There are different opinions regarding whether it is forbidden to cook undomesticated animals or birds with milk. The mishna and gemara also discuss other cases and whether or not one would be obligated for cooking/eating milk and meat in that case.
This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
Chullin 113
ולימא ליה מדשמואל דאמר שמואל מליח הרי הוא כרותח וכבוש הרי הוא כמבושל
The Gemara objects: But let Rava say to him the same ruling by instead citing the seemingly more relevant statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A salted food imparts its flavor like a boiling food, and a marinated food is as absorbent as a cooked food. Clearly, the kosher meat absorbed flavor from the meat of the tereifa as it would have had they been cooked together.
אי מדשמואל הוה אמינא הני מילי דמן אבל צירן ורוטבן לא קמשמע לן
The Gemara explains: Had Rava based his ruling only on Shmuel’s statement, I would say in response: This statement applies only to the absorption of the blood of the meat, but kosher meat is not prohibited if it absorbs only the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa. Since in this case the meat is salted in a perforated vessel, the blood from each piece runs out and is not absorbed by the other, and one might think that the kosher meat remains permitted. Rava’s interpretation of the verse in Leviticus teaches us that the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa must also be taken into account.
מיתיבי דג טהור שמלחו עם דג טמא מותר מאי לאו שהיו שניהן מלוחין לא כגון שהיה טהור מליח וטמא תפל
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where they were both salted and expel juices? This indicates that the kosher fish is not prohibited by the juices of the non-kosher fish, contrary to Rava’s statement. The Gemara responds: No, this is referring to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted. Since an unsalted fish does not emit juices, the kosher fish does not absorb the flavor of the non-kosher fish.
והא מדקתני סיפא (אבל אם היה טהור מליח וטמא תפל) מכלל דרישא בששניהם מלוחין עסקינן פרושי קא מפרש טהור שמלחו עם דג טמא מותר כיצד שהיה טהור מליח וטמא תפל
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: But if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted the kosher fish remains permitted, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where they are both salted. The Gemara responds: The latter clause is explaining the halakha of the first clause. The baraita should be read as follows: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. How so? This is the halakha if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted.
ה”נ מסתברא דאי סלקא דעתך רישא שניהם מלוחים השתא שניהם מלוחים שרי טהור מליח וטמא תפל מיבעיא
The Gemara notes: So, too, it is reasonable that this is the meaning of the baraita, as if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to a case where both of them are salted, one can claim: Now that the baraita has stated that even if both of them are salted the kosher fish is permitted, is it necessary to state that the same applies in the less problematic case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted?
אי משום הא לא איריא תנא סיפא לגלויי רישא דלא תימא רישא טהור מליח וטמא תפל אבל שניהם מלוחין אסור תנא סיפא טהור מליח וטמא תפל מכלל דרישא שניהן מלוחין ואפ”ה שרי
The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. It is possible that the first clause of the baraita is indeed referring to a case where both fish are salted, and the tanna of the baraita nevertheless taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you should not say: The first clause is referring only to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, but if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is prohibited. To rule this out, he taught the latter clause, which explicitly makes reference to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, which by inference indicates that the first clause is referring to a case where they are both salted, and teaches that even so the kosher fish is permitted.
ת”ש מסיפא דסיפא אבל אם היה טמא מליח וטהור תפל אסור טמא מליח וטהור תפל הוא דאסור הא שניהן מלוחין שרי
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear proof against Rava’s ruling from the latter clause of the latter clause, i.e., the third clause of that baraita: But if the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish was unsalted, the kosher fish is prohibited. One can infer from here that it is only if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher fish is unsalted that the kosher fish is prohibited. But if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is permitted, contrary to Rava’s ruling.
איידי דתנא רישא טהור מליח וטמא תפל תנא נמי סיפא טמא מליח וטהור תפל
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the last section of the baraita uses this language only since it teaches in the former clause, i.e., the second clause: If the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, etc. The baraita therefore taught the last clause as well using parallel language: If the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish unsalted, etc. But nothing can be derived from here with regard to a case where both fish were salted.
