Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

June 8, 2022 | 讟壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Yevamot 93

Reish Lakish suggested that the Mishna quoted by Rabbi Yochanan could be explained as Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion. But this is rejected as Rabbi Akiva holds that one can acquire things that are not yet in existence and the Mishna was based on the principle that things that are not yet in existence cannot be acquired. Some hold that Rabbi Akiva holds this way and others disagree. Rav Nachman brought a list of rabbis, including Rabbi Akiva, who all hold that one can acquire something that is not yet in existence. The Gemara then lists all of the sources in which we see each one鈥檚 opinion. Two versions are brought of a question that Rav Sheshet was asked. Either the question was 鈥 can one witness be accepted to permit a woman to marry a yabam. Or can one witness be accepted to permit a woman to marry someone other than the yabam (that the son died after the father)?

拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专

If a wife said: Konam, i.e., this is forbidden like consecrated property, in reference to anything that I will prepare for your mouth, that is, the payment for any work I perform shall be forbidden to you, he is not required to nullify the vow, as it is automatically void, since she was under a prior obligation to give him her earnings as part of their marriage agreement.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she exceed more than is fitting for him. A husband is entitled only to a certain sum from his wife鈥檚 earnings (see Ketubot 64b). If she earns only the sum of money to which he is entitled, the vow certainly does not go into effect. However, she might earn more, in which case the vow would apply with regard to the additional amount. To avoid this scenario, it is preferable for the husband to nullify the vow. This shows that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva a vow applies even with regard to an entity that has not yet come into the world. In this case, the entity is the earnings for work she has yet to perform.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛诐 讚讬讚讬诐 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注诇诪讗

The Gemara refutes this proof: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This mishna is not referring to a woman who renders the earnings for work she has yet to perform forbidden, but to a wife who says: Let my hands be consecrated to their Maker. In other words, she declares that it is as though her hands were sanctified, which means that anything produced by them is forbidden. Since these hands are in the world, she has not attempted to acquire something that does not exist. Therefore, there is no proof from here with regard to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion on that issue.

讜驻诇讬讙讗 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻专讘 讜专讘 讻专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 讜专讘讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

搂 The Gemara comments: And this opinion, that Rabbi Akiva maintains that one cannot acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world, disagrees with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k, as Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: Rav Huna agrees with the opinion of Rav, and Rav agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, and Rabbi 岣yya with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: A person can transfer to another an entity that has not yet come into the world. This shows that Rabbi Akiva indeed maintains that one can acquire something that does not yet exist.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 驻讬专讜转 讚拽诇 诇讞讘专讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 注讚 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诪砖讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara specifies the particular contexts in which the aforementioned opinions, all of which concur, were issued: Rav Huna, what is the source for his ruling? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells the fruit of a palm tree to another before the fruit has grown, Rav Huna said: Until the fruit has come into the world, he can retract the sale, as it has yet to take effect. However, after the fruit has come into the world, he can no longer retract, despite the fact the fruit had not yet sprouted when he made the acquisition.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讗祝 诪砖讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讜讚讬谞讗 讚讗讬 砖诪讬讟 讜讗讻讬诇 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rav Na岣an said: Even after they have come into the world he can retract, as the acquisition was defective from the outset. He maintains that one cannot transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist. Rav Na岣an said: Even so, I concede that if the buyer seizes the fruit and consumes it, the court does not remove them from him, because despite the faulty acquisition he was promised a sale of fruit.

专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诇讜拽讞 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽谞讛

The Gemara cites the proof that Rav also accepts the ruling that one can acquire an entity that does not yet exist, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to one who says to another: This field that I am about to buy, when I buy it, it is acquired by you from now, the addressee has acquired the field, despite the fact that it did not belong to the speaker at the time of his statement.

