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Today's Daf Yomi

March 16, 2022 | 讬状讙 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 9

Today’s daf is sponsored by Professor Jonathan Ben-Ezra in honor of his wife, Dr. Robin Zeiger. “I am so proud that we were able to finish Seder Moed together.”

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Jennifer and Joshua Lankin in loving memory of Jennifer鈥檚 brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham ben Rachel Leah and Meir Tzvi, in honor of her grandma Marilyn Kaiman, daughter Adi and all agunot on this international agunah day. 鈥淢y grandmother is an inspiration through her daf learning & I pray my daughter Adi will grow up to love learning Torah.鈥

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Rebbi and the rabbis each learn out the laws of our Mishna from different verses in the Torah. The rabbis derived it from Vayikra 18 from the verse regarding one’s wife’s sister (from the word “aleha“). Rebbi derived it from the verse in Devarim 25 regarding yibum. If so, what does Rebbi derive from the verse regarding one’s wife’s sister from the word “aleha“? He derives from there through a gezeira shava to the verses about a bull offering brought when the community sins and needs to bring a sin offering. They derive from one’s wife’s sister, that in order to be obligated to bring the bull sin offering, it needs to be that the community sinned on a transgression that is punishable by karet and if done unwittingly, one would bring a sin offering. From there it is derived that the same holds true for other sin offerings such as an individual who makes a mistake or a nasi, a kohen gadol, and one who sins by worshipping idols (both for the individual and the community). How are each of these derived from the verses? From where do the rabbis derive this? What does Rebbi derive from the verses that the rabbis used? Why does the Mishna list 15 cases when they could have listed 16? Rebbi explained that the Mishna only listed cases that are not subjects of dispute. Is this really true? The Gemara raises a number of questions against this explanation. But answers are brought.

 

讜诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讻诇 诪爪讜讛 砖讘转讜专讛 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讬讞讬讚 诪讘讬讗 讻砖讘讛 讗讜 砖注讬专讛 谞砖讬讗 诪讘讬讗 砖注讬专 诪砖讬讞 讜讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 驻专

And a community brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin for idolatrous worship only if the act of idolatry involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And we also learned in a mishna: With regard to any mitzva in the Torah for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, if a private individual sinned unwittingly, he brings a ewe or a she-goat. If it was a Nasi, he brings a goat for a sin of this kind, and if the sinner was an anointed High Priest or the court, they bring a bull.

讜讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讬讞讬讚 谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 诪讘讬讗讬谉 砖注讬专讛 爪讘讜专 诪讘讬讗讬诐 驻专 讜砖注讬专 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬

And if they unwittingly sinned in a matter involving idolatrous worship, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest bring a she-goat, whereas a community brings a bull and a goat, the bull as a burnt-offering and the goat as a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that one must bring a sin-offering for this transgression, derived?

讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜谞讜讚注讛 讛讞讟讗转 讗砖专 讞讟讗讜 注诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 注诇讬讛 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 注诇讬讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬诐 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讗祝 讻讗谉 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转

The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught with regard to an unwitting communal sin offering: 鈥淎nd the sin by which they have sinned is known鈥 (Leviticus 4:14). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated here, with regard to a sin-offering: 鈥淏y which [aleha],鈥 and it is stated there, with regard to the prohibition with regard to a wife鈥檚 sister: 鈥淯nto [aleha].鈥 This teaches by verbal analogy: Just as there, in the case of a wife鈥檚 sister, it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the offering is brought for a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 爪讘讜专 诪砖讬讞 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讘诪砖讬讞 诇讗砖诪转 讛注诐 讛专讬 诪砖讬讞 讻爪讘讜专

The Gemara continues: We found a source for the halakha that the offering brought by the community is a sin-offering; from where do we derive that an anointed High Priest also brings a sin-offering for this transgression? As it is written with regard to an anointed High Priest: 鈥淚f the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt on the people鈥 (Leviticus 4:3), which indicates that an anointed High Priest brings an offering like the community.

讬讞讬讚 讜谞砖讬讗 讗转讬讗 诪爪讜转 诪爪讜转

From where is it derived that a private individual and a Nasi bring sin-offerings only for a severe transgression of this kind? This is derived by verbal analogy between the words 鈥渕itzvot鈥 and 鈥渕itzvot鈥 that are stated three times, with regard to the community鈥檚 sin-offering, a private individual鈥檚 sin-offering, and the sin-offering of a Nasi: 鈥淎ny of the mitzvot of the Lord that He has commanded not to be done鈥 (Leviticus 4:2, 13, 22).

讜诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讬诇讬祝 诪注讬谞讬 诪注讬谞讬

And it was stated above that this halakha applies to idolatrous worship only if it involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The halakha of a community that was guilty of idolatrous worship is derived by a verbal analogy between the phrases 鈥渇rom the eyes鈥 and 鈥渇rom the eyes.鈥 With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, the verse states: 鈥淔rom the eyes of the assembly鈥 (Leviticus 4:13), while concerning an unwitting sin of idol worship, it says: 鈥淔rom the eyes of the congregation鈥 (Numbers 15:24). This verbal analogy teaches that a congregation brings a sin-offering for idolatrous worship only if it involved a transgression that incurs karet when performed intentionally.

