Yevamot 95

אחות אשה דבמזיד לא אסירא מדאורייתא בשוגג לא גזרו בה רבנן ומנלן דלא אסירא דתניא אותה אותה שכיבתה אוסרתה ואין שכיבת אחותה אוסרתה

However, with regard to a wife’s sister, where even if the sister sins intentionally the wife is not forbidden to him by Torah law, if he did so unwittingly the Sages did not decree with regard to him. And from where do we derive that she is not forbidden? As it is taught in a baraita that in the verse: “A man, when his wife goes aside…and a man lies with her” (Numbers 5:12–13), the emphasis of “her” teaches: It is her intercourse with another man that renders her forbidden to her husband, but the intercourse of her sister does not render her forbidden.

שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה במקום שבא על איסור קל נאסר האוסר מקום שבא על איסור חמור אינו דין שנאסר האוסר

As, were it not for this verse, one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: And if in a case where he has relations subject to a light prohibition, the one causing her to be rendered prohibited is forbidden, then in a situation where he has intercourse subject to a severe prohibition, is it not right that the one causing her to be rendered prohibited should be forbidden? This a fortiori inference will be explained later in the Gemara.

אמר רבי יהודה לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בבא על חמותו שפוסל את אשתו על מה נחלקו בבא על אחות אשתו שבית שמאי אומרים פוסל ובית הלל אומרים לא פוסל אמר רבי יוסי לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בבא על אחות אשתו שלא פוסל את אשתו על מה נחלקו בבא על חמותו שבית שמאי אומרים פוסל ובית הלל אומרים לא פוסל

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, that he renders his wife disqualified from remaining married to him. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, as Beit Shammai say that he renders his wife disqualified, and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified. Rabbi Yosei said: Not so, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, that he does not render his wife disqualified from remaining married to him. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, as Beit Shammai say he renders his wife disqualified and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

לפי שבתחלה הוא מותר בכל הנשים שבעולם והיא מותרת בכל האנשים שבעולם קדשה הוא אוסרה והיא אסרתו מרובה איסור שאסרה מאיסור שאסרתהו שהוא אסרה בכל אנשים שבעולם והיא לא אסרתהו אלא בקרובותיה

Rabbi Yosei explains why Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the case of one who has relations with his wife’s sister. This is because at first, before the marriage, he is permitted to all the women in the world and she is permitted to all the men in the world. After he has betrothed her as his wife, he renders her forbidden to all men, and she renders him forbidden to her relatives. Consequently, the prohibition by which he renders her forbidden is greater than the prohibition by which she renders him forbidden, as he renders her forbidden to all the men in the world and she renders him forbidden by their betrothal only to her relatives.

והלא דין הוא ומה הוא שאסרה בכל אנשים שבעולם שגגה באסור לה אינה נאסרת במותר לה היא שלא אסרתהו אלא בקרובותיה שגג באסור לו אינו דין שלא נאסר לו במותר לו

Rabbi Yosei’s explanation continues. Could this halakha of a wife’s sister not be derived through an a fortiori inference: And if he prohibited her through their betrothal to all men in the world, and yet she was unwitting with one forbidden to her, i.e., she had relations with another man by mistake, she is not forbidden to he who is permitted to her, her husband; she, who prohibited him only to her relatives, if he was unwitting with one forbidden to him, her sister, is it not right that we should not render him forbidden to her, she who is permitted to him, namely his wife?

וזה הדין לשוגג למזיד מנין תלמוד לומר אותה אותה שכיבתה אוסרתה ואין שכיבת אחותה אוסרתה

And this is the a fortiori inference and the reason for the halakha of an unwitting sinner, i.e., that if he had unwitting relations with one of his wife’s relations the wife is not thereby rendered forbidden to him. With regard to one whose act was intentional, from where is the halakha derived? The verse states: “Her,” meaning that it is her intercourse with another man that renders her forbidden to her husband, but the intercourse of her husband with sister does not render her forbidden to him.

