讛 诇讬 注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚 诇注谞讬谉 讬讬讘讜诐 砖讛专讬 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 谞注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻谞注讜专讬讛 驻专讟 诇诪注讜讘专转

However, this proof can be refuted: No, what I should say is that the Torah made a fetus like a child who was born with regard to levirate marriage, because with regard to levirate marriage the Torah made the dead like the living: If the woman had a child at the time of her husband鈥檚 death she is entirely exempt from levirate marriage, even if her son subsequently died. The deceased child is like a living one in the sense that he continues to exempt his mother from the requirement of levirate marriage. Shall we then make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, where the Torah did not make the dead like the living? In the case of teruma, as long as the daughter of a priest has a living son from her Israelite husband, she is disqualified from teruma, but if he dies she may partake of teruma again, as we do not consider him like a living son. Consequently, we cannot learn the halakha of teruma from levirate marriage with regard to the status of a fetus. Therefore, the verse states 鈥渁s in her youth鈥 to exclude a pregnant woman.

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 诪注讜讘专转 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讜讛砖转讗 转专讬 讙讜驻讬 讗讘诇 诪注讜讘专转 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讜讛砖转讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讗讬诪讗 转讬讻讜诇 爪专讬讻讗 讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪注讜讘专转 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讙讜驻讗

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to write this verse that teaches the halakha of a pregnant woman, and it was necessary also to write 鈥渁nd she have no child鈥 (Leviticus 22:13) because had the Merciful One written only: 鈥淎nd she have no child,鈥 I would have said that at the outset she was only one body when she ate teruma, and now, upon her return, there are two bodies, and that is why she is no longer 鈥渁s in her youth.鈥 But a pregnant woman, who at the outset was one body and now is still one body, one might say that she may partake of teruma until the birth of her son. Consequently, it is necessary for a verse to teach the halakha. And vice-versa, had the Merciful One written the halakha with regard to a pregnant woman, I might have said that this is true only of a pregnant woman because at the outset her body

住专讬拽讗 讜讛砖转讗 讙讜驻讗 诪诇讬讗 讗讘诇 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讙讜驻讗 住专讬拽讗 讜讛砖转讗 讙讜驻讗 住专讬拽讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

was empty, and now her body is full with the child, and therefore she is no longer 鈥渁s in her youth.鈥 But in a situation where 鈥渟he has no child,鈥 when at the outset her body was empty and now her body is also empty, as she has given birth, you might say that she should not be disqualified. Therefore, it is necessary to write both verses.

(住讬诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪注砖讬讛 讘诪讬转讛 谞注砖讛 讜诇讗 谞注砖讛 讘讜诇讚 讬讘诐 讜转专讜诪讛 讬讘讜诐 讜转专讜诪讛 住讬诪谉)

Parenthetically, the Gemara lists terms signifying the following discussions, to serve as a mnemonic device: Said to him, we should not make, by death, we should make and not make, by a child, yavam and teruma, levirate marriage and teruma. This list of terms, taken from the introductions or key phrases in each of the ensuing discussions, is the mnemonic.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讚讗住拽专转讗 诇专讘讗 诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐

Rav Yehuda from De鈥檌skarta said to Rava, in continuation of the discussion of the baraita: Should we not make the halakha concerning dead children like the halakha concerning living children with regard to levirate marriage by an a fortiori inference, and say: And if in a place where the Torah made the halakha with regard to a child from the first husband like the halakha with regard to a child from the second husband, to disqualify her from teruma, for as long as she has a child who is not a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, the Torah nevertheless did not make dead children like living ones; therefore, in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, is it not right that we should not make the dead like the living? Why, then, is a yevama exempt from levirate marriage if her late husband鈥檚 only child dies?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讚专讻讬讛 讚专讻讬 谞讜注诐 讜讻诇 谞转讬讘讜转讬讛 砖诇讜诐

The verse states: 鈥淗er ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace鈥 (Proverbs 3:17). In other words, since the ways of Torah are those of pleasantness, the Torah would not obligate a woman who has married in the meantime to subsequently perform 岣litza, as this might demean her in her husband鈥檚 eyes.

