Zevachim 10
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
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Summary
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering.
A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them.
Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ila supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ila’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved.
In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
Zevachim 10
הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה; מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִבִּפְנִים.
With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or in order to burn its forbidden fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite; idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. And this halakha is derived from the halakhot of piggul, as we derive halakhot of idol worship, which are applicable even outside the Temple, from halakhot concerning intent that apply inside the Temple.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת; אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. One cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot applicable outside the Temple from halakhot that apply inside the Temple.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן;
Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to that issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that Reish Lakish says his opinion only with regard to that issue, as he maintains that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. But with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified, as halakhot applicable inside the Temple can be derived from other halakhot applicable inside the Temple.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ; צְרִיכִי.
And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to this issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only with regard to this issue, which concerns halakhot applicable inside the Temple. But with regard to that issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would say that he concedes to the opinion of Reish Lakish that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements are necessary.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מֵתִיב רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Yirmeya responds to this dispute by eliciting evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish.
רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ – פָּסוּל, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rav Dimi elaborated: Rav Yirmeya elicits evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan by an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it beyond its designated time, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי: מָה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן כָּרֵת!
Rava bar Ahilai objects to this inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. What is notable about intent beyond its designated time? It is notable in that one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with karet, whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says: Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by karet. And this is what he is saying: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it outside its designated area, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מַה לְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים; תֹּאמַר בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בְּפֶסַח וְחַטָּאת?!
Rav Ashi objects to this inference: What is notable about intent to sprinkle the blood outside its designated area? It is notable in that the disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say that the same halakhot govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ (שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ) לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rather, Rav Ashi says: This is what Rav Yirmeya is saying: Just as in the case of deviation with regard to the owner, where, if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit? The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.
רַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא תֹּאמַר בִּזְרִיקָה, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֵּינַיָּיא מִשְּׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה! לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא? לוֹמַר דְּאֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה.
Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish, that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah should not have stated the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake with regard to sprinkling of the blood, and rather should have let one derive it by an a fortiori inference from the common element of two other rites, from slaughter and collection of the blood. If so, for what halakha does the Merciful One write this redundant requirement? It is in order to say that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: וְדִלְמָא דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה!
Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: But perhaps the requirement is written to teach the opposite, that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite. A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.
אִם כֵּן, לִשְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.
The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, and one could derive that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite from Rav Ashi’s aforementioned a fortiori inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
וְאִידָּךְ פָּרֵיךְ הָכִי: מָה לְהָנָךְ – שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן, וְיֶשְׁנָן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת!
And the other amora, Rabbi Yoḥanan, would refute Rabbi Ila’s proof like this: It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. What is notable about these? They are notable in that in offerings of the most sacred order they must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, they are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.
וְאִידַּךְ – הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא בִּשְׁלָמִים קַיָּימִין.
And the other amora, Reish Lakish, would respond that now, in any event, we stand in a discussion with regard to peace offerings, since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.
אִיתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ, לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה. וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבָּה לְגַבֵּי רַב נַחְמָן, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.
A parallel dispute was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says that the offering is unfit, and Rabba says that it is fit. And Rabba retracted his opinion, and conceded to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s a fortiori inference.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף (אֶת) הָאָשָׁם. תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, אַף אָשָׁם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – פָּסוּל.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too, is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for committing a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for committing a transgression. Just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The inference is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: פֶּסַח יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁדָּמוֹ לְמַטָּה, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as its blood is sprinkled below the red line, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מָה לְפֶסַח – שֶׁכֵּן זְמַנּוֹ קָבוּעַ!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its designated time is fixed. A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת תּוֹכִיחַ.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ:
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:
חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה.
I return to my previous claim that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around [ḥalila] in circles.
חָזַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְדָנוֹ דִּין אַחֵר: חַטָּאת נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ ״הִיא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – הִיא לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁירָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; וּפֶסַח נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל;
Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, in the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they kill the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. And similarly, with regard to a Paschal offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter [zeviḥa], in the verse: “It is the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27). Here, the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
אַף אָשָׁם נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
And the word “it” is stated with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Here too, say that the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: חַטָּאת נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ ״הִיא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – הִיא לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה. פֶּסַח נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל. אֲבָל אָשָׁם, לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ – אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הוּקְטְרוּ אֵימוּרִין – כָּשֵׁר!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. With regard to a Paschal offering too, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, likewise teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. But with regard to a guilt offering, the word “it” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הֲרֵי [הוּא] אוֹמֵר: ״כַּחַטָּאת כָּאָשָׁם״ – מָה חַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל, אַף אָשָׁם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
The baraita concludes: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are juxtaposed in the verse that states: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7). The verse teaches that just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
אָמַר מָר: אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה. וּלְמִיהְדַּר דִּינָא, וְלַיְיתֵי בְּ״מָה הַצַּד״!
§ The Gemara discusses the baraita. The Master said: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I return to my previous claim, that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around in circles. The Gemara asks: And let the derivation revert to its starting point, and let Rabbi Eliezer derive the point by analogy from the common element of the two sources, a sin offering and a Paschal offering. Together they can prove that a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is also unfit, since they share no element of stringency that the latter lacks.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד כָּרֵת.
The Gemara answers: Even such a derivation is not valid, as it can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? A sin offering and a Paschal offering are notable in that they both have an element of karet. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with karet. A guilt offering, by contrast, has no element of karet.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה! וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנַי וְלִפְנִים!
§ The baraita states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering is not valid. If you say a halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Yehoshua say to him another refutation: Your comparison is not valid, as if you say the halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood enters the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, must the same be said for a guilt offering, whose blood never enters the innermost sanctum?
בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַחִיצוֹנוֹת קָאָמְרִינַן.
The Gemara answers: We are stating a comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering specifically with regard to the external sin offerings, whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctum.
שֶׁאִם נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ [לִפְנַי] וְלִפְנִים – פְּסוּלָה!
The Gemara counters: If so, Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the comparison by pointing out another difference between a sin offering and a guilt offering, as, if the blood of an external sin offering enters the innermost sanctum, it is disqualified. This is not so in the case of the blood of a guilt offering.
אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר ״אַף הָאָשָׁם״.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a guilt offering whose blood enters the innermost sanctum is also disqualified.
שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, as a sin offering atones for transgressions for which one is liable to receive karet if he committed them intentionally.
מֵחַטָּאת דִּשְׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer derives the halakha specifically from a sin offering brought for hearing the voice, i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by karet.
שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה אַרְבַּע מַתָּנוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that the blood of a sin offering requires four placements on the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering requires only two.
כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הַדָּמִים (טְעוּנָה) [טְעוּנִין] אַרְבַּע מַתָּנוֹת.
The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that the blood of almost all offerings requires four placements.
שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה עַל אַרְבַּע קְרָנוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that a sin offering’s blood requires placement on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is sprinkled on only two corners.
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, הָאִיכָּא אֶצְבַּע! הָאִיכָּא קֶרֶן! הָאִיכָּא חוּדָּהּ! אֶלָּא חַד מִתְּרֵי תְּלָת טַעְמֵי נָקֵט.
The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua mention other distinctions between a sin offering and a guilt offering? Isn’t there the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his finger? Isn’t there the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the corner of the altar? And even according to the opinion that it is not placed on the corner itself, isn’t there the requirement to place it on the edge of the corner? None of these requirements pertain to any offering other than a sin offering. Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned one of two or three valid claims at his disposal.
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ. לֵימָא לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אָשָׁם נָמֵי דָּמוֹ לְמַעְלָה!