אמר רבי אמי אמר ריש לקיש מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה דכתיב באש ישרפו אותו ואתהן וכי כל הבית כולו בשרפה אם אינו ענין לשרפה תנהו ענין לאיסורא

Rabbi Ami said that Reish Lakish said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law is forbidden to his wife? As it is written: “They shall be burned in fire, he and they” (Leviticus 20:14). This verse is puzzling: And shall the entire house be punished by burning? Why should both women be punished when only one of them transgressed? If it does not refer to the matter of burning, refer it to the matter of a prohibition, that they are both forbidden to him. This teaches that he is forbidden not only to the woman with whom he sinned, but also to his wife.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין הלכה כרבי יהודה ההוא דעבד איסורא בחמתיה אתייה רב יהודה נגדיה אמר ליה אי לאו דאמר שמואל אין הלכה כרבי יהודה אסריתה עלך איסורא דעלם

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara relates: A certain individual performed a transgression by having relations with his mother-in-law. Rav Yehuda had him brought for judgment and ordered that he be flogged. He said to him: If it were not for the fact that Shmuel said the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would render your wife forbidden to you permanently.

מאי איסור קל אמר רב חסדא מחזיר גרושתו משנשאת

§ At the start of the baraita the tanna stated an a fortiori inference that is not entirely clear: If in a place where he has relations subject to a light prohibition, the one causing her to be rendered prohibited is forbidden. The Gemara asks: What is this light prohibition? Rav Ḥisda said: It is referring to one who remarries his divorcée after she married another man.

בא עליה האי אסרה עליה דהאי בא עליה אידך אסרה עליה דהאי

The Gemara explains that according to this interpretation the a fortiori inference should be understood as follows: If this one, the second husband, has relations with her, he has rendered her forbidden to that one, the first husband. And if the second man divorced her and then the other one, the first husband, had relations with her, he has likewise rendered her forbidden to this one. This demonstrates that even with regard to a light prohibition the man who renders her forbidden is also forbidden by this intercourse.

מה למחזיר גרושתו משנשאת שכן נטמא הגוף ואיסורה ברוב ואיסורה איסור עולם

The Gemara refutes this interpretation: What about the fact that one who remarries his divorcée after she married another man cannot be considered to have violated a light prohibition, as the prohibition is stringent in several regards: As the body is defiled by this intercourse, for the Torah states “after she has been defiled” (Deuteronomy 24:4); and her prohibition applies to the majority of the Jewish people, not to select groups; and her prohibition is an irrevocable prohibition, as she is no longer permitted to her first husband after having relations with her second husband. This last stringency is not true of his wife’s sister, who is permitted to him after the death of his wife.

אלא אמר ריש לקיש יבמה יבמה למאן אילימא לאחר וכדרב המנונא דאמר רב המנונא שומרת יבם שזינתה אסורה ליבמה

Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation in favor of the following one that Reish Lakish said: The baraita is referring to relations with a yevama, which is called a light prohibition, as the man who has relations with her is forbidden to her. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to this yevama, with whom did she engage in intercourse? If we say that she had relations with another man, not her yavam, this would mean that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. As Rav Hamnuna said: A widow waiting for her yavam who engaged in licentious sexual relations with another man is forbidden to her yavam. The argument would be as follows: Although the yavam renders the yevama forbidden to every other man, if she has relations with another she becomes forbidden to him as well.

מה ליבמה שכן נטמא הגוף ואיסורה ברוב

However, this argument can also be challenged: What about the fact that in the case of a yevama who engages in this forbidden relationship, the body is defiled and her prohibition applies equally to the majority of the people. Therefore, one cannot derive the prohibitions of one’s wife’s relatives from this halakha.