讜谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讜讛讗 讗讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara inquires: And let us make the halakha with regard to dead children like the halakha with regard to living ones with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, it nevertheless made the living like the dead, as a woman whose husband died and left a child is exempt from levirate marriage even if that child subsequently dies; then, in a place where the Torah made a child from the first like a child from the second to disqualify her from teruma, is it not right that we should make the living like the dead? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states 鈥渁nd she have no child, she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), and here she does not currently have children.

讜谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讜讛讗 讗讬谉 诇讜

The Gemara further suggests: And let us make her child from the first husband like her child from the second one with regard to levirate marriage, again from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead with regard to teruma, it still made a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where it made the living like the dead, with regard to levirate marriage, is it not right that we should make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, and thereby exempt her from levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: The verse states about levirate marriage: 鈥淎nd he has no child鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), and in fact he had none at the time of his death.

讜诇讗 谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇转专讜诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讛 讜讛讗 讬砖 诇讛

The Gemara offers another possibility: And should we make a child from the first husband not like a child from the second one with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: If in a place where the Torah made the living like the dead to exempt her from levirate marriage, it still did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead, with regard to teruma, is it not right that we should not make the child from the first husband like the child from the second? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd she have no child,鈥 but in fact this woman has children.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讬砖 诪讜转专讜转

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 转爪讗 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back from out of the country, she must leave both this man and that one, as they are both forbidden to her. And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and that one.

讜讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讜诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讜讗诐 谞讟诇讛 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 转讞讝讬专

And furthermore, she has a claim to neither payment of her marriage contract, nor the profits of her property used by either of them, nor sustenance, nor the worn clothes she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims neither against this man nor against that one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. And if she took any of these items from this man or from that one, she must return them to him.

讜讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜诇讗 讝讛 讜讝讛 诪讟诪讗 诇讛 讜诇讗 讝讛 讜讝讛 讝讻讗讬诐 诇讗 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛

And the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one. Her child from the second husband is a definite mamzer, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a mamzer. And neither this man nor that man may become impure for her upon her death, if they are priests. And neither this one nor that one is entitled to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: Neither to her found articles, nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows.

讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 谞驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讜讘转 诇讜讬 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 讜讘转 讻讛谉 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讜讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讗诐 诪转讜 讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉

If she was a regular Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, and the daughter of a Levite is disqualified from partaking of the first tithe, and the daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And neither the heirs of this man nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract, as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. And if they both died childless, the brothers of this one and the brothers of this one must perform 岣litza and they do not enter into levirate marriage.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻转讜讘转讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬讗转讛 讗讜 讞诇讬爪转讛 诪讗讞讬讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 驻讜讟专转 爪专转讛 讜讗讬谉 讛讜诇讚 诪诪谞讜 诪诪讝专

Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the first tanna and says that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found articles, to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows. Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. Rabbi Shimon says an even more far-reaching ruling: Her sexual relations or her 岣litza with the brothers of the first husband exempts her rival wife, as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or 岣litza, and certainly she does not require 岣litza from the brother of the second husband. And if she returns to her first husband, the child from him is not a mamzer.

讜讗诐 谞讬住转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛拽专讘谉

All these halakhot refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. But if she married without the consent of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If she married by permission of the court, she must leave both of them and she is exempt from bringing the offering, i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress.

诇讗 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 讬驻讛 讻讞 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛拽专讘谉 讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽诇拽诇讛 讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 砖诇讗 讛转讬专讜讛 讗诇讗 诇讬谞砖讗

If, however, she did not marry by permission of the court, she must leave her second husband and is liable to bring an offering for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from bringing an offering. If the court instructed her to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, and she went and ruined herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and not to engage in licentious relations.

讙诪壮 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 谞砖讗转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讘注讚讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉

GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If she married without the consent of the court she is permitted to return to him, this indicates that she did so not by the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses, i.e., as there are two witnesses, she does not require special permission from the court. With this in mind, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna, which speaks of one who acted with the consent of the court, is referring to a situation when there was one witness. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible when he testifies about a husband鈥檚 death, i.e., the court will permit a wife to marry on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讜讞讝拽讜 诇讛讬讜转 诪砖讬讗讬谉 注讚 诪驻讬 注讚 讜讗砖讛 诪驻讬 讗砖讛 讜讗砖讛 诪驻讬 注讘讚 讜诪驻讬 砖驻讞讛 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉

And we also learned in a mishna (122a): They established that they would allow a woman to marry if her husband was reported dead by one witness, based solely on what he learned from the mouth of another witness, i.e., hearsay testimony, and also the testimony of a woman who heard from another woman, and even the testimony of a woman who heard from a slave or from a maidservant. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible in this regard, as whenever hearsay testimony is accepted, the testimony of one witness is also valid.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 驻讟讜专 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 讛讗 讗讬砖转讬拽 诪讛讬诪谉 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

And we also learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b) that if one witness says to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and the accused says: I did not eat it, the accused is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that the individual in question said: I did not eat it, which indicates that if he had been silent and failed to deny the accusation, the lone witness is deemed credible. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible by Torah law with regard to certain issues.

诪谞讗 诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 讗讜 讛讜讚注 讗诇讬讜 讞讟讗转讜 讜诇讗 砖讬讜讚讬注讜讛讜 讗讞专讬诐 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讻讞讬砖讜 讬讛讗 驻讟讜专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讛讜讚注 讗诇讬讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: 鈥淥r if his sin be known to him鈥 (Leviticus 4:23, 28). This indicates that he himself must be aware of his sin, and not if it was made known to him by others. In other words, one is not obligated to bring an offering due to the testimony of others, even if they testify that he had transgressed. I might have thought he should be exempt even though he does not contradict the witness鈥檚 claim. Therefore, the verse states: If his sin be known to him, which indicates that in any case, however he comes by this knowledge, he is liable.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗转讜 转专讬 讜诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讛讜 拽专讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讞讚 讜讻讬 诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讬讛 诪讛讬诪谉 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉 讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪砖讜诐 讚诪讛讬诪谉 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 砖转讬拽 讜砖转讬拽讛 讻讛讜讚讗讛 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara clarifies this halakha. What are the circumstances? If we say that two witnesses came and informed him and he does not contradict them, why do I need a verse to teach this ruling? After all, the testimony of two witnesses is always accepted. Rather, is it not referring to one witness, and yet if he does not contradict the sole witness, that witness is deemed credible? One can learn from this that one witness is deemed credible with regard to prohibitions. The Gemara refutes this claim: And from where do you infer that the reason is due to the fact that the one witness is deemed credible? Perhaps the accused must bring an offering because he remains silent, as there is a principle that silence is considered like an admission.

转讚注 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 驻讟讜专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讗诐 讛讘讬讗讜讛讜 砖谞讬诐 诇讬讚讬 诪讬转讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜讛讜 诇讬讚讬 拽专讘谉 讛拽诇

And you should know that this is the reason, as the latter clause of that same baraita teaches that if two witnesses said to him: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, he is exempt, and Rabbi Meir obligates him to bring an offering. Rabbi Meir said that this is an a fortiori inference: If two witnesses can bring him to the severe penalty of death by testifying that he had committed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, should they not bring him to the more lenient obligation of an offering?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗诐 讬专爪讛 诇讜诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讬讬转讬 专讬砖讗

The Rabbis said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as with regard to an offering, what is the halakha if he would choose to say: I was an intentional sinner? One who sins intentionally is not liable to bring an offering. Since the accused in the latter clause of the baraita can negate the testimony that would have rendered him liable to bring an offering, he can likewise deny the act itself, whereas if witnesses testify that he performed an action that incurs the death penalty, his denial has no bearing on the case. The Gemara clarifies: In the first clause

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Yevamot 87

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Yevamot 87

讘转 讻讛谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讬砖专讗诇 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 谞讬住转 诇诇讜讬 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 谞讬住转 诇讻讛谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讜诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讘谉 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛

The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. If the Israelite died and she has a son from him, she may not partake of teruma as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently married a Levite she may partake of tithe. If he died, and she had a son from him, she may still partake of tithe. If she subsequently married a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she had a son from him, she may partake of teruma.

诪转 讘谞讛 诪讻讛谉 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 诪转 讘谞讛 诪诇讜讬 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘诪注砖专 诪转 讘谞讛 诪讬砖专讗诇 讞讜讝专转 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜注诇 讝讜 谞讗诪专 讜砖讘讛 讗诇 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讻谞注讜专讬讛 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇

If her son from the priest also died, she may not partake of teruma, but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If her son from the Levite died, she may no longer partake of tithe. If her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father鈥檚 house and may once again partake of teruma. And with regard to this woman, it is stated: 鈥淎nd she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13).