§ The Master says: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him: The blood of a guilt offering is also sprinkled above the red line, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the halakhot of a guilt offering and a sin offering are parallel.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָשָׁם דָּמוֹ לְמַעְלָה לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וְחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא כָּלִיל – דָּמָהּ לְמַטָּה, אָשָׁם שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּלִיל – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Abaye said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering is presented above the red line, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, which is treated stringently in that it is totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line, all the more so is it not clear that in the case of a guilt offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line?
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת!
The Gemara rejects the inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin, unlike a guilt offering. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
חַטַּאת הָעוֹף תּוֹכִיחַ.
The Gemara answers: A bird sin offering can prove the point, as it atones for a sin, and still its blood is presented below the red line.
מָה לְחַטַּאת הָעוֹף, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מִין זֶבַח!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a bird sin offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of offering that is slaughtered; it is killed by pinching the nape of its neck. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְדָמָן לְמַטָּה; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים, וְדָמוֹ לְמַטָּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is slaughtered, and its blood is still presented below the red line. Therefore, the halakha is derived from a combination of the halakhot of a burnt offering and a bird sin offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and their blood is presented below the red line. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering of the most sacred order, and therefore its blood is presented below the red line.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא מִפַּרְזִקְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלִפְרוֹךְ, מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהֶן קִצְבָה; תֹּאמַר בְּאָשָׁם – שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קִצְבָה?!
Rava of Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Let Rabbi Eliezer refute this inference: What is notable about the common element of the two cases? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a bird sin offering has a fixed value. Need you say that the same halakhot apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value of two silver shekels (see Leviticus 5:15)?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הַכֹּהֵן הַמְחַטֵּא אוֹתָהּ״ – אוֹתָהּ דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה, וְאֵין דָּמוֹ שֶׁל אַחֵר לְמַעְלָה.
Rather, this is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for not claiming that the blood of a guilt offering is presented below the red line: As the verse states with regard to the presenting of the blood of a sin offering: “The priest who offers it” (Leviticus 6:19). The word “it” indicates that its blood is presented above the red line, but the blood of another slaughtered offering is not presented above the red line.
אִי הָכִי, חַטָּאת נָמֵי נֵימָא: אוֹתָהּ – לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; הָא שְׁאָר זְבָחִים – בֵּין לִשְׁמָן בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִין!
The Gemara asks: If so, if Rabbi Eliezer accepts that the word “it” indicates exclusivity, let him also say that the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaches that only a sin offering is fit if slaughtered for its sake, and unfit if slaughtered not for its sake. Consequently, other slaughtered offerings, whether slaughtered for their sake or not for their sake, are fit. Why then does Rabbi Eliezer deem a guilt offering unfit if slaughtered not for its sake?
הָהוּא ״אוֹתָהּ״ לָאו דַּוְקָא, דְּהָא שַׁיַּיר פֶּסַח.
The Gemara answers: That instance of the word “it” does not indicate that the halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and to no other offerings, as the Torah excludes the Paschal offering from such a generalization. A Paschal offering is certainly disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
הָכָא נָמֵי לָאו דַּוְקָא, דְּהָא שַׁיַּיר עוֹלַת הָעוֹף!
The Gemara counters: If so, here too, with regard to the presenting of the blood above the red line, one must say the word “it” does not indicate that this halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and no other offerings, as the Torah excludes a bird burnt offering from such a generalization. The blood of a bird burnt offering is presented above the red line.
בִּזְבִיחָה מִיהָא לָא שַׁיַּיר מִידֵּי.
The Gemara answers: With regard to offerings that require slaughter, in any event, the Torah excluded nothing from the generalization. Bird offerings are irrelevant, as they are killed by the pinching of the nape.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הַאי מָקוֹם לְחוֹד, וְהַאי מָקוֹם לְחוֹד.
And if you wish, say instead that even the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented in a manner different from that of a sin offering. In accordance with whose opinion is this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: This place where the blood of a sin offering is presented is discrete, and that place where the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented is discrete.