专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讗专讬住讗 讚讛讜讛 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讻谞转讗 讚驻讬专讬 讻诇 诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 讛讛讜讗 讬讜诪讗 谞讙讛 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讗转讗 砖拽诇 注砖专 诪驻讬专讬 讚讘讬转讬讛 注诇讬讬讛讜 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗

Rabbi Yannai also agrees with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, as demonstrated by the following episode: Rabbi Yannai had a sharecropper working his land who would bring him a basket [kanta] of fruit every Shabbat eve. One day he was late and did not come. Rabbi Yannai took tithe from the fruit in his house for the fruit he expected to receive. He did this in case the fruit arrived near the beginning of Shabbat, as one may not tithe on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Yannai was uncertain whether it is indeed possible to separate tithes for an entity that has not yet reached one鈥檚 possession. He therefore came before Rabbi 岣yya to inquire whether his separation of tithes was effective.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖驻讬专 注讘讚转 讚转谞讬讗 诇诪注谉 转诇诪讚 诇讬专讗讛 讗转 讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讻诇 讛讬诪讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讘转讜转 讜讬诪讬诐 讟讜讘讬诐 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇注砖讜专讬 讜诪讬讻诇 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇诪讬砖专讬 讟诇讟讜诇 讚专讘谞谉

Rabbi 岣yya said to him: You acted well, as it is taught in a baraita, with regard to a verse that discusses tithes: 鈥淎nd you shall eat before the Lord your God鈥in order that you should learn to fear the Lord your God all the days鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:23). With regard to the emphasis of 鈥渁ll,鈥 these are Shabbatot and Festivals. With regard to what halakha was this stated? If we say it was stated in regard to the issue of tithing and eating on Shabbat, this halakha is redundant. Was a verse necessary to permit the prohibition against moving objects, which applies by rabbinic law? Since the prohibition against moving objects is from the Sages, the Torah is certainly not referring to this halakha.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讗拽专讬讜谉 讘讞诇诪讗 拽谞讛 专爪讜抓 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 诇讬 讛谞讛 讘讟讞转 诇讱 注诇 诪砖注谞转 讛拽谞讛 讛专爪讜抓 讛讝讛

Rather, is it not referring to a case like this, of one who tithed an entity that was not yet in the world, in honor of Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi 岣yya: But they read before me in a dream these two words: Bruised reed. What, is it not the case that they said to me as follows: 鈥淏ehold you trust upon the staff of this bruised reed鈥 (II聽Kings 18:21)? In other words, you rely on an unsubstantiated idea.

诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 诇讱 拽谞讛 专爪讜抓 诇讗 讬砖讘讜专 讜驻砖转讛 讻讛讛 诇讗 讬讻讘谞讛

Rabbi 岣yya said to him: No; The dream referred to a different verse, one that deals with the Messiah, as they said to you as follows: 鈥淎 bruised reed he shall not break and the dimly burning wick he shall not quench; according to truth he shall bring forth justice鈥 (Isaiah 42:3). In other words, Rabbi Yannai acted correctly, in accordance with the ways of truth. This exchange shows that both Rabbi 岣yya and Rabbi Yannai agree that an entity not in the world can be acquired.

专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 转住讙讬专 注讘讚 讗诇 讗讚讜谞讬讜 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘诇讜拽讞 注讘讚 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讞专专讜 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讻砖讗拽讞讱 讛专讬 注爪诪讱 拽谞讜讬 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜

With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not deliver a slave to his master鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:16). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who buys a slave on the condition to free him. This owner may not keep his acquisition as a slave. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: It is referring to a case where one wrote to a slave in the document of acquisition: When I acquire you as a slave, you are acquired by yourself from now. In this case, the buyer transfers ownership of an entity not yet in the world, as the slave did not yet belong to him.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讱 讬讘诪讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转

