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Today's Daf Yomi

June 4, 2022 | 讛壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Yevamot 89 – Shabbat June 4

This is the daf for Shabbat. For Friday’s daf, click here.

A woman who was told by one witness that her husband died and she remarried and later found out that her first husband was still alive, needs a get from each of them. The get from the second is not really needed but the rabbis were concerned people would see and think that one can get out of marriage without a get. If so, then if she was engaged only to the second husband, one would need a get as well. Therefore, they suggest that even though the Mishna didn鈥檛 say so, it must be a get is needed. In the end, though, the Gemara rejects this and explains why a get would be needed only if she was married, but not if she was only betrothed to the second husband. Why doesn鈥檛 the woman have rights to the ketuba of the first husband or produce from her property she brought into the marriage or food or shreds of clothes of hers that she brought into the marriage? The Gemara brings a Mishna in Trumot 2:2 that explains what happens in a case where someone took truma from impure produce on behalf of fruits that were pure. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Oshaya differ in their understanding of what happens if it was done on purpose. The braita says 鈥淗e did not do anything.鈥 Does this mean that it is not truma (Rav Chisda) or it is considered truma but he needs to take truma again on the pure produce? Rav Chisda explains his opinion that the rabbis decided it wouldn鈥檛 be truma as they were concerned that if they declared it truma (as it is actually by Torah law), the person would likely not take truma from the pure produce as well. Several sources are brought to question both Rav Chisda and Rav Oshaya鈥檚 positions and they are answered by distinguishing between the different cases. Raba questions Rav Chisda by raising a very basic question 鈥 how can the rabbis override Torah law and basically allow a non-kohen to eat truma (as they declared something that is actually truma by Torah law not to be considered truma). Rav Chisda is not bothered by the questions and begins to bring sources where we see the rabbis can overturn Torah law. The first source is from our Mishna as they state the children from her first and second husband are all mamzerim even though by Torah law she is married to the first husband. By issuing this penalty they are permitting someone who is a regular Israelite by Torah law (the child) to marry a mamzer! Raba rejects this by quoting those who say he cannot marry a mamzeret. The second source regards a minor who is betrothed only by rabbinic law and yet she is considered married for certain basic laws. Raba rejects each part for different reasons.

砖谞转谉 诇讛 讗讞专讜谉 讙讟 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 诪讻诇诇 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讚讗讬 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗诇讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讟注讜转 讛讜讜

the last one gave her a bill of divorce, he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered a divorc茅e at all, this proves by inference that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. The reason is that if she requires a bill of divorce, even if it is only due to uncertainty, why has he not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood? A bill of divorce of any validity would bar her from marrying a priest. Rather, a bill of divorce given by a man to a woman who is not his wife is clearly of no account, and the reason for the ruling in the latter clause, with regard to betrothal, is that people will say there was no need for a bill of divorce because it was a mistaken betrothal.

专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讗诪专讬 谞讬砖讜讗讬 讟注讜转 讛讜讜 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讬砖讗 讚注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 拽谞住讜讛 住讬驻讗 讚诇讗 注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause too, they will say it was a mistaken marriage. The Gemara answers: The Sages penalized her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, lest people say she divorced this man and went back and married the first one. The Gemara counters: If so, in the latter clause of the mishna let us also penalize her. The Gemara responds: The first clause involves a situation where she violated a prohibition through her intercourse, and therefore the Sages penalized her. Conversely, in the latter clause, when she did not violate a prohibition, as she simply became betrothed, the Sages did not penalize her.

讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讻转讜讘讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛

搂 The mishna taught that this woman does not have, i.e., she is not entitled to, the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages instituted a marriage contract in general, for an ordinary woman? So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The necessity to find money for her marriage contract will prevent a hasty decision to divorce her. However, in the case of this woman, on the contrary, the Sages actually prefer that she will be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as the marriage was forbidden and she may not remain with him. Consequently, they eliminated her marriage contract to encourage him to divorce her.

讗讬谉 诇讛 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 转谞讗讬 讻转讜讘讛 讻讻转讜讘讛 讚诪讬

搂 The mishna further states that she does not have claim to profits, or sustenance, or worn clothes. Why not? Because the stipulations in the marriage contract, i.e., all the rights of a wife stemming from the stipulations that are part of a marriage contract, are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she has no marriage contract, she does not have the stipulations in a marriage contract either.

谞讟诇讛 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna also teaches that if she took any of the above from this man or from that one she must return anything she took. The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Since she is not entitled to these articles, of course she must give them back. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that since she has already taken hold of them we do not remove them from her possession, as this is merely a penalty and she obtained nothing that did not legally belong to her. The tanna therefore teaches us that the court requires her to return even these items.

讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 转谞谉 讛转诐 讗讬谉 转讜专诪讬谉 诪谉 讛讟诪讗 注诇 讛讟讛讜专 讜讗诐 转专诐 讘砖讜讙讙 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诪讗讬 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讛讛讬讗 讙专讬讜讗 讛讚专 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that the child of either of the men is a mamzer. To clarify this issue, the Gemara cites a different discussion. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Terumot 2:2): One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce in order to exempt ritually pure food, and if he separated teruma from impure food unwittingly, his teruma is considered teruma. If he acted intentionally, he has done nothing, that is, his action is of no effect. The Sages debated: What is the meaning of the expression: He has done nothing? Rav 岣sda said: He has done nothing at all, meaning that even that griva of produce he set aside as teruma returns to its former untithed state, as his entire act is completely disregarded.

专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诇转拽谉 讗转 讛砖讬专讬诐 讗讘诇 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讚讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讜讬 转专讜诪讛 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚驻砖注 讜诇讗 诪驻专讬砖

Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, said: He has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce from which he separated teruma, but the fruit he separated is itself teruma. Although the portion he set aside is sanctified as teruma, this does not exempt him from separating more teruma from ritually pure produce. The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: Rav 岣sda did not say his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, as, if you say it is teruma, on occasion he will be negligent and not separate anything more, assuming that if the portion he set aside has the status of teruma he must certainly have done everything required.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛转讜专诐 拽讬砖讜转 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪专讛 讗讘讟讬讞 讜谞诪爪讗转 住专讜讞 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐 砖讜讙讙 讗诪讝讬讚 拽专诪讬转 砖讜讙讙 诇讗 注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗 诪讝讬讚 拽注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:1): With regard to one who separates teruma from a serpent melon [kishut] and it was discovered to be bitter, or from a watermelon and it was discovered to be spoiled, it is teruma, and yet he must go back and separate teruma from another serpent melon or watermelon. No concern is expressed in this mishna that one might neglect to set aside teruma a second time. The Gemara answers: Are you raising a contradiction between the case of an unwitting sinner and that of an intentional sinner? There is a difference between them, as one who was unwitting did not commit a transgression and consequently does not deserve to be penalized, whereas one who was an intentional sinner did commit a transgression.

讜专诪讬 砖讜讙讙 讗砖讜讙讙 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讘砖讜讙讙 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讛转诐 拽转谞讬 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this ruling involving an unwitting sinner and another halakha of an unwitting sinner: Here, it is taught that if the one who separated ritually impure produce instead of ritually pure produce was unwitting, his teruma is teruma, which indicates that he does not have to separate teruma again. However, there, with regard to rotten fruit, it is taught that it is teruma and yet he must separate teruma again.

讛转诐 砖讜讙讙 拽专讜讘 诇诪讝讬讚 讚讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬讟注诪讬讛

The Gemara explains: There, his was an unwitting act that is close to an intentional one, as he should have tasted it first to ensure that he was separating quality fruit. His failure to do so renders him virtually a willful sinner, and therefore the Sages penalized him by obligating him to set aside teruma again. In the case of impure teruma, in contrast, he may not have been able to investigate the matter when he separated the portion.

讜专诪讬 诪讝讬讚 讗诪讝讬讚 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐 讛转诐 转谞谉 讛转讜专诐 诪砖讗讬谉 谞拽讜讘 注诇 谞拽讜讘 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐

And the Gemara also raises a contradiction between one case involving an intentional sinner and another case of an intentional sinner. Here, it is taught that in the case of an intentional sinner who separates teruma, he has done nothing. There, we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10), that with regard to one who separates teruma from produce growing in a vessel that is not perforated, for produce that grew in a perforated vessel, which is considered connected to the ground, it is teruma, but he must go back and separate teruma a second time. This ruling is based on the principle that anything that grew in a pot without a hole does not require separation of teruma by Torah law. In this case, the fact that he must again set aside teruma does not mean that the portion he separated is not consecrated at all.

讘转专讬 诪讗谞讬 爪讬讬转 讘讞讚 诪谞讗 诇讗 爪讬讬转

The Gemara answers: In a case involving two vessels he will listen. Since the difference between the two vessels is clear to the eye, if the owner is told he must separate teruma again, it can be assumed that he will comply. In contrast, in the case of one vessel he will not listen, as ritually impure and pure produce look the same to him. Consequently, if he is informed that he must set aside teruma a second time despite the fact that the produce he already set aside has the status of teruma, he will take no notice.