דְּתַנְיָא: דָּמִים הַתַּחְתּוֹנִים נִיתָּנִין מִחוּט הַסִּיקְרָא וּלְמַטָּה, וְהָעֶלְיוֹנִים מִחוּט הַסִּיקְרָא וּלְמַעְלָה. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִין – בְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף; אֲבָל בְּחַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה – הִיא עַצְמָהּ אֵין נַעֲשֶׂה אֶלָּא עַל גּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קֶרֶן.
As it is taught in a baraita: The blood that must be placed on the lower half of the altar is placed anywhere from the red [hasikra] line and below, and the blood that must be placed on the upper half is placed anywhere from the red line and above. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a bird burnt offering. But the placement of the blood of an animal sin offering is itself performed only on the actual corner of the altar.
תְּנַן הָתָם, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כׇּל דָּמִים שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ לַהֵיכָל לְכַפֵּר – פְּסוּלִים. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: חַטָּאת בִּלְבַד. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת כָּאָשָׁם״.
§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (81b): As Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that should have been sprinkled on the external altar but instead entered to atone in the Sanctuary is unfit. And the Rabbis say: That is the halakha only with regard to the blood of a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhic status of a guilt offering is also like that of a sin offering, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7).
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – כִּדְקָאָמַר טַעְמָא, אֶלָּא רַבָּנַן מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara asks: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is understandable, as he states the reason for his opinion. But what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis?
אָמַר רָבָא: אָשָׁם נִכְנַס דָּמוֹ לִפְנִים פָּסוּל – לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; מָה
Rava said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering that entered into the Sanctuary is disqualified, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as
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I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!
Maale Adumim, Israel
In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.
Worcester, United States
I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!
Hashmonaim, Israel
Minneapolis, MN, United States
Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!
Raanana, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Jerusalem, Israel
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
I began my journey two years ago at the beginning of this cycle of the daf yomi. It has been an incredible, challenging experience and has given me a new perspective of Torah Sh’baal Peh and the role it plays in our lives
Efrat, Israel
I began learning the daf in January 2022. I initially “flew under the radar,” sharing my journey with my husband and a few close friends. I was apprehensive – who, me? Gemara? Now, 2 years in, I feel changed. The rigor of a daily commitment frames my days. The intellectual engagement enhances my knowledge. And the virtual community of learners has become a new family, weaving a glorious tapestry.
Far Rockaway, United States
Studying has changed my life view on הלכה and יהדות and time. It has taught me bonudaries of the human nature and honesty of our sages in their discourse to try and build a nation of caring people .
Kfar Saba, Israel
Palo Alto, CA, United States
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Haifa, Israel
Zevachim 10
הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה; מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִבִּפְנִים.
With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or in order to burn its forbidden fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite; idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. And this halakha is derived from the halakhot of piggul, as we derive halakhot of idol worship, which are applicable even outside the Temple, from halakhot concerning intent that apply inside the Temple.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת; אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. One cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot applicable outside the Temple from halakhot that apply inside the Temple.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן;
Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to that issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that Reish Lakish says his opinion only with regard to that issue, as he maintains that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. But with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified, as halakhot applicable inside the Temple can be derived from other halakhot applicable inside the Temple.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ; צְרִיכִי.
And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to this issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only with regard to this issue, which concerns halakhot applicable inside the Temple. But with regard to that issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would say that he concedes to the opinion of Reish Lakish that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements are necessary.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מֵתִיב רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Yirmeya responds to this dispute by eliciting evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish.
רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ – פָּסוּל, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rav Dimi elaborated: Rav Yirmeya elicits evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan by an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it beyond its designated time, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי: מָה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן כָּרֵת!
Rava bar Ahilai objects to this inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. What is notable about intent beyond its designated time? It is notable in that one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with karet, whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says: Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by karet. And this is what he is saying: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it outside its designated area, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מַה לְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים; תֹּאמַר בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בְּפֶסַח וְחַטָּאת?!
Rav Ashi objects to this inference: What is notable about intent to sprinkle the blood outside its designated area? It is notable in that the disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say that the same halakhot govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ (שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ) לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!
