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Today's Daf Yomi

June 9, 2022 | 讬壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 94

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There are three attempts to answer a question asked of Rav Sheshet (version 2) about whether one witness to allow a woman to be exempt from yibum. If one鈥檚 wife went abroad and he was told she was dead and married her sister, what is the law?

讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

hates the yavam, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him. Rav Sheshet said to them that you learned it in the mishna. If they said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, and she married another man, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave the other man, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 转专讬 讜转专讬 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬 讜注讜讚 诪诪讝专 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讛讜讗 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 讚拽 讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

Again, Rav Sheshet analyzes the case: What are the circumstances? If we say that they are two and two, i.e., the account of two witnesses was contradicted by two other witnesses, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on those? Why should she have to leave this man? And furthermore, why should the child be a mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there is no proof that the second witnesses are more reliable. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his language, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讞讚 讜讟注诪讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讗讻讞砖讜讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诪讛讬诪谉 诇注讜诇诐 转专讬 讜转专讬 讜讻讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘注讚讬 讛讝诪讛

Rather, is it not the case that this is referring to one witness, and the reason is that two others came and contradicted him. It may be inferred from this that if it was not so, the sole witness is deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this proof: Actually, the mishna is speaking of a case when two witnesses came first, followed by another two witnesses, and the ruling is as Rav A岣 bar Manyumi said, with regard to a different issue, that it is referring to witnesses of false, conspiring testimony.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注讚讬 讛讝诪讛

In other words, the second set of witnesses did not offer an alternative account of the same incident. Rather, they claimed that the first witnesses lied, as they were with them, elsewhere, during the time that they supposedly witnessed the husband鈥檚 death. In this case, the first witnesses are entirely disqualified, as the account of the second pair is accepted. Here too, we are dealing with witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. Consequently, the question of whether the court believes one witness who testifies that a yavam is dead cannot be resolved from the mishna.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讗诪谞转 诇讜诪专 诪转 讬讘诪讬 砖讗谞砖讗 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗讞讜转讬 砖讗讻谞住 诇讘讬转讛 讛讬讗 谞讬讛讬 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讛讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav A岣 who said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a different source (Yevamot 118b): A woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam is dead, so that I may marry, i.e., to permit herself to marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says: My sister is dead, so that I may enter her house, i.e., to marry her husband. The Gemara infers: It is she herself who is not deemed credible. It may be inferred from this that if one witness issues this report, he is deemed credible.

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 讛讗讬砖 谞讗诪谉 诇讜诪专 诪转 讗讞讬 砖讗讬讬讘诐 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗砖转讬 砖讗砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讛讜讗 谞讬讛讜 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 讛讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉 讘砖诇诪讗 讙讘讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讜诐 注讬讙讜谞讗 讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara refutes this argument. And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother is dead, so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife. And he is not deemed credible when he says: My wife is dead, so that I may marry her sister. Following the above reasoning, it is he himself who is not deemed credible, which indicates that one witness is deemed credible. Yet this cannot be correct: Granted, with regard to a woman, due to the concern that she be left a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient in her case, by allowing her to rely on a single witness. However, with regard to a man, what can be said? There is no concern that he will be left deserted, as a man can marry more than one woman, so he certainly cannot marry a woman on the basis of such flimsy testimony.

讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讬砖 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讗讬诪讗 讞讬讬砖讗 讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讝专注讗 讜讚讬讬拽讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 (讚讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讬讚讛 讞讬讬砖讗 讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讝专注讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讗)

Rather, the case of one witness cannot be decided from the mishna, as when is this halakha that a woman is not deemed credible when she says that her yavam is dead necessary to be stated? It is necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Akiva said that the offspring born of intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, which indicates that even the offspring of a yevama who unlawfully wed another man is a mamzer, one might say that she is concerned for the ruin of her offspring and is consequently exacting in her investigation and would marry only if she received clear, unambiguous testimony. The tanna therefore teaches us that she is concerned for her own ruin, e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether her husband died, which would force her to leave both him and her second husband, but she is not as concerned for the ruin of her offspring, and in this case she is likelier to marry unlawfully.