Rabbi Meir, his opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; after your yavam performs 岣litza with you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir says she is betrothed, as the acquisition of a betrothal applies even to an entity not yet in the world, in this case, a woman available for betrothal.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讚转谞讬讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 讝讜 转诇讜砖讬诐 讬讛讜 转专讜诪讛 注诇 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 诪讞讜讘专讬诐 讗讜 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 诪讞讜讘专讬诐 注诇 驻讬专讜转 讝讜 转诇讜砖讬谉 诇讻砖讬讘讬讗讜 砖诇讬砖 讜讬转诇砖讜 讜讛讘讬讗讜 砖诇讬砖 讜谞转诇砖讜 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov said that even if one said: The detached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently attached fruit of this garden bed when its fruit will be detached, or if he said: The attached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently detached fruit of this garden bed when the fruit reach a third of their growth, i.e., a third of their ripeness, and are detached, and if they actually reached a third and were detached, then his words are upheld and the teruma takes effect, despite the fact that the stipulation was issued before the attached fruit had ripened and before the obligation of teruma applied to the detached fruit. This halakha shows that one can acquire an entity not yet in the world; in this case he acquires the fruit by applying the sanctity of teruma to it.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva, his opinion is as we learned in the aforementioned mishna, that if a wife says: Konam that I will prepare for your mouth, the husband is not required to nullify the vow. Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she exceed more than is fitting for him, as he maintains that the vow applies even to entities not yet in the world.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 注讚 讗讞讚 讘讬讘诪讛 诪讛讜 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬诇转讗 讚注讘讬讚讗 诇讗讬讙诇讜讬讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讜讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讬 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讜讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讞诪讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗

They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In a case of one witness who testifies that a woman鈥檚 husband is dead, with regard to a yevama, what is the halakha? Can the court rely on this witness? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason that the testimony of one witness in the case of a missing husband is accepted because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and here, too, he will not lie, in case the husband later arrives? Or, perhaps the reason for the eligibility of one witness is because the woman herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. But here, since she sometimes loves the yavam, as she already knew him beforehand, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘谞讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 转专讬 讜转专讬 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬

Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned the answer to this question in the mishna: If they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. Rav Sheshet analyzes this case: What are the circumstances? If we say they are two and two, i.e., two witnesses came first and said one account, followed by two other witnesses who claimed the reverse, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on the first pair? The first witnesses do not lose their credibility merely due to the testimony of the second pair, so why should she have to leave the yavam?

讜注讜讚 诪诪讝专 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讛讜讗 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 讚拽 讜讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

And furthermore, why should the child be a definite mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there are two conflicting sets of testimonies. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his failure to distinguish between a definite mamzer and one of uncertain status, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner, i.e., the mamzer the tanna referred to is a definite mamzer.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讞讚 讜讟注诪讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讗讻讞砖讜讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诪讛讬诪谉

Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from here that only one witness testified at first, and the reason for the halakha is that two people came and contradicted him, as the testimony of two witnesses certainly overrules that of a single witness? It may be inferred from this that if it were not so, the lone witness is deemed credible. This shows that the court will accept the testimony of one witness even to allow a woman to enter into levirate marriage.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讛讗 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讗讬讛讬 谞诪讬 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 转谞砖讗 诪转 讘注诇讬 转转讬讬讘诐 讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 诇诪讬砖专讬 讬讘诪讛 诇注诇诪讗

The Gemara provides an alternative version of the discussion. And some Sages maintain another version that says: Let the dilemma not be raised, as even a wife herself is also deemed credible when she says her husband is dead, as we learned in a mishna (114b): With regard to a woman who said: My husband is dead, she may marry. Likewise, if she claimed: My husband is dead, she should enter into levirate marriage. If so, one witness is certainly deemed credible when he says her husband has died. The case where you could raise the dilemma is with regard to permitting a yevama to all other men, if a witness claims that the yavam is dead.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬诇转讗 讚注讘讬讚讗 诇讗讬讙诇讜讬讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讬 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讚诪讬住谞讗 讛讜讗

In this case as well, the Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and therefore here too he would not lie? Or, perhaps the reason for accepting the testimony of one witness is because the wife is exacting in her investigation before she marries again, but this yevama is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Why not? Because she

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

learn daf yomi one week at a time with tamara spitz

Yevamot: 93-98 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will learn about the consequences of the case of a woman who goes abroad, it is said...
talking talmud_square

Yevamot 93: The Existence of the Things That Do Not Yet Exist

First, a brief comment on Daf 91: the reading of the woman's get. Next: Establishing a vow or acquiring something...