讙诪壮 诪转 讘谞讛 诪诇讜讬 转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讚讛讚专讗 讗讻诇讛 诪砖讜诐 讘谞讛 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 讘转 讜讘转

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: If her son from the Levite died she may partake of teruma. The Gemara asks: This halakha with regard to a woman previously married to a priest, who had a child from the priest and was then married to a Levite and separated from him, that she once again may partake due to her son from the priest, from where do we derive it? Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: It states: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). The verse could have stated: If a priest鈥檚 daughter. Instead, it states: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter,鈥 with an extra word, represented by the single Hebrew letter vav, to include this case.

讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讚专讬砖 讜讜讬 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 讻讜诇讗 讜讘转 拽专讗 讬转讬专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: In accordance with the opinion of which Sage is this exposition? Is it only in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the additional letter vav, representing the word 鈥渁nd,鈥 as an inclusive term? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: It can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, who do not usually derive halakhot from an additional vav, as in this case the entire phrase: 鈥淏ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter,鈥 is superfluous, as the previous verse had already specified that we are dealing with 鈥渢he daughter of a priest.鈥 Therefore, everyone agrees that in this context the additional letter in the text comes to include the additional case.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻砖讛讬讗 讞讜讝专转 讞讜讝专转 诇转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讘专 砖讬诇讗 诪讗讬 拽专讗 讛讬讗 讘转专讜诪转 讛拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讘诪讜专诐 诪谉 讛拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 诪诇讞诐 讜诇讗 讻诇 诇讞诐 驻专讟 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

The Sages taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father鈥檚 house after having been married to a non-priest and then separated from her husband, she returns to partaking of teruma but she does not return to partake of the breast and right hind leg of peace-offerings. Rav 岣sda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: What is the verse that teaches us this halakha? 鈥淪he may not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred things鈥 (Leviticus 22:12). This verse indicates: From that which is separated from the sacred things, i.e., offerings, and given to a priest, she may not eat. Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said that this halakha comes from a different source: We infer from the words 鈥渟he may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), that she may not eat all bread; this comes to exclude the breast and right hind leg.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讗讬诪讗 驻专讟 诇讛驻专转 谞讚专讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讘专 驻住拽讛 转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜谞讚专 讗诇诪谞讛 讜讙专讜砖讛 讬拽讜诐 注诇讬讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讛诇讗 诪讜爪讗讛 诪讻诇诇 讗讘 讜诪讜爪讗讛 诪讻诇诇 讘注诇

Rami bar 岣ma objects to this: But we can say that the verse comes to exclude nullification of vows. The Torah would consequently be teaching us that even after she 鈥渋s returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), she does not return to her youth in all ways, as her father may not nullify her vows. Rava said: The connection between her and her father鈥檚 house with regard to vows has already been severed, as taught by the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: 鈥淏ut the vow of a widow, or of a divorc茅e鈥hall stand against her鈥 (Numbers 30:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? She was removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her father when she married, and she has likewise been removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her husband, as she is no longer married to him.

讗诇讗 讛专讬 砖诪住专 讛讗讘 诇砖诇讜讞讬 讛讘注诇 讗讜 砖诪住专讜 砖诇讜讞讬 讛讗讘 诇砖诇讜讞讬 讛讘注诇 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讘讚专讱 讛讬讗讱 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 砖诇 讝讜 讗讜 讘讬转 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗讛 砖注讛 讗讞转 诪专砖讜转 讛讗讘 砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专

Rather, the verse is referring to a case where the father transferred his daughter to the husband鈥檚 agents for the purpose of marriage, and she consequently left her father鈥檚 house. Or, it is referring to a case where the father鈥檚 agents transferred her to the husband鈥檚 agents and she was widowed or divorced on the way, before she arrived at her husband鈥檚 house. How shall I consider her? Is she in the house of this one, her father, or is she in the house of that one, her husband? Rather, this comes to tell you: Since she has entirely left her father鈥檚 jurisdiction when she was transferred to the husband鈥檚 agents, even if for just one moment, her father is no longer able to nullify her vows. We learn from here that a father cannot annul his daughter鈥檚 vows after she has been married, and there is no need for an additional verse to teach this halakha.