专讘讗 讗诪专 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉 讘讬讘诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讛转专转 诇讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讛讬讗 注爪诪讛 转讜讻讬讞 讚诇讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讛转专转 诇讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讛转专转

Rava said: One witness is deemed credible in the case of a yevama by means of an a fortiori inference: If for a prohibition involving karet, i.e., adultery of a married woman, you permitted the testimony of one witness, then for a regular prohibition, that of a yevama to another man, is it not all the more so? One of the Sages said to Rava: She herself, a woman who testifies with regard to herself, can prove otherwise: For a prohibition involving karet you permitted her, i.e., if she testifies that her husband is dead she may marry another man and there is no concern that she might still be a married woman, and yet for a regular prohibition you did not permit her, as she is not deemed credible when she claims that her yavam is dead.

讜讗诇讗 讗讬讛讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 注讚 讗讞讚 谞诪讬 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讝诪谞讬谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗

But rather, she herself, what is the reason that she is not deemed credible? Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her examination of the matter and marries. With regard to one witness, the same concern also applies: Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. The court believes one witness only because they assume that she herself is careful to examine the matter. The a fortiori inference is therefore groundless, and the question remains unresolved.

讝讛 诪讚专砖 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪转讬讗 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇诪讚专砖 讘讬讛 诪专讙谞讬转讗 讜讚专砖 讘讬讛 讞住驻讗

搂 The mishna states that this was an exposition taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7). This teaches that a woman is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood by a bill of divorce she receives from a man other than her husband. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar should have taught this verse as a pearl but in fact he taught it as earthenware shard. In other words, he could have arrived at a more significant conclusion.

诪讗讬 诪专讙谞讬转讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬砖讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讻讛讜谞讛 讜讛讬讬谞讜 专讬讞 讛讙讟 讚驻讜住诇 讘讻讛讜谞讛

The Gemara asks: What pearl does he mean? As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband,鈥 even if she was divorced only from her husband. Even if the woman was separated from her husband and was not permitted to marry anyone else, e.g., if her husband wrote in the bill of divorce: This is your bill of divorce but you are not permitted to any other man, this document is certainly not considered a full-fledged bill of divorce, and yet she is disqualified from the priesthood. If her husband later passes away, she has the status of a divorc茅e, not a widow, which means that she is prohibited from marrying a priest. And this is the trace of a bill of divorce, which is not an actual bill of divorce and yet disqualifies from the priesthood.

诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讗砖转讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转讛 讗砖转讱 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗转 讗砖转讜 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专

MISHNA: In the case of one whose wife went overseas and people came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came back from overseas, the original wife is permitted to return

诇讜 讜诪讜转专 讘拽专讜讘讜转 砖谞讬讛 讜砖谞讬讛 诪讜转专转 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜讗诐 诪转讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诪讜转专 讘砖谞讬讛

to him, as his erroneous marriage to her sister is considered licentious sexual relations, and one who has intercourse with his wife鈥檚 relatives has not rendered his first wife forbidden to himself. And he is permitted to the relatives of the second woman, e.g., her daughter, and this second woman is permitted to his relatives, e.g., his son, as the marriage was entirely invalid. And if the first woman died he is permitted to the second woman, despite the fact that he has already engaged in forbidden relations with her.

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转讛 讗砖转讜 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讜 拽讬讬诪转 讛讬转讛 讜诪转讛 讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜

If they said to him that his wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward they said to him that she was alive when he married the sister and only later died, in this case the first child, born to the sister while his wife was still alive, is a mamzer, as he was born from the union of a man and his sister-in-law, and the last one is not a mamzer. Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others also disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself either. Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 obscure statement will be explained by the Gemara.

讙诪壮 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讝讬诇 讗砖转讜 讜讙讬住讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讚讗讛谞讬 讛谞讬 谞砖讜讗讬诐 讚拽诪讬转住专讗 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗讙讬住讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗住讬专讗 讗砖转讜 砖专讬讗

GEMARA: With regard to the case of a man who married his wife鈥檚 sister after he was informed that his wife was dead, the Gemara comments: And even if his wife and his brother-in-law both went overseas and he was told that they had died, the halakha is that this marriage he performed is effective only to the extent that his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law. The reason for this prohibition is that he performed a marriage ceremony with a married woman by mistake, and one who erroneously weds a married woman has thereby rendered her forbidden to her husband. The Gemara adds: Even so, it is only his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife who is forbidden to her husband, whereas his own wife remains permitted to him.

讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转讜讱 砖谞讗住专讛 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗讙讬住讜 转讬讗住专 讗砖转讜 注诇讬讜 诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讗讞讜转 讙专讜砖转讜

It might have been thought that his own marriage, which caused this to be an act of forbidden sexual relations, would also be adversely affected. But the Gemara adds that we do not say: Since his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law, his wife is likewise forbidden to him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The reason is that if the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his wife is now considered, with regard to him, the sister of his divorc茅e.

讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 注专讬讜转 砖讘转讜专讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讜转 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 讞讜抓 诪讗砖转 讗讬砖 砖谞砖讗转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讜住讬祝 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讞 讜讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讘注讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讬诇讗 讗讬转住专讗 注诇讬讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讗讞讜转 讙专讜砖转讜

As it is taught in a baraita: None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother鈥檚 wife and a wife鈥檚 sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother鈥檚 wife, or a wife鈥檚 sister after his wife鈥檚 death, they too require a bill of divorce. And with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Akiva said that a wife鈥檚 sister requires a bill of divorce, this factor by itself indicates that his wife is forbidden to him, as his wife is considered the sister of his divorc茅e.

讜诇讗讜 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讬 讗砖转 讗讞 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讚砖 讗讞讬讜 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讛诇讱 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转 讗讞讬讜 讜注诪讚 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讛讱 拽诪讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讛讗讬 砖驻讬专 谞住讬讘

The Gemara refutes this claim: And wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to this case that Rav Giddel said that Rav 岣yya bar Yosef said that Rav said: In the case of this brother鈥檚 wife, mentioned by Rabbi Akiva, what are the circumstances? For example, if his brother betrothed a woman and then went overseas, and the man who was here heard that his brother was dead, and he arose and married his brother鈥檚 wife as a yevama The reason for Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 ruling is that uninformed people will say: This first one had a condition in the betrothal with his wife, and his betrothal was canceled because the condition was left unfulfilled, and this other one married well, in compliance with the halakha, as she was not his brother鈥檚 wife. It is for this reason that Rabbi Akiva requires him to give her a bill of divorce.

讜讛讗讬 讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 谞诪讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讗转 讗砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转讛 注诪讚 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 转谞讗讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘拽讚讜砖讬讛 讜讛讗 砖驻讬专 谞住讬讘 讗诇讗 谞砖讜讗讬谉 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 转谞讗讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉

And in this case of a wife鈥檚 sister as well, what are the circumstances? For example, if he betrothed a woman and she went overseas, and he heard she died and arose and married her sister. As people will say: This first one, he had a condition in her betrothal, and as the condition was not fulfilled the betrothal is annulled, and this other one married well. However, with regard to the case of the mishna, which involves an actual previous marriage, can it be said that he had a condition in the marriage? There is a presumption that no man marries a woman conditionally. Once he marries her, it is assumed that he waived all prior conditions, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva agrees that a bill of divorce is not required in this case.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讞诪讜转讜 讚讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讞诪讜转讜 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗讜 讘砖专驻讛

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach the case of his mother-in-law, as she is another forbidden woman who nevertheless requires a bill of divorce, as we have heard him, Rabbi Akiva, say: One who has relations with his mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death is not liable to being executed by burning, because the prohibition lapses upon his wife鈥檚 death.

讚转谞讬讗 讘讗砖 讬砖专驻讜 讗讜转讜 讜讗转讛谉 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 讗讞转 诪讛谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 砖转讬讛谉

As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states, with regard to one who takes a woman and her daughter: 鈥淭hey shall be burned in fire, he and they [et鈥檋en]鈥 (Leviticus 20:14). Now this cannot literally mean that both women are burned, as the first woman he took did not sin at all. The Sages therefore explained that the word et鈥檋en means he and one of them [mehen]. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: He and both of them. Since it is hard to understand how they could both deserve punishment, the amora鈥檌m suggested various interpretations of Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 诪砖诪注讜转 讚讜专砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 住讘专 讞讚讗 讻转讬讘 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 转专转讬 讻转讬讘 砖驻讬专