Yevamot 93

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 93

拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专

If a wife said: Konam, i.e., this is forbidden like consecrated property, in reference to anything that I will prepare for your mouth, that is, the payment for any work I perform shall be forbidden to you, he is not required to nullify the vow, as it is automatically void, since she was under a prior obligation to give him her earnings as part of their marriage agreement.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬讜转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she exceed more than is fitting for him. A husband is entitled only to a certain sum from his wife鈥檚 earnings (see Ketubot 64b). If she earns only the sum of money to which he is entitled, the vow certainly does not go into effect. However, she might earn more, in which case the vow would apply with regard to the additional amount. To avoid this scenario, it is preferable for the husband to nullify the vow. This shows that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva a vow applies even with regard to an entity that has not yet come into the world. In this case, the entity is the earnings for work she has yet to perform.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛诐 讚讬讚讬诐 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注诇诪讗

The Gemara refutes this proof: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This mishna is not referring to a woman who renders the earnings for work she has yet to perform forbidden, but to a wife who says: Let my hands be consecrated to their Maker. In other words, she declares that it is as though her hands were sanctified, which means that anything produced by them is forbidden. Since these hands are in the world, she has not attempted to acquire something that does not exist. Therefore, there is no proof from here with regard to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion on that issue.

讜驻诇讬讙讗 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻专讘 讜专讘 讻专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 讜专讘讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

搂 The Gemara comments: And this opinion, that Rabbi Akiva maintains that one cannot acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world, disagrees with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k, as Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: Rav Huna agrees with the opinion of Rav, and Rav agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, and Rabbi 岣yya with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: A person can transfer to another an entity that has not yet come into the world. This shows that Rabbi Akiva indeed maintains that one can acquire something that does not yet exist.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 驻讬专讜转 讚拽诇 诇讞讘专讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 注讚 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诪砖讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara specifies the particular contexts in which the aforementioned opinions, all of which concur, were issued: Rav Huna, what is the source for his ruling? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells the fruit of a palm tree to another before the fruit has grown, Rav Huna said: Until the fruit has come into the world, he can retract the sale, as it has yet to take effect. However, after the fruit has come into the world, he can no longer retract, despite the fact the fruit had not yet sprouted when he made the acquisition.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讗祝 诪砖讘讗讜 诇注讜诇诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讜讚讬谞讗 讚讗讬 砖诪讬讟 讜讗讻讬诇 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rav Na岣an said: Even after they have come into the world he can retract, as the acquisition was defective from the outset. He maintains that one cannot transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist. Rav Na岣an said: Even so, I concede that if the buyer seizes the fruit and consumes it, the court does not remove them from him, because despite the faulty acquisition he was promised a sale of fruit.

专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诇讜拽讞 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽谞讛

The Gemara cites the proof that Rav also accepts the ruling that one can acquire an entity that does not yet exist, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to one who says to another: This field that I am about to buy, when I buy it, it is acquired by you from now, the addressee has acquired the field, despite the fact that it did not belong to the speaker at the time of his statement.