(סימן בישרא דמנח נפקותא)
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the three halakhot stated by Shmuel below: The manner in which blood is expelled from meat; salted meat that is placed on a vessel; an animal whose neck is broken before its soul departs.
אמר שמואל אין הבשר יוצא מידי דמו אלא א”כ מולחו יפה יפה ומדיחו יפה יפה אתמר רב הונא אמר מולח ומדיח במתניתא תנא מדיח ומולח ומדיח ולא פליגי הא דחלליה בי טבחא הא דלא חלליה בי טבחא רב דימי מנהרדעא מלח ליה במילחא גללניתא ומנפיץ ליה
Shmuel says: Meat cannot be rid of its blood unless one salts it thoroughly and rinses it thoroughly in water. It was stated: Rav Huna says: One must salt and rinse the meat in water. And it was taught in a baraita: One must rinse the meat, and salt it, and then rinse it again. The Gemara adds: And these two rulings do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to a case where one already washed the meat in the slaughterhouse before salting, whereas that baraita is referring to a case where one did not wash the meat in the slaughterhouse. The Gemara relates: Rav Dimi of Neharde’a would salt meat with coarse salt and then shake the salt off the meat.
אמר רב משרשיא אין מחזיקין דם בבני מעיים תרגמא אכרכשא ומעייא והדרא דכנתא
Rav Mesharshiyya says: One does not presume that there is blood in the intestines, and therefore they are not prohibited if they have not been salted. The Gemara comments: The Sages interpreted this statement as referring to the rectum, the intestines, and the spiral colon.
אמר שמואל אין מניחין בשר מליח אלא ע”ג כלי מנוקב
Shmuel says: One may place salted meat only on a perforated vessel, so that the expelled blood can run out. But if the vessel is not perforated then the blood will pool and be reabsorbed by the meat.
רב ששת מלח ליה גרמא גרמא תרי מאי טעמא לא משום דפריש מהאי ובלע האי חד נמי פריש מהאי גיסא ובלע האי גיסא אלא לא שנא
The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet would salt meat one bone, i.e., one piece, at a time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he would not salt two together? Could it be because the blood leaves this piece and that piece absorbs it? If so, with regard to one piece as well, one could claim that the blood leaves this side of the piece and that side absorbs it. Rather, there is no difference between one piece and two pieces, and one may salt even several pieces together.
אמר שמואל משום ר’ חייא השובר מפרקתה של בהמה קודם שתצא נפשה הרי זה מכביד את הבשר וגוזל את הבריות ומבליע דם באברים
Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who breaks the neck of an animal after it is slaughtered but before its soul departs thereby makes the meat heavy. The meat expels blood at the time of slaughter, but if one breaks the animal’s neck, excess blood is trapped inside and weighs down the meat. And by this action he robs people, as he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs, and since he sells the meat by weight, people will pay extra to acquire the same amount of edible meat.
איבעיא להו היכי קאמר מכביד את הבשר וגוזל את הבריות משום דמבליע דם באברים הא לדידיה שפיר דמי או דלמא לדידיה נמי אסור תיקו:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is he speaking? Does Shmuel mean that there is only one problem with this practice, namely, that it renders the meat heavy and robs people since he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs? If so, it may be inferred that if one wishes to keep the meat for himself, one may well do so, since he is robbing no one. Or perhaps Shmuel is referring to two prohibitions, first, that the blood trapped in the meat renders it prohibited for consumption, and second, that of robbery. If so, then even if one wants to keep the meat for himself, it is also prohibited. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מתני׳ המעלה את העוף עם הגבינה על השלחן אינו עובר בלא תעשה:
MISHNA: One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
גמ׳ הא אוכלו עובר בלא תעשה שמע מינה בשר עוף בחלב דאורייתא אימא המעלה את העוף עם הגבינה על השולחן אינו בא לידי לא תעשה:
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Since the mishna mentions only that placing meat of birds and milk on one table does not violate a Torah prohibition, one may consequently infer that if one eats them together he does violate a Torah prohibition. If so, learn from the mishna that meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that it applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara responds: Say that the mishna should be understood as follows: One who places bird meat with cheese on the table will not thereby come to violate a Torah prohibition, since eating the two together is a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Akiva maintains.
