There are different opinions regarding whether it is forbidden to cook undomesticated animals or birds with milk. The mishna and gemara also discuss other cases and whether or not one would be obligated for cooking/eating milk and meat in that case.
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi for the continued health and good outcome for Talia Nechama bat Chana.
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Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi for the continued health and good outcome for Talia Nechama bat Chana.
Chullin 113
וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מָלִיחַ הֲרֵי הוּא כְּרוֹתֵחַ, וְכָבוּשׁ הֲרֵי הוּא כִּמְבוּשָּׁל!
The Gemara objects: But let Rava say to him the same ruling by instead citing the seemingly more relevant statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A salted food imparts its flavor like a boiling food, and a marinated food is as absorbent as a cooked food. Clearly, the kosher meat absorbed flavor from the meat of the tereifa as it would have had they been cooked together.
אִי מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי – דָּמָן, אֲבָל צִירָן וְרוֹטְבָן – לָא, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: Had Rava based his ruling only on Shmuel’s statement, I would say in response: This statement applies only to the absorption of the blood of the meat, but kosher meat is not prohibited if it absorbs only the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa. Since in this case the meat is salted in a perforated vessel, the blood from each piece runs out and is not absorbed by the other, and one might think that the kosher meat remains permitted. Rava’s interpretation of the verse in Leviticus teaches us that the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa must also be taken into account.
מֵיתִיבִי: דָּג טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר. מַאי לָאו שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין? לָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where they were both salted and expel juices? This indicates that the kosher fish is not prohibited by the juices of the non-kosher fish, contrary to Rava’s statement. The Gemara responds: No, this is referring to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted. Since an unsalted fish does not emit juices, the kosher fish does not absorb the flavor of the non-kosher fish.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין עָסְקִינַן! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר, כֵּיצַד? שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: But if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted the kosher fish remains permitted, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where they are both salted. The Gemara responds: The latter clause is explaining the halakha of the first clause. The baraita should be read as follows: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. How so? This is the halakha if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ רֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים – הַשְׁתָּא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים שְׁרֵי, טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל מִיבַּעְיָא?
The Gemara notes: So, too, it is reasonable that this is the meaning of the baraita, as if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to a case where both of them are salted, one can claim: Now that the baraita has stated that even if both of them are salted the kosher fish is permitted, is it necessary to state that the same applies in the less problematic case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted?
אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא לָא אִירְיָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא, דְּלָא תֵּימָא רֵישָׁא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, אֲבָל שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין אָסוּר, תְּנָא סֵיפָא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי שְׁרֵי.
The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. It is possible that the first clause of the baraita is indeed referring to a case where both fish are salted, and the tanna of the baraita nevertheless taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you should not say: The first clause is referring only to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, but if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is prohibited. To rule this out, he taught the latter clause, which explicitly makes reference to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, which by inference indicates that the first clause is referring to a case where they are both salted, and teaches that even so the kosher fish is permitted.
תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא דְּסֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל – אָסוּר. טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין – שְׁרֵי.
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear proof against Rava’s ruling from the latter clause of the latter clause, i.e., the third clause of that baraita: But if the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish was unsalted, the kosher fish is prohibited. One can infer from here that it is only if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher fish is unsalted that the kosher fish is prohibited. But if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is permitted, contrary to Rava’s ruling.
אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא: טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, תְּנָא נָמֵי סֵיפָא: טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל.
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the last section of the baraita uses this language only since it teaches in the former clause, i.e., the second clause: If the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, etc. The baraita therefore taught the last clause as well using parallel language: If the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish unsalted, etc. But nothing can be derived from here with regard to a case where both fish were salted.
(סִימָן: בִּישְׂרָא דְּמַנַּח נַפְקוּתָא).
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the three halakhot stated by Shmuel below: The manner in which blood is expelled from meat; salted meat that is placed on a vessel; an animal whose neck is broken before its soul departs.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין הַבָּשָׂר יוֹצֵא מִידֵי דָּמוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מוֹלְחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה, וּמְדִיחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה. אִתְּמַר: רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: מוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. בְּמַתְנִיתָא תְּנָא: מֵדִיחַ וּמוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. וְלָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא דְּחַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא, הָא דְּלָא חַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא מָלַח לֵיהּ בְּמִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא, וּמְנַפֵּיץ לֵיהּ.