讬讞讬讚 谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 诪讜讗诐 谞驻砖 讗讞转 讗讞讚 讬讞讬讚 讜讗讞讚 谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 诪砖讬讞 讘诪砖诪注 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉

The cases of a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest are derived from a verse that deals with an unwitting sin of idolatry: 鈥淎nd if one person sin鈥 (Numbers 15:27). All of these, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, are included in this verse. In this case the principle: The letter vav adds to the previous matter, applies. When a phrase begins with the conjunction vav, meaning: And, it is a continuation of the previous matter rather than a new topic. Based on this principle, these two halakhot are connected with one another.

讜讬诇诪讚 转讞转讜谉 诪谉 讛注诇讬讜谉

And therefore let the lower, i.e., the second, subject, a private individual, be derived from the upper issue, the community. Just as a community brings this offering only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet, the same is true of a private individual. The verbal analogy stated in this baraita is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 inference from the phrase 鈥渨ith her.鈥

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 住讘专讗 诪谞讗 诇讛讜 谞驻拽讗 诇讛讜 诪讚诪拽专讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇讘专讬讛 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注讜砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转注砖讛 讘讬讚 专诪讛

搂 The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who interpret 鈥渨ith her鈥 with regard to rival wives, from where do they derive this conclusion that one is liable to bring the offering for idolatrous worship only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet? The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi read out to his son to teach him the verses that summarize the case of unwitting idol worship: 鈥淵ou shall have one law [Torah] for him that does unwittingly. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Numbers 15:29鈥30).

讛讜拽砖讛 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 诇注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转

In this manner, the entire Torah is juxtaposed with idolatrous worship. Just as in the case of idolatrous worship there is no obligation to bring an offering unless it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, as indicated by the verse: 鈥淭hat soul shall be cut off from among his people,鈥 so too, the same applies to any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 讬讞讬讚 讜谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 讘讬谉 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讘讬谉 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗诐 谞驻砖 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉

The Gemara comments: We found a source for a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, whether with regard to idolatrous worship or with regard to the other mitzvot. From where is it derived that a community is liable only for an unwitting transgression of idolatrous worship of this kind? The verse states: 鈥淎nd if one person sin鈥 (Numbers 15:27). Once again, the letter vav teaches that these two cases are connected, and let the upper, the first, issue of a community, be derived from the lower case, that of a private individual.

讗诇讗 爪讘讜专 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 诪谞诇谉 讬诇讬祝 诪注讬谞讬 诪注讬谞讬 讜专讘讬 讛讗讬 转讜专讛 讗讞转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 砖讞诇拽 讛讻转讜讘 讘讬谉 讬讞讬讚讬诐 诇诪专讜讘讬诐

However, from where do we derive that a community brings an offering for other mitzvot only if the intentional violation of the prohibition incurs karet? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the aforementioned verbal analogy between 鈥渇rom the eyes鈥 and 鈥渇rom the eyes.鈥 The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi do with this verse: 鈥淥ne law鈥? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Since we find that the Torah differentiates between private individuals who sinned and the many who sinned in idol worship.

讬讞讬讚讬诐 讘住拽讬诇讛 诇驻讬讻讱 诪诪讜谞谉 驻诇讟 诪专讜讘讬谉 讘住讬讬祝 诇驻讬讻讱 诪诪讜谞谉 讗讘讚

The baraita elaborates: Private individuals who worshipped idols are sentenced to stoning, and therefore their money is spared from destruction. Although the sinner is put to death, his possessions are not destroyed. By contrast, the many are condemned to the lighter death penalty of decapitation by sword, the punishment for those who worshipped idols in an idolatrous city, and therefore their money is forfeited, as by Torah law all possessions belonging to the residents of an idolatrous city must be burned.

讬讻讜诇 谞讞诇讜拽 讘拽专讘谞讜转讬讛谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐

Due to this difference, one might have thought that we should likewise differentiate between their offerings, i.e., if an individual and a community unwittingly practiced idolatrous worship, different offerings are brought in the two cases. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淥ne law for you.鈥 The word: 鈥測ou鈥 is in the plural, which indicates that an individual and a community that worshipped idols are subject to the same halakha.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讞诇拽讬讛 诪讛讙专讜谞讬讗 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 谞讞诇拽 诪讗讬 诇讬讬转讜 诇讬讬转讜 驻专 爪讘讜专 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讜

Rav 岣lkiya from the city of Hagronya strongly objects to this: The reason for this ruling is that the Merciful One specifically writes: 鈥淥ne law for you,鈥 from which it may be inferred that if that were not so, I would say that we should differentiate between the offerings of an individual and a community. If so, it is appropriate to ask: What offering would they bring if we were to differentiate? You cannot say they would bring a bull, as it is a community that sinned unwittingly in transgressing other mitzvot who bring a bull, and as this case is written separately, clearly its halakha is different.

