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Today's Daf Yomi

March 22, 2019 | ื˜ืดื• ื‘ืื“ืจ ื‘ืณ ืชืฉืขืดื˜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Chullin 115

There are 6 opinions brought to show a source in the Torah that it is forbidden to eat and to benefit from milk and meat cooked together.


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ืžืขืฉื” ืฉื‘ืช ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื

then let the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, e.g., food cooked on Shabbat, be prohibited for consumption, as desecration of Shabbat is a practice of which God states: I have made it abominable to you, in that it is prohibited to cook on Shabbat. How can this food be prohibited only to the one who cooked it as a penalty by rabbinic law, but be permitted to others (see 15a)?

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ืงื“ืฉ ื”ื™ื ืœื›ื ื”ื™ื ืงื“ืฉ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื” ืงื“ืฉ

The Gemara answers: A product of the desecration of Shabbat is an exception to the rule, as the verse states with regard to Shabbat: โ€œFor it is sacred to youโ€ (Exodus 31:14). One may infer: It, Shabbat itself, is sacred, but the products of actions that desecrate it are not sacred, i.e., not prohibited.

ื—ื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ื—ื•ืกื ืคื™ ืคืจื” ื•ื“ืฉ ื‘ื” ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื

The Gemara raises another difficulty: If one plows with an ox and with a donkey together, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 22:10, or if one muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 25:4, the seeds or threshed grain should be prohibited for consumption according to the above principle, as these are both practices I have made abominable to you.

ื”ืฉืชื ื•ืžื” ืฉื‘ืช ื“ื—ืžื™ืจื ืžืขืฉื™ื” ืžื•ืชืจื™ื ื”ื ื™ ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara responds: Now that it has been established that products of desecration of Shabbat are permitted, one can derive the following using an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to Shabbat, which is treated more stringently, the products of prohibited actions are permitted; is it not all the more so with regard to these prohibitions of plowing with an ox and a donkey and threshing with a muzzled animal, which are treated less stringently, that the products of prohibited actions should be permitted?

ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื ืžื“ื’ืœื™ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ืคืŸ ืชืงื“ืฉ ืคืŸ ืชื•ืงื“ ืืฉ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ืฉืจื•

The Gemara challenges: Diverse kinds of seeds sown together should be prohibited for consumption, as this is a matter whose practice I have made abominable to you. The Gemara explains: One learns otherwise from the fact that the Merciful One revealed with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard: โ€œYou shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the growth of the seed that you will sow be forfeited [pen tikdash]โ€ (Deuteronomy 22:9). The Sages read the phrase โ€œbe forfeited [pen tikdash]โ€ as though it states: Lest it be burned [pen tukad esh], indicating that diverse kinds in a vineyard must be destroyed so that no benefit is derived from them. Since this is stated specifically with regard to a vineyard, one can conclude by inference that other diverse kinds of seeds are permitted.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ืœืื™ ื›ืจื ืืกื•ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ืืกื™ืจื™ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืฉืจื• ืื™ืชืงื•ืฉ ืœื›ืœืื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœื ืชืจื‘ื™ืข ื›ืœืื™ื ืฉื“ืš ืœื ืชื–ืจืข ื›ืœืื™ื ืžื” ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ืืฃ ืฉื“ืš ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื• ืžื•ืชืจ

The Gemara objects: But say instead that the uniqueness of diverse kinds in a vineyard is that they are prohibited both for consumption and for benefit, whereas diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption but are permitted for benefit. The Gemara responds: One cannot say that diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption, as they are juxtaposed in the Torah to diverse kinds of animals, whose offspring are permitted. As it is written: โ€œYou shall not let your cattle mate with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seedโ€ (Leviticus 19:19). The juxtaposition teaches that just as with regard to your cattle, the animal that comes from diverse species is permitted, so too, with regard to your field, that produce that comes from diverse seeds is permitted.

