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Today's Daf Yomi

June 3, 2022 | 讚壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 88

On what basis is one witness believed in this case to permit the woman to remarry? Four answers are brought – the first three try to prove it from Torah laws, but are unsuccessful. In the end, the Gemara concludes that she can marry based on one witness because the rabbis decided to be lenient in order toprevent an aguna situation. That explains why in the end, they are very strict with her if she is wrong – they assume that she will not only rely on the one witness but will do everything she can to make sure that he is really not alive. Rav and Shmuel each state a limitation on the Mishna and the Gemara tries to understand what they each meant by their statements. The Mishna said she needs a get from both husbands – why from the second – wasn’t her marriage to him invalid?

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讛讬诪谉 讜讛讗 转专讬 讘注诇诪讗 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讛讜 讗讬谞讛讜 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讜拽讗 驻讟专讬 专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬砖转讬拽 讜砖转讬拽讛 讻讛讜讚讗讛 讚诪讬讗

of the mishna, what is the reason that when he remains silent, the Rabbis obligate him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? If we say it is because the witness is deemed credible, but there is the case of an ordinary pair of witnesses, where even though he contradicts their claim they are deemed credible, and yet the Rabbis exempt him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. Rather, is it not because he remained silent, and silence is considered like an admission? If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted.

讗诇讗 住讘专讗 讛讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讞转讬讻讛 住驻拽 砖诇 讞诇讘 住驻拽 砖诇 砖讜诪谉 讜讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 讚砖讜诪谉 讛讜讗 讚诪讛讬诪谉

Rather, this is evidently based on logical reasoning: Just as it is in the case of a piece of meat about which it is uncertain if it is forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and there is no way of clarifying which it is, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇讗 讗讬转讞讝拽 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讻讗 讗讬转讞讝拽 讗讬住讜专讗 讚讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专 砖讘注专讜讛 驻讞讜转 诪砖谞讬诐

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas here, the presumption of the prohibition with regard to a married woman is established, and there is a principle that nothing involving those with whom relations are forbidden can be determined by fewer than two witnesses.

讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讞转讬讻讛 讚讜讚讗讬 讞诇讘 讜讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 讚砖讜诪谉 讛讜讛 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讗转讜 讘讬 诪讗讛 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讞讚 谞诪讬 诇讛讬诪谞讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讟讘诇 讛拽讚砖 讜拽讜谞诪讜转

In fact, this is comparable only to a case involving a piece of meat that is definitely forbidden fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, as the halakha is that he is not deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this claim: Is it comparable? There, when it is established as forbidden fat, even if one hundred witnesses come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two witnesses come and say the husband is dead they would be deemed credible, let us also deem one witness credible. This is just as it is in the case of untithed produce, i.e., produce from which neither teruma nor tithe has been separated, consecrated property, and konamot, an alternative term for offerings [korbanot] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: Konamot.

讛讗讬 讟讘诇 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇转拽谞讜 讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 诪讗讬 拽住讘专

The Gemara asks: With regard to this case of untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If it is his, and he testifies that terumot and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. Rather, you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce of another, but if so, what does the anonymous Sage who cited this example hold in this case?

讗讬 拽讗 住讘专 转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘专讜 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇转拽谞讜 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 讬讚注谞讗 讘讬讛 讚诪转拽谉 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara elaborates: If he holds that one who separates tithes from his produce for that of another does not require the owner鈥檚 knowledge, and he can prepare his friend鈥檚 produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds that the owner鈥檚 knowledge is required before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared, in that case, it itself, this very halakha, from where do we derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband?

讛拽讚砖 谞诪讬 讗讬 拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讗讬 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇讗讬转砖讜诇讬 注诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讬讚注谞讗 讘讬讛 讚讗讬转砖讬诇 诪专讬讛 注诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

Similarly, with regard to consecrated property too, if it is merely sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is due to the fact that it is within his power to redeem it. And if this is referring to inherent sanctity, the matter still remains to be clarified: If it is his offering, then the reason is due to the fact that it is within his power to request from a Sage that the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. Rather, you must say that it is referring to the offering of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case itself, from where do we derive that he is deemed credible?