讻砖讘讛 讬讞讬讚 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讬 砖注讬专 谞砖讬讗 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讬 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讜 讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 砖注讬专讛 讬讞讬讚 谞诪讬 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专讘谞讜

Likewise, you cannot say that they should bring a ewe, as it is an individual who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a ewe. Nor can you say that they bring a goat, as it is a Nasi who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a goat. And you cannot say that they would bring a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, as it is the community, i.e., the majority of Jews, who sinned in performing idolatrous worship who bring these. Rather, what might they bring? If one were to suggest a she-goat, that would not be appropriate, because this is the offering of a private individual as well, since an individual brings a ewe or a she-goat as a sin-offering. Apparently there is no need for a special inference in this case, as there are no other possibilities.

讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜爪讘讜专 讘讛讜专讗讛 诪讬讬转讜 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 讗讬谞讛讜 谞诪讬 谞讬转讜 讗讬驻讻讗

The Gemara answers: It is necessary for a verse to teach that there is no difference between the offerings of an individual and a community, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a community that sinned by the erroneous instruction of the court that it is permitted to practice idolatry brings a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, then, when a community sins of its own accord they too should bring these animals, but the opposite, i.e., a bull as a sin-offering and a goat as a burnt-offering.

讗讬 谞诪讬 爪专讬讱 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 转拽谞讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Alternatively, it could be argued: Theoretically a community must bring a different form of atonement from that of an individual, yet they have no remedy, as the Torah did not specify which offering is brought for a sin of the many. Therefore, the verse teaches us by means of the phrase 鈥渙ne law for you鈥 that there is indeed an offering for the many who practiced idol worship.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讜讬 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讚转谞讬 讞诪砖 注砖专讛 诇讬转谞讬 砖砖 注砖专讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诪讚讜诪讛 诇讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 诪讜讞 讘拽讚拽讚讜

搂 After discussing different interpretations of the relevant verses, the Gemara addresses the details of the halakhot of the mishna. It first considers the numbers that comprise the structure of the mishna as a whole. The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head.

诪讗讬 讚注转讱 讗诪讜 讗谞讜住转 讗讘讬讜

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi proceeded to explain the question and the answer himself: What is your thinking? Is it that the tanna should have included the case of his mother who had been raped by his father? In the opinion of the Rabbis, a woman raped by one鈥檚 father is permitted in marriage to another of his sons. Consequently, it is possible that she might give birth to a son and later marry one of the other sons of the rapist. If her husband subsequently died childless, this woman would come before the brother of the deceased for levirate marriage, who is in this case her son. If so, there are in fact sixteen women with whom relations are forbidden.

讗诪讜 讗谞讜住转 讗讘讬讜 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

However, continued Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is incorrect, as the case of his mother raped by his father is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a woman raped by one鈥檚 father could never come before him for levirate marriage, as it is prohibited for her to marry his brothers. And the tanna of this mishna does not deal with disputed cases. The mishna enumerates only those cases that are accepted by all opinions, not those that are a matter of dispute.

讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 讗讬住讜专 诪爪讜讛 讜讗讬住讜专 拽讚讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: And does the tanna really not mention disputed cases? But there are the cases of a prohibition resulting from a mitzva of the Sages, and a prohibition stemming from sanctity. In other words, the tanna does refer to the cases of a woman who one is prohibited to marry by decree of the Sages, e.g., a distant secondary forbidden relation, and one who is prohibited due to a regular prohibition that preserves the sanctity of the Jewish people or the priesthood.

讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜专讘谞谉 讜拽转谞讬

These are cases concerning which Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree whether these women are entirely exempt from both levirate marriage and 岣litza like a forbidden relation, or whether the mitzva of levirate marriage does in fact apply but since the yavam may not marry her in practice, she must be released by 岣litza. And yet these disputed cases are taught in the mishna.

讘驻专拽讬谉 拽讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讜讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪转讬专讬谉 讗转 讛爪专讜转 诇讗讞讬谉 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜住专讬谉

The Gemara responds: When we say that only accepted halakhot are included in the mishna, we are referring only to our present chapter, whereas the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is stated in the second chapter. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in this chapter it is stated that Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, as they hold that there is no prohibition against rival wives of those with whom relations are forbidden, and Beit Hillel prohibit this. Evidently, the first chapter does deal with disputed cases.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讘诪拽讜诐 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讬谞讛 诪砖谞讛 讜讛专讬 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜

The Gemara answers: When Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, i.e., it is completely disregarded, as it is commonly accepted that the opinion of Beit Shammai is rejected and not ruled as halakha. Therefore, this cannot be considered a true dispute. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But there is the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, i.e., the yavam was not alive at the time of his brother鈥檚 death.

讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 讜拽转谞讬 讘谞讜诇讚

This is a case concerning which Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree, and yet it is taught. If this halakha is taught, evidently this mishna does deal with matters subject to dispute. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the Rabbis concerning all cases of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. If this yavam was born after his brother鈥檚 death, he concedes that the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply to the newborn yavam. Rather, the yevama is prohibited to him as his brother鈥檚 wife.