Rather, Rav Ashi says: This is what Rav Yirmeya is saying: Just as in the case of deviation with regard to the owner, where, if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit? The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.
רַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא תֹּאמַר בִּזְרִיקָה, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֵּינַיָּיא מִשְּׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה! לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא? לוֹמַר דְּאֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה.
Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish, that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah should not have stated the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake with regard to sprinkling of the blood, and rather should have let one derive it by an a fortiori inference from the common element of two other rites, from slaughter and collection of the blood. If so, for what halakha does the Merciful One write this redundant requirement? It is in order to say that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: וְדִלְמָא דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה!
Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: But perhaps the requirement is written to teach the opposite, that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite. A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.
אִם כֵּן, לִשְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.
The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, and one could derive that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite from Rav Ashi’s aforementioned a fortiori inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
וְאִידָּךְ פָּרֵיךְ הָכִי: מָה לְהָנָךְ – שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן, וְיֶשְׁנָן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת!
And the other amora, Rabbi Yoḥanan, would refute Rabbi Ila’s proof like this: It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. What is notable about these? They are notable in that in offerings of the most sacred order they must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, they are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.
וְאִידַּךְ – הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא בִּשְׁלָמִים קַיָּימִין.
And the other amora, Reish Lakish, would respond that now, in any event, we stand in a discussion with regard to peace offerings, since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.
אִיתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ, לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה. וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבָּה לְגַבֵּי רַב נַחְמָן, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.
A parallel dispute was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says that the offering is unfit, and Rabba says that it is fit. And Rabba retracted his opinion, and conceded to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s a fortiori inference.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף (אֶת) הָאָשָׁם. תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, אַף אָשָׁם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – פָּסוּל.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too, is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for committing a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for committing a transgression. Just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The inference is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: פֶּסַח יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁדָּמוֹ לְמַטָּה, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as its blood is sprinkled below the red line, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מָה לְפֶסַח – שֶׁכֵּן זְמַנּוֹ קָבוּעַ!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its designated time is fixed. A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת תּוֹכִיחַ.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ:
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:
חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה.
I return to my previous claim that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around [ḥalila] in circles.
חָזַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְדָנוֹ דִּין אַחֵר: חַטָּאת נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ ״הִיא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – הִיא לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁירָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; וּפֶסַח נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל;
Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, in the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they kill the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. And similarly, with regard to a Paschal offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter [zeviḥa], in the verse: “It is the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27). Here, the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
אַף אָשָׁם נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
And the word “it” is stated with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Here too, say that the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: חַטָּאת נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ ״הִיא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – הִיא לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה. פֶּסַח נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – הוּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל. אֲבָל אָשָׁם, לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ – אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הוּקְטְרוּ אֵימוּרִין – כָּשֵׁר!
Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. With regard to a Paschal offering too, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, likewise teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. But with regard to a guilt offering, the word “it” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הֲרֵי [הוּא] אוֹמֵר: ״כַּחַטָּאת כָּאָשָׁם״ – מָה חַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל, אַף אָשָׁם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.
The baraita concludes: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are juxtaposed in the verse that states: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7). The verse teaches that just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
אָמַר מָר: אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה. וּלְמִיהְדַּר דִּינָא, וְלַיְיתֵי בְּ״מָה הַצַּד״!
§ The Gemara discusses the baraita. The Master said: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I return to my previous claim, that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around in circles. The Gemara asks: And let the derivation revert to its starting point, and let Rabbi Eliezer derive the point by analogy from the common element of the two sources, a sin offering and a Paschal offering. Together they can prove that a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is also unfit, since they share no element of stringency that the latter lacks.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד כָּרֵת.
The Gemara answers: Even such a derivation is not valid, as it can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? A sin offering and a Paschal offering are notable in that they both have an element of karet. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with karet. A guilt offering, by contrast, has no element of karet.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה! וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנַי וְלִפְנִים!