拽讜谞诪讜转 谞诪讬 讗讬 拽住讘专 讬砖 诪注讬诇讛 讘拽讜谞诪讜转 讜拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐 谞讞转讗 诇讛讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬谉 诪注讬诇讛 讘拽讜谞诪讜转 讜讗讬住讜专 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚专讻讬讘 诇讛讜 讗讻转驻讬讛 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇讗讬转砖讜诇讬 注诇讬讛

In the case of konamot too, if he holds that there is misuse of consecrated objects with regard to konamot, i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a konam have the status of consecrated property, and that the sanctity that inheres in its value applies to them, then his claim is accepted because it is within his power to redeem it. And if he maintains that there is no misuse of consecrated objects in the case of konamot, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders, i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: If the property in question is his, it is permitted because it is within his power to request from a Sage that his vow be dissolved.

讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 讬讚注谞讗 讚讗讬转砖讬诇 诪专讬讛 注诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

Rather, you will say that the konam must belong to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this halakha itself, that one witness is deemed credible in this case, from where do we derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讜讱 讞讜诪专 砖讛讞诪专转 注诇讬讛 讘住讜驻讛 讛拽诇转 注诇讬讛 讘转讞诇讛 诇讗 诇讬讞诪讬专 讜诇讗 诇讬拽讬诇

Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her, the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, at the end, i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the halakha is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, you are lenient with her at the beginning, by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us not be stringent at the end and not be lenient at the beginning.

诪砖讜诐 注讬讙讜谞讗 讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: Due to the case of a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her. Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband鈥檚 death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts.

转爪讗 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖谞讬住转 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬 注讚讬诐 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讞讻讜 注诇讬讛 讘诪注专讘讗 讗转讗 讙讘专讗 讜拽讗讬 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 诇讬讛

搂 The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught this halakha only if she married by virtue of the testimony of one witness, but if she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she does not have to leave him. They laughed at him in the West, Eretz Yisrael: The man, the first husband, has come and stands before us, and yet you say she does not have to leave her second husband. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a situation when we do not know the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband.

讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗诪讗讬 转爪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讬 讗谞谉 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛讚讬讛 诪讻讬 谞驻拽 讜注讚 讛砖转讗 讜讗转讜谉 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬转讜 诇讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讻专 讬讜住祝 讗转 讗讞讬讜 讜讛诐 诇讗 讛讻讬专讜讛讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪诇诪讚 砖讬爪讗 讘诇讗 讞转讬诪转 讝拽谉 讜讘讗 讘讞转讬诪转 讝拽谉

The Gemara asks: If we do not know him, even if she married by one witness, why should she leave? The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case when two others came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him, as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is as it is written: 鈥淎nd Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him鈥 (Genesis 42:8), and Rav 岣sda said that this verse teaches that Joseph left his brothers without a full beard, and he came with a full beard, which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one鈥檚 appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him.

住讜祝 住讜祝 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜

The Gemara asks: Even in this case, ultimately they are two against two. Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?

讜讛讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛

And as this is an uncertain case, one who has intercourse with her stands obligated to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. Since before she remarried some witnesses say she is a married woman while others claim she is now a widow, her relations with her second husband involve a possible prohibition that entails karet, and whoever mistakenly performs an action of this kind is liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. If so, this second husband must certainly divorce her. Rav Sheshet said: We are dealing with a case where that woman married one of her witnesses, who testified that her husband had died. Since the witness himself has no doubt as to the truth, he is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讗讜诪专转 讘专讬 诇讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讻砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专

The Gemara asks: Even so, she herself stands obligated to bring a uncertain guilt-offering, as she has no personal knowledge of the matter and relied on the witness. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where she says: It is clear to me. For whatever reason, she is certain that this is not her husband and that he is dead, and therefore she too is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this? That is, if Rav is referring only to this particular case, he has not taught anything new, as even Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, stated his opinion only with regard to a case where witnesses came and afterward she married, but in the case where she married and afterward witnesses came, he did not state his halakha with regard to this case.