专讘 住驻专讗 讗诪专 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇 诇讞诐 讜诇讗 讘砖专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诪诇讞诐 讗讘讬讛 转讗讻诇 诇讞诐 讛拽谞讜讬 诇讗讘讬讛 驻专讟 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讚诪砖诇讞谉 讙讘讜讛 拽讗 讝讻讜

Rav Safra said: The halakha that she does not return to her father鈥檚 house with regard to the breast and the right hind leg is derived from the verse: 鈥淔rom her father鈥檚 bread she may eat,鈥 which indicates that she partakes of the 鈥渂read鈥 of teruma but not of the meat of the breast and hind leg. Rav Pappa said a different interpretation: 鈥淔rom her father鈥檚 bread she may eat鈥 is referring to bread owned by her father, such as teruma, which is the property of the priest, which excludes the breast and right hind leg, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Unlike teruma, the breast and right hind leg do not belong to the priests. Rather, after the offering is sacrificed to God, they eat these portions but are not considered to own them.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讜讗转 讞讝讛 讛转谞讜驻讛 讜讗转 砖讜拽 讛转专讜诪讛 转讗讻诇讜 讗转讛 讜讘谞讬讱 讜讘谞讜转讬讱 讗转讱 讘讝诪谉 砖讗转讱

And Rava said: It states: 鈥淎nd the breast of waving and the hind leg of heaving you shall eat鈥ou, and your sons and your daughters with you鈥 (Leviticus 10:14). This indicates that daughters of priests may eat at a time when they are 鈥渨ith you,鈥 but once they have left the priest鈥檚 domain, e.g., by marrying an ordinary Israelite, they may no longer partake of these gifts even if they subsequently return to his household.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 转谞讗 讻砖讛讬讗 讞讜讝专转 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讞讜讝专转 诇转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽 讘砖讘讬诇 讘谞讛 讞讜讝专转 讗祝 诇讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It was taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father鈥檚 house, after marrying and separating from her husband without a child, she returns for the purposes of eating teruma, but she does not return for the purposes of eating the breast and right hind leg. By contrast, if an Israelite woman ate on account of her son from a priest, if she later married an Israelite and he died, she returns to partake even of the breast and right hind leg.

讗讝诇 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 讗诪专讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪转专讘讬讗 诪讜讘转 诪讬 注讚讬驻讗 诇讛 诪讬谞讛 讛转诐 讻转讬讘讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讛讻讗 诇讗 讻转讬讘讬 诪讬注讜讟讬

Rav Mordekhai went and stated this halakha before Rav Ashi, who said to him: From where does he include the case of a woman who partakes of teruma on account of her son? From the verse 鈥渂ut if a priest鈥檚 daughter鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). Is the Israelite woman preferable to her, the daughter of a priest herself, who does not return to eating the breast and hind leg? The Gemara answers: There, the Torah writes exclusions, as we learned above, which teach us that she does not return in all regards, whereas here it does not write exclusions. Consequently, although the halakha of a woman who has a son from a priest is itself derived from the case of the daughter of a priest returning to her father鈥檚 house, she has more abilities than the latter.

讘转 讻讛谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讬砖专讗诇 讜讻讜壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜砖讘讛 讗诇 讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 驻专讟 诇砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讻谞注讜专讬讛 驻专讟 诇诪注讜讘专转

搂 The Gemara returns to the mishna. The mishna taught: The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. The Sages taught: 鈥淎nd she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house鈥 (Leviticus 22:13); this excludes a widow awaiting her yavam, for she cannot go back to her father鈥檚 house as long as she is still waiting for the yavam to perform levirate marriage. 鈥淎s in her youth鈥; this excludes a pregnant woman, as her pregnancy has changed her, and she is no longer as she was in her youth.

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚

But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, without the need for a special exposition of a verse? If in a place, i.e., a case, where the Torah did not make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to exempt her from levirate marriage; this is the case of a woman who married a man, had a son with him, was widowed, remarried, and her second husband died childless. She requires levirate marriage despite the fact that she has a child, as the first husband鈥檚 child is irrelevant with regard to her need for levirate marriage for the second husband. Despite this limitation, the Torah made the status of a fetus like that of a child who was born, as a pregnant woman does not perform levirate marriage.

诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚

If this is so, then in a place where the Torah did make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to disqualify her from teruma; this is the case of a daughter of a priest who married an Israelite, had a son with him, was widowed, and afterward married another Israelite, who died childless. She may not partake of teruma on account of her son from the first husband. Is it not, therefore, right that we should make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, that would prevent her from returning to partake of teruma if she is pregnant? If this reasoning is correct, there is no need for the biblical exposition.

诇讗 诪讛 诇讬 注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚 诇注谞讬谉 讬讬讘讜诐 砖讛专讬 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 谞注砖讛 注讜讘专 讻讬诇讜讚 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻谞注讜专讬讛 驻专讟 诇诪注讜讘专转

However, this proof can be refuted: No, what I should say is that the Torah made a fetus like a child who was born with regard to levirate marriage, because with regard to levirate marriage the Torah made the dead like the living: If the woman had a child at the time of her husband鈥檚 death she is entirely exempt from levirate marriage, even if her son subsequently died. The deceased child is like a living one in the sense that he continues to exempt his mother from the requirement of levirate marriage. Shall we then make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, where the Torah did not make the dead like the living? In the case of teruma, as long as the daughter of a priest has a living son from her Israelite husband, she is disqualified from teruma, but if he dies she may partake of teruma again, as we do not consider him like a living son. Consequently, we cannot learn the halakha of teruma from levirate marriage with regard to the status of a fetus. Therefore, the verse states 鈥渁s in her youth鈥 to exclude a pregnant woman.

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 诪注讜讘专转 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讜讛砖转讗 转专讬 讙讜驻讬 讗讘诇 诪注讜讘专转 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讜讛砖转讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讗讬诪讗 转讬讻讜诇 爪专讬讻讗 讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪注讜讘专转 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讙讜驻讗

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to write this verse that teaches the halakha of a pregnant woman, and it was necessary also to write 鈥渁nd she have no child鈥 (Leviticus 22:13) because had the Merciful One written only: 鈥淎nd she have no child,鈥 I would have said that at the outset she was only one body when she ate teruma, and now, upon her return, there are two bodies, and that is why she is no longer 鈥渁s in her youth.鈥 But a pregnant woman, who at the outset was one body and now is still one body, one might say that she may partake of teruma until the birth of her son. Consequently, it is necessary for a verse to teach the halakha. And vice-versa, had the Merciful One written the halakha with regard to a pregnant woman, I might have said that this is true only of a pregnant woman because at the outset her body

住专讬拽讗 讜讛砖转讗 讙讜驻讗 诪诇讬讗 讗讘诇 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讙讜驻讗 住专讬拽讗 讜讛砖转讗 讙讜驻讗 住专讬拽讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

was empty, and now her body is full with the child, and therefore she is no longer 鈥渁s in her youth.鈥 But in a situation where 鈥渟he has no child,鈥 when at the outset her body was empty and now her body is also empty, as she has given birth, you might say that she should not be disqualified. Therefore, it is necessary to write both verses.

(住讬诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪注砖讬讛 讘诪讬转讛 谞注砖讛 讜诇讗 谞注砖讛 讘讜诇讚 讬讘诐 讜转专讜诪讛 讬讘讜诐 讜转专讜诪讛 住讬诪谉)

Parenthetically, the Gemara lists terms signifying the following discussions, to serve as a mnemonic device: Said to him, we should not make, by death, we should make and not make, by a child, yavam and teruma, levirate marriage and teruma. This list of terms, taken from the introductions or key phrases in each of the ensuing discussions, is the mnemonic.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讚讗住拽专转讗 诇专讘讗 诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐

Rav Yehuda from De鈥檌skarta said to Rava, in continuation of the discussion of the baraita: Should we not make the halakha concerning dead children like the halakha concerning living children with regard to levirate marriage by an a fortiori inference, and say: And if in a place where the Torah made the halakha with regard to a child from the first husband like the halakha with regard to a child from the second husband, to disqualify her from teruma, for as long as she has a child who is not a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, the Torah nevertheless did not make dead children like living ones; therefore, in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, is it not right that we should not make the dead like the living? Why, then, is a yevama exempt from levirate marriage if her late husband鈥檚 only child dies?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讚专讻讬讛 讚专讻讬 谞讜注诐 讜讻诇 谞转讬讘讜转讬讛 砖诇讜诐

The verse states: 鈥淗er ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace鈥 (Proverbs 3:17). In other words, since the ways of Torah are those of pleasantness, the Torah would not obligate a woman who has married in the meantime to subsequently perform 岣litza, as this might demean her in her husband鈥檚 eyes.