§ The baraita states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering is not valid. If you say a halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Yehoshua say to him another refutation: Your comparison is not valid, as if you say the halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood enters the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, must the same be said for a guilt offering, whose blood never enters the innermost sanctum?
בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַחִיצוֹנוֹת קָאָמְרִינַן.
The Gemara answers: We are stating a comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering specifically with regard to the external sin offerings, whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctum.
שֶׁאִם נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ [לִפְנַי] וְלִפְנִים – פְּסוּלָה!
The Gemara counters: If so, Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the comparison by pointing out another difference between a sin offering and a guilt offering, as, if the blood of an external sin offering enters the innermost sanctum, it is disqualified. This is not so in the case of the blood of a guilt offering.
אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר ״אַף הָאָשָׁם״.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a guilt offering whose blood enters the innermost sanctum is also disqualified.
שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, as a sin offering atones for transgressions for which one is liable to receive karet if he committed them intentionally.
מֵחַטָּאת דִּשְׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer derives the halakha specifically from a sin offering brought for hearing the voice, i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by karet.
שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה אַרְבַּע מַתָּנוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that the blood of a sin offering requires four placements on the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering requires only two.
כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הַדָּמִים (טְעוּנָה) [טְעוּנִין] אַרְבַּע מַתָּנוֹת.
The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that the blood of almost all offerings requires four placements.
שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה עַל אַרְבַּע קְרָנוֹת!
The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that a sin offering’s blood requires placement on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is sprinkled on only two corners.
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, הָאִיכָּא אֶצְבַּע! הָאִיכָּא קֶרֶן! הָאִיכָּא חוּדָּהּ! אֶלָּא חַד מִתְּרֵי תְּלָת טַעְמֵי נָקֵט.
The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua mention other distinctions between a sin offering and a guilt offering? Isn’t there the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his finger? Isn’t there the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the corner of the altar? And even according to the opinion that it is not placed on the corner itself, isn’t there the requirement to place it on the edge of the corner? None of these requirements pertain to any offering other than a sin offering. Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned one of two or three valid claims at his disposal.
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ. לֵימָא לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אָשָׁם נָמֵי דָּמוֹ לְמַעְלָה!
§ The Master says: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him: The blood of a guilt offering is also sprinkled above the red line, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the halakhot of a guilt offering and a sin offering are parallel.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָשָׁם דָּמוֹ לְמַעְלָה לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וְחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא כָּלִיל – דָּמָהּ לְמַטָּה, אָשָׁם שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּלִיל – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Abaye said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering is presented above the red line, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, which is treated stringently in that it is totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line, all the more so is it not clear that in the case of a guilt offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line?
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת!
The Gemara rejects the inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin, unlike a guilt offering. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
חַטַּאת הָעוֹף תּוֹכִיחַ.
The Gemara answers: A bird sin offering can prove the point, as it atones for a sin, and still its blood is presented below the red line.
מָה לְחַטַּאת הָעוֹף, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מִין זֶבַח!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a bird sin offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of offering that is slaughtered; it is killed by pinching the nape of its neck. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְדָמָן לְמַטָּה; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים, וְדָמוֹ לְמַטָּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is slaughtered, and its blood is still presented below the red line. Therefore, the halakha is derived from a combination of the halakhot of a burnt offering and a bird sin offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and their blood is presented below the red line. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering of the most sacred order, and therefore its blood is presented below the red line.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא מִפַּרְזִקְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלִפְרוֹךְ, מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהֶן קִצְבָה; תֹּאמַר בְּאָשָׁם – שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קִצְבָה?!
Rava of Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Let Rabbi Eliezer refute this inference: What is notable about the common element of the two cases? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a bird sin offering has a fixed value. Need you say that the same halakhot apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value of two silver shekels (see Leviticus 5:15)?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הַכֹּהֵן הַמְחַטֵּא אוֹתָהּ״ – אוֹתָהּ דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה, וְאֵין דָּמוֹ שֶׁל אַחֵר לְמַעְלָה.