讜诇专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诇转拽谉 砖讬专讬诐 讗讘诇 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讬

The Gemara asks another question: And according to the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, who said that he has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce but it is nevertheless teruma,

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 诪谉 讛谞拽讜讘 注诇 砖讗讬谉 谞拽讜讘 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讜诇讗 转讗讻诇 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 注诇讬讛 转专讜诪讛 讜诪注砖专 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专

in what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10): If one separates teruma from that which grew in a perforated pot for that which is from a non-perforated pot, his teruma is teruma, but it may not be eaten until he removes on behalf of that portion itself teruma and tithe from another place? In other words, the portion he separated as teruma is not entirely consecrated, as it too is considered untithed produce in the sense that teruma must be separated for it. In contrast, one who sets aside impure teruma does not have to separate teruma from that portion itself.

砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 转专讜诪讛 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 讻讚专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 诪谞讬谉 诇转讜专诐 诪谉 讛专注讛 注诇 讛讬驻讛 砖转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜诇讗 转砖讗讜 注诇讬讜 讞讟讗 讘讛专讬诪讻诐 讗转 讞诇讘讜 诪诪谞讜

The Gemara answers: Here, with regard to ritually impure teruma, it is different, as by Torah law it is in fact full-fledged teruma, but the Sages penalized him by making him separate teruma again. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elai, as Rabbi Elai said: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is teruma? As it is written with regard to teruma: 鈥淎nd you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it its best鈥 (Numbers 18:32). This verse that if one separated teruma from inferior-quality produce he has committed a sin, which shows that his action is effective, as Rabbi Elai proceeds to explain.

讜讗诐 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖 谞砖讬讗讜转 讞讟讗 诇诪讛 诪讬讻谉 诇转讜专诐 诪谉 讛专注讛 注诇 讛讬驻讛 砖转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Elai elaborates: And if this inferior portion is not sanctified as teruma at all, why is there a bearing of sin? If the produce does not have the status of teruma he has not done anything, which means that his action cannot be considered a transgression. From here we learn with regard to one who separated from the bad for the good that his teruma is teruma after the fact. Similarly, the teruma of one who separates ritually impure food for pure food is valid teruma by Torah law.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 诇专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讚讬讚讱 讚讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讛讛讜讗 讙专讬讜讗 讛讚专 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讝讬专讛 讚诇诪讗 驻砖注 讜诇讗 诪驻专讬砖 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讜讬 转专讜诪讛 讜诪砖讜诐 讚诇诪讗 驻砖注 讗驻拽讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讜讻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讬谉 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛

After clarifying the opinions themselves, the Gemara analyzes the case in greater detail. Rabba said to Rav 岣sda: According to your opinion, that you said he has done nothing at all, meaning that even that se鈥檃 he set aside returns to its former untithed state, what is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will be negligent and will not separate teruma a second time. However, is there anything that by Torah law is teruma, as stated by Rabbi Elai, and yet due to the concern: Perhaps he will be negligent, the Sages removed its status as sacred and gave to it the status of non-sacred food? And can the court stipulate and enact a decree to uproot something that applies by Torah law?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讗转 诇讗 转住讘专讗 讜讛转谞谉 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪专讗砖讜谉 讗诪讗讬 讗砖转讜 讛讬讗 讜讬砖专讗诇 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讜拽讗 砖专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讘诪诪讝专转

Rav 岣sda said to Rabba: And you, do you not hold that the Sages have the power to do so? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna that the child is a mamzer from this one and from that one? Granted, the child from the second man is a mamzer, as he was born to a married woman from a man who was not her husband. However, with regard to the child from the first husband, why is he a mamzer? After all, she is his wife, and by Torah law their son is a full-fledged Jew. And the Sages鈥 declaration that he is a mamzer cannot be seen as a mere stringency, as they thereby permit him to a mamzeret. This shows that a rabbinical decree can uproot a Torah prohibition.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜讻谉 讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 诪诪讝专 诇讗讜住专讜 讘讘转 讬砖专讗诇

Rabba said to Rav 岣sda that Shmuel said as follows: It is forbidden for the child of the first husband to marry a mamzeret. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the child is forbidden to a mamzeret. And if so, why does the mishna call him a mamzer? This is to teach us that the Sages are stringent and render it prohibited for him to marry a regular Jewish woman. With regard to the issue at hand, as he may not marry a mamzeret, the Sages did not in fact uproot a mitzva that applies by Torah law.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘讛 讘讬讚 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讬谉 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讗讬诪转讬 讗讚诐 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 拽讟谞讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖转讘注诇 讜讬讜专砖讛 讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讗讜讻诇转 讘讙讬谞讜 转专讜诪讛