讜诇讘住讜祝 讬讬讘诐 诇讗 驻诇讬讙 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

Furthermore, in a case where he was born and at the end, i.e., afterward, a second older brother entered into levirate marriage with the yevama and subsequently died as well, and the same woman again came before that same younger brother, Rabbi Shimon did not disagree with the opinion of the Rabbis here either, as he admits that this woman is permanently forbidden to him because when he was born she was classified as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.
In fact, Rabbi Shimon disagreed only with regard to a different case, when there were two brothers, one of whom died, and the second took the yevama in levirate marriage. If a third brother was subsequently born and afterward the second brother died, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the youngest brother may enter into levirate marriage with this woman because she was never forbidden to him, as what occurred prior to his birth is of no relevance. Since even in Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 opinion it is possible to find a case in which the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist is forbidden to him, it can be claimed that the mishna is taught in accordance with all opinions.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讞诇讜拽 讛讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗祝 讘专讗砖讜谞讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Oshaya say that Rabbi Shimon disagreed even with regard to the first case? In other words, Rabbi Shimon disagreed not only in the case of a woman who entered into levirate marriage before the young brother was born, but even if the young brother was born before the initial levirate marriage took place.

讛讗 讗讬转讜转讘 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This statement of Rabbi Oshaya was conclusively refuted. Consequently, it remains possible to say that the mishna does not deal with disputes.
The Gemara raises a difficulty from another angle. The third chapter discusses a case involving four brothers, two of whom passed away after they were married to two sisters. As a result, the two sisters simultaneously came before the surviving brothers for levirate marriage or 岣litza. The Sages ruled that in this case the brothers may not enter into levirate marriage with the sisters, as it is as though the two sisters came before each brother individually, and due to the levirate bond each sister was, in a sense, considered married to each brother to a certain extent.
Consequently, for each brother the other sister is viewed as his wife鈥檚 sister, as it were, and is forbidden to him. Since this occurs to both sisters simultaneously, it is prohibited for both of them to enter into levirate marriage. However, the Sages further said that if one of these sisters was a forbidden relation to one of the surviving brothers, e.g., if he had married her daughter or some other relative, the second sister, to whom he is not a close relative, is permitted to him. If the same applies to the other brother and the second sister, the two brothers could perform 岣litza with the two sisters or even enter into levirate marriage with them.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讻谉 转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘讻讜诇谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛谉 讛讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讜讛讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讜讗讞讜转讛 砖讛讬讗 讬讘诪转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讬讘诪转

With this in mind, the Gemara states its objection: And didn鈥檛 Rav Yehuda say that Rav said, and likewise Rabbi 岣yya taught in a baraita: With regard to all of those fifteen women enumerated in the mishna, it is possible to find a scenario in which I would call them: The woman who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother, and the one who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother. And consequently, her sister who is her sister-in-law performs 岣litza or enters into levirate marriage. This complex situation can be demonstrated with regard to each of the women enumerated in the mishna, e.g., if one sister is the mother-in-law of one brother, and the second sister is the mother-in-law of the second brother, and so on.

讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪转专讙诐 诪讞诪讜转讜 讜讗讬诇讱 讗讘诇 砖讬转讗 讘讘讬 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

And Rav Yehuda explains that this is not true of all of the women listed in the mishna. Only from the case of his mother-in-law and onward, until the end of the list, is it possible for one sister to be a forbidden relation to one brother and the other sister not to be forbidden at all. However, in the first six cases, no, this option does not apply. What is the reason for this?

讻讬讜谉 讚讘转讜

Since, for example, in the case of one鈥檚 daughter, although it is possible that one of the sisters is the daughter of one of the brothers, her mother is prohibited to all of the brothers as their brother鈥檚 wife, and therefore she could not possibly have a daughter from another brother. This case is possible only if one brother raped a woman who subsequently gave birth to his daughter. Since the prohibition with regard to a brother鈥檚 wife applies only in the case of marriage, this same woman is not forbidden to a different brother. If another brother came and raped her as well and she gave birth to his daughter too, and these two daughters later married two other brothers, each of these sisters who are sisters-in-law is forbidden to one of the brothers but permitted to the other.

讘讗讜谞住讬谉 诪砖讻讞转 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 拽诪讬讬专讬 讘讗讜谞住讬谉 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

Accordingly, in the case of rape you can find this scenario, but in the case of marriage you cannot find it. However, the mishna cannot be interpreted as referring to a case of this kind, as it deals with marriage and it does not deal with rape.

讜讗讘讬讬 诪转专讙诐 讗祝 讘转讜 诪讗谞讜住转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗砖讻讜讞讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗讬 讘注讬讗 诪谉 讛讗讜谞住讬谉 转讛讜讬 [讗讬 讘注讬讗 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 转讛讜讬] 讗讘诇 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

And Abaye explains differently, as he would include in this scenario even his daughter from the woman he raped. Why would he include this case? Since you can find this possibility, if you wish it can be by rape, and if you wish it can be by marriage, i.e., regardless of the details, this situation can occur. However, the last case, that of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, he would not include. What is the reason for this?