讚转谞讬讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞讬住转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 转爪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

To what ruling is the Gemara referring? As it is taught in a baraita: If two witnesses say that the husband is dead and two say he is not dead, or if two say that this woman was divorced and two say she was not divorced, this woman may not marry; and if she married regardless, she need not leave her new husband, as there is no uncontroverted testimony that she is forbidden to him. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: She must leave him. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, further said: When do I say she must leave him? When the witnesses who contradicted the first pair by claiming she is still married came and afterward she married, despite their testimony. However, if she married and afterward the second pair of witnesses came, this woman need not leave her second husband.

讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘 谞诪讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讟注诪讗 讚谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 转爪讗 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara answers: When Rav spoke too, he was referring to a case when the second pair of witnesses came and testified that this is her husband, and afterward she married. Rav claims that even in that case she need not leave her second husband. His ruling serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, in favor of that of the first tanna. And some say that Rav鈥檚 teaching should be understood as follows: The reason is that she married and afterward witnesses came; however, if witnesses came and afterward she married, she must leave him. According to whose opinion is this ruling of Rav? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 诇讗 专爪讛 讚驻谞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜拽讚砖转讜 讘注诇 讻专讞讜

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: From where is it derived that if a priest does not want to observe the strictures against disqualified women, that the court forces him [dafno] by flogging him, and it sanctifies him despite his wishes? The verse states, at the end of the chapter that deals with the prohibitions of the priesthood: 鈥淎nd you shall sanctify him鈥e shall be sacred for you鈥 (Leviticus 21:8), which indicates that this is performed even against his will.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚诇讗 谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讜诇讗 拽讗诪专讛 讘专讬 诇讬 爪专讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讚驻谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讜拽讗诪专讛 讘专讬 诇讬 讜拽转谞讬 讚驻谞讜 讗诇诪讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

Rava analyzes this baraita: What are the circumstances? Assuming that this is referring to a priest who married a woman whose status as a divorced woman or a zona is uncertain, if we say that she did not marry one of her witnesses and did not say: It is clear to me, that the opposing witnesses were speaking the truth, need this be said that the court forces him? Since both of them are clearly in violation of a transgression, it is obvious that they must be separated. Rather, is it not referring to a case when she married one of her witnesses and she says: It is clear to me, and even so the baraita is teaching that the court forces him? Apparently, the halakha is that they remove her from him, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 opinion that one who married based on the testimony of two witnesses need not leave her second husband.

讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪讗讬 讚驻谞讜 讚驻谞讜 讘注讚讬诐 讜讗讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讜专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara answers: A prohibition with regard to the priesthood is different, as uncertainties with regard to priests are treated stringently, as though they were definite. And if you wish, say: What is the meaning of the phrase: The court forces him? It means that it forces him by witnesses. In other words, only if another pair of witnesses comes and clarifies the matter does the court prevent the marriage ab initio. However, if she has already married she need not leave her husband. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a situation when witnesses came and afterward she married, and this baraita, which claims that the court forces him to divorce her in that case, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜诪专 诪讗讬 诇讗 转爪讗 讚拽讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讛讬转讬专讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

Rav Ashi said: What is the meaning of the phrase: She need not leave him, that Rav said? It means that she need not leave her state of being permitted to her first husband. Since she married according to halakha, on the basis of witness testimony, she is considered to have acted under duress. Like any other woman not married to a priest who was unfaithful against her will, she may return to her first husband upon his return.

讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚转谞谉 谞讬住转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讻讬 讛诇讻转讗 讞讚讗 诪讻诇诇讗 讚讞讘专转讛 讗讬转诪专

The Gemara asks: If that is what he meant, Rav already said it once. As we learned in the mishna: If she married without the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses鈥 testimony, it is permitted for her to return to him. And Rav Huna said that Rav said: That is the halakha. Evidently, Rav already ruled that she does not forfeit her original permitted status. The Gemara answers: One ruling was stated by inference from the other. In other words, Rav did not state both halakhot explicitly, but only one of them, from which his other statement was inferred.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖诇讗 诪讻讞砖转讜 讗讘诇 诪讻讞砖转讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讘讬 转专讬 讻讬 诪讻讞砖转讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 讘讞讚 讟注诪讗 讚诪讻讞砖转讜 讛讗 砖转拽讛 转爪讗