מתני׳ בשר בהמה טהורה בחלב בהמה טהורה אסור לבשל ואסור בהנאה בשר בהמה טהורה בחלב בהמה טמאה בשר בהמה טמאה בחלב בהמה טהורה מותר לבשל ומותר בהנאה ר”ע אומר חיה ועוף אינם מן התורה שנאמר (שמות כג, יט) לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו ג’ פעמים פרט לחיה ולעוף ובהמה טמאה
MISHNA: It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.
רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר נאמר (דברים יד, כא) לא תאכלו כל נבלה ונאמר לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו את שאסור משום נבלה אסור לבשל בחלב עוף שאסור משום נבלה יכול יהא אסור לבשל בחלב ת”ל בחלב אמו יצא עוף שאין לו חלב אם:
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
גמ׳ מנא הני מילי א”ר אלעזר אמר קרא (בראשית לח, כ) וישלח יהודה את גדי העזים
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states: “And Judah sent the kid of the goats” (Genesis 38:20).
כאן גדי עזים הא כל מקום שנאמר גדי סתם אפילו פרה ורחל במשמע
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
ולילף מיניה כתיב קרא אחרינא (בראשית כז, טז) ואת עורות גדיי העזים כאן גדיי העזים הא כל מקום שנאמר גדי סתם אפילו פרה ורחל במשמע
The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.
ולילף מיניה הוו להו שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין
The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.
הניחא למ”ד אין מלמדין אלא למ”ד מלמדין מאי איכא למימר תרי מיעוטי כתיבי עזים העזים
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.
אמר שמואל גדי לרבות את החלב גדי לרבות את המתה גדי לרבות את השליל
§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.
גדי להוציא את הדם גדי להוציא את השליא גדי להוציא את הטמאה
Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.
בחלב אמו ולא בחלב זכר בחלב אמו ולא בחלב שחוטה בחלב אמו ולא בחלב טמאה
Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.
הא תלתא גדי כתיבי ואנן שיתא דרשינן קסבר שמואל איסור חל על איסור ואיסור חלב ומתה מחד קרא נפקי דם נמי לאו גדי הוא ושליא נמי פירשא בעלמא הוא פשו להו תרי חד לרבות את השליל וחד למעוטי בהמה טמאה
The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.
וסבר שמואל איסור חל על איסור והאמר שמואל משום ר’ אלעזר מנין לכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טמאה שאינו במיתה שנאמר (ויקרא כב, ט) ומתו בו כי יחללוהו פרט לזו שמחוללת ועומדת
The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.
איבעית אימא בעלמא איסור חל על איסור ושאני התם דמיעט רחמנא ומתו בו איבעית אימא בעלמא קסבר שמואל אין איסור חל על איסור ושאני הכא דרבי רחמנא גדי
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”
ואיבעית אימא הא דידיה הא דרביה
And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
בעא מיניה רב אחדבוי בר אמי מרב המבשל בחלב גדי שלא הניקה מהו א”ל מדאיצטריכא לשמואל למימר בחלב אמו ולא בחלב זכר זכר הוא דלא אתי לכלל אם אבל האי כיון דבא לכלל אם אסור
§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.
אתמר המבשל חלב בחלב רבי אמי ורבי אסי חד אמר לוקה וחד אמר אינו לוקה לימא בהא קמיפלגי דמ”ד לוקה קסבר איסור חל על איסור ומאן דאמר אינו לוקה קסבר אין איסור חל על איסור
It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
לא דכ”ע אין איסור חל על איסור אאכילה דכ”ע לא פליגי דלא לקי כי פליגי אבשול מ”ד לוקה חד איסורא הוא ומ”ד אינו לוקה להכי אפקה רחמנא לאכילה בלשון בישול
The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”
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Far Rockaway, United States
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Caroline Graham-Ofstein
Bet Shemesh, Israel
I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.