ื•ื›ืœืื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื’ื•ืคื™ื™ื”ื• ืžื ื ืœืŸ ืžื“ืืกืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ืœืื™ื ืœื’ื‘ื•ื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœื”ื“ื™ื•ื˜ ืฉืจื™

The Gemara asks: And with regard to diverse kinds of animals themselves, from where do we derive that their offspring is permitted? The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits the offspring of diverse kinds of animals for sacrifice to the Most High upon the altar (see 38b), learn by inference that they are permitted to ordinary people for consumption.

ืื•ืชื• ื•ืืช ื‘ื ื• ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืžื“ืืกืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืžื—ื•ืกืจ ื–ืžืŸ ืœื’ื‘ื•ื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœื”ื“ื™ื•ื˜ ืฉืจื™

The Gemara raises another difficulty: A mother and its offspring slaughtered on the same day should be prohibited for consumption, as this too is a practice made abominable. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits an animal whose time has not yet arrived, i.e., that is less than eight days old, as an offering to the Most High (Leviticus 22:27), learn by inference that such animals are permitted to ordinary people for consumption. The offspring of a mother slaughtered that day is also considered an animal whose time has not yet arrived, since the prohibition against slaughtering it is limited to that day.

ืฉื™ืœื•ื— ื”ืงืŸ ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ืฉืœื— ืœืชืงืœื”

The Gemara raises a final difficulty: If one violated the mitzva that mandates sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall not take the mother with the young. You shall in any way let the mother goโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:6โ€“7), and the court instructed him to set the mother bird free, that mother bird should be prohibited to all, as this practice is also abominable. The Gemara responds: The Torah did not say: Send it away, if doing so could lead to a mishap. If the bird were prohibited, the Torah would not have commanded one to send it away, as others might eat it unwittingly.

ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืืœ ืชืื›ืœื• ืžืžื ื• ื ื ื•ื‘ืฉืœ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืš ื™ืฉ ืœืš ื‘ืฉื•ืœ ืื—ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ื›ื–ื” ื•ืื™ ื–ื” ื–ื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘

ยง Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption? The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: โ€œYou shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any wayโ€ (Exodus 12:9). As there is no need for the verse to state: โ€œBoiled in any way,โ€ since it could simply have stated: โ€œBoiled.โ€ What is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œBoiled in any way?โ€ It is included to tell you that there is another manner of cooking, the product of which is prohibited like this one. And which cooking is this? This is meat cooked in milk.

ืืžืจ ืœื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ

Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to Reish Lakish:

ื›ืขื•ืจื” ื–ื• ืฉืฉื ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืœื ืชืื›ืœื ื• ื‘ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ

Is that derivation that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught ugly, that you derive a new one? The verse states with regard to an animalโ€™s blood: โ€œYou shall not eat it; you shall pour it upon the earth as waterโ€ (Deuteronomy 12:24), and the next verse adds: โ€œYou shall not eat it; that it may go well with you, and with your children after you.โ€ Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches that the redundant second verse is not referring to the prohibition of blood. Rather, the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, teaching that it is prohibited for consumption.

ืืชื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ ืื• ืื™ื ื• ืืœื ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ืชื•ืจื” ืืžืจืช ืฆื ื•ืœืžื“ ืžืฉืœืฉ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื“ื•ืช ืฉื”ืชื•ืจื” ื ื“ืจืฉืช ื‘ื”ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ืœืžื“ ืžืขื ื™ื ื• ื‘ืžื” ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ

Do you say that the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? Or perhaps it is only referring to one of the other prohibitions in the Torah? You say: Go out and learn from the thirteen hermeneutical principles, one of which is: A matter that is derived from its context. To what are the adjacent verses referring? They are referring to consecrated animals that were redeemed, which are a combination of two types: They are non-sacred in that they may be eaten, but they are prohibited for shearing and work, like consecrated animals. Here too, one may conclude that the verse is referring to a prohibition that involves two types of food, i.e., the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.