讻讬讜谉 讚诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讜讗 讚诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诇专讘谞谉 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

Since it is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that you find this potential scenario, as he permits a yevama to her yavam in a case where he was born after she first entered levirate marriage, it is therefore possible that one sister might be forbidden to one brother if he was born before his brother took her in levirate marriage. Likewise, another sister might be forbidden to another brother for the same reason, although the first woman would be permitted to him, as in his lifetime she was never the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, however, you cannot find this scenario, and the mishna does not deal with disputes but only with those cases that are accepted by all opinions.

讜专讘 住驻专讗 诪转专讙诐 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜 讜诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘砖讬转讗 讗讞讬诐 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

But Rav Safra explains that the possibility of one brother permitted only to one woman and another brother likewise permitted to only one woman exists even in the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, and you can find this scenario in a case involving six brothers, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 9

讜诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讻诇 诪爪讜讛 砖讘转讜专讛 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讬讞讬讚 诪讘讬讗 讻砖讘讛 讗讜 砖注讬专讛 谞砖讬讗 诪讘讬讗 砖注讬专 诪砖讬讞 讜讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 驻专

And a community brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin for idolatrous worship only if the act of idolatry involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And we also learned in a mishna: With regard to any mitzva in the Torah for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, if a private individual sinned unwittingly, he brings a ewe or a she-goat. If it was a Nasi, he brings a goat for a sin of this kind, and if the sinner was an anointed High Priest or the court, they bring a bull.

讜讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讬讞讬讚 谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 诪讘讬讗讬谉 砖注讬专讛 爪讘讜专 诪讘讬讗讬诐 驻专 讜砖注讬专 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬

And if they unwittingly sinned in a matter involving idolatrous worship, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest bring a she-goat, whereas a community brings a bull and a goat, the bull as a burnt-offering and the goat as a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that one must bring a sin-offering for this transgression, derived?

讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜谞讜讚注讛 讛讞讟讗转 讗砖专 讞讟讗讜 注诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 注诇讬讛 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 注诇讬讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬诐 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讗祝 讻讗谉 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转

The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught with regard to an unwitting communal sin offering: 鈥淎nd the sin by which they have sinned is known鈥 (Leviticus 4:14). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated here, with regard to a sin-offering: 鈥淏y which [aleha],鈥 and it is stated there, with regard to the prohibition with regard to a wife鈥檚 sister: 鈥淯nto [aleha].鈥 This teaches by verbal analogy: Just as there, in the case of a wife鈥檚 sister, it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the offering is brought for a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 爪讘讜专 诪砖讬讞 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讘诪砖讬讞 诇讗砖诪转 讛注诐 讛专讬 诪砖讬讞 讻爪讘讜专

The Gemara continues: We found a source for the halakha that the offering brought by the community is a sin-offering; from where do we derive that an anointed High Priest also brings a sin-offering for this transgression? As it is written with regard to an anointed High Priest: 鈥淚f the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt on the people鈥 (Leviticus 4:3), which indicates that an anointed High Priest brings an offering like the community.

讬讞讬讚 讜谞砖讬讗 讗转讬讗 诪爪讜转 诪爪讜转

From where is it derived that a private individual and a Nasi bring sin-offerings only for a severe transgression of this kind? This is derived by verbal analogy between the words 鈥渕itzvot鈥 and 鈥渕itzvot鈥 that are stated three times, with regard to the community鈥檚 sin-offering, a private individual鈥檚 sin-offering, and the sin-offering of a Nasi: 鈥淎ny of the mitzvot of the Lord that He has commanded not to be done鈥 (Leviticus 4:2, 13, 22).

讜诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讬诇讬祝 诪注讬谞讬 诪注讬谞讬

And it was stated above that this halakha applies to idolatrous worship only if it involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The halakha of a community that was guilty of idolatrous worship is derived by a verbal analogy between the phrases 鈥渇rom the eyes鈥 and 鈥渇rom the eyes.鈥 With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, the verse states: 鈥淔rom the eyes of the assembly鈥 (Leviticus 4:13), while concerning an unwitting sin of idol worship, it says: 鈥淔rom the eyes of the congregation鈥 (Numbers 15:24). This verbal analogy teaches that a congregation brings a sin-offering for idolatrous worship only if it involved a transgression that incurs karet when performed intentionally.

讬讞讬讚 谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 诪讜讗诐 谞驻砖 讗讞转 讗讞讚 讬讞讬讚 讜讗讞讚 谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 诪砖讬讞 讘诪砖诪注 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉

The cases of a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest are derived from a verse that deals with an unwitting sin of idolatry: 鈥淎nd if one person sin鈥 (Numbers 15:27). All of these, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, are included in this verse. In this case the principle: The letter vav adds to the previous matter, applies. When a phrase begins with the conjunction vav, meaning: And, it is a continuation of the previous matter rather than a new topic. Based on this principle, these two halakhot are connected with one another.