Adina Hagege
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
I decided to learn one masechet, Brachot, but quickly fell in love and never stopped! It has been great, everyone is always asking how it’s going and chering me on, and my students are always making sure I did the day’s daf.
Yafit Fishbach
Memphis, Tennessee, United States
The start of my journey is not so exceptional. I was between jobs and wanted to be sure to get out every day (this was before corona). Well, I was hooked after about a month and from then on only looked for work-from-home jobs so I could continue learning the Daf. Daf has been a constant in my life, though hurricanes, death, illness/injury, weddings. My new friends are Rav, Shmuel, Ruth, Joanna.
Judi Felber
Raanana, Israel
I started learning daf in January, 2020, being inspired by watching the Siyyum Hashas in Binyanei Haumah. I wasn’t sure I would be able to keep up with the task. When I went to school, Gemara was not an option. Fast forward to March, 2022, and each day starts with the daf. The challenge is now learning the intricacies of delving into the actual learning. Hadran community, thank you!
Rochel Cheifetz
Riverdale, NY, United States
Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.
Lisa S. Malik
Wynnewood, United States
A friend mentioned that she was starting Daf Yomi in January 2020. I had heard of it and thought, why not? I decided to try it – go day by day and not think about the seven plus year commitment. Fast forward today, over two years in and I can’t imagine my life without Daf Yomi. It’s part of my morning ritual. If I have a busy day ahead of me I set my alarm to get up early to finish the day’s daf
Debbie Fitzerman
Ontario, Canada
I started learning Dec 2019 after reading “If all the Seas Were Ink”. I found
Daily daf sessions of Rabbanit Michelle in her house teaching, I then heard about the siyum and a new cycle starting wow I am in! Afternoon here in Sydney, my family and friends know this is my sacred time to hide away to live zoom and learn. Often it’s hard to absorb and relate then a gem shines touching my heart.
Dianne Kuchar
Dover Heights, Australia
After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.
Madeline Cohen
London, United Kingdom
I started learning Daf Yomi inspired by תָּפַסְתָּ מְרוּבֶּה לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ, תָּפַסְתָּ מוּעָט תָּפַסְתָּ. I thought I’d start the first page, and then see. I was swept up into the enthusiasm of the Hadran Siyum, and from there the momentum kept building. Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur gives me an anchor, a connection to an incredible virtual community, and an energy to face whatever the day brings.
Medinah Korn
בית שמש, Israel
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Shira Jacobowitz
Jerusalem, Israel
I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.
Adina Hagege
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
In July, 2012 I wrote for Tablet about the first all women’s siyum at Matan in Jerusalem, with 100 women. At the time, I thought, I would like to start with the next cycle – listening to a podcast at different times of day makes it possible. It is incredible that after 10 years, so many women are so engaged!
Beth Kissileff
Pittsburgh, United States
I decided to learn one masechet, Brachot, but quickly fell in love and never stopped! It has been great, everyone is always asking how it’s going and chering me on, and my students are always making sure I did the day’s daf.
Yafit Fishbach
Memphis, Tennessee, United States
When we heard that R. Michelle was starting daf yomi, my 11-year-old suggested that I go. Little did she know that she would lose me every morning from then on. I remember standing at the Farbers’ door, almost too shy to enter. After that first class, I said that I would come the next day but couldn’t commit to more. A decade later, I still look forward to learning from R. Michelle every morning.
Ruth Leah Kahan
Ra’anana, Israel
I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!
Batsheva Pava
Hashmonaim, Israel
I have joined the community of daf yomi learners at the start of this cycle. I have studied in different ways – by reading the page, translating the page, attending a local shiur and listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcasts, depending on circumstances and where I was at the time. The reactions have been positive throughout – with no exception!
Silke Goldberg
Guildford, United Kingdom
As Jewish educator and as a woman, I’m mindful that Talmud has been kept from women for many centuries. Now that we are privileged to learn, and learning is so accessible, it’s my intent to complete Daf Yomi. I am so excited to keep learning with my Hadran community.