Rav 岣sda sent a proof to Rabba, in the hand of Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna: And can the court not stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: From when does a man inherit from his minor wife, who was married off by her mother or brother, as enacted by the Sages, a marriage that is not valid by Torah law? Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her fully developed height, i.e., when she grows up and reaches the age of maturity. And Beit Hillel say: From when she enters the wedding canopy. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. As soon as she is considered his wife, all the halakhot of a wife apply to her. And he inherits from her and becomes impure for her if she dies, even if he is a priest, and she eats teruma on his account if he is a priest.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讗讬诪讗 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讜转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讚拽讗诪专讬转讜 诪砖转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 讗讬 注诪讚讛 讘拽讜诪转讛 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讞讜驻讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讞讜驻讛

The Gemara first clarifies various details of this baraita. Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her height. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is this the case even though she has not yet entered the wedding canopy? Betrothal alone, without the marriage canopy, is not enough to enable a man to inherit from an adult woman, let alone a minor. The Gemara answers: You must say that Beit Shammai meant from when she stands at her fully developed height and enters the wedding canopy. And Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel as follows: That which you said, that he inherits her from when she enters the wedding canopy, is not enough. Rather, if she stands at her fully developed height, the wedding canopy is effective for bringing about her marriage, and if not, the wedding canopy is not effective for bringing about her marriage.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖转讘注诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬谉 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讗讬诪讗 诪砖转讙讚讬诇 讜转讘注诇

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. The Gemara again expresses surprise: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer say that the actions of a minor girl are nothing, which indicates that marriage and intercourse with her are not considered an act of acquisition. Rather, we must say that he meant from when she matures and has sexual relations.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 讬讜专砖讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘讜讛 讬专讬转 诇讛 讜诪讚专讘谞谉 讬专讬转 诇讛 讘注诇 讛驻拽专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讬讛 讛驻拽专

The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. In any event the baraita is teaching that he inherits from her. But here is a case where by Torah law her father, i.e., his relatives, as he is dead, inherits from her, as a minor orphan cannot marry by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law the husband inherits from her. This shows that the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as in monetary matters property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless, and therefore the court can allocate her inheritance as they see fit.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诪谞讬谉 砖讛驻拽专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讬讛 讛驻拽专 砖谞讗诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 诇讗 讬讘讗 诇砖诇砖转 讛讬诪讬诐 讘注爪转 讛砖专讬诐 讜讛讝拽谞讬诐 讬讞专诐 讻诇 专讻讜砖讜 讜讛讜讗 讬讘讚诇 诪拽讛诇 讛讙讜诇讛

As Rabbi Yitz岣k said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: 鈥淎nd whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity鈥 (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone鈥檚 possessions.

专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讗诇讛 讛谞讞诇讜转 讗砖专 谞讞诇讜 讗诇注讝专 讛讻讛谉 讜讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 谞讜谉 讜专讗砖讬 讛讗讘讜转 诇诪讟讜转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讬诐 讗爪诇 讗讘讜转 讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讗讘讜转 诪谞讞讬诇讬谉 讘谞讬讛诐 讻诇 诪讛 砖讬专爪讜 讗祝 专讗砖讬诐 诪谞讞讬诇讬谉 讗转 讛注诐 讻诇 诪讛 砖讬专爪讜

Rabbi Elazar says that the proof that the court can declare property ownerless is from here: 鈥淭hese are the inheritances that Elazar the priest, and Joshua, son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers鈥 houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance鈥 (Joshua 19:51). What do heads have to do with fathers? The expression 鈥渢he heads of the fathers鈥 houses of the tribes鈥 is unusual and vague. Rather, this comes to tell you: Just as fathers bequeath to their sons anything they want to, so too, the heads, i.e., the leaders and judges of the people, bequeath to the people anything they want to. This shows that the leaders can take property from one individual and give it to another.

讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘讬讛 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜诪讚专讘谞谉 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讘注诇 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 诪转 诪爪讜讛

It was stated that the husband of a minor becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The Gemara asks: But here is a case where by Torah law her father, not the man she married, is obligated to become impure for her, as the latter is not his wife by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law her husband defiles himself for her. The Gemara answers: This is because she is considered like a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], for which even a priest must become impure. Once she is married, her relatives from her father鈥檚 family no longer care for her welfare, which means her husband is the only one who is entrusted with her burial.