Shmuel says: Meat cannot be rid of its blood unless one salts it thoroughly and rinses it thoroughly in water. It was stated: Rav Huna says: One must salt and rinse the meat in water. And it was taught in a baraita: One must rinse the meat, and salt it, and then rinse it again. The Gemara adds: And these two rulings do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to a case where one already washed the meat in the slaughterhouse before salting, whereas that baraita is referring to a case where one did not wash the meat in the slaughterhouse. The Gemara relates: Rav Dimi of Neharde’a would salt meat with coarse salt and then shake the salt off the meat.
אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין דָּם בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים. תַּרְגְּמַאּ אַכַּרְכְּשָׁא וּמְעַיָּיא וְהַדְרָא דְּכַנְתָּא.
Rav Mesharshiyya says: One does not presume that there is blood in the intestines, and therefore they are not prohibited if they have not been salted. The Gemara comments: The Sages interpreted this statement as referring to the rectum, the intestines, and the spiral colon.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין מַנִּיחִין בָּשָׂר מָלִיחַ אֶלָּא עַל גַּבֵּי כְּלִי מְנוּקָּב.
Shmuel says: One may place salted meat only on a perforated vessel, so that the expelled blood can run out. But if the vessel is not perforated then the blood will pool and be reabsorbed by the meat.
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מָלַח לֵיהּ גַּרְמָא גַּרְמָא. תְּרֵי מַאי טַעְמָא לָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּפָרֵישׁ מֵהַאי וּבָלַע הַאי? חַד נָמֵי פָּרֵישׁ מֵהַאי גִּיסָא וּבָלַע הַאי גִּיסָא! אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.
The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet would salt meat one bone, i.e., one piece, at a time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he would not salt two together? Could it be because the blood leaves this piece and that piece absorbs it? If so, with regard to one piece as well, one could claim that the blood leaves this side of the piece and that side absorbs it. Rather, there is no difference between one piece and two pieces, and one may salt even several pieces together.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹבֵר מַפְרַקְתָּהּ שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשָׁהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, וּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים.
Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who breaks the neck of an animal after it is slaughtered but before its soul departs thereby makes the meat heavy. The meat expels blood at the time of slaughter, but if one breaks the animal’s neck, excess blood is trapped inside and weighs down the meat. And by this action he robs people, as he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs, and since he sells the meat by weight, people will pay extra to acquire the same amount of edible meat.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵיכִי קָאָמַר? מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת מִשּׁוּם דְּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים – הָא לְדִידֵיהּ שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי אֲסִיר? תֵּיקוּ.
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is he speaking? Does Shmuel mean that there is only one problem with this practice, namely, that it renders the meat heavy and robs people since he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs? If so, it may be inferred that if one wishes to keep the meat for himself, one may well do so, since he is robbing no one. Or perhaps Shmuel is referring to two prohibitions, first, that the blood trapped in the meat renders it prohibited for consumption, and second, that of robbery. If so, then even if one wants to keep the meat for himself, it is also prohibited. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
MISHNA: One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
גְּמָ׳ הָא אוֹכְלוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא! אֵימָא: הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשּׁוּלְחָן – אֵינוֹ בָּא לִידֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Since the mishna mentions only that placing meat of birds and milk on one table does not violate a Torah prohibition, one may consequently infer that if one eats them together he does violate a Torah prohibition. If so, learn from the mishna that meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that it applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara responds: Say that the mishna should be understood as follows: One who places bird meat with cheese on the table will not thereby come to violate a Torah prohibition, since eating the two together is a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Akiva maintains.
מַתְנִי׳ בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – מוּתָּר לְבַשֵּׁל וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּה וָעוֹף אֵינָם מִן הַתּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – פְּרָט לְחַיָּה, וּלְעוֹף, וּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
MISHNA: It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״, אֶת שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב. עוֹף שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה, יָכוֹל יְהֵא אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – יָצָא עוֹף שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָמַר קְרָא ״וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוּדָה אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים״,
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states: “And Judah sent the kid of the goats” (Genesis 38:20).