Sue Parker Gerson
Denver, United States
Chullin 113
ולימא ליה מדשמואל דאמר שמואל מליח הרי הוא כרותח וכבוש הרי הוא כמבושל
The Gemara objects: But let Rava say to him the same ruling by instead citing the seemingly more relevant statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A salted food imparts its flavor like a boiling food, and a marinated food is as absorbent as a cooked food. Clearly, the kosher meat absorbed flavor from the meat of the tereifa as it would have had they been cooked together.
אי מדשמואל הוה אמינא הני מילי דמן אבל צירן ורוטבן לא קמשמע לן
The Gemara explains: Had Rava based his ruling only on Shmuel’s statement, I would say in response: This statement applies only to the absorption of the blood of the meat, but kosher meat is not prohibited if it absorbs only the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa. Since in this case the meat is salted in a perforated vessel, the blood from each piece runs out and is not absorbed by the other, and one might think that the kosher meat remains permitted. Rava’s interpretation of the verse in Leviticus teaches us that the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa must also be taken into account.
מיתיבי דג טהור שמלחו עם דג טמא מותר מאי לאו שהיו שניהן מלוחין לא כגון שהיה טהור מליח וטמא תפל
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where they were both salted and expel juices? This indicates that the kosher fish is not prohibited by the juices of the non-kosher fish, contrary to Rava’s statement. The Gemara responds: No, this is referring to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted. Since an unsalted fish does not emit juices, the kosher fish does not absorb the flavor of the non-kosher fish.
והא מדקתני סיפא (אבל אם היה טהור מליח וטמא תפל) מכלל דרישא בששניהם מלוחין עסקינן פרושי קא מפרש טהור שמלחו עם דג טמא מותר כיצד שהיה טהור מליח וטמא תפל
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: But if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted the kosher fish remains permitted, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where they are both salted. The Gemara responds: The latter clause is explaining the halakha of the first clause. The baraita should be read as follows: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. How so? This is the halakha if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted.
ה”נ מסתברא דאי סלקא דעתך רישא שניהם מלוחים השתא שניהם מלוחים שרי טהור מליח וטמא תפל מיבעיא
The Gemara notes: So, too, it is reasonable that this is the meaning of the baraita, as if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to a case where both of them are salted, one can claim: Now that the baraita has stated that even if both of them are salted the kosher fish is permitted, is it necessary to state that the same applies in the less problematic case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted?
אי משום הא לא איריא תנא סיפא לגלויי רישא דלא תימא רישא טהור מליח וטמא תפל אבל שניהם מלוחין אסור תנא סיפא טהור מליח וטמא תפל מכלל דרישא שניהן מלוחין ואפ”ה שרי
The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. It is possible that the first clause of the baraita is indeed referring to a case where both fish are salted, and the tanna of the baraita nevertheless taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you should not say: The first clause is referring only to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, but if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is prohibited. To rule this out, he taught the latter clause, which explicitly makes reference to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, which by inference indicates that the first clause is referring to a case where they are both salted, and teaches that even so the kosher fish is permitted.
ת”ש מסיפא דסיפא אבל אם היה טמא מליח וטהור תפל אסור טמא מליח וטהור תפל הוא דאסור הא שניהן מלוחין שרי
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear proof against Rava’s ruling from the latter clause of the latter clause, i.e., the third clause of that baraita: But if the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish was unsalted, the kosher fish is prohibited. One can infer from here that it is only if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher fish is unsalted that the kosher fish is prohibited. But if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is permitted, contrary to Rava’s ruling.
איידי דתנא רישא טהור מליח וטמא תפל תנא נמי סיפא טמא מליח וטהור תפל
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the last section of the baraita uses this language only since it teaches in the former clause, i.e., the second clause: If the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, etc. The baraita therefore taught the last clause as well using parallel language: If the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish unsalted, etc. But nothing can be derived from here with regard to a case where both fish were salted.