ืื™ ืžื”ื”ื™ื ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืœื ืงืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

Reish Lakish replied to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan: My exposition is still necessary, since if the source for the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk were from that verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi alone, I would say that this statement applies only to the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk, but not to that of deriving benefit from it. The verse cited with regard to the Paschal offering teaches us that even deriving benefit is prohibited, just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a disqualified Paschal offering.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื ื ืœื™ื” ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื›ื ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื›ื™ ืขื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืืชื” ืœื”ืณ ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื•ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื” ืงื“ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, from where does he derive that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit? The Gemara responds: He derives it from here, as it is stated here: โ€œFor you are a sacred [kadosh] people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: โ€œNeither shall there be a sodomite [kadesh] of the sons of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 23:18). The similar expressions teach that just as below, the prohibition of sodomy is a prohibition that involves enjoyment, i.e., deriving benefit, not eating, so too here, meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to deriving benefit.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืชื ื ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ื›ืœ ื ื‘ืœื” [ื•ื’ื•ืณ] ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื›ืฉืชืžื›ืจื ื” ืœื ืชื‘ืฉืœื ื” ื•ืชืžื›ืจื ื”

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught: The verse states: โ€œYou shall not eat of any animal carcass; you may give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). The Torah stated the prohibition of meat cooked in milk after the halakha of an animal carcass to teach that when you sell a carcass to a gentile, you shall not cook it in milk and then sell it, i.e., meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit and may not be sold.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืชื ื ืœื ืชื‘ืฉืœ ื’ื“ื™ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืืžื• ืฉืœืฉ ืคืขืžื™ื ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ืื›ื™ืœื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ื”ื ืื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ื‘ืฉื•ืœ

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah states three times: โ€œYou shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). One verse serves to teach the prohibition against eating meat cooked in milk, and one serves to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from it, and one serves to teach the prohibition against cooking meat in milk.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ืกื™ ื‘ืŸ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื›ื™ ืขื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืืชื” ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื•ืื ืฉื™ ืงื“ืฉ ืชื”ื™ื•ืŸ ืœื™ ื•ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ืฉื“ื” ื˜ืจืคื” ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ืืกื•ืจ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ืืกื•ืจ

It is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk? It is stated here: โ€œFor you are a sacred people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: โ€œAnd you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of animals in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogsโ€ (Exodus 22:30). Just as below it is prohibited to eat a tereifa, so too here it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk.

ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืืžืจืช ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืขืจืœื” ืฉืœื ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื• ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

And from this I have derived only that it is prohibited for consumption. From where do I derive that it is prohibited for benefit as well? You can say it can be derived by an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], which is treated less stringently as no sin has been committed in the planting of the tree and its production of fruit, it is prohibited for benefit, is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited for benefit?

ืžื” ืœืขืจืœื” ืฉื›ืŸ ืœื ื”ื™ืชื” ืœื” ืฉืขืช ื”ื›ื•ืฉืจ

The Gemara rejects this, as orla exhibits a unique stringency: What is unique about orla? It is unique in that it never had a time when it was fit. The same cannot be said about meat and milk, which were each permitted on their own before being cooked together.

ื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื”ื™ืชื” ืœื• ืฉืขืช ื”ื›ื•ืฉืจ ื•ืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื” ืœื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ืฉื›ืŸ ืขื ื•ืฉ ื›ืจืช

The Gemara suggests: Let leavened bread on Passover prove the point, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited for benefit. The Gemara rejects this inference as well: What is unique about consumption of leavened bread on Passover? It is unique in that it is punishable by karet, unlike the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.

ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืขื ื•ืฉ ื›ืจืช ื•ืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara comments: Let the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard prove the point, as it is not punishable by karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the product.

ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืœื™ื™ืชื™ ื›ื•ืœื” ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžืขืจืœื” ื•ืžื” ืขืจืœื” ืฉืœื ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื• ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara asks: Why do I need both Isi ben Yehudaโ€™s verbal analogy to teach the prohibition of consumption and the a fortiori inference to teach the prohibition of benefit? Let all of it, both the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition against deriving benefit, be derived by an a fortiori inference from orla: Just as orla, which is treated less stringently, as no sin has been committed in the treeโ€™s planting, is nevertheless prohibited both for consumption and for benefit; is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited both for consumption and for benefit?

ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื—ื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ื—ื•ืกื ืคื™ ืคืจื” ื•ื“ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื”ื ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืฉืจื•

The Gemara responds: That inference would be invalid because one could say: The cases of one who plows with an ox and with a donkey, and one who muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it prove it invalid. As in those cases, a sin has been committed through them, and yet benefit from the products of these actions is permitted. One cannot refute a verbal analogy with logical reasoning.

ืœืžื” ืœื™ ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ืœื™ืžื ืขืจืœื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ื•ืœื™ื”ื“ืจ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ืœื™ืชื™ ื‘ืžื” ื”ืฆื“

The Gemara asks further: Why do I need to say, as was stated above, that the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard proves that benefit from meat and milk is prohibited? At that point, two other cases, orla and leavened bread on Passover, had already been offered as proof. Although they were rejected because they both possess a unique stringency, each lacks the stringency possessed by the other. Therefore, let us say that the case of orla proves that the stringency for consumption of leavened bread on Passover, i.e., the penalty of karet, is irrelevant, and vice versa. And let the inference revert to its starting point, and let the halakha with regard to meat cooked in milk be derived by analogy from the common element of the two sources, i.e., the prohibition against both consumption and benefit.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื ื‘ืœื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื•ืžื•ืชืจืช ื‘ื”ื ืื”

Rav Ashi said: Such a derivation cannot be suggested, because one can say that the case of an unslaughtered animal carcass proves it invalid, as an animal carcass is prohibited for consumption and yet it is permitted for benefit.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืžื’ื•ืคื• ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ืžืขืœืžื ืœื ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy only by invoking conflicting details of the two sources themselves, e.g., here, some stringency shared by orla and leavened bread, but not by meat cooked in milk. One cannot refute the analogy from an external case, as you do.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืชื™ืชื™ ื‘ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara asks: If so, then the question remains: Why not let the halakha be derived by analogy from the common element of orla and leavened bread on Passover? The Gemara responds: Because the analogy can be refuted as follows: What is unique about the common element of orla and leavened bread? It is unique in that they both involve produce that grows from the ground, whereas meat and milk do not grow from the ground.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื ืžื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara counters: If so, then even now that the Gemara has invoked diverse kinds in a vineyard to prove the point, the derivation can be refuted in the same manner: What is unique about the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard? It is unique in that it involves produce that grows from the ground.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืœื ืื ืืžืจืช ื—ื“ื ืžื—ื“ื ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืœื ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy by invoking any factor shared by the two source cases but not by the target case. But this is insufficient to refute an analogy to a single source from a single source using the standard formulation: No, if you say the halakha applies to the source case, which possesses a unique factor X, must you say the same of the target case, which does not? One can refute such analogies using this formulation only by way of an a fortiori inference, i.e., if the unique factor X is a stringency. But one cannot refute it by simply mentioning any unique factor, e.g., that diverse kinds in a vineyard grow from the ground.

ื•ืœื™ืคืจื•ืš ืœื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืžื” ืœื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara counters: But one need not invoke the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard by itself, since it is invoked in addition to the cases of orla and leavened bread. Consequently, this is effectively a derivation from the common element of all three sources, not from one single case to another. If so, let us refute the derivation from all of them: What is unique about all of the cases? They are unique in that they involve produce that grows from the ground.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ

Rather, Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Chullin 115

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Chullin 115

ืžืขืฉื” ืฉื‘ืช ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื

then let the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, e.g., food cooked on Shabbat, be prohibited for consumption, as desecration of Shabbat is a practice of which God states: I have made it abominable to you, in that it is prohibited to cook on Shabbat. How can this food be prohibited only to the one who cooked it as a penalty by rabbinic law, but be permitted to others (see 15a)?