讜讬诇诪讚 转讞转讜谉 诪谉 讛注诇讬讜谉

And therefore let the lower, i.e., the second, subject, a private individual, be derived from the upper issue, the community. Just as a community brings this offering only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet, the same is true of a private individual. The verbal analogy stated in this baraita is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 inference from the phrase 鈥渨ith her.鈥

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 住讘专讗 诪谞讗 诇讛讜 谞驻拽讗 诇讛讜 诪讚诪拽专讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇讘专讬讛 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 诇注讜砖讛 讘砖讙讙讛 讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转注砖讛 讘讬讚 专诪讛

搂 The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who interpret 鈥渨ith her鈥 with regard to rival wives, from where do they derive this conclusion that one is liable to bring the offering for idolatrous worship only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet? The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi read out to his son to teach him the verses that summarize the case of unwitting idol worship: 鈥淵ou shall have one law [Torah] for him that does unwittingly. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Numbers 15:29鈥30).

讛讜拽砖讛 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 诇注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讜 讻专转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讜 讞讟讗转

In this manner, the entire Torah is juxtaposed with idolatrous worship. Just as in the case of idolatrous worship there is no obligation to bring an offering unless it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, as indicated by the verse: 鈥淭hat soul shall be cut off from among his people,鈥 so too, the same applies to any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 讬讞讬讚 讜谞砖讬讗 讜诪砖讬讞 讘讬谉 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讘讬谉 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗诐 谞驻砖 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉

The Gemara comments: We found a source for a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, whether with regard to idolatrous worship or with regard to the other mitzvot. From where is it derived that a community is liable only for an unwitting transgression of idolatrous worship of this kind? The verse states: 鈥淎nd if one person sin鈥 (Numbers 15:27). Once again, the letter vav teaches that these two cases are connected, and let the upper, the first, issue of a community, be derived from the lower case, that of a private individual.

讗诇讗 爪讘讜专 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 诪谞诇谉 讬诇讬祝 诪注讬谞讬 诪注讬谞讬 讜专讘讬 讛讗讬 转讜专讛 讗讞转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 砖讞诇拽 讛讻转讜讘 讘讬谉 讬讞讬讚讬诐 诇诪专讜讘讬诐

However, from where do we derive that a community brings an offering for other mitzvot only if the intentional violation of the prohibition incurs karet? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the aforementioned verbal analogy between 鈥渇rom the eyes鈥 and 鈥渇rom the eyes.鈥 The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi do with this verse: 鈥淥ne law鈥? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Since we find that the Torah differentiates between private individuals who sinned and the many who sinned in idol worship.

讬讞讬讚讬诐 讘住拽讬诇讛 诇驻讬讻讱 诪诪讜谞谉 驻诇讟 诪专讜讘讬谉 讘住讬讬祝 诇驻讬讻讱 诪诪讜谞谉 讗讘讚

The baraita elaborates: Private individuals who worshipped idols are sentenced to stoning, and therefore their money is spared from destruction. Although the sinner is put to death, his possessions are not destroyed. By contrast, the many are condemned to the lighter death penalty of decapitation by sword, the punishment for those who worshipped idols in an idolatrous city, and therefore their money is forfeited, as by Torah law all possessions belonging to the residents of an idolatrous city must be burned.

讬讻讜诇 谞讞诇讜拽 讘拽专讘谞讜转讬讛谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐

Due to this difference, one might have thought that we should likewise differentiate between their offerings, i.e., if an individual and a community unwittingly practiced idolatrous worship, different offerings are brought in the two cases. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淥ne law for you.鈥 The word: 鈥測ou鈥 is in the plural, which indicates that an individual and a community that worshipped idols are subject to the same halakha.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讞诇拽讬讛 诪讛讙专讜谞讬讗 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 转讜专讛 讗讞转 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 谞讞诇拽 诪讗讬 诇讬讬转讜 诇讬讬转讜 驻专 爪讘讜专 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讜

Rav 岣lkiya from the city of Hagronya strongly objects to this: The reason for this ruling is that the Merciful One specifically writes: 鈥淥ne law for you,鈥 from which it may be inferred that if that were not so, I would say that we should differentiate between the offerings of an individual and a community. If so, it is appropriate to ask: What offering would they bring if we were to differentiate? You cannot say they would bring a bull, as it is a community that sinned unwittingly in transgressing other mitzvot who bring a bull, and as this case is written separately, clearly its halakha is different.

讻砖讘讛 讬讞讬讚 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讬 砖注讬专 谞砖讬讗 讘砖讗专 诪爪讜转 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讬 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 爪讘讜专 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讬转讜 讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 砖注讬专讛 讬讞讬讚 谞诪讬 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专讘谞讜

Likewise, you cannot say that they should bring a ewe, as it is an individual who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a ewe. Nor can you say that they bring a goat, as it is a Nasi who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a goat. And you cannot say that they would bring a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, as it is the community, i.e., the majority of Jews, who sinned in performing idolatrous worship who bring these. Rather, what might they bring? If one were to suggest a she-goat, that would not be appropriate, because this is the offering of a private individual as well, since an individual brings a ewe or a she-goat as a sin-offering. Apparently there is no need for a special inference in this case, as there are no other possibilities.

讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜爪讘讜专 讘讛讜专讗讛 诪讬讬转讜 驻专 诇注讜诇讛 讜砖注讬专 诇讞讟讗转 讗讬谞讛讜 谞诪讬 谞讬转讜 讗讬驻讻讗

The Gemara answers: It is necessary for a verse to teach that there is no difference between the offerings of an individual and a community, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a community that sinned by the erroneous instruction of the court that it is permitted to practice idolatry brings a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, then, when a community sins of its own accord they too should bring these animals, but the opposite, i.e., a bull as a sin-offering and a goat as a burnt-offering.

讗讬 谞诪讬 爪专讬讱 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 转拽谞讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Alternatively, it could be argued: Theoretically a community must bring a different form of atonement from that of an individual, yet they have no remedy, as the Torah did not specify which offering is brought for a sin of the many. Therefore, the verse teaches us by means of the phrase 鈥渙ne law for you鈥 that there is indeed an offering for the many who practiced idol worship.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讜讬 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讚转谞讬 讞诪砖 注砖专讛 诇讬转谞讬 砖砖 注砖专讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诪讚讜诪讛 诇讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 诪讜讞 讘拽讚拽讚讜

搂 After discussing different interpretations of the relevant verses, the Gemara addresses the details of the halakhot of the mishna. It first considers the numbers that comprise the structure of the mishna as a whole. The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head.

诪讗讬 讚注转讱 讗诪讜 讗谞讜住转 讗讘讬讜

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi proceeded to explain the question and the answer himself: What is your thinking? Is it that the tanna should have included the case of his mother who had been raped by his father? In the opinion of the Rabbis, a woman raped by one鈥檚 father is permitted in marriage to another of his sons. Consequently, it is possible that she might give birth to a son and later marry one of the other sons of the rapist. If her husband subsequently died childless, this woman would come before the brother of the deceased for levirate marriage, who is in this case her son. If so, there are in fact sixteen women with whom relations are forbidden.

讗诪讜 讗谞讜住转 讗讘讬讜 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

However, continued Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is incorrect, as the case of his mother raped by his father is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a woman raped by one鈥檚 father could never come before him for levirate marriage, as it is prohibited for her to marry his brothers. And the tanna of this mishna does not deal with disputed cases. The mishna enumerates only those cases that are accepted by all opinions, not those that are a matter of dispute.

讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 讗讬住讜专 诪爪讜讛 讜讗讬住讜专 拽讚讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: And does the tanna really not mention disputed cases? But there are the cases of a prohibition resulting from a mitzva of the Sages, and a prohibition stemming from sanctity. In other words, the tanna does refer to the cases of a woman who one is prohibited to marry by decree of the Sages, e.g., a distant secondary forbidden relation, and one who is prohibited due to a regular prohibition that preserves the sanctity of the Jewish people or the priesthood.

讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜专讘谞谉 讜拽转谞讬

These are cases concerning which Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree whether these women are entirely exempt from both levirate marriage and 岣litza like a forbidden relation, or whether the mitzva of levirate marriage does in fact apply but since the yavam may not marry her in practice, she must be released by 岣litza. And yet these disputed cases are taught in the mishna.

讘驻专拽讬谉 拽讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讜讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪转讬专讬谉 讗转 讛爪专讜转 诇讗讞讬谉 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜住专讬谉

The Gemara responds: When we say that only accepted halakhot are included in the mishna, we are referring only to our present chapter, whereas the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is stated in the second chapter. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in this chapter it is stated that Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, as they hold that there is no prohibition against rival wives of those with whom relations are forbidden, and Beit Hillel prohibit this. Evidently, the first chapter does deal with disputed cases.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讘诪拽讜诐 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讬谞讛 诪砖谞讛 讜讛专讬 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜

The Gemara answers: When Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, i.e., it is completely disregarded, as it is commonly accepted that the opinion of Beit Shammai is rejected and not ruled as halakha. Therefore, this cannot be considered a true dispute. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But there is the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, i.e., the yavam was not alive at the time of his brother鈥檚 death.

讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 讜拽转谞讬 讘谞讜诇讚

This is a case concerning which Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree, and yet it is taught. If this halakha is taught, evidently this mishna does deal with matters subject to dispute. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the Rabbis concerning all cases of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. If this yavam was born after his brother鈥檚 death, he concedes that the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply to the newborn yavam. Rather, the yevama is prohibited to him as his brother鈥檚 wife.

讜诇讘住讜祝 讬讬讘诐 诇讗 驻诇讬讙 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

Furthermore, in a case where he was born and at the end, i.e., afterward, a second older brother entered into levirate marriage with the yevama and subsequently died as well, and the same woman again came before that same younger brother, Rabbi Shimon did not disagree with the opinion of the Rabbis here either, as he admits that this woman is permanently forbidden to him because when he was born she was classified as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.
In fact, Rabbi Shimon disagreed only with regard to a different case, when there were two brothers, one of whom died, and the second took the yevama in levirate marriage. If a third brother was subsequently born and afterward the second brother died, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the youngest brother may enter into levirate marriage with this woman because she was never forbidden to him, as what occurred prior to his birth is of no relevance. Since even in Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 opinion it is possible to find a case in which the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist is forbidden to him, it can be claimed that the mishna is taught in accordance with all opinions.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讞诇讜拽 讛讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗祝 讘专讗砖讜谞讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Oshaya say that Rabbi Shimon disagreed even with regard to the first case? In other words, Rabbi Shimon disagreed not only in the case of a woman who entered into levirate marriage before the young brother was born, but even if the young brother was born before the initial levirate marriage took place.