(סימן בישרא דמנח נפקותא)
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the three halakhot stated by Shmuel below: The manner in which blood is expelled from meat; salted meat that is placed on a vessel; an animal whose neck is broken before its soul departs.
אמר שמואל אין הבשר יוצא מידי דמו אלא א”כ מולחו יפה יפה ומדיחו יפה יפה אתמר רב הונא אמר מולח ומדיח במתניתא תנא מדיח ומולח ומדיח ולא פליגי הא דחלליה בי טבחא הא דלא חלליה בי טבחא רב דימי מנהרדעא מלח ליה במילחא גללניתא ומנפיץ ליה
Shmuel says: Meat cannot be rid of its blood unless one salts it thoroughly and rinses it thoroughly in water. It was stated: Rav Huna says: One must salt and rinse the meat in water. And it was taught in a baraita: One must rinse the meat, and salt it, and then rinse it again. The Gemara adds: And these two rulings do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to a case where one already washed the meat in the slaughterhouse before salting, whereas that baraita is referring to a case where one did not wash the meat in the slaughterhouse. The Gemara relates: Rav Dimi of Neharde’a would salt meat with coarse salt and then shake the salt off the meat.
אמר רב משרשיא אין מחזיקין דם בבני מעיים תרגמא אכרכשא ומעייא והדרא דכנתא
Rav Mesharshiyya says: One does not presume that there is blood in the intestines, and therefore they are not prohibited if they have not been salted. The Gemara comments: The Sages interpreted this statement as referring to the rectum, the intestines, and the spiral colon.
אמר שמואל אין מניחין בשר מליח אלא ע”ג כלי מנוקב
Shmuel says: One may place salted meat only on a perforated vessel, so that the expelled blood can run out. But if the vessel is not perforated then the blood will pool and be reabsorbed by the meat.
רב ששת מלח ליה גרמא גרמא תרי מאי טעמא לא משום דפריש מהאי ובלע האי חד נמי פריש מהאי גיסא ובלע האי גיסא אלא לא שנא
The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet would salt meat one bone, i.e., one piece, at a time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he would not salt two together? Could it be because the blood leaves this piece and that piece absorbs it? If so, with regard to one piece as well, one could claim that the blood leaves this side of the piece and that side absorbs it. Rather, there is no difference between one piece and two pieces, and one may salt even several pieces together.
אמר שמואל משום ר’ חייא השובר מפרקתה של בהמה קודם שתצא נפשה הרי זה מכביד את הבשר וגוזל את הבריות ומבליע דם באברים
Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who breaks the neck of an animal after it is slaughtered but before its soul departs thereby makes the meat heavy. The meat expels blood at the time of slaughter, but if one breaks the animal’s neck, excess blood is trapped inside and weighs down the meat. And by this action he robs people, as he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs, and since he sells the meat by weight, people will pay extra to acquire the same amount of edible meat.
איבעיא להו היכי קאמר מכביד את הבשר וגוזל את הבריות משום דמבליע דם באברים הא לדידיה שפיר דמי או דלמא לדידיה נמי אסור תיקו:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is he speaking? Does Shmuel mean that there is only one problem with this practice, namely, that it renders the meat heavy and robs people since he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs? If so, it may be inferred that if one wishes to keep the meat for himself, one may well do so, since he is robbing no one. Or perhaps Shmuel is referring to two prohibitions, first, that the blood trapped in the meat renders it prohibited for consumption, and second, that of robbery. If so, then even if one wants to keep the meat for himself, it is also prohibited. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מתני׳ המעלה את העוף עם הגבינה על השלחן אינו עובר בלא תעשה:
MISHNA: One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
גמ׳ הא אוכלו עובר בלא תעשה שמע מינה בשר עוף בחלב דאורייתא אימא המעלה את העוף עם הגבינה על השולחן אינו בא לידי לא תעשה:
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Since the mishna mentions only that placing meat of birds and milk on one table does not violate a Torah prohibition, one may consequently infer that if one eats them together he does violate a Torah prohibition. If so, learn from the mishna that meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that it applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara responds: Say that the mishna should be understood as follows: One who places bird meat with cheese on the table will not thereby come to violate a Torah prohibition, since eating the two together is a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Akiva maintains.