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ืงื“ืฉ ื”ื™ื ืœื›ื ื”ื™ื ืงื“ืฉ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื” ืงื“ืฉ

The Gemara answers: A product of the desecration of Shabbat is an exception to the rule, as the verse states with regard to Shabbat: โ€œFor it is sacred to youโ€ (Exodus 31:14). One may infer: It, Shabbat itself, is sacred, but the products of actions that desecrate it are not sacred, i.e., not prohibited.

ื—ื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ื—ื•ืกื ืคื™ ืคืจื” ื•ื“ืฉ ื‘ื” ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื

The Gemara raises another difficulty: If one plows with an ox and with a donkey together, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 22:10, or if one muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 25:4, the seeds or threshed grain should be prohibited for consumption according to the above principle, as these are both practices I have made abominable to you.

ื”ืฉืชื ื•ืžื” ืฉื‘ืช ื“ื—ืžื™ืจื ืžืขืฉื™ื” ืžื•ืชืจื™ื ื”ื ื™ ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara responds: Now that it has been established that products of desecration of Shabbat are permitted, one can derive the following using an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to Shabbat, which is treated more stringently, the products of prohibited actions are permitted; is it not all the more so with regard to these prohibitions of plowing with an ox and a donkey and threshing with a muzzled animal, which are treated less stringently, that the products of prohibited actions should be permitted?

ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ืœื™ืชืกืจื• ื“ื”ื ืชื™ืขื‘ืชื™ ืœืš ื”ื•ื ืžื“ื’ืœื™ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ืคืŸ ืชืงื“ืฉ ืคืŸ ืชื•ืงื“ ืืฉ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ืฉืจื•

The Gemara challenges: Diverse kinds of seeds sown together should be prohibited for consumption, as this is a matter whose practice I have made abominable to you. The Gemara explains: One learns otherwise from the fact that the Merciful One revealed with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard: โ€œYou shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the growth of the seed that you will sow be forfeited [pen tikdash]โ€ (Deuteronomy 22:9). The Sages read the phrase โ€œbe forfeited [pen tikdash]โ€ as though it states: Lest it be burned [pen tukad esh], indicating that diverse kinds in a vineyard must be destroyed so that no benefit is derived from them. Since this is stated specifically with regard to a vineyard, one can conclude by inference that other diverse kinds of seeds are permitted.

ื•ืื™ืžื ื›ืœืื™ ื›ืจื ืืกื•ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื›ืœืื™ ื–ืจืขื™ื ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ืืกื™ืจื™ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืฉืจื• ืื™ืชืงื•ืฉ ืœื›ืœืื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœื ืชืจื‘ื™ืข ื›ืœืื™ื ืฉื“ืš ืœื ืชื–ืจืข ื›ืœืื™ื ืžื” ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ืืฃ ืฉื“ืš ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื• ืžื•ืชืจ

The Gemara objects: But say instead that the uniqueness of diverse kinds in a vineyard is that they are prohibited both for consumption and for benefit, whereas diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption but are permitted for benefit. The Gemara responds: One cannot say that diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption, as they are juxtaposed in the Torah to diverse kinds of animals, whose offspring are permitted. As it is written: โ€œYou shall not let your cattle mate with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seedโ€ (Leviticus 19:19). The juxtaposition teaches that just as with regard to your cattle, the animal that comes from diverse species is permitted, so too, with regard to your field, that produce that comes from diverse seeds is permitted.

ื•ื›ืœืื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื’ื•ืคื™ื™ื”ื• ืžื ื ืœืŸ ืžื“ืืกืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ืœืื™ื ืœื’ื‘ื•ื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœื”ื“ื™ื•ื˜ ืฉืจื™

The Gemara asks: And with regard to diverse kinds of animals themselves, from where do we derive that their offspring is permitted? The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits the offspring of diverse kinds of animals for sacrifice to the Most High upon the altar (see 38b), learn by inference that they are permitted to ordinary people for consumption.