כָּאן גְּדִי עִזִּים, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר גְּדִי סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״וְאֵת עֹרֹת גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״ – כָּאן ״גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״גְּדִי״ סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? הָווּ לְהוּ שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד – אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.
The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תְּרֵי מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי: ״עִזִּים״, ״הָעִזִּים״.
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַחֵלֶב, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמֵּתָה, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל.
§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.
״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּם, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַשִּׁלְיָא, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַטְּמֵאָה.
Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.
״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב שְׁחוּטָה, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב טְמֵאָה.
Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.
הָא תְּלָתָא ״גְּדִי״ כְּתִיבִי, וַאֲנַן שִׁיתָּא דָּרְשִׁינַן! קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְאִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וּמֵתָה מֵחַד קְרָא נָפְקִי. דָּם נָמֵי לָאו ״גְּדִי״ הוּא, וְשִׁלְיָא נָמֵי פִּירְשָׁא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא. פָּשׁוּ לְהוּ תְּרֵי: חַד לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.
וְסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מִנַּיִן לְכֹהֵן טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּמִיתָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ כִּי יְחַלְּלֻהוּ״ – פְּרַט לָזוֹ שֶׁמְּחוּלֶּלֶת וְעוֹמֶדֶת.
The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״גְּדִי״.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ.
And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי מֵרַב: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בַּחֲלֵב גְּדִי שֶׁלֹּא הֵנִיקָה, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיכָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל לְמֵימַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, זָכָר הוּא דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל אֵם, אֲבָל הַאי, כֵּיוָן דְּבָא לִכְלַל אֵם – אָסוּר.
§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.
אִתְּמַר: הַמְבַשֵּׁל חֵלֶב בְּחָלָב, רַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי – חַד אָמַר: לוֹקֶה, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.
It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, אַאֲכִילָה דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא לָקֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַבִּשּׁוּל. מַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – חַד אִיסּוּרָא הוּא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לַאֲכִילָה בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל,
The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”
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Chullin 113
וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מָלִיחַ הֲרֵי הוּא כְּרוֹתֵחַ, וְכָבוּשׁ הֲרֵי הוּא כִּמְבוּשָּׁל!
The Gemara objects: But let Rava say to him the same ruling by instead citing the seemingly more relevant statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A salted food imparts its flavor like a boiling food, and a marinated food is as absorbent as a cooked food. Clearly, the kosher meat absorbed flavor from the meat of the tereifa as it would have had they been cooked together.
אִי מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי – דָּמָן, אֲבָל צִירָן וְרוֹטְבָן – לָא, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: Had Rava based his ruling only on Shmuel’s statement, I would say in response: This statement applies only to the absorption of the blood of the meat, but kosher meat is not prohibited if it absorbs only the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa. Since in this case the meat is salted in a perforated vessel, the blood from each piece runs out and is not absorbed by the other, and one might think that the kosher meat remains permitted. Rava’s interpretation of the verse in Leviticus teaches us that the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa must also be taken into account.
מֵיתִיבִי: דָּג טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר. מַאי לָאו שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין? לָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where they were both salted and expel juices? This indicates that the kosher fish is not prohibited by the juices of the non-kosher fish, contrary to Rava’s statement. The Gemara responds: No, this is referring to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted. Since an unsalted fish does not emit juices, the kosher fish does not absorb the flavor of the non-kosher fish.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין עָסְקִינַן! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר, כֵּיצַד? שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: But if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted the kosher fish remains permitted, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where they are both salted. The Gemara responds: The latter clause is explaining the halakha of the first clause. The baraita should be read as follows: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. How so? This is the halakha if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ רֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים – הַשְׁתָּא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים שְׁרֵי, טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל מִיבַּעְיָא?