讜谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇驻讜住诇讛 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 讜讛讗 讗讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara inquires: And let us make the halakha with regard to dead children like the halakha with regard to living ones with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, it nevertheless made the living like the dead, as a woman whose husband died and left a child is exempt from levirate marriage even if that child subsequently dies; then, in a place where the Torah made a child from the first like a child from the second to disqualify her from teruma, is it not right that we should make the living like the dead? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states 鈥渁nd she have no child, she is returned unto her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth鈥 (Leviticus 22:13), and here she does not currently have children.

讜谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讜讛讗 讗讬谉 诇讜

The Gemara further suggests: And let us make her child from the first husband like her child from the second one with regard to levirate marriage, again from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead with regard to teruma, it still made a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where it made the living like the dead, with regard to levirate marriage, is it not right that we should make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, and thereby exempt her from levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: The verse states about levirate marriage: 鈥淎nd he has no child鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), and in fact he had none at the time of his death.

讜诇讗 谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诇转专讜诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛讬讬讘讜诐 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 诪拽讜诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 诪转讬诐 讻讞讬讬诐 诇注谞讬谉 转专讜诪讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 谞注砖讛 讜诇讚 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讻讜诇讚 诪谉 讛砖谞讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讛 讜讛讗 讬砖 诇讛

The Gemara offers another possibility: And should we make a child from the first husband not like a child from the second one with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: If in a place where the Torah made the living like the dead to exempt her from levirate marriage, it still did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead, with regard to teruma, is it not right that we should not make the child from the first husband like the child from the second? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd she have no child,鈥 but in fact this woman has children.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讬砖 诪讜转专讜转

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 转爪讗 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back from out of the country, she must leave both this man and that one, as they are both forbidden to her. And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and that one.

讜讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讜诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讜讗诐 谞讟诇讛 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 转讞讝讬专

And furthermore, she has a claim to neither payment of her marriage contract, nor the profits of her property used by either of them, nor sustenance, nor the worn clothes she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims neither against this man nor against that one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. And if she took any of these items from this man or from that one, she must return them to him.

讜讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜诇讗 讝讛 讜讝讛 诪讟诪讗 诇讛 讜诇讗 讝讛 讜讝讛 讝讻讗讬诐 诇讗 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛

And the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one. Her child from the second husband is a definite mamzer, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a mamzer. And neither this man nor that man may become impure for her upon her death, if they are priests. And neither this one nor that one is entitled to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: Neither to her found articles, nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows.

讛讬转讛 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 谞驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讜讘转 诇讜讬 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 讜讘转 讻讛谉 诪谉 讛转专讜诪讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讜讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讗诐 诪转讜 讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉

If she was a regular Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, and the daughter of a Levite is disqualified from partaking of the first tithe, and the daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And neither the heirs of this man nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract, as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. And if they both died childless, the brothers of this one and the brothers of this one must perform 岣litza and they do not enter into levirate marriage.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻转讜讘转讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬讗转讛 讗讜 讞诇讬爪转讛 诪讗讞讬讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 驻讜讟专转 爪专转讛 讜讗讬谉 讛讜诇讚 诪诪谞讜 诪诪讝专

Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the first tanna and says that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found articles, to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows. Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. Rabbi Shimon says an even more far-reaching ruling: Her sexual relations or her 岣litza with the brothers of the first husband exempts her rival wife, as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or 岣litza, and certainly she does not require 岣litza from the brother of the second husband. And if she returns to her first husband, the child from him is not a mamzer.

讜讗诐 谞讬住转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛拽专讘谉

All these halakhot refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. But if she married without the consent of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If she married by permission of the court, she must leave both of them and she is exempt from bringing the offering, i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress.

诇讗 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 讬驻讛 讻讞 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖驻讜讟专讛 诪谉 讛拽专讘谉 讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽诇拽诇讛 讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 砖诇讗 讛转讬专讜讛 讗诇讗 诇讬谞砖讗

If, however, she did not marry by permission of the court, she must leave her second husband and is liable to bring an offering for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from bringing an offering. If the court instructed her to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, and she went and ruined herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and not to engage in licentious relations.