Rather, this is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for not claiming that the blood of a guilt offering is presented below the red line: As the verse states with regard to the presenting of the blood of a sin offering: “The priest who offers it” (Leviticus 6:19). The word “it” indicates that its blood is presented above the red line, but the blood of another slaughtered offering is not presented above the red line.
אִי הָכִי, חַטָּאת נָמֵי נֵימָא: אוֹתָהּ – לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; הָא שְׁאָר זְבָחִים – בֵּין לִשְׁמָן בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִין!
The Gemara asks: If so, if Rabbi Eliezer accepts that the word “it” indicates exclusivity, let him also say that the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaches that only a sin offering is fit if slaughtered for its sake, and unfit if slaughtered not for its sake. Consequently, other slaughtered offerings, whether slaughtered for their sake or not for their sake, are fit. Why then does Rabbi Eliezer deem a guilt offering unfit if slaughtered not for its sake?
הָהוּא ״אוֹתָהּ״ לָאו דַּוְקָא, דְּהָא שַׁיַּיר פֶּסַח.
The Gemara answers: That instance of the word “it” does not indicate that the halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and to no other offerings, as the Torah excludes the Paschal offering from such a generalization. A Paschal offering is certainly disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
הָכָא נָמֵי לָאו דַּוְקָא, דְּהָא שַׁיַּיר עוֹלַת הָעוֹף!
The Gemara counters: If so, here too, with regard to the presenting of the blood above the red line, one must say the word “it” does not indicate that this halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and no other offerings, as the Torah excludes a bird burnt offering from such a generalization. The blood of a bird burnt offering is presented above the red line.
בִּזְבִיחָה מִיהָא לָא שַׁיַּיר מִידֵּי.
The Gemara answers: With regard to offerings that require slaughter, in any event, the Torah excluded nothing from the generalization. Bird offerings are irrelevant, as they are killed by the pinching of the nape.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הַאי מָקוֹם לְחוֹד, וְהַאי מָקוֹם לְחוֹד.
And if you wish, say instead that even the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented in a manner different from that of a sin offering. In accordance with whose opinion is this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: This place where the blood of a sin offering is presented is discrete, and that place where the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented is discrete.
דְּתַנְיָא: דָּמִים הַתַּחְתּוֹנִים נִיתָּנִין מִחוּט הַסִּיקְרָא וּלְמַטָּה, וְהָעֶלְיוֹנִים מִחוּט הַסִּיקְרָא וּלְמַעְלָה. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִין – בְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף; אֲבָל בְּחַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה – הִיא עַצְמָהּ אֵין נַעֲשֶׂה אֶלָּא עַל גּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קֶרֶן.
As it is taught in a baraita: The blood that must be placed on the lower half of the altar is placed anywhere from the red [hasikra] line and below, and the blood that must be placed on the upper half is placed anywhere from the red line and above. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a bird burnt offering. But the placement of the blood of an animal sin offering is itself performed only on the actual corner of the altar.
תְּנַן הָתָם, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כׇּל דָּמִים שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ לַהֵיכָל לְכַפֵּר – פְּסוּלִים. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: חַטָּאת בִּלְבַד. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת כָּאָשָׁם״.
§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (81b): As Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that should have been sprinkled on the external altar but instead entered to atone in the Sanctuary is unfit. And the Rabbis say: That is the halakha only with regard to the blood of a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhic status of a guilt offering is also like that of a sin offering, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7).
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – כִּדְקָאָמַר טַעְמָא, אֶלָּא רַבָּנַן מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara asks: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is understandable, as he states the reason for his opinion. But what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis?
אָמַר רָבָא: אָשָׁם נִכְנַס דָּמוֹ לִפְנִים פָּסוּל – לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; מָה
Rava said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering that entered into the Sanctuary is disqualified, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as