专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讗专讬住讗 讚讛讜讛 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讻谞转讗 讚驻讬专讬 讻诇 诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 讛讛讜讗 讬讜诪讗 谞讙讛 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讗转讗 砖拽诇 注砖专 诪驻讬专讬 讚讘讬转讬讛 注诇讬讬讛讜 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗

Rabbi Yannai also agrees with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, as demonstrated by the following episode: Rabbi Yannai had a sharecropper working his land who would bring him a basket [kanta] of fruit every Shabbat eve. One day he was late and did not come. Rabbi Yannai took tithe from the fruit in his house for the fruit he expected to receive. He did this in case the fruit arrived near the beginning of Shabbat, as one may not tithe on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Yannai was uncertain whether it is indeed possible to separate tithes for an entity that has not yet reached one鈥檚 possession. He therefore came before Rabbi 岣yya to inquire whether his separation of tithes was effective.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖驻讬专 注讘讚转 讚转谞讬讗 诇诪注谉 转诇诪讚 诇讬专讗讛 讗转 讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讻诇 讛讬诪讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讘转讜转 讜讬诪讬诐 讟讜讘讬诐 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇注砖讜专讬 讜诪讬讻诇 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇诪讬砖专讬 讟诇讟讜诇 讚专讘谞谉

Rabbi 岣yya said to him: You acted well, as it is taught in a baraita, with regard to a verse that discusses tithes: 鈥淎nd you shall eat before the Lord your God鈥in order that you should learn to fear the Lord your God all the days鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:23). With regard to the emphasis of 鈥渁ll,鈥 these are Shabbatot and Festivals. With regard to what halakha was this stated? If we say it was stated in regard to the issue of tithing and eating on Shabbat, this halakha is redundant. Was a verse necessary to permit the prohibition against moving objects, which applies by rabbinic law? Since the prohibition against moving objects is from the Sages, the Torah is certainly not referring to this halakha.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讗拽专讬讜谉 讘讞诇诪讗 拽谞讛 专爪讜抓 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 诇讬 讛谞讛 讘讟讞转 诇讱 注诇 诪砖注谞转 讛拽谞讛 讛专爪讜抓 讛讝讛

Rather, is it not referring to a case like this, of one who tithed an entity that was not yet in the world, in honor of Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi 岣yya: But they read before me in a dream these two words: Bruised reed. What, is it not the case that they said to me as follows: 鈥淏ehold you trust upon the staff of this bruised reed鈥 (II聽Kings 18:21)? In other words, you rely on an unsubstantiated idea.

诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 诇讱 拽谞讛 专爪讜抓 诇讗 讬砖讘讜专 讜驻砖转讛 讻讛讛 诇讗 讬讻讘谞讛

Rabbi 岣yya said to him: No; The dream referred to a different verse, one that deals with the Messiah, as they said to you as follows: 鈥淎 bruised reed he shall not break and the dimly burning wick he shall not quench; according to truth he shall bring forth justice鈥 (Isaiah 42:3). In other words, Rabbi Yannai acted correctly, in accordance with the ways of truth. This exchange shows that both Rabbi 岣yya and Rabbi Yannai agree that an entity not in the world can be acquired.

专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 转住讙讬专 注讘讚 讗诇 讗讚讜谞讬讜 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘诇讜拽讞 注讘讚 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讞专专讜 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讻砖讗拽讞讱 讛专讬 注爪诪讱 拽谞讜讬 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜

With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not deliver a slave to his master鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:16). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who buys a slave on the condition to free him. This owner may not keep his acquisition as a slave. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: It is referring to a case where one wrote to a slave in the document of acquisition: When I acquire you as a slave, you are acquired by yourself from now. In this case, the buyer transfers ownership of an entity not yet in the world, as the slave did not yet belong to him.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讱 讬讘诪讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转