Shmuel said: They taught that she must leave her second husband only if she does not contradict the witness who claims her first husband is alive. However, if she contradicts him, she need not leave her second husband. The Gemara inquires: With what are we dealing here? If we say we are dealing with two witnesses who testified that her husband is still alive, even if she contradicts him, what of it? The testimony of the two witnesses is fully accepted. Rather, it must be referring to one witness, from which it may be inferred that the reason that she need not leave her second husband is that she contradicts him, which indicates that if she remains silent and does not contradict his testimony, she must leave him.

讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Ulla say that wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, this is a full testimony equal to that of two witnesses, and the statement of one witness has no bearing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses? If so, there is no difference between one witness and two witnesses in this case. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the pair who said he was dead were disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions. If the testimony is valid, the account of two witnesses is the same as one hundred, as no greater credence is granted to the larger number. However, when the testimony is invalid the majority opinion is accepted. And in these cases they established the testimony of two women against one man like the testimony of two men against one man, whose claim is not considered equivalent to two. In this case, if the wife also contradicts their account she joins the single witness, and therefore the testimony of the disqualified witnesses is not accepted.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讻砖专 诪注讬拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 谞砖讬诐 讻注讚 讗讞讚 讚诪讬讬谉 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讗转讬讗 讗砖讛 诪注讬拽专讗

And if you wish, say instead that anywhere that one valid witness came initially and testified that the husband was dead, even one hundred women claiming that he is alive are considered like one witness, and their contrary account is not accepted. And with what are we dealing here? In a case where a woman came and testified initially.

讜转专爪讛 诇讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讛讻讬 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚诪讬

And you must accordingly amend the statement of Rabbi Ne岣mya so that it reads as follows: Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions, and they established two women against one woman like two men against one man. However, in a case involving two women against one man who is a valid witness, this is like half against half, i.e., they are equal. With regard to Shmuel鈥檚 statement, if the wife herself remains silent, the testimony of the first woman that the husband is dead has been negated, as her account was contradicted by two women. But if the claim of the wife is joined to that of the first woman she need not leave her second husband.

爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪专讗砖讜谉 转讘注讬 讙讟 讗诇讗 诪砖谞讬 讗诪讗讬 讝谞讜转 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches that if she remarried as the result of an error, then when her first husband returns she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one. The Gemara asks: Granted, from the first husband she requires a bill of divorce, as she is his actual wife. But from the second, why does she need a bill of divorce? Surely their relationship is merely licentious. Since her first husband was alive at the time, her marriage to the second is entirely invalid, as one cannot betroth a married woman. A woman does not require a bill of divorce for engaging in sexual relations.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 讙讬专砖 讝讛 讜谞砖讗 讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讬讜爪讗讛 讘诇讗 讙讟 讗讬 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讱 讜谞转拽讚砖讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讛转诐 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讙讬专砖 讝讛 讜拽讚砖 讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讬讜爪讗讛 砖诇讗 讘讙讟

Rav Huna said: It is a rabbinic decree lest those who are unaware of the entire story say that this first husband divorced her and afterward this second man married her. And if she subsequently leaves him without a bill of divorce, they will claim that we find a married woman leaving her husband without a bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: If so, consider the latter clause of the mishna (92a), that teaches that if they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she became betrothed to another, and afterward her husband came, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. There too, let us say that people might think that this one divorced her and that one betrothed her, and we find a married woman leaving her husband, i.e., her second husband, without a bill of divorce.