אלא יבמה לאחין עבד בה מאמר האי אסרה עליה דהאי בא עליה אידך אסרה עליה דהאי מאי איריא שבא עליה שני אפילו עבד בה נמי מאמר

Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case of a yevama to the brothers, as follows: If this brother performed levirate betrothal [ma’amar] with her he has rendered her forbidden to that one, the other brothers, as she is effectively betrothed to him. If one of the other brothers, who had not performed levirate betrothal with her, subsequently has relations with her, he has rendered her forbidden to this one who had performed levirate betrothal with her. The Gemara asks: If that is the meaning of the baraita, why specifically state that the second had relations with her? Even if he performed levirate betrothal with her too, he thereby renders her forbidden to the first brother, which proves that it is not the act of intercourse itself that causes the prohibition.

הא לא קשיא כרבן גמליאל דאמר אין מאמר אחר מאמר אלא אפילו נתן לה גט ואפילו חלץ לה

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: This is not difficult, as it can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who said: There is no levirate betrothal after a levirate betrothal, i.e., if one brother performed levirate betrothal with the yevama, no other levirate betrothal is of any effect. However, this explanation can still be refuted, as her prohibition to the yavam is not due to the act of intercourse, as even if the other brother gave her a bill of divorce, or even if he performed ḥalitza with her, he has likewise rendered her forbidden to the first brother, who performed levirate betrothal.

אלא אמר רבי יוחנן סוטה סוטה למאן אילימא לבעל בא עליה בעל אסרה עליה דבועל מאי איריא בא עליה אפילו נתן לה גט ואפילו אמר אין אני משקה

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The light prohibition is that of a sota. The Gemara asks: This sota, to whom is she forbidden? If we say that she is forbidden to the husband, the explanation would be as follows: If her husband has relations with her, despite the fact that she is forbidden to him after she disobeyed his warning not to seclude herself with a certain man, he has rendered her forbidden to the fornicator, as she is barred from marrying him even if her husband divorces her. However, why is this true specifically in a case in which he had relations with her? Even if her husband only gave her a bill of divorce and did not have relations with her after her seclusion, or even if he said: I will not force her to drink the waters of a sota, she is likewise forbidden to the other man.

אלא סוטה לבועל האי איסור קל הוא איסור חמור הוא דהיינו אשת איש

Rather, the baraita is referring to a sota who had relations with the fornicator, thereby rendering herself permanently forbidden to her husband, as she was a married woman at the time. Yet this too is puzzling: Is this a light prohibition? It is a severe prohibition, as this is the prohibition proscribing a married woman, one of the most serious of all prohibitions.

אלא אמר רבא אשת איש וכן כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן אשת איש ומאי קרי לה איסור קל שאין האוסרה אוסרה כל ימיו תניא נמי הכי אבא חנן אמר משום רבי אלעזר אשת איש

Rather, Rava said that the light prohibition is actually that of a married woman. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the baraita is referring to a married woman. And for what reason does the tanna call this a light prohibition? The reason is that it differs from and is more lenient than other prohibitions in that her husband, who renders her forbidden, does not render her forbidden for his whole lifetime, as he can negate the prohibition by giving her a bill of divorce. This is also taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The baraita is referring to a married woman.

ומה במקום הבא על איסור קל שאין האוסרה אוסרה כל ימיו נאסר האוסר הבא על איסור חמור שהאוסרה אוסרה כל ימיו אינו דין שנאסר האוסרה

The Gemara explains that according to this opinion the a fortiori inference should be understood as follows: And if in a case where he has relations with a married woman, which is a light prohibition, due to the fact that he who renders her forbidden does not render her forbidden for his whole lifetime, and yet the one who renders her forbidden is forbidden, as the husband of a woman who committed adultery is permanently barred from having relations with her, then the following conclusion is correct: One who has relations subject to a severe transgression, e.g., a wife’s sister, which is severe because the one who renders his wife forbidden renders her forbidden for her whole lifetime, since as long as his wife remains alive he is forbidden to her sister, is it not right that the one who renders her forbidden should be forbidden?