讛讗 讗讬转讜转讘 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This statement of Rabbi Oshaya was conclusively refuted. Consequently, it remains possible to say that the mishna does not deal with disputes.
The Gemara raises a difficulty from another angle. The third chapter discusses a case involving four brothers, two of whom passed away after they were married to two sisters. As a result, the two sisters simultaneously came before the surviving brothers for levirate marriage or 岣litza. The Sages ruled that in this case the brothers may not enter into levirate marriage with the sisters, as it is as though the two sisters came before each brother individually, and due to the levirate bond each sister was, in a sense, considered married to each brother to a certain extent.
Consequently, for each brother the other sister is viewed as his wife鈥檚 sister, as it were, and is forbidden to him. Since this occurs to both sisters simultaneously, it is prohibited for both of them to enter into levirate marriage. However, the Sages further said that if one of these sisters was a forbidden relation to one of the surviving brothers, e.g., if he had married her daughter or some other relative, the second sister, to whom he is not a close relative, is permitted to him. If the same applies to the other brother and the second sister, the two brothers could perform 岣litza with the two sisters or even enter into levirate marriage with them.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讻谉 转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘讻讜诇谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛谉 讛讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讜讛讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讜讗讞讜转讛 砖讛讬讗 讬讘诪转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讬讘诪转

With this in mind, the Gemara states its objection: And didn鈥檛 Rav Yehuda say that Rav said, and likewise Rabbi 岣yya taught in a baraita: With regard to all of those fifteen women enumerated in the mishna, it is possible to find a scenario in which I would call them: The woman who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother, and the one who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother. And consequently, her sister who is her sister-in-law performs 岣litza or enters into levirate marriage. This complex situation can be demonstrated with regard to each of the women enumerated in the mishna, e.g., if one sister is the mother-in-law of one brother, and the second sister is the mother-in-law of the second brother, and so on.

讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪转专讙诐 诪讞诪讜转讜 讜讗讬诇讱 讗讘诇 砖讬转讗 讘讘讬 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

And Rav Yehuda explains that this is not true of all of the women listed in the mishna. Only from the case of his mother-in-law and onward, until the end of the list, is it possible for one sister to be a forbidden relation to one brother and the other sister not to be forbidden at all. However, in the first six cases, no, this option does not apply. What is the reason for this?

讻讬讜谉 讚讘转讜

Since, for example, in the case of one鈥檚 daughter, although it is possible that one of the sisters is the daughter of one of the brothers, her mother is prohibited to all of the brothers as their brother鈥檚 wife, and therefore she could not possibly have a daughter from another brother. This case is possible only if one brother raped a woman who subsequently gave birth to his daughter. Since the prohibition with regard to a brother鈥檚 wife applies only in the case of marriage, this same woman is not forbidden to a different brother. If another brother came and raped her as well and she gave birth to his daughter too, and these two daughters later married two other brothers, each of these sisters who are sisters-in-law is forbidden to one of the brothers but permitted to the other.

讘讗讜谞住讬谉 诪砖讻讞转 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 拽诪讬讬专讬 讘讗讜谞住讬谉 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

Accordingly, in the case of rape you can find this scenario, but in the case of marriage you cannot find it. However, the mishna cannot be interpreted as referring to a case of this kind, as it deals with marriage and it does not deal with rape.

讜讗讘讬讬 诪转专讙诐 讗祝 讘转讜 诪讗谞讜住转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗砖讻讜讞讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗讬 讘注讬讗 诪谉 讛讗讜谞住讬谉 转讛讜讬 [讗讬 讘注讬讗 诪谉 讛谞砖讜讗讬谉 转讛讜讬] 讗讘诇 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

And Abaye explains differently, as he would include in this scenario even his daughter from the woman he raped. Why would he include this case? Since you can find this possibility, if you wish it can be by rape, and if you wish it can be by marriage, i.e., regardless of the details, this situation can occur. However, the last case, that of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, he would not include. What is the reason for this?

讻讬讜谉 讚诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讜讗 讚诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诇专讘谞谉 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讬专讬

Since it is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that you find this potential scenario, as he permits a yevama to her yavam in a case where he was born after she first entered levirate marriage, it is therefore possible that one sister might be forbidden to one brother if he was born before his brother took her in levirate marriage. Likewise, another sister might be forbidden to another brother for the same reason, although the first woman would be permitted to him, as in his lifetime she was never the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, however, you cannot find this scenario, and the mishna does not deal with disputes but only with those cases that are accepted by all opinions.

讜专讘 住驻专讗 诪转专讙诐 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讞讬讜 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘注讜诇诪讜 讜诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘砖讬转讗 讗讞讬诐 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

But Rav Safra explains that the possibility of one brother permitted only to one woman and another brother likewise permitted to only one woman exists even in the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, and you can find this scenario in a case involving six brothers, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

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