Granted, this makes sense according to the explanation of this dispute suggested by Abaye, who said that the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. In other words, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva did not argue over the halakha itself, but merely over the manner in which the halakha is derived from the Torah. That is, Rabbi Yishmael holds that it states: One woman, and the plain meaning of the verse is: He and one of them. And Rabbi Akiva holds that it states: Two, e.g., if he took two women who were both forbidden to him, such as his mother-in-law and her mother, they are both liable to be executed by burning. If this is the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, it is fine, as there is no proof from here that prohibition of a mother-in-law lapses upon his wife鈥檚 death.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讞诪讜转讜 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讞诪讜转讜

However, there is a difficulty according to the explanation of Rava, who said that the practical difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion concerns one鈥檚 mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that even after the death of one鈥檚 wife he is liable for marrying his mother-in-law. Rabbi Akiva maintains that one is liable only if both women are alive, as the verse mentions two women, but if the first one has already died his relations with the second woman are no longer punishable by Torah law. If so, let the tanna of the mishna, according to Rabbi Akiva, also teach that one must give a bill of divorce to his mother-in-law whom he married by mistake, as she too will be permitted to him after his wife鈥檚 death.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚诪讬注讟讛 拽专讗 诪砖专驻讛 诪讗讬住讜专讗 诪讬 诪讬注讟讛 拽专讗

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the verse excluded her from the punishment of burning, did the verse also exclude her from a prohibition? Even Rabbi Akiva agrees that the Torah prohibits a man from marrying his mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death. Consequently, he cannot marry her in a permitted manner, despite the fact that according to Rava鈥檚 explanation Rabbi Akiva maintains that they are not executed by burning.

讜转讗住专 讘砖讻讬讘讛 讚讗讞讜转讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗砖转讜 讚讘诪讝讬讚 讗住讬专讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘砖讜讙讙 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

搂 The Gemara asks another question, from a different perspective: And let his wife be forbidden by his sexual relations with her sister, just as it is in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas, who is forbidden to her husband if she had relations with another man by mistake. The Gemara answers: This is not comparable. With regard to his wife, who is forbidden to him by Torah law if she committed adultery intentionally, the Sages decreed concerning her that she is forbidden to him even if she did so unwittingly.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 94

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Yevamot 94

讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

hates the yavam, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him. Rav Sheshet said to them that you learned it in the mishna. If they said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, and she married another man, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave the other man, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 转专讬 讜转专讬 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬 讜注讜讚 诪诪讝专 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讛讜讗 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 讚拽 讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

Again, Rav Sheshet analyzes the case: What are the circumstances? If we say that they are two and two, i.e., the account of two witnesses was contradicted by two other witnesses, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on those? Why should she have to leave this man? And furthermore, why should the child be a mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there is no proof that the second witnesses are more reliable. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his language, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讞讚 讜讟注诪讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讗讻讞砖讜讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诪讛讬诪谉 诇注讜诇诐 转专讬 讜转专讬 讜讻讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讘注讚讬 讛讝诪讛

Rather, is it not the case that this is referring to one witness, and the reason is that two others came and contradicted him. It may be inferred from this that if it was not so, the sole witness is deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this proof: Actually, the mishna is speaking of a case when two witnesses came first, followed by another two witnesses, and the ruling is as Rav A岣 bar Manyumi said, with regard to a different issue, that it is referring to witnesses of false, conspiring testimony.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注讚讬 讛讝诪讛

In other words, the second set of witnesses did not offer an alternative account of the same incident. Rather, they claimed that the first witnesses lied, as they were with them, elsewhere, during the time that they supposedly witnessed the husband鈥檚 death. In this case, the first witnesses are entirely disqualified, as the account of the second pair is accepted. Here too, we are dealing with witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. Consequently, the question of whether the court believes one witness who testifies that a yavam is dead cannot be resolved from the mishna.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讗诪谞转 诇讜诪专 诪转 讬讘诪讬 砖讗谞砖讗 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗讞讜转讬 砖讗讻谞住 诇讘讬转讛 讛讬讗 谞讬讛讬 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讛讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav A岣 who said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a different source (Yevamot 118b): A woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam is dead, so that I may marry, i.e., to permit herself to marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says: My sister is dead, so that I may enter her house, i.e., to marry her husband. The Gemara infers: It is she herself who is not deemed credible. It may be inferred from this that if one witness issues this report, he is deemed credible.