תלמוד לומר אותה אותה שכיבתה אוסרתה ואין שכיבת אחותה אוסרתה

The verse therefore states: “Her,” from which it is derived: It is her intercourse that renders her forbidden, but the intercourse of her sister does not render her forbidden.

רבי יוסי אומר כל שפוסל וכו׳ מאי קאמר רבי יוסי אילימא דקאמר תנא קמא דאזיל אשתו וגיסו למדינת הים אשת גיסו אסירא ואשתו שריא

§ The mishna taught: Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others also disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself. The Gemara asks: What is it Rabbi Yosei is saying? If we say that the first tanna said that one’s wife and brother-in-law went overseas and he mistakenly had relations with his wife’s sister, who is married to his brother-in-law, and consequently the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden to the brother-in-law, and his wife is permitted to him, this is problematic.

וקאמר ליה רבי יוסי כי היכי דאשתו שריא אשת גיסו נמי שריא אי הכי כל שאין פוסל על ידי אחרים אין פוסל על ידי עצמו כל שאין פוסל על ידי עצמו אינו פוסל על ידי אחרים מיבעיא ליה

The Gemara elaborates: And according to this explanation, Rabbi Yosei says to the first tanna: Just as his wife is permitted to him, the wife of his brother-in-law is also permitted to her husband. Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning is that if he has not disqualified his wife to himself, due to the accidental nature of his relations with her sister, he should not disqualify the sister to her husband either. The Gemara continues: If so, the formulation of Rabbi Yosei’s statement is imprecise, as instead of saying: Whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself, he should have said: Whoever does not disqualify himself, i.e., his sexual relations do not render his wife forbidden to him, does not disqualify others, i.e., the wife of the other man.

ואלא כי היכי דאשת גיסו אסירא אשתו נמי אסירא התינח כל שפוסל כל שאינו פוסל מאי עבידתיה

But rather, one might explain Rabbi Yosei’s teaching in the reverse manner: Just as the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden to her husband, his own wife is also forbidden to him. This works out well with regard to the clause that starts with: Whoever disqualifies, as he disqualifies others, i.e., his brother-in-law’s wife to his brother-in-law, and therefore he also disqualifies his wife to himself. However, the continuation of the statement: Whoever does not disqualify, what is its purpose? This clause has no apparent relevance to Rabbi Yosei’s statement.

אמר רבי אמי ארישא ניסת על פי בית דין תצא ופטורה מן הקרבן על פי עדים תצא וחייבת בקרבן יפה כחו של בית דין שפטרה מן הקרבן

Rabbi Ami said: Rabbi Yosei’s statement does not refer to this halakha, but to the first mishna of the chapter, which taught that if a woman whose husband went overseas was informed that he was dead and she married by permission of the court she must leave her new husband and is exempt from bringing an offering. If she married based on the testimony of witnesses, without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring an offering. In this regard, the power of the court is enhanced, as she is exempt from an offering.

וקאמר תנא קמא לא שנא על פי עדים דאשת גיסו שריא ולא שנא על פי בית דין דאשת גיסו אסירא

Rabbi Ami explains: And accordingly, if his wife and brother-in-law went overseas and witnesses came and testified that they were both dead, the first tanna says that it is no different whether the wife of his brother-in-law married him based on the testimony of witnesses alone, in which case the wife of his brother-in-law is permitted to her husband, as she is considered as having acted under duress, having heard testimony that her husband was dead, and it is no different if she married him by permission of the court, as although the wife of his brother-in-law is prohibited, his own wife remains permitted to him.

וקאמר ליה רבי יוסי על פי בית דין דפוסל על ידי אחרים פוסל על ידי עצמו על פי עדים דאינו פוסל על ידי אחרים אינו פוסל על ידי עצמו

Rabbi Ami continues his explanation. And Rabbi Yosei says to the first tanna: One who married by permission of the court, who disqualifies others, he also disqualified himself to his own wife; however, in the case of one who married based on the testimony of witnesses who does not disqualify others, I agree that he does not disqualify himself, and his wife is permitted to him.