讜诪讬 讛讜讬 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 讗讬 讝讛讜 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 拽讜讘专讬谉 拽讜专讗 讜讗讞专讬诐 注讜谞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗讬谉 讝讛 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讬专转讬 诇讛 拽专讬讗 讜诇讗 注谞讜 诇讛

The Gemara asks: And is she in fact a met mitzva? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Which corpse is a met mitzva? Any corpse that does not have anyone to bury it. If it was in a place where if one calls and others would answer him, this is not a met mitzva. In contrast, this girl does have relatives who can bury her, if necessary. The Gemara answers: Here too, since the members of her father鈥檚 family do not inherit from her, she would call and they would not answer her, as they have no desire to go to any trouble for her. Since her husband inherits from her, it is his duty to tend to her burial, and he must therefore become impure for her, as she has the status of a met mitzva.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Yevamot 89 – Shabbat June 4

砖谞转谉 诇讛 讗讞专讜谉 讙讟 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 诪讻诇诇 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讚讗讬 讘注讬讗 讙讟 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗诇讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讟注讜转 讛讜讜

the last one gave her a bill of divorce, he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered a divorc茅e at all, this proves by inference that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. The reason is that if she requires a bill of divorce, even if it is only due to uncertainty, why has he not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood? A bill of divorce of any validity would bar her from marrying a priest. Rather, a bill of divorce given by a man to a woman who is not his wife is clearly of no account, and the reason for the ruling in the latter clause, with regard to betrothal, is that people will say there was no need for a bill of divorce because it was a mistaken betrothal.

专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讗诪专讬 谞讬砖讜讗讬 讟注讜转 讛讜讜 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬拽谞住讜讛 专讬砖讗 讚注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 拽谞住讜讛 住讬驻讗 讚诇讗 注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause too, they will say it was a mistaken marriage. The Gemara answers: The Sages penalized her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, lest people say she divorced this man and went back and married the first one. The Gemara counters: If so, in the latter clause of the mishna let us also penalize her. The Gemara responds: The first clause involves a situation where she violated a prohibition through her intercourse, and therefore the Sages penalized her. Conversely, in the latter clause, when she did not violate a prohibition, as she simply became betrothed, the Sages did not penalize her.

讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讻转讜讘讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛

搂 The mishna taught that this woman does not have, i.e., she is not entitled to, the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages instituted a marriage contract in general, for an ordinary woman? So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The necessity to find money for her marriage contract will prevent a hasty decision to divorce her. However, in the case of this woman, on the contrary, the Sages actually prefer that she will be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as the marriage was forbidden and she may not remain with him. Consequently, they eliminated her marriage contract to encourage him to divorce her.

讗讬谉 诇讛 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜诇讗 讘诇讗讜转 转谞讗讬 讻转讜讘讛 讻讻转讜讘讛 讚诪讬

搂 The mishna further states that she does not have claim to profits, or sustenance, or worn clothes. Why not? Because the stipulations in the marriage contract, i.e., all the rights of a wife stemming from the stipulations that are part of a marriage contract, are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she has no marriage contract, she does not have the stipulations in a marriage contract either.

谞讟诇讛 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna also teaches that if she took any of the above from this man or from that one she must return anything she took. The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Since she is not entitled to these articles, of course she must give them back. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that since she has already taken hold of them we do not remove them from her possession, as this is merely a penalty and she obtained nothing that did not legally belong to her. The tanna therefore teaches us that the court requires her to return even these items.

讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 转谞谉 讛转诐 讗讬谉 转讜专诪讬谉 诪谉 讛讟诪讗 注诇 讛讟讛讜专 讜讗诐 转专诐 讘砖讜讙讙 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诪讗讬 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讛讛讬讗 讙专讬讜讗 讛讚专 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛

搂 The mishna taught that the child of either of the men is a mamzer. To clarify this issue, the Gemara cites a different discussion. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Terumot 2:2): One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce in order to exempt ritually pure food, and if he separated teruma from impure food unwittingly, his teruma is considered teruma. If he acted intentionally, he has done nothing, that is, his action is of no effect. The Sages debated: What is the meaning of the expression: He has done nothing? Rav 岣sda said: He has done nothing at all, meaning that even that griva of produce he set aside as teruma returns to its former untithed state, as his entire act is completely disregarded.