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 讛讗讬砖 谞讗诪谉 诇讜诪专 诪转 讗讞讬 砖讗讬讬讘诐 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 诪转讛 讗砖转讬 砖讗砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讛讜讗 谞讬讛讜 讚诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 讛讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讛讬诪谉 讘砖诇诪讗 讙讘讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讜诐 注讬讙讜谞讗 讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara refutes this argument. And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother is dead, so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife. And he is not deemed credible when he says: My wife is dead, so that I may marry her sister. Following the above reasoning, it is he himself who is not deemed credible, which indicates that one witness is deemed credible. Yet this cannot be correct: Granted, with regard to a woman, due to the concern that she be left a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient in her case, by allowing her to rely on a single witness. However, with regard to a man, what can be said? There is no concern that he will be left deserted, as a man can marry more than one woman, so he certainly cannot marry a woman on the basis of such flimsy testimony.

讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讬砖 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讗讬诪讗 讞讬讬砖讗 讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讝专注讗 讜讚讬讬拽讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 (讚讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讬讚讛 讞讬讬砖讗 讗拽诇拽讜诇讗 讚讝专注讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讗)

Rather, the case of one witness cannot be decided from the mishna, as when is this halakha that a woman is not deemed credible when she says that her yavam is dead necessary to be stated? It is necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Akiva said that the offspring born of intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, which indicates that even the offspring of a yevama who unlawfully wed another man is a mamzer, one might say that she is concerned for the ruin of her offspring and is consequently exacting in her investigation and would marry only if she received clear, unambiguous testimony. The tanna therefore teaches us that she is concerned for her own ruin, e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether her husband died, which would force her to leave both him and her second husband, but she is not as concerned for the ruin of her offspring, and in this case she is likelier to marry unlawfully.

专讘讗 讗诪专 注讚 讗讞讚 谞讗诪谉 讘讬讘诪讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讛转专转 诇讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讛讬讗 注爪诪讛 转讜讻讬讞 讚诇讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讛转专转 诇讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讛转专转

Rava said: One witness is deemed credible in the case of a yevama by means of an a fortiori inference: If for a prohibition involving karet, i.e., adultery of a married woman, you permitted the testimony of one witness, then for a regular prohibition, that of a yevama to another man, is it not all the more so? One of the Sages said to Rava: She herself, a woman who testifies with regard to herself, can prove otherwise: For a prohibition involving karet you permitted her, i.e., if she testifies that her husband is dead she may marry another man and there is no concern that she might still be a married woman, and yet for a regular prohibition you did not permit her, as she is not deemed credible when she claims that her yavam is dead.

讜讗诇讗 讗讬讛讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 注讚 讗讞讚 谞诪讬 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讝诪谞讬谉 讚住谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗

But rather, she herself, what is the reason that she is not deemed credible? Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her examination of the matter and marries. With regard to one witness, the same concern also applies: Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. The court believes one witness only because they assume that she herself is careful to examine the matter. The a fortiori inference is therefore groundless, and the question remains unresolved.

讝讛 诪讚专砖 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪转讬讗 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇诪讚专砖 讘讬讛 诪专讙谞讬转讗 讜讚专砖 讘讬讛 讞住驻讗

搂 The mishna states that this was an exposition taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7). This teaches that a woman is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood by a bill of divorce she receives from a man other than her husband. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar should have taught this verse as a pearl but in fact he taught it as earthenware shard. In other words, he could have arrived at a more significant conclusion.

诪讗讬 诪专讙谞讬转讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬砖讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讻讛讜谞讛 讜讛讬讬谞讜 专讬讞 讛讙讟 讚驻讜住诇 讘讻讛讜谞讛

The Gemara asks: What pearl does he mean? As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband,鈥 even if she was divorced only from her husband. Even if the woman was separated from her husband and was not permitted to marry anyone else, e.g., if her husband wrote in the bill of divorce: This is your bill of divorce but you are not permitted to any other man, this document is certainly not considered a full-fledged bill of divorce, and yet she is disqualified from the priesthood. If her husband later passes away, she has the status of a divorc茅e, not a widow, which means that she is prohibited from marrying a priest. And this is the trace of a bill of divorce, which is not an actual bill of divorce and yet disqualifies from the priesthood.

诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讗砖转讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转讛 讗砖转讱 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗转 讗砖转讜 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专

MISHNA: In the case of one whose wife went overseas and people came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came back from overseas, the original wife is permitted to return

诇讜 讜诪讜转专 讘拽专讜讘讜转 砖谞讬讛 讜砖谞讬讛 诪讜转专转 讘拽专讜讘讬讜 讜讗诐 诪转讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诪讜转专 讘砖谞讬讛

to him, as his erroneous marriage to her sister is considered licentious sexual relations, and one who has intercourse with his wife鈥檚 relatives has not rendered his first wife forbidden to himself. And he is permitted to the relatives of the second woman, e.g., her daughter, and this second woman is permitted to his relatives, e.g., his son, as the marriage was entirely invalid. And if the first woman died he is permitted to the second woman, despite the fact that he has already engaged in forbidden relations with her.

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转讛 讗砖转讜 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讜 拽讬讬诪转 讛讬转讛 讜诪转讛 讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜

If they said to him that his wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward they said to him that she was alive when he married the sister and only later died, in this case the first child, born to the sister while his wife was still alive, is a mamzer, as he was born from the union of a man and his sister-in-law, and the last one is not a mamzer. Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others also disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself either. Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 obscure statement will be explained by the Gemara.

讙诪壮 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讝讬诇 讗砖转讜 讜讙讬住讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讚讗讛谞讬 讛谞讬 谞砖讜讗讬诐 讚拽诪讬转住专讗 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗讙讬住讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗住讬专讗 讗砖转讜 砖专讬讗

GEMARA: With regard to the case of a man who married his wife鈥檚 sister after he was informed that his wife was dead, the Gemara comments: And even if his wife and his brother-in-law both went overseas and he was told that they had died, the halakha is that this marriage he performed is effective only to the extent that his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law. The reason for this prohibition is that he performed a marriage ceremony with a married woman by mistake, and one who erroneously weds a married woman has thereby rendered her forbidden to her husband. The Gemara adds: Even so, it is only his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife who is forbidden to her husband, whereas his own wife remains permitted to him.

讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转讜讱 砖谞讗住专讛 讗砖转 讙讬住讜 讗讙讬住讜 转讬讗住专 讗砖转讜 注诇讬讜 诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讗讞讜转 讙专讜砖转讜

It might have been thought that his own marriage, which caused this to be an act of forbidden sexual relations, would also be adversely affected. But the Gemara adds that we do not say: Since his brother-in-law鈥檚 wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law, his wife is likewise forbidden to him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The reason is that if the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his wife is now considered, with regard to him, the sister of his divorc茅e.

讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 注专讬讜转 砖讘转讜专讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讜转 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 讞讜抓 诪讗砖转 讗讬砖 砖谞砖讗转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讜住讬祝 讗祝 讗砖转 讗讞 讜讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讘注讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讬诇讗 讗讬转住专讗 注诇讬讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讗讞讜转 讙专讜砖转讜

As it is taught in a baraita: None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother鈥檚 wife and a wife鈥檚 sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother鈥檚 wife, or a wife鈥檚 sister after his wife鈥檚 death, they too require a bill of divorce. And with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Akiva said that a wife鈥檚 sister requires a bill of divorce, this factor by itself indicates that his wife is forbidden to him, as his wife is considered the sister of his divorc茅e.

讜诇讗讜 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讬 讗砖转 讗讞 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讚砖 讗讞讬讜 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讛诇讱 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转 讗讞讬讜 讜注诪讚 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讛讱 拽诪讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讛讗讬 砖驻讬专 谞住讬讘

The Gemara refutes this claim: And wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to this case that Rav Giddel said that Rav 岣yya bar Yosef said that Rav said: In the case of this brother鈥檚 wife, mentioned by Rabbi Akiva, what are the circumstances? For example, if his brother betrothed a woman and then went overseas, and the man who was here heard that his brother was dead, and he arose and married his brother鈥檚 wife as a yevama The reason for Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 ruling is that uninformed people will say: This first one had a condition in the betrothal with his wife, and his betrothal was canceled because the condition was left unfulfilled, and this other one married well, in compliance with the halakha, as she was not his brother鈥檚 wife. It is for this reason that Rabbi Akiva requires him to give her a bill of divorce.