מתני׳ בשר בהמה טהורה בחלב בהמה טהורה אסור לבשל ואסור בהנאה בשר בהמה טהורה בחלב בהמה טמאה בשר בהמה טמאה בחלב בהמה טהורה מותר לבשל ומותר בהנאה ר”ע אומר חיה ועוף אינם מן התורה שנאמר (שמות כג, יט) לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו ג’ פעמים פרט לחיה ולעוף ובהמה טמאה
MISHNA: It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.
רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר נאמר (דברים יד, כא) לא תאכלו כל נבלה ונאמר לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו את שאסור משום נבלה אסור לבשל בחלב עוף שאסור משום נבלה יכול יהא אסור לבשל בחלב ת”ל בחלב אמו יצא עוף שאין לו חלב אם:
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
גמ׳ מנא הני מילי א”ר אלעזר אמר קרא (בראשית לח, כ) וישלח יהודה את גדי העזים
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states: “And Judah sent the kid of the goats” (Genesis 38:20).
כאן גדי עזים הא כל מקום שנאמר גדי סתם אפילו פרה ורחל במשמע
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
ולילף מיניה כתיב קרא אחרינא (בראשית כז, טז) ואת עורות גדיי העזים כאן גדיי העזים הא כל מקום שנאמר גדי סתם אפילו פרה ורחל במשמע
The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.
ולילף מיניה הוו להו שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין
The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.
הניחא למ”ד אין מלמדין אלא למ”ד מלמדין מאי איכא למימר תרי מיעוטי כתיבי עזים העזים
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.
אמר שמואל גדי לרבות את החלב גדי לרבות את המתה גדי לרבות את השליל
§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.
גדי להוציא את הדם גדי להוציא את השליא גדי להוציא את הטמאה
Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.
בחלב אמו ולא בחלב זכר בחלב אמו ולא בחלב שחוטה בחלב אמו ולא בחלב טמאה
Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.
הא תלתא גדי כתיבי ואנן שיתא דרשינן קסבר שמואל איסור חל על איסור ואיסור חלב ומתה מחד קרא נפקי דם נמי לאו גדי הוא ושליא נמי פירשא בעלמא הוא פשו להו תרי חד לרבות את השליל וחד למעוטי בהמה טמאה
The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.
וסבר שמואל איסור חל על איסור והאמר שמואל משום ר’ אלעזר מנין לכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טמאה שאינו במיתה שנאמר (ויקרא כב, ט) ומתו בו כי יחללוהו פרט לזו שמחוללת ועומדת
The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.
איבעית אימא בעלמא איסור חל על איסור ושאני התם דמיעט רחמנא ומתו בו איבעית אימא בעלמא קסבר שמואל אין איסור חל על איסור ושאני הכא דרבי רחמנא גדי
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”
ואיבעית אימא הא דידיה הא דרביה
And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
בעא מיניה רב אחדבוי בר אמי מרב המבשל בחלב גדי שלא הניקה מהו א”ל מדאיצטריכא לשמואל למימר בחלב אמו ולא בחלב זכר זכר הוא דלא אתי לכלל אם אבל האי כיון דבא לכלל אם אסור
§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.
אתמר המבשל חלב בחלב רבי אמי ורבי אסי חד אמר לוקה וחד אמר אינו לוקה לימא בהא קמיפלגי דמ”ד לוקה קסבר איסור חל על איסור ומאן דאמר אינו לוקה קסבר אין איסור חל על איסור
It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
לא דכ”ע אין איסור חל על איסור אאכילה דכ”ע לא פליגי דלא לקי כי פליגי אבשול מ”ד לוקה חד איסורא הוא ומ”ד אינו לוקה להכי אפקה רחמנא לאכילה בלשון בישול
The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”
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