专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诇转拽谉 讗转 讛砖讬专讬诐 讗讘诇 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讚讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讜讬 转专讜诪讛 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚驻砖注 讜诇讗 诪驻专讬砖

Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, said: He has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce from which he separated teruma, but the fruit he separated is itself teruma. Although the portion he set aside is sanctified as teruma, this does not exempt him from separating more teruma from ritually pure produce. The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: Rav 岣sda did not say his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, as, if you say it is teruma, on occasion he will be negligent and not separate anything more, assuming that if the portion he set aside has the status of teruma he must certainly have done everything required.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛转讜专诐 拽讬砖讜转 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪专讛 讗讘讟讬讞 讜谞诪爪讗转 住专讜讞 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐 砖讜讙讙 讗诪讝讬讚 拽专诪讬转 砖讜讙讙 诇讗 注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗 诪讝讬讚 拽注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:1): With regard to one who separates teruma from a serpent melon [kishut] and it was discovered to be bitter, or from a watermelon and it was discovered to be spoiled, it is teruma, and yet he must go back and separate teruma from another serpent melon or watermelon. No concern is expressed in this mishna that one might neglect to set aside teruma a second time. The Gemara answers: Are you raising a contradiction between the case of an unwitting sinner and that of an intentional sinner? There is a difference between them, as one who was unwitting did not commit a transgression and consequently does not deserve to be penalized, whereas one who was an intentional sinner did commit a transgression.

讜专诪讬 砖讜讙讙 讗砖讜讙讙 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讘砖讜讙讙 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讛转诐 拽转谞讬 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this ruling involving an unwitting sinner and another halakha of an unwitting sinner: Here, it is taught that if the one who separated ritually impure produce instead of ritually pure produce was unwitting, his teruma is teruma, which indicates that he does not have to separate teruma again. However, there, with regard to rotten fruit, it is taught that it is teruma and yet he must separate teruma again.

讛转诐 砖讜讙讙 拽专讜讘 诇诪讝讬讚 讚讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬讟注诪讬讛

The Gemara explains: There, his was an unwitting act that is close to an intentional one, as he should have tasted it first to ensure that he was separating quality fruit. His failure to do so renders him virtually a willful sinner, and therefore the Sages penalized him by obligating him to set aside teruma again. In the case of impure teruma, in contrast, he may not have been able to investigate the matter when he separated the portion.

讜专诪讬 诪讝讬讚 讗诪讝讬讚 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐 讛转诐 转谞谉 讛转讜专诐 诪砖讗讬谉 谞拽讜讘 注诇 谞拽讜讘 转专讜诪讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转专讜诐

And the Gemara also raises a contradiction between one case involving an intentional sinner and another case of an intentional sinner. Here, it is taught that in the case of an intentional sinner who separates teruma, he has done nothing. There, we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10), that with regard to one who separates teruma from produce growing in a vessel that is not perforated, for produce that grew in a perforated vessel, which is considered connected to the ground, it is teruma, but he must go back and separate teruma a second time. This ruling is based on the principle that anything that grew in a pot without a hole does not require separation of teruma by Torah law. In this case, the fact that he must again set aside teruma does not mean that the portion he separated is not consecrated at all.

讘转专讬 诪讗谞讬 爪讬讬转 讘讞讚 诪谞讗 诇讗 爪讬讬转

The Gemara answers: In a case involving two vessels he will listen. Since the difference between the two vessels is clear to the eye, if the owner is told he must separate teruma again, it can be assumed that he will comply. In contrast, in the case of one vessel he will not listen, as ritually impure and pure produce look the same to him. Consequently, if he is informed that he must set aside teruma a second time despite the fact that the produce he already set aside has the status of teruma, he will take no notice.

讜诇专讘 谞转谉 讘专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 诇转拽谉 砖讬专讬诐 讗讘诇 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讬

The Gemara asks another question: And according to the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, who said that he has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce but it is nevertheless teruma,

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 诪谉 讛谞拽讜讘 注诇 砖讗讬谉 谞拽讜讘 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讜诇讗 转讗讻诇 注讚 砖讬讜爪讬讗 注诇讬讛 转专讜诪讛 讜诪注砖专 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专

in what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10): If one separates teruma from that which grew in a perforated pot for that which is from a non-perforated pot, his teruma is teruma, but it may not be eaten until he removes on behalf of that portion itself teruma and tithe from another place? In other words, the portion he separated as teruma is not entirely consecrated, as it too is considered untithed produce in the sense that teruma must be separated for it. In contrast, one who sets aside impure teruma does not have to separate teruma from that portion itself.

砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 转专讜诪讛 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 讻讚专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 诪谞讬谉 诇转讜专诐 诪谉 讛专注讛 注诇 讛讬驻讛 砖转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜诇讗 转砖讗讜 注诇讬讜 讞讟讗 讘讛专讬诪讻诐 讗转 讞诇讘讜 诪诪谞讜

The Gemara answers: Here, with regard to ritually impure teruma, it is different, as by Torah law it is in fact full-fledged teruma, but the Sages penalized him by making him separate teruma again. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elai, as Rabbi Elai said: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is teruma? As it is written with regard to teruma: 鈥淎nd you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it its best鈥 (Numbers 18:32). This verse that if one separated teruma from inferior-quality produce he has committed a sin, which shows that his action is effective, as Rabbi Elai proceeds to explain.

讜讗诐 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖 谞砖讬讗讜转 讞讟讗 诇诪讛 诪讬讻谉 诇转讜专诐 诪谉 讛专注讛 注诇 讛讬驻讛 砖转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Elai elaborates: And if this inferior portion is not sanctified as teruma at all, why is there a bearing of sin? If the produce does not have the status of teruma he has not done anything, which means that his action cannot be considered a transgression. From here we learn with regard to one who separated from the bad for the good that his teruma is teruma after the fact. Similarly, the teruma of one who separates ritually impure food for pure food is valid teruma by Torah law.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 诇专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讚讬讚讱 讚讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讛讛讜讗 讙专讬讜讗 讛讚专 诇讟讬讘诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讝讬专讛 讚诇诪讗 驻砖注 讜诇讗 诪驻专讬砖 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讜讬 转专讜诪讛 讜诪砖讜诐 讚诇诪讗 驻砖注 讗驻拽讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讜讻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讬谉 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛

After clarifying the opinions themselves, the Gemara analyzes the case in greater detail. Rabba said to Rav 岣sda: According to your opinion, that you said he has done nothing at all, meaning that even that se鈥檃 he set aside returns to its former untithed state, what is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will be negligent and will not separate teruma a second time. However, is there anything that by Torah law is teruma, as stated by Rabbi Elai, and yet due to the concern: Perhaps he will be negligent, the Sages removed its status as sacred and gave to it the status of non-sacred food? And can the court stipulate and enact a decree to uproot something that applies by Torah law?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讗转 诇讗 转住讘专讗 讜讛转谞谉 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪砖谞讬 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪专讗砖讜谉 讗诪讗讬 讗砖转讜 讛讬讗 讜讬砖专讗诇 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讜拽讗 砖专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讘诪诪讝专转

Rav 岣sda said to Rabba: And you, do you not hold that the Sages have the power to do so? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna that the child is a mamzer from this one and from that one? Granted, the child from the second man is a mamzer, as he was born to a married woman from a man who was not her husband. However, with regard to the child from the first husband, why is he a mamzer? After all, she is his wife, and by Torah law their son is a full-fledged Jew. And the Sages鈥 declaration that he is a mamzer cannot be seen as a mere stringency, as they thereby permit him to a mamzeret. This shows that a rabbinical decree can uproot a Torah prohibition.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜讻谉 讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗住讜专 讘诪诪讝专转 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 诪诪讝专 诇讗讜住专讜 讘讘转 讬砖专讗诇

Rabba said to Rav 岣sda that Shmuel said as follows: It is forbidden for the child of the first husband to marry a mamzeret. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the child is forbidden to a mamzeret. And if so, why does the mishna call him a mamzer? This is to teach us that the Sages are stringent and render it prohibited for him to marry a regular Jewish woman. With regard to the issue at hand, as he may not marry a mamzeret, the Sages did not in fact uproot a mitzva that applies by Torah law.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘讛 讘讬讚 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讬谉 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讗讬诪转讬 讗讚诐 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 拽讟谞讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖转讘注诇 讜讬讜专砖讛 讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讗讜讻诇转 讘讙讬谞讜 转专讜诪讛

Rav 岣sda sent a proof to Rabba, in the hand of Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna: And can the court not stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: From when does a man inherit from his minor wife, who was married off by her mother or brother, as enacted by the Sages, a marriage that is not valid by Torah law? Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her fully developed height, i.e., when she grows up and reaches the age of maturity. And Beit Hillel say: From when she enters the wedding canopy. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. As soon as she is considered his wife, all the halakhot of a wife apply to her. And he inherits from her and becomes impure for her if she dies, even if he is a priest, and she eats teruma on his account if he is a priest.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讗讬诪讗 诪砖转注诪讜讚 讘拽讜诪转讛 讜转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讚拽讗诪专讬转讜 诪砖转讻谞住 诇讞讜驻讛 讗讬 注诪讚讛 讘拽讜诪转讛 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讞讜驻讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讞讜驻讛