讜讛讗讬 讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 谞诪讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讗转 讗砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜砖诪注 砖诪转讛 注诪讚 讜谞砖讗 讗转 讗讞讜转讛 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 转谞讗讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘拽讚讜砖讬讛 讜讛讗 砖驻讬专 谞住讬讘 讗诇讗 谞砖讜讗讬谉 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 转谞讗讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉

And in this case of a wife鈥檚 sister as well, what are the circumstances? For example, if he betrothed a woman and she went overseas, and he heard she died and arose and married her sister. As people will say: This first one, he had a condition in her betrothal, and as the condition was not fulfilled the betrothal is annulled, and this other one married well. However, with regard to the case of the mishna, which involves an actual previous marriage, can it be said that he had a condition in the marriage? There is a presumption that no man marries a woman conditionally. Once he marries her, it is assumed that he waived all prior conditions, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva agrees that a bill of divorce is not required in this case.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讞诪讜转讜 讚讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讞诪讜转讜 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗讜 讘砖专驻讛

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach the case of his mother-in-law, as she is another forbidden woman who nevertheless requires a bill of divorce, as we have heard him, Rabbi Akiva, say: One who has relations with his mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death is not liable to being executed by burning, because the prohibition lapses upon his wife鈥檚 death.

讚转谞讬讗 讘讗砖 讬砖专驻讜 讗讜转讜 讜讗转讛谉 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 讗讞转 诪讛谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 砖转讬讛谉

As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states, with regard to one who takes a woman and her daughter: 鈥淭hey shall be burned in fire, he and they [et鈥檋en]鈥 (Leviticus 20:14). Now this cannot literally mean that both women are burned, as the first woman he took did not sin at all. The Sages therefore explained that the word et鈥檋en means he and one of them [mehen]. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: He and both of them. Since it is hard to understand how they could both deserve punishment, the amora鈥檌m suggested various interpretations of Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 诪砖诪注讜转 讚讜专砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 住讘专 讞讚讗 讻转讬讘 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 转专转讬 讻转讬讘 砖驻讬专

Granted, this makes sense according to the explanation of this dispute suggested by Abaye, who said that the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. In other words, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva did not argue over the halakha itself, but merely over the manner in which the halakha is derived from the Torah. That is, Rabbi Yishmael holds that it states: One woman, and the plain meaning of the verse is: He and one of them. And Rabbi Akiva holds that it states: Two, e.g., if he took two women who were both forbidden to him, such as his mother-in-law and her mother, they are both liable to be executed by burning. If this is the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, it is fine, as there is no proof from here that prohibition of a mother-in-law lapses upon his wife鈥檚 death.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讞诪讜转讜 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讞诪讜转讜

However, there is a difficulty according to the explanation of Rava, who said that the practical difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion concerns one鈥檚 mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that even after the death of one鈥檚 wife he is liable for marrying his mother-in-law. Rabbi Akiva maintains that one is liable only if both women are alive, as the verse mentions two women, but if the first one has already died his relations with the second woman are no longer punishable by Torah law. If so, let the tanna of the mishna, according to Rabbi Akiva, also teach that one must give a bill of divorce to his mother-in-law whom he married by mistake, as she too will be permitted to him after his wife鈥檚 death.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚诪讬注讟讛 拽专讗 诪砖专驻讛 诪讗讬住讜专讗 诪讬 诪讬注讟讛 拽专讗

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the verse excluded her from the punishment of burning, did the verse also exclude her from a prohibition? Even Rabbi Akiva agrees that the Torah prohibits a man from marrying his mother-in-law after his wife鈥檚 death. Consequently, he cannot marry her in a permitted manner, despite the fact that according to Rava鈥檚 explanation Rabbi Akiva maintains that they are not executed by burning.

讜转讗住专 讘砖讻讬讘讛 讚讗讞讜转讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗砖转讜 讚讘诪讝讬讚 讗住讬专讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘砖讜讙讙 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

搂 The Gemara asks another question, from a different perspective: And let his wife be forbidden by his sexual relations with her sister, just as it is in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas, who is forbidden to her husband if she had relations with another man by mistake. The Gemara answers: This is not comparable. With regard to his wife, who is forbidden to him by Torah law if she committed adultery intentionally, the Sages decreed concerning her that she is forbidden to him even if she did so unwittingly.

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