诇注讜诇诐 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讗讬 讛讻讬 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讚讗诪专 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗住讜专讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪讜转专转

The Gemara answers: Actually, even if she was merely betrothed she requires a bill of divorce from the second man before she can return to her first husband. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, people will say that we find this one remarrying his divorc茅e after she was betrothed to another. The Gemara answers: In this regard the tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, who stated a principle with regard to a divorc茅e who formed a relationship with another man, that if she came from marriage it is prohibited for her to return to her first husband, but if she came from betrothal it is permitted. Consequently, even if people do claim as above, there is no cause for concern.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna (92a) teaches: Even though

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 88

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讛讬诪谉 讜讛讗 转专讬 讘注诇诪讗 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽讗 诪讻讞讬砖 诇讛讜 讗讬谞讛讜 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讜拽讗 驻讟专讬 专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬砖转讬拽 讜砖转讬拽讛 讻讛讜讚讗讛 讚诪讬讗

of the mishna, what is the reason that when he remains silent, the Rabbis obligate him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? If we say it is because the witness is deemed credible, but there is the case of an ordinary pair of witnesses, where even though he contradicts their claim they are deemed credible, and yet the Rabbis exempt him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. Rather, is it not because he remained silent, and silence is considered like an admission? If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted.

讗诇讗 住讘专讗 讛讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讞转讬讻讛 住驻拽 砖诇 讞诇讘 住驻拽 砖诇 砖讜诪谉 讜讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 讚砖讜诪谉 讛讜讗 讚诪讛讬诪谉

Rather, this is evidently based on logical reasoning: Just as it is in the case of a piece of meat about which it is uncertain if it is forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and there is no way of clarifying which it is, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇讗 讗讬转讞讝拽 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讻讗 讗讬转讞讝拽 讗讬住讜专讗 讚讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专 砖讘注专讜讛 驻讞讜转 诪砖谞讬诐

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas here, the presumption of the prohibition with regard to a married woman is established, and there is a principle that nothing involving those with whom relations are forbidden can be determined by fewer than two witnesses.

讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讞转讬讻讛 讚讜讚讗讬 讞诇讘 讜讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 讚砖讜诪谉 讛讜讛 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讗转讜 讘讬 诪讗讛 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 诪讛讬诪谞讬 讞讚 谞诪讬 诇讛讬诪谞讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讟讘诇 讛拽讚砖 讜拽讜谞诪讜转

In fact, this is comparable only to a case involving a piece of meat that is definitely forbidden fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, as the halakha is that he is not deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this claim: Is it comparable? There, when it is established as forbidden fat, even if one hundred witnesses come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two witnesses come and say the husband is dead they would be deemed credible, let us also deem one witness credible. This is just as it is in the case of untithed produce, i.e., produce from which neither teruma nor tithe has been separated, consecrated property, and konamot, an alternative term for offerings [korbanot] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: Konamot.

讛讗讬 讟讘诇 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇转拽谞讜 讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 诪讗讬 拽住讘专

The Gemara asks: With regard to this case of untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If it is his, and he testifies that terumot and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. Rather, you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce of another, but if so, what does the anonymous Sage who cited this example hold in this case?

讗讬 拽讗 住讘专 转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘专讜 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇转拽谞讜 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 讬讚注谞讗 讘讬讛 讚诪转拽谉 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara elaborates: If he holds that one who separates tithes from his produce for that of another does not require the owner鈥檚 knowledge, and he can prepare his friend鈥檚 produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds that the owner鈥檚 knowledge is required before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared, in that case, it itself, this very halakha, from where do we derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband?

讛拽讚砖 谞诪讬 讗讬 拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讗讬 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇讗讬转砖讜诇讬 注诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讬讚注谞讗 讘讬讛 讚讗讬转砖讬诇 诪专讬讛 注诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

Similarly, with regard to consecrated property too, if it is merely sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is due to the fact that it is within his power to redeem it. And if this is referring to inherent sanctity, the matter still remains to be clarified: If it is his offering, then the reason is due to the fact that it is within his power to request from a Sage that the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. Rather, you must say that it is referring to the offering of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case itself, from where do we derive that he is deemed credible?

拽讜谞诪讜转 谞诪讬 讗讬 拽住讘专 讬砖 诪注讬诇讛 讘拽讜谞诪讜转 讜拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐 谞讞转讗 诇讛讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬谉 诪注讬诇讛 讘拽讜谞诪讜转 讜讗讬住讜专 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚专讻讬讘 诇讛讜 讗讻转驻讬讛 讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬讚讜 诇讗讬转砖讜诇讬 注诇讬讛

In the case of konamot too, if he holds that there is misuse of consecrated objects with regard to konamot, i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a konam have the status of consecrated property, and that the sanctity that inheres in its value applies to them, then his claim is accepted because it is within his power to redeem it. And if he maintains that there is no misuse of consecrated objects in the case of konamot, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders, i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: If the property in question is his, it is permitted because it is within his power to request from a Sage that his vow be dissolved.