The Gemara first clarifies various details of this baraita. Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her height. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is this the case even though she has not yet entered the wedding canopy? Betrothal alone, without the marriage canopy, is not enough to enable a man to inherit from an adult woman, let alone a minor. The Gemara answers: You must say that Beit Shammai meant from when she stands at her fully developed height and enters the wedding canopy. And Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel as follows: That which you said, that he inherits her from when she enters the wedding canopy, is not enough. Rather, if she stands at her fully developed height, the wedding canopy is effective for bringing about her marriage, and if not, the wedding canopy is not effective for bringing about her marriage.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖转讘注诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬谉 诪注砖讛 拽讟谞讛 讻诇讜诐 讗讬诪讗 诪砖转讙讚讬诇 讜转讘注诇

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. The Gemara again expresses surprise: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer say that the actions of a minor girl are nothing, which indicates that marriage and intercourse with her are not considered an act of acquisition. Rather, we must say that he meant from when she matures and has sexual relations.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 讬讜专砖讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘讜讛 讬专讬转 诇讛 讜诪讚专讘谞谉 讬专讬转 诇讛 讘注诇 讛驻拽专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讬讛 讛驻拽专

The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. In any event the baraita is teaching that he inherits from her. But here is a case where by Torah law her father, i.e., his relatives, as he is dead, inherits from her, as a minor orphan cannot marry by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law the husband inherits from her. This shows that the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as in monetary matters property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless, and therefore the court can allocate her inheritance as they see fit.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诪谞讬谉 砖讛驻拽专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讬讛 讛驻拽专 砖谞讗诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 诇讗 讬讘讗 诇砖诇砖转 讛讬诪讬诐 讘注爪转 讛砖专讬诐 讜讛讝拽谞讬诐 讬讞专诐 讻诇 专讻讜砖讜 讜讛讜讗 讬讘讚诇 诪拽讛诇 讛讙讜诇讛

As Rabbi Yitz岣k said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: 鈥淎nd whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity鈥 (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone鈥檚 possessions.

专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讗诇讛 讛谞讞诇讜转 讗砖专 谞讞诇讜 讗诇注讝专 讛讻讛谉 讜讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 谞讜谉 讜专讗砖讬 讛讗讘讜转 诇诪讟讜转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讬诐 讗爪诇 讗讘讜转 讗诇讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讗讘讜转 诪谞讞讬诇讬谉 讘谞讬讛诐 讻诇 诪讛 砖讬专爪讜 讗祝 专讗砖讬诐 诪谞讞讬诇讬谉 讗转 讛注诐 讻诇 诪讛 砖讬专爪讜

Rabbi Elazar says that the proof that the court can declare property ownerless is from here: 鈥淭hese are the inheritances that Elazar the priest, and Joshua, son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers鈥 houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance鈥 (Joshua 19:51). What do heads have to do with fathers? The expression 鈥渢he heads of the fathers鈥 houses of the tribes鈥 is unusual and vague. Rather, this comes to tell you: Just as fathers bequeath to their sons anything they want to, so too, the heads, i.e., the leaders and judges of the people, bequeath to the people anything they want to. This shows that the leaders can take property from one individual and give it to another.

讜诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘讬讛 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜诪讚专讘谞谉 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讘注诇 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 诪转 诪爪讜讛

It was stated that the husband of a minor becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The Gemara asks: But here is a case where by Torah law her father, not the man she married, is obligated to become impure for her, as the latter is not his wife by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law her husband defiles himself for her. The Gemara answers: This is because she is considered like a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], for which even a priest must become impure. Once she is married, her relatives from her father鈥檚 family no longer care for her welfare, which means her husband is the only one who is entrusted with her burial.

讜诪讬 讛讜讬 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 讗讬 讝讛讜 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 拽讜讘专讬谉 拽讜专讗 讜讗讞专讬诐 注讜谞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗讬谉 讝讛 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讬专转讬 诇讛 拽专讬讗 讜诇讗 注谞讜 诇讛

The Gemara asks: And is she in fact a met mitzva? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Which corpse is a met mitzva? Any corpse that does not have anyone to bury it. If it was in a place where if one calls and others would answer him, this is not a met mitzva. In contrast, this girl does have relatives who can bury her, if necessary. The Gemara answers: Here too, since the members of her father鈥檚 family do not inherit from her, she would call and they would not answer her, as they have no desire to go to any trouble for her. Since her husband inherits from her, it is his duty to tend to her burial, and he must therefore become impure for her, as she has the status of a met mitzva.

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