讙诪壮 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 谞砖讗转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讘注讚讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉

GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If she married without the consent of the court she is permitted to return to him, this indicates that she did so not by the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses, i.e., as there are two witnesses, she does not require special permission from the court. With this in mind, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna, which speaks of one who acted with the consent of the court, is referring to a situation when there was one witness. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible when he testifies about a husband鈥檚 death, i.e., the court will permit a wife to marry on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讜讞讝拽讜 诇讛讬讜转 诪砖讬讗讬谉 注讚 诪驻讬 注讚 讜讗砖讛 诪驻讬 讗砖讛 讜讗砖讛 诪驻讬 注讘讚 讜诪驻讬 砖驻讞讛 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉

And we also learned in a mishna (122a): They established that they would allow a woman to marry if her husband was reported dead by one witness, based solely on what he learned from the mouth of another witness, i.e., hearsay testimony, and also the testimony of a woman who heard from another woman, and even the testimony of a woman who heard from a slave or from a maidservant. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible in this regard, as whenever hearsay testimony is accepted, the testimony of one witness is also valid.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 驻讟讜专 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 讛讗 讗讬砖转讬拽 诪讛讬诪谉 讗诇诪讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

And we also learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b) that if one witness says to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and the accused says: I did not eat it, the accused is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that the individual in question said: I did not eat it, which indicates that if he had been silent and failed to deny the accusation, the lone witness is deemed credible. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible by Torah law with regard to certain issues.

诪谞讗 诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 讗讜 讛讜讚注 讗诇讬讜 讞讟讗转讜 讜诇讗 砖讬讜讚讬注讜讛讜 讗讞专讬诐 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讻讞讬砖讜 讬讛讗 驻讟讜专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讛讜讚注 讗诇讬讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: 鈥淥r if his sin be known to him鈥 (Leviticus 4:23, 28). This indicates that he himself must be aware of his sin, and not if it was made known to him by others. In other words, one is not obligated to bring an offering due to the testimony of others, even if they testify that he had transgressed. I might have thought he should be exempt even though he does not contradict the witness鈥檚 claim. Therefore, the verse states: If his sin be known to him, which indicates that in any case, however he comes by this knowledge, he is liable.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗转讜 转专讬 讜诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讛讜 拽专讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讞讚 讜讻讬 诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讬讛 诪讛讬诪谉 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉 讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪砖讜诐 讚诪讛讬诪谉 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 砖转讬拽 讜砖转讬拽讛 讻讛讜讚讗讛 讚诪讬讗

The Gemara clarifies this halakha. What are the circumstances? If we say that two witnesses came and informed him and he does not contradict them, why do I need a verse to teach this ruling? After all, the testimony of two witnesses is always accepted. Rather, is it not referring to one witness, and yet if he does not contradict the sole witness, that witness is deemed credible? One can learn from this that one witness is deemed credible with regard to prohibitions. The Gemara refutes this claim: And from where do you infer that the reason is due to the fact that the one witness is deemed credible? Perhaps the accused must bring an offering because he remains silent, as there is a principle that silence is considered like an admission.

转讚注 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 驻讟讜专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讗诐 讛讘讬讗讜讛讜 砖谞讬诐 诇讬讚讬 诪讬转讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜讛讜 诇讬讚讬 拽专讘谉 讛拽诇

And you should know that this is the reason, as the latter clause of that same baraita teaches that if two witnesses said to him: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, he is exempt, and Rabbi Meir obligates him to bring an offering. Rabbi Meir said that this is an a fortiori inference: If two witnesses can bring him to the severe penalty of death by testifying that he had committed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, should they not bring him to the more lenient obligation of an offering?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗诐 讬专爪讛 诇讜诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讬讬转讬 专讬砖讗

The Rabbis said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as with regard to an offering, what is the halakha if he would choose to say: I was an intentional sinner? One who sins intentionally is not liable to bring an offering. Since the accused in the latter clause of the baraita can negate the testimony that would have rendered him liable to bring an offering, he can likewise deny the act itself, whereas if witnesses testify that he performed an action that incurs the death penalty, his denial has no bearing on the case. The Gemara clarifies: In the first clause

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