רבי יצחק נפחא אמר לעולם אסיפא (הא דנסיב אשת גיסו והא דנסיב ארוסת גיסו) הא דאזלי ארוסתו וגיסו הא דאזלי אשתו וגיסו וקאמר תנא קמא לא שנא אשתו וגיסו ולא שנא ארוסתו וגיסו אשת גיסו אסירא ואשתו שריא

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: Actually, Rabbi Yosei is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, and the explanation is as follows: This is referring to one who married his brother-in-law’s wife, and that case is referring to one who married his brother-in-law’s betrothed. Alternatively, this involves a situation where his betrothed and his brother-in-law went overseas, whereas that concerns a situation when his wife and his brother-in-law went abroad. And the first tanna said: It is no different whether the ones who left were his wife and his brother-in-law, and it is no different whether they were his betrothed and his brother-in-law. Either way his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden to her husband and his own wife or betrothed is permitted to him.

וקאמר ליה רבי יוסי אשתו וגיסו דליכא למימר תנאה הוה ליה בנשואין דאינו פוסל על ידי אחר אינו פוסל על ידי עצמו ארוסתו וגיסו דאיכא למימר תנאה הוה ליה בקידושין ופוסל על ידי אחרים אף פוסל על ידי עצמו

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa continues his interpretation. And Rabbi Yosei said to the first tanna: If his wife and his brother-in-law left, in which case it cannot be said that he had a condition with regard to his marriage to his wife, i.e., that the finalization of the marriage was pending on the fulfillment of some condition, everyone would realize that his marriage to her sister was a mistake and she is therefore permitted to his brother-in-law. Consequently, as he does not disqualify another, he does not disqualify himself either. If, however, it was his betrothed and his brother-in-law who left, when it can be mistakenly said that he had a condition with regard to his betrothal and the condition was unfulfilled, his brother-in-law’s wife is therefore prohibited from returning to his brother-in-law. And therefore, as he disqualifies others he also disqualifies himself, and his betrothed is forbidden to him.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי מתקיף לה רב יוסף ומי אמר שמואל הכי והאתמר יבמה רב אמר הרי היא כאשת איש ושמואל אמר אינה כאשת איש ואמר רב הונא כגון שקדש אחיו את האשה והלך לו למדינת הים ושמע שמת אחיו ועמד ונשא את אשתו

§ Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this: And did Shmuel actually say this? But wasn’t it stated that they disputed the status of a yevama: Rav said that she is like a married woman, and Shmuel said that she is not like a married woman. And Rav Huna said that this dispute concerns a case where his brother betrothed a woman and that brother went off overseas, and the one left behind heard that his brother was dead and he arose and married his brother’s wife, in levirate marriage, and subsequently the missing brother returned.

דרב אמר הרי היא כאשת איש ואסורה ליבם ושמואל אמר אינה כאשת איש ושריא ליה

As Rav said that she is like a married woman who married another man based on testimony that her husband was dead and is therefore forbidden to the yavam, i.e., to her first husband, who is called the yavam after his brother married her. And Shmuel said that she is not like a married woman, and is permitted to him. This apparently contradicts Rav Yehuda’s ruling in the name of Shmuel that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as here too people might mistakenly think that the original betrothal included an unfulfilled condition and she should therefore be forbidden to him as the wife of his brother.

אמר ליה אביי וממאי דכי אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי אדרבי יצחק נפחא קאמר דלמא אדרבי אמי קאמר ואי נמי אדרבי יצחק נפחא ממאי דאפוסל

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And from where do you know that when Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, he was speaking of the explanation of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? Perhaps he was speaking of the explanation of Rabbi Ami, that Rabbi Yosei is referring to the difference between one who married by permission of the court and one who did so based on the testimony of witnesses. And even if one accepts the claim that Shmuel’s ruling endorses the interpretation of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, from where do you know that he was referring to the clause: One who disqualifies?