ืื•ืชื• ื•ืืช ื‘ื ื• ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืžื“ืืกืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ืžื—ื•ืกืจ ื–ืžืŸ ืœื’ื‘ื•ื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœื”ื“ื™ื•ื˜ ืฉืจื™

The Gemara raises another difficulty: A mother and its offspring slaughtered on the same day should be prohibited for consumption, as this too is a practice made abominable. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits an animal whose time has not yet arrived, i.e., that is less than eight days old, as an offering to the Most High (Leviticus 22:27), learn by inference that such animals are permitted to ordinary people for consumption. The offspring of a mother slaughtered that day is also considered an animal whose time has not yet arrived, since the prohibition against slaughtering it is limited to that day.

ืฉื™ืœื•ื— ื”ืงืŸ ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ืฉืœื— ืœืชืงืœื”

The Gemara raises a final difficulty: If one violated the mitzva that mandates sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall not take the mother with the young. You shall in any way let the mother goโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:6โ€“7), and the court instructed him to set the mother bird free, that mother bird should be prohibited to all, as this practice is also abominable. The Gemara responds: The Torah did not say: Send it away, if doing so could lead to a mishap. If the bird were prohibited, the Torah would not have commanded one to send it away, as others might eat it unwittingly.

ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืืœ ืชืื›ืœื• ืžืžื ื• ื ื ื•ื‘ืฉืœ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืžื‘ืฉืœ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืš ื™ืฉ ืœืš ื‘ืฉื•ืœ ืื—ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ื›ื–ื” ื•ืื™ ื–ื” ื–ื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘

ยง Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption? The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: โ€œYou shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any wayโ€ (Exodus 12:9). As there is no need for the verse to state: โ€œBoiled in any way,โ€ since it could simply have stated: โ€œBoiled.โ€ What is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œBoiled in any way?โ€ It is included to tell you that there is another manner of cooking, the product of which is prohibited like this one. And which cooking is this? This is meat cooked in milk.

ืืžืจ ืœื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ

Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to Reish Lakish:

ื›ืขื•ืจื” ื–ื• ืฉืฉื ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืœื ืชืื›ืœื ื• ื‘ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ

Is that derivation that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught ugly, that you derive a new one? The verse states with regard to an animalโ€™s blood: โ€œYou shall not eat it; you shall pour it upon the earth as waterโ€ (Deuteronomy 12:24), and the next verse adds: โ€œYou shall not eat it; that it may go well with you, and with your children after you.โ€ Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches that the redundant second verse is not referring to the prohibition of blood. Rather, the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, teaching that it is prohibited for consumption.

ืืชื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ ืื• ืื™ื ื• ืืœื ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ืชื•ืจื” ืืžืจืช ืฆื ื•ืœืžื“ ืžืฉืœืฉ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื“ื•ืช ืฉื”ืชื•ืจื” ื ื“ืจืฉืช ื‘ื”ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ืœืžื“ ืžืขื ื™ื ื• ื‘ืžื” ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ

Do you say that the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? Or perhaps it is only referring to one of the other prohibitions in the Torah? You say: Go out and learn from the thirteen hermeneutical principles, one of which is: A matter that is derived from its context. To what are the adjacent verses referring? They are referring to consecrated animals that were redeemed, which are a combination of two types: They are non-sacred in that they may be eaten, but they are prohibited for shearing and work, like consecrated animals. Here too, one may conclude that the verse is referring to a prohibition that involves two types of food, i.e., the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.