讗诇讗 讚讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 讬讚注谞讗 讚讗讬转砖讬诇 诪专讬讛 注诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪谞诇谉

Rather, you will say that the konam must belong to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this halakha itself, that one witness is deemed credible in this case, from where do we derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讜讱 讞讜诪专 砖讛讞诪专转 注诇讬讛 讘住讜驻讛 讛拽诇转 注诇讬讛 讘转讞诇讛 诇讗 诇讬讞诪讬专 讜诇讗 诇讬拽讬诇

Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her, the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, at the end, i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the halakha is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, you are lenient with her at the beginning, by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us not be stringent at the end and not be lenient at the beginning.

诪砖讜诐 注讬讙讜谞讗 讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: Due to the case of a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her. Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband鈥檚 death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts.

转爪讗 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖谞讬住转 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬 注讚讬诐 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讞讻讜 注诇讬讛 讘诪注专讘讗 讗转讗 讙讘专讗 讜拽讗讬 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 诇讬讛

搂 The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught this halakha only if she married by virtue of the testimony of one witness, but if she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she does not have to leave him. They laughed at him in the West, Eretz Yisrael: The man, the first husband, has come and stands before us, and yet you say she does not have to leave her second husband. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a situation when we do not know the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband.

讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗诪讗讬 转爪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讬 讗谞谉 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛讚讬讛 诪讻讬 谞驻拽 讜注讚 讛砖转讗 讜讗转讜谉 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬转讜 诇讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讻专 讬讜住祝 讗转 讗讞讬讜 讜讛诐 诇讗 讛讻讬专讜讛讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪诇诪讚 砖讬爪讗 讘诇讗 讞转讬诪转 讝拽谉 讜讘讗 讘讞转讬诪转 讝拽谉

The Gemara asks: If we do not know him, even if she married by one witness, why should she leave? The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case when two others came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him, as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is as it is written: 鈥淎nd Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him鈥 (Genesis 42:8), and Rav 岣sda said that this verse teaches that Joseph left his brothers without a full beard, and he came with a full beard, which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one鈥檚 appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him.

住讜祝 住讜祝 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜

The Gemara asks: Even in this case, ultimately they are two against two. Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?

讜讛讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛

And as this is an uncertain case, one who has intercourse with her stands obligated to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. Since before she remarried some witnesses say she is a married woman while others claim she is now a widow, her relations with her second husband involve a possible prohibition that entails karet, and whoever mistakenly performs an action of this kind is liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. If so, this second husband must certainly divorce her. Rav Sheshet said: We are dealing with a case where that woman married one of her witnesses, who testified that her husband had died. Since the witness himself has no doubt as to the truth, he is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讗讜诪专转 讘专讬 诇讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讻砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专

The Gemara asks: Even so, she herself stands obligated to bring a uncertain guilt-offering, as she has no personal knowledge of the matter and relied on the witness. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where she says: It is clear to me. For whatever reason, she is certain that this is not her husband and that he is dead, and therefore she too is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this? That is, if Rav is referring only to this particular case, he has not taught anything new, as even Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, stated his opinion only with regard to a case where witnesses came and afterward she married, but in the case where she married and afterward witnesses came, he did not state his halakha with regard to this case.

讚转谞讬讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞讬住转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 转爪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讗讘诇 谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

To what ruling is the Gemara referring? As it is taught in a baraita: If two witnesses say that the husband is dead and two say he is not dead, or if two say that this woman was divorced and two say she was not divorced, this woman may not marry; and if she married regardless, she need not leave her new husband, as there is no uncontroverted testimony that she is forbidden to him. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: She must leave him. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, further said: When do I say she must leave him? When the witnesses who contradicted the first pair by claiming she is still married came and afterward she married, despite their testimony. However, if she married and afterward the second pair of witnesses came, this woman need not leave her second husband.

讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘 谞诪讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讟注诪讗 讚谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 转爪讗 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara answers: When Rav spoke too, he was referring to a case when the second pair of witnesses came and testified that this is her husband, and afterward she married. Rav claims that even in that case she need not leave her second husband. His ruling serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, in favor of that of the first tanna. And some say that Rav鈥檚 teaching should be understood as follows: The reason is that she married and afterward witnesses came; however, if witnesses came and afterward she married, she must leave him. According to whose opinion is this ruling of Rav? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 诇讗 专爪讛 讚驻谞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜拽讚砖转讜 讘注诇 讻专讞讜

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: From where is it derived that if a priest does not want to observe the strictures against disqualified women, that the court forces him [dafno] by flogging him, and it sanctifies him despite his wishes? The verse states, at the end of the chapter that deals with the prohibitions of the priesthood: 鈥淎nd you shall sanctify him鈥e shall be sacred for you鈥 (Leviticus 21:8), which indicates that this is performed even against his will.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚诇讗 谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讜诇讗 拽讗诪专讛 讘专讬 诇讬 爪专讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讚驻谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讜拽讗诪专讛 讘专讬 诇讬 讜拽转谞讬 讚驻谞讜 讗诇诪讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

Rava analyzes this baraita: What are the circumstances? Assuming that this is referring to a priest who married a woman whose status as a divorced woman or a zona is uncertain, if we say that she did not marry one of her witnesses and did not say: It is clear to me, that the opposing witnesses were speaking the truth, need this be said that the court forces him? Since both of them are clearly in violation of a transgression, it is obvious that they must be separated. Rather, is it not referring to a case when she married one of her witnesses and she says: It is clear to me, and even so the baraita is teaching that the court forces him? Apparently, the halakha is that they remove her from him, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 opinion that one who married based on the testimony of two witnesses need not leave her second husband.

讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪讗讬 讚驻谞讜 讚驻谞讜 讘注讚讬诐 讜讗讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讬住转 讜专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara answers: A prohibition with regard to the priesthood is different, as uncertainties with regard to priests are treated stringently, as though they were definite. And if you wish, say: What is the meaning of the phrase: The court forces him? It means that it forces him by witnesses. In other words, only if another pair of witnesses comes and clarifies the matter does the court prevent the marriage ab initio. However, if she has already married she need not leave her husband. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a situation when witnesses came and afterward she married, and this baraita, which claims that the court forces him to divorce her in that case, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜诪专 诪讗讬 诇讗 转爪讗 讚拽讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 转爪讗 诪讛讬转讬专讛 讛专讗砖讜谉

Rav Ashi said: What is the meaning of the phrase: She need not leave him, that Rav said? It means that she need not leave her state of being permitted to her first husband. Since she married according to halakha, on the basis of witness testimony, she is considered to have acted under duress. Like any other woman not married to a priest who was unfaithful against her will, she may return to her first husband upon his return.

讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚转谞谉 谞讬住转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讻讬 讛诇讻转讗 讞讚讗 诪讻诇诇讗 讚讞讘专转讛 讗讬转诪专

The Gemara asks: If that is what he meant, Rav already said it once. As we learned in the mishna: If she married without the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses鈥 testimony, it is permitted for her to return to him. And Rav Huna said that Rav said: That is the halakha. Evidently, Rav already ruled that she does not forfeit her original permitted status. The Gemara answers: One ruling was stated by inference from the other. In other words, Rav did not state both halakhot explicitly, but only one of them, from which his other statement was inferred.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖诇讗 诪讻讞砖转讜 讗讘诇 诪讻讞砖转讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讘讬 转专讬 讻讬 诪讻讞砖转讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 讘讞讚 讟注诪讗 讚诪讻讞砖转讜 讛讗 砖转拽讛 转爪讗

Shmuel said: They taught that she must leave her second husband only if she does not contradict the witness who claims her first husband is alive. However, if she contradicts him, she need not leave her second husband. The Gemara inquires: With what are we dealing here? If we say we are dealing with two witnesses who testified that her husband is still alive, even if she contradicts him, what of it? The testimony of the two witnesses is fully accepted. Rather, it must be referring to one witness, from which it may be inferred that the reason that she need not leave her second husband is that she contradicts him, which indicates that if she remains silent and does not contradict his testimony, she must leave him.

讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘驻住讜诇讬 注讚讜转 讜讻讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Ulla say that wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, this is a full testimony equal to that of two witnesses, and the statement of one witness has no bearing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses? If so, there is no difference between one witness and two witnesses in this case. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the pair who said he was dead were disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ne岣mya.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions. If the testimony is valid, the account of two witnesses is the same as one hundred, as no greater credence is granted to the larger number. However, when the testimony is invalid the majority opinion is accepted. And in these cases they established the testimony of two women against one man like the testimony of two men against one man, whose claim is not considered equivalent to two. In this case, if the wife also contradicts their account she joins the single witness, and therefore the testimony of the disqualified witnesses is not accepted.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讻砖专 诪注讬拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 谞砖讬诐 讻注讚 讗讞讚 讚诪讬讬谉 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讗转讬讗 讗砖讛 诪注讬拽专讗

And if you wish, say instead that anywhere that one valid witness came initially and testified that the husband was dead, even one hundred women claiming that he is alive are considered like one witness, and their contrary account is not accepted. And with what are we dealing here? In a case where a woman came and testified initially.

讜转专爪讛 诇讚专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讛讻讬 专讘讬 谞讞诪讬讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 讚注讜转 讜注砖讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻砖谞讬 讗谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘讗讬砖 讗讞讚 讻驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 讚诪讬

And you must accordingly amend the statement of Rabbi Ne岣mya so that it reads as follows: Rabbi Ne岣mya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions, and they established two women against one woman like two men against one man. However, in a case involving two women against one man who is a valid witness, this is like half against half, i.e., they are equal. With regard to Shmuel鈥檚 statement, if the wife herself remains silent, the testimony of the first woman that the husband is dead has been negated, as her account was contradicted by two women. But if the claim of the wife is joined to that of the first woman she need not leave her second husband.

爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪专讗砖讜谉 转讘注讬 讙讟 讗诇讗 诪砖谞讬 讗诪讗讬 讝谞讜转 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches that if she remarried as the result of an error, then when her first husband returns she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one. The Gemara asks: Granted, from the first husband she requires a bill of divorce, as she is his actual wife. But from the second, why does she need a bill of divorce? Surely their relationship is merely licentious. Since her first husband was alive at the time, her marriage to the second is entirely invalid, as one cannot betroth a married woman. A woman does not require a bill of divorce for engaging in sexual relations.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 讙讬专砖 讝讛 讜谞砖讗 讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讬讜爪讗讛 讘诇讗 讙讟 讗讬 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讱 讜谞转拽讚砖讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讛转诐 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讙讬专砖 讝讛 讜拽讚砖 讝讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讬讜爪讗讛 砖诇讗 讘讙讟

Rav Huna said: It is a rabbinic decree lest those who are unaware of the entire story say that this first husband divorced her and afterward this second man married her. And if she subsequently leaves him without a bill of divorce, they will claim that we find a married woman leaving her husband without a bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: If so, consider the latter clause of the mishna (92a), that teaches that if they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she became betrothed to another, and afterward her husband came, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. There too, let us say that people might think that this one divorced her and that one betrothed her, and we find a married woman leaving her husband, i.e., her second husband, without a bill of divorce.

诇注讜诇诐 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讗讬 讛讻讬 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讚讗诪专 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗住讜专讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪讜转专转

The Gemara answers: Actually, even if she was merely betrothed she requires a bill of divorce from the second man before she can return to her first husband. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, people will say that we find this one remarrying his divorc茅e after she was betrothed to another. The Gemara answers: In this regard the tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, who stated a principle with regard to a divorc茅e who formed a relationship with another man, that if she came from marriage it is prohibited for her to return to her first husband, but if she came from betrothal it is permitted. Consequently, even if people do claim as above, there is no cause for concern.

讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna (92a) teaches: Even though

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