The Gemara notes: So, too, it is reasonable that this is the meaning of the baraita, as if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to a case where both of them are salted, one can claim: Now that the baraita has stated that even if both of them are salted the kosher fish is permitted, is it necessary to state that the same applies in the less problematic case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted?
אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא לָא אִירְיָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא, דְּלָא תֵּימָא רֵישָׁא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, אֲבָל שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין אָסוּר, תְּנָא סֵיפָא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי שְׁרֵי.
The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. It is possible that the first clause of the baraita is indeed referring to a case where both fish are salted, and the tanna of the baraita nevertheless taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you should not say: The first clause is referring only to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, but if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is prohibited. To rule this out, he taught the latter clause, which explicitly makes reference to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, which by inference indicates that the first clause is referring to a case where they are both salted, and teaches that even so the kosher fish is permitted.
תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא דְּסֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל – אָסוּר. טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין – שְׁרֵי.
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear proof against Rava’s ruling from the latter clause of the latter clause, i.e., the third clause of that baraita: But if the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish was unsalted, the kosher fish is prohibited. One can infer from here that it is only if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher fish is unsalted that the kosher fish is prohibited. But if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is permitted, contrary to Rava’s ruling.
אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא: טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, תְּנָא נָמֵי סֵיפָא: טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל.
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the last section of the baraita uses this language only since it teaches in the former clause, i.e., the second clause: If the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, etc. The baraita therefore taught the last clause as well using parallel language: If the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish unsalted, etc. But nothing can be derived from here with regard to a case where both fish were salted.
(סִימָן: בִּישְׂרָא דְּמַנַּח נַפְקוּתָא).
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the three halakhot stated by Shmuel below: The manner in which blood is expelled from meat; salted meat that is placed on a vessel; an animal whose neck is broken before its soul departs.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין הַבָּשָׂר יוֹצֵא מִידֵי דָּמוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מוֹלְחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה, וּמְדִיחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה. אִתְּמַר: רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: מוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. בְּמַתְנִיתָא תְּנָא: מֵדִיחַ וּמוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. וְלָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא דְּחַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא, הָא דְּלָא חַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא מָלַח לֵיהּ בְּמִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא, וּמְנַפֵּיץ לֵיהּ.
Shmuel says: Meat cannot be rid of its blood unless one salts it thoroughly and rinses it thoroughly in water. It was stated: Rav Huna says: One must salt and rinse the meat in water. And it was taught in a baraita: One must rinse the meat, and salt it, and then rinse it again. The Gemara adds: And these two rulings do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to a case where one already washed the meat in the slaughterhouse before salting, whereas that baraita is referring to a case where one did not wash the meat in the slaughterhouse. The Gemara relates: Rav Dimi of Neharde’a would salt meat with coarse salt and then shake the salt off the meat.
אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין דָּם בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים. תַּרְגְּמַאּ אַכַּרְכְּשָׁא וּמְעַיָּיא וְהַדְרָא דְּכַנְתָּא.
Rav Mesharshiyya says: One does not presume that there is blood in the intestines, and therefore they are not prohibited if they have not been salted. The Gemara comments: The Sages interpreted this statement as referring to the rectum, the intestines, and the spiral colon.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין מַנִּיחִין בָּשָׂר מָלִיחַ אֶלָּא עַל גַּבֵּי כְּלִי מְנוּקָּב.
Shmuel says: One may place salted meat only on a perforated vessel, so that the expelled blood can run out. But if the vessel is not perforated then the blood will pool and be reabsorbed by the meat.
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מָלַח לֵיהּ גַּרְמָא גַּרְמָא. תְּרֵי מַאי טַעְמָא לָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּפָרֵישׁ מֵהַאי וּבָלַע הַאי? חַד נָמֵי פָּרֵישׁ מֵהַאי גִּיסָא וּבָלַע הַאי גִּיסָא! אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.
The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet would salt meat one bone, i.e., one piece, at a time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he would not salt two together? Could it be because the blood leaves this piece and that piece absorbs it? If so, with regard to one piece as well, one could claim that the blood leaves this side of the piece and that side absorbs it. Rather, there is no difference between one piece and two pieces, and one may salt even several pieces together.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹבֵר מַפְרַקְתָּהּ שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשָׁהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, וּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים.
Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who breaks the neck of an animal after it is slaughtered but before its soul departs thereby makes the meat heavy. The meat expels blood at the time of slaughter, but if one breaks the animal’s neck, excess blood is trapped inside and weighs down the meat. And by this action he robs people, as he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs, and since he sells the meat by weight, people will pay extra to acquire the same amount of edible meat.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵיכִי קָאָמַר? מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת מִשּׁוּם דְּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים – הָא לְדִידֵיהּ שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי אֲסִיר? תֵּיקוּ.
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is he speaking? Does Shmuel mean that there is only one problem with this practice, namely, that it renders the meat heavy and robs people since he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs? If so, it may be inferred that if one wishes to keep the meat for himself, one may well do so, since he is robbing no one. Or perhaps Shmuel is referring to two prohibitions, first, that the blood trapped in the meat renders it prohibited for consumption, and second, that of robbery. If so, then even if one wants to keep the meat for himself, it is also prohibited. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
MISHNA: One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
גְּמָ׳ הָא אוֹכְלוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא! אֵימָא: הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשּׁוּלְחָן – אֵינוֹ בָּא לִידֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Since the mishna mentions only that placing meat of birds and milk on one table does not violate a Torah prohibition, one may consequently infer that if one eats them together he does violate a Torah prohibition. If so, learn from the mishna that meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that it applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara responds: Say that the mishna should be understood as follows: One who places bird meat with cheese on the table will not thereby come to violate a Torah prohibition, since eating the two together is a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Akiva maintains.
מַתְנִי׳ בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – מוּתָּר לְבַשֵּׁל וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּה וָעוֹף אֵינָם מִן הַתּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – פְּרָט לְחַיָּה, וּלְעוֹף, וּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
MISHNA: It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״, אֶת שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב. עוֹף שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה, יָכוֹל יְהֵא אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – יָצָא עוֹף שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָמַר קְרָא ״וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוּדָה אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים״,
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states: “And Judah sent the kid of the goats” (Genesis 38:20).
כָּאן גְּדִי עִזִּים, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר גְּדִי סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״וְאֵת עֹרֹת גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״ – כָּאן ״גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״גְּדִי״ סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? הָווּ לְהוּ שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד – אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.
The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תְּרֵי מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי: ״עִזִּים״, ״הָעִזִּים״.
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַחֵלֶב, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמֵּתָה, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל.
§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.
״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּם, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַשִּׁלְיָא, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַטְּמֵאָה.
Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.
״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב שְׁחוּטָה, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב טְמֵאָה.
Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.
הָא תְּלָתָא ״גְּדִי״ כְּתִיבִי, וַאֲנַן שִׁיתָּא דָּרְשִׁינַן! קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְאִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וּמֵתָה מֵחַד קְרָא נָפְקִי. דָּם נָמֵי לָאו ״גְּדִי״ הוּא, וְשִׁלְיָא נָמֵי פִּירְשָׁא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא. פָּשׁוּ לְהוּ תְּרֵי: חַד לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.
וְסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מִנַּיִן לְכֹהֵן טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּמִיתָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ כִּי יְחַלְּלֻהוּ״ – פְּרַט לָזוֹ שֶׁמְּחוּלֶּלֶת וְעוֹמֶדֶת.
The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״גְּדִי״.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ.
And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי מֵרַב: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בַּחֲלֵב גְּדִי שֶׁלֹּא הֵנִיקָה, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיכָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל לְמֵימַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, זָכָר הוּא דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל אֵם, אֲבָל הַאי, כֵּיוָן דְּבָא לִכְלַל אֵם – אָסוּר.
§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.
אִתְּמַר: הַמְבַשֵּׁל חֵלֶב בְּחָלָב, רַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי – חַד אָמַר: לוֹקֶה, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.
It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, אַאֲכִילָה דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא לָקֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַבִּשּׁוּל. מַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – חַד אִיסּוּרָא הוּא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לַאֲכִילָה בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל,
The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”
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