ืื™ ืžื”ื”ื™ื ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืœื ืงืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

Reish Lakish replied to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan: My exposition is still necessary, since if the source for the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk were from that verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi alone, I would say that this statement applies only to the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk, but not to that of deriving benefit from it. The verse cited with regard to the Paschal offering teaches us that even deriving benefit is prohibited, just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a disqualified Paschal offering.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื ื ืœื™ื” ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื›ื ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื›ื™ ืขื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืืชื” ืœื”ืณ ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื•ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื” ืงื“ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, from where does he derive that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit? The Gemara responds: He derives it from here, as it is stated here: โ€œFor you are a sacred [kadosh] people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: โ€œNeither shall there be a sodomite [kadesh] of the sons of Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 23:18). The similar expressions teach that just as below, the prohibition of sodomy is a prohibition that involves enjoyment, i.e., deriving benefit, not eating, so too here, meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to deriving benefit.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืชื ื ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ื›ืœ ื ื‘ืœื” [ื•ื’ื•ืณ] ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื›ืฉืชืžื›ืจื ื” ืœื ืชื‘ืฉืœื ื” ื•ืชืžื›ืจื ื”

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught: The verse states: โ€œYou shall not eat of any animal carcass; you may give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). The Torah stated the prohibition of meat cooked in milk after the halakha of an animal carcass to teach that when you sell a carcass to a gentile, you shall not cook it in milk and then sell it, i.e., meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit and may not be sold.

ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืชื ื ืœื ืชื‘ืฉืœ ื’ื“ื™ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืืžื• ืฉืœืฉ ืคืขืžื™ื ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ืื›ื™ืœื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ื”ื ืื” ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืื™ืกื•ืจ ื‘ืฉื•ืœ

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah states three times: โ€œYou shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). One verse serves to teach the prohibition against eating meat cooked in milk, and one serves to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from it, and one serves to teach the prohibition against cooking meat in milk.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ืกื™ ื‘ืŸ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื ืืžืจ ื›ืืŸ ื›ื™ ืขื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ืืชื” ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืœืŸ ื•ืื ืฉื™ ืงื“ืฉ ืชื”ื™ื•ืŸ ืœื™ ื•ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ืฉื“ื” ื˜ืจืคื” ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ืžื” ืœื”ืœืŸ ืืกื•ืจ ืืฃ ื›ืืŸ ืืกื•ืจ

It is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk? It is stated here: โ€œFor you are a sacred people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its motherโ€™s milkโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: โ€œAnd you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of animals in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogsโ€ (Exodus 22:30). Just as below it is prohibited to eat a tereifa, so too here it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk.

ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืืžืจืช ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืขืจืœื” ืฉืœื ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื• ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

And from this I have derived only that it is prohibited for consumption. From where do I derive that it is prohibited for benefit as well? You can say it can be derived by an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], which is treated less stringently as no sin has been committed in the planting of the tree and its production of fruit, it is prohibited for benefit, is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited for benefit?

ืžื” ืœืขืจืœื” ืฉื›ืŸ ืœื ื”ื™ืชื” ืœื” ืฉืขืช ื”ื›ื•ืฉืจ

The Gemara rejects this, as orla exhibits a unique stringency: What is unique about orla? It is unique in that it never had a time when it was fit. The same cannot be said about meat and milk, which were each permitted on their own before being cooked together.

ื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื”ื™ืชื” ืœื• ืฉืขืช ื”ื›ื•ืฉืจ ื•ืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ืžื” ืœื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ืฉื›ืŸ ืขื ื•ืฉ ื›ืจืช

The Gemara suggests: Let leavened bread on Passover prove the point, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited for benefit. The Gemara rejects this inference as well: What is unique about consumption of leavened bread on Passover? It is unique in that it is punishable by karet, unlike the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.

ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืขื ื•ืฉ ื›ืจืช ื•ืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara comments: Let the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard prove the point, as it is not punishable by karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the product.

ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืœื™ื™ืชื™ ื›ื•ืœื” ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžืขืจืœื” ื•ืžื” ืขืจืœื” ืฉืœื ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื” ื‘ืฉืจ ื‘ื—ืœื‘ ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื• ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืืกื•ืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ืื”

The Gemara asks: Why do I need both Isi ben Yehudaโ€™s verbal analogy to teach the prohibition of consumption and the a fortiori inference to teach the prohibition of benefit? Let all of it, both the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition against deriving benefit, be derived by an a fortiori inference from orla: Just as orla, which is treated less stringently, as no sin has been committed in the treeโ€™s planting, is nevertheless prohibited both for consumption and for benefit; is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited both for consumption and for benefit?

ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื—ื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ื—ื•ืกื ืคื™ ืคืจื” ื•ื“ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื”ื ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืฉืจื•

The Gemara responds: That inference would be invalid because one could say: The cases of one who plows with an ox and with a donkey, and one who muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it prove it invalid. As in those cases, a sin has been committed through them, and yet benefit from the products of these actions is permitted. One cannot refute a verbal analogy with logical reasoning.

ืœืžื” ืœื™ ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ืœื™ืžื ืขืจืœื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ื•ืœื™ื”ื“ืจ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ืœื™ืชื™ ื‘ืžื” ื”ืฆื“

The Gemara asks further: Why do I need to say, as was stated above, that the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard proves that benefit from meat and milk is prohibited? At that point, two other cases, orla and leavened bread on Passover, had already been offered as proof. Although they were rejected because they both possess a unique stringency, each lacks the stringency possessed by the other. Therefore, let us say that the case of orla proves that the stringency for consumption of leavened bread on Passover, i.e., the penalty of karet, is irrelevant, and vice versa. And let the inference revert to its starting point, and let the halakha with regard to meat cooked in milk be derived by analogy from the common element of the two sources, i.e., the prohibition against both consumption and benefit.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื ื‘ืœื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื” ื•ืžื•ืชืจืช ื‘ื”ื ืื”

Rav Ashi said: Such a derivation cannot be suggested, because one can say that the case of an unslaughtered animal carcass proves it invalid, as an animal carcass is prohibited for consumption and yet it is permitted for benefit.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืžื’ื•ืคื• ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ืžืขืœืžื ืœื ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy only by invoking conflicting details of the two sources themselves, e.g., here, some stringency shared by orla and leavened bread, but not by meat cooked in milk. One cannot refute the analogy from an external case, as you do.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืชื™ืชื™ ื‘ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara asks: If so, then the question remains: Why not let the halakha be derived by analogy from the common element of orla and leavened bread on Passover? The Gemara responds: Because the analogy can be refuted as follows: What is unique about the common element of orla and leavened bread? It is unique in that they both involve produce that grows from the ground, whereas meat and milk do not grow from the ground.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื ืžื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœื›ืœืื™ ื”ื›ืจื ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara counters: If so, then even now that the Gemara has invoked diverse kinds in a vineyard to prove the point, the derivation can be refuted in the same manner: What is unique about the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard? It is unique in that it involves produce that grows from the ground.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืžื” ื”ืฆื“ ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืœื ืื ืืžืจืช ื—ื“ื ืžื—ื“ื ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืœื ืคืจื›ื™ื ืŸ

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy by invoking any factor shared by the two source cases but not by the target case. But this is insufficient to refute an analogy to a single source from a single source using the standard formulation: No, if you say the halakha applies to the source case, which possesses a unique factor X, must you say the same of the target case, which does not? One can refute such analogies using this formulation only by way of an a fortiori inference, i.e., if the unique factor X is a stringency. But one cannot refute it by simply mentioning any unique factor, e.g., that diverse kinds in a vineyard grow from the ground.

ื•ืœื™ืคืจื•ืš ืœื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืžื” ืœื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

The Gemara counters: But one need not invoke the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard by itself, since it is invoked in addition to the cases of orla and leavened bread. Consequently, this is effectively a derivation from the common element of all three sources, not from one single case to another. If so, let us refute the derivation from all of them: What is unique about all of the cases? They are unique in that they involve produce that grows from the ground.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ

Rather, Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows:

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