Rabbi Meir, his opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; after your yavam performs 岣litza with you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir says she is betrothed, as the acquisition of a betrothal applies even to an entity not yet in the world, in this case, a woman available for betrothal.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讚转谞讬讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 讝讜 转诇讜砖讬诐 讬讛讜 转专讜诪讛 注诇 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 诪讞讜讘专讬诐 讗讜 驻讬专讜转 注专讜讙讛 诪讞讜讘专讬诐 注诇 驻讬专讜转 讝讜 转诇讜砖讬谉 诇讻砖讬讘讬讗讜 砖诇讬砖 讜讬转诇砖讜 讜讛讘讬讗讜 砖诇讬砖 讜谞转诇砖讜 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov said that even if one said: The detached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently attached fruit of this garden bed when its fruit will be detached, or if he said: The attached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently detached fruit of this garden bed when the fruit reach a third of their growth, i.e., a third of their ripeness, and are detached, and if they actually reached a third and were detached, then his words are upheld and the teruma takes effect, despite the fact that the stipulation was issued before the attached fruit had ripened and before the obligation of teruma applied to the detached fruit. This halakha shows that one can acquire an entity not yet in the world; in this case he acquires the fruit by applying the sanctity of teruma to it.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

Rabbi Akiva, his opinion is as we learned in the aforementioned mishna, that if a wife says: Konam that I will prepare for your mouth, the husband is not required to nullify the vow. Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she exceed more than is fitting for him, as he maintains that the vow applies even to entities not yet in the world.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 注讚 讗讞讚 讘讬讘诪讛 诪讛讜 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬诇转讗 讚注讘讬讚讗 诇讗讬讙诇讜讬讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讜讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讬 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讜讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讞诪讗 诇讬讛 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗

They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In a case of one witness who testifies that a woman鈥檚 husband is dead, with regard to a yevama, what is the halakha? Can the court rely on this witness? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason that the testimony of one witness in the case of a missing husband is accepted because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and here, too, he will not lie, in case the husband later arrives? Or, perhaps the reason for the eligibility of one witness is because the woman herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. But here, since she sometimes loves the yavam, as she already knew him beforehand, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘谞讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 转专讬 讜转专讬 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬

Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned the answer to this question in the mishna: If they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. Rav Sheshet analyzes this case: What are the circumstances? If we say they are two and two, i.e., two witnesses came first and said one account, followed by two other witnesses who claimed the reverse, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on the first pair? The first witnesses do not lose their credibility merely due to the testimony of the second pair, so why should she have to leave the yavam?

讜注讜讚 诪诪讝专 住驻拽 诪诪讝专 讛讜讗 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 讚拽 讜讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讜拽讗 拽转谞讬

And furthermore, why should the child be a definite mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there are two conflicting sets of testimonies. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his failure to distinguish between a definite mamzer and one of uncertain status, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner, i.e., the mamzer the tanna referred to is a definite mamzer.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讞讚 讜讟注诪讗 讚讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讗讻讞砖讜讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诪讛讬诪谉

Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from here that only one witness testified at first, and the reason for the halakha is that two people came and contradicted him, as the testimony of two witnesses certainly overrules that of a single witness? It may be inferred from this that if it were not so, the lone witness is deemed credible. This shows that the court will accept the testimony of one witness even to allow a woman to enter into levirate marriage.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讛讗 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讗讬讛讬 谞诪讬 诪讛讬诪谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 诪转 讘注诇讬 转谞砖讗 诪转 讘注诇讬 转转讬讬讘诐 讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 诇诪讬砖专讬 讬讘诪讛 诇注诇诪讗

The Gemara provides an alternative version of the discussion. And some Sages maintain another version that says: Let the dilemma not be raised, as even a wife herself is also deemed credible when she says her husband is dead, as we learned in a mishna (114b): With regard to a woman who said: My husband is dead, she may marry. Likewise, if she claimed: My husband is dead, she should enter into levirate marriage. If so, one witness is certainly deemed credible when he says her husband has died. The case where you could raise the dilemma is with regard to permitting a yevama to all other men, if a witness claims that the yavam is dead.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬诇转讗 讚注讘讬讚讗 诇讗讬讙诇讜讬讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖拽专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚注讚 讗讞讚 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讬 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讚诪讬住谞讗 讛讜讗

In this case as well, the Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and therefore here too he would not lie? Or, perhaps the reason for accepting the testimony of one witness is because the wife is exacting in her investigation before she marries again, but this yevama is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Why not? Because she

Scroll To Top