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Daf Yomi

January 19, 2024 | 讟壮 讘砖讘讟 转砖驻状讚

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.聽

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 78

Rava said that the word “se – sheep” in the Torah comes to exclude mixed breeds. To what halakha was this statement referring to? If one took upon oneself to bring a sacrifice of a burnt offering (“harei alai olah“), designated a bull and then someone stole it, does the thief have to replace it with a bull or can the thief replace it with a sheep or bird as the original owner can give one of those as an offering to fulfill their commitment? If a thief did not completely sell the animal or did not do a proper slaughter, there is no four/five payment. There are four different opinions regarding what part of the animal the thief would leave for him/herself which would render the animal still partially owned by the thief, thereby exempting the thief from the four/five payment. There are contradictory braitot regarding partners who stole and animal and one of them sold it – one says the one who sold it is liable and the other, exempt. How does Rav Nachman resolve this contradiction? Rav Yirmia and Rav Papa ask more questions regarding cases of partial sales of the animals. Their questions are left unanswered.

讛讗 讙讘讬 拽讚砖讬诐 谞诪讬 谞讗诪专 砖讜专 讗讜 讻砖讘 砖讗讬谉 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讻诇讗讬诐 诪讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜谞专讘讬 诪讚住讬驻讗 诇诪注讟 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 诇诪注讟 讗讚专讘讛 诪讚专讬砖讗 诇专讘讜转 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 诇专讘讜转


The Gemara asks: But with regard to sacrificial animals it is also stated in the first part of the verse: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep鈥 (Leviticus 22:27), which are two animals from which you cannot produce diverse kinds. And accordingly, let us include an animal of diverse kinds as being fit for sacrifice on the altar on that account. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the latter clause of the verse: 鈥淥r a goat,鈥 serves to exclude a type of animal from being fit for sacrifice on the altar, it may be inferred that the first clause: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep,鈥 also serves to exclude a type of animal from being fit for sacrifice on the altar. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, one could equally argue that from the fact that the first clause of the verse serves to include a type of animal as being fit for sacrifice on the altar, the latter clause also serves to include a type of animal as being fit for sacrifice on the altar.


讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇诪注讟 讛讜讗 讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 转专讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬诪注讟 讻诇讗讬诐 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪注讜讟讬 谞讚诪讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇专讘讜转 转专讬 专讬讘讜讬讬 诇诪讛 讛砖转讗 讻诇讗讬诐 讗讬专讘讬 诇讬讛 谞讚诪讛 诪讘注讬讗


The Gemara rejects this argument: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that both expressions serve to exclude types of animals from being fit for sacrifice on the altar, this is why two exclusions were necessary: One exclusion is referring to diverse kinds and the other is referring to an animal that resembles another species, as even though an animal of diverse kinds is excluded, it was still necessary to exclude an animal that resembles another. But if you say that both phrases serve to include types of animals as being fit for sacrifice on the altar, why are two inclusions required? Now that an animal of diverse kinds has been included, in the first inclusion, is it necessary to say that an animal that resembles another is also included? There is more justification for including an animal that resembles another, whose parentage is entirely of one species, than for including an animal of diverse kinds.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讛 讘谞讛 讗讘 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 砖讛 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讛讻诇讗讬诐 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讬 诇拽讚砖讬诐 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 砖讜专 讗讜 讻砖讘 驻专讟 诇讻诇讗讬诐


The Gemara has established that when the Torah uses the word seh (Exodus 21:37) in the context of theft it does not serve to exclude animals of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: If so, what is meant by this statement that Rava says with regard to the verse: 鈥淭he ox, the seh of a sheep, and the seh of a goat鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this establishes a paradigm for other cases, teaching that wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves to exclude only an animal of diverse kinds. With regard to what halakha did Rava state this principle? If this principle is referring to the halakha concerning sacrificial animals, it is written explicitly with regard to them: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep鈥 (Leviticus 22:27), which, as taught in the aforementioned baraita, serves to exclude diverse kinds.


讗讬 诇诪注砖专 转讞转 转讞转 讬诇讬祝 诪拽讚砖讬诐


If this principle is referring to the halakha concerning animal tithe, concerning which it is written: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock [tzon], any one that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32), this principle is not necessary either. The reason is that the exclusion of diverse kinds can be derived by means of a verbal analogy from the term 鈥渦nder鈥 in this verse, and the word 鈥渦nder鈥 in a verse that deals with sacrificial animals: 鈥淲hen a bull, or a sheep, or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother鈥 (Leviticus 22:27). This verbal analogy, from which many halakhot of animal tithe are derived, indicates that diverse kinds are not subject to animal tithe, just as they cannot be used for an offering.


讗讬 诇讘讻讜专 讛注讘专讛 讛注讘专讛 讬诇讬祝 诪诪注砖专


If this principle is referring to firstborn animals, concerning which it is written: 鈥淗owever, the firstborn among animals, which is born as a firstling to the Lord, no man shall sanctify it; whether it be ox or seh, it is the Lord鈥檚鈥 (Leviticus 27:26), it is not necessary in that context either. The reason is that this can be derived by a verbal analogy between the term passing, in the verse: 鈥淎nd you shall cause to pass to the Lord all that open the womb鈥 (Exodus 13:12), and the same term passing, from a verse concerning animal tithe: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock, any one that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32). This verbal analogy teaches that if the firstborn of a ewe or a she-goat is an animal of diverse kinds it is not considered a firstborn with regard to the halakhot of firstborn animals, which means that Rava鈥檚 principle is not necessary here.


讗讬 谞诪讬 谞讚诪讛 讗诪专转 诇讗 讚讻转讬讘 讗讱 讘讻讜专 砖讜专 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讛讜讗 砖讜专 讜讘讻讜专讜 砖讜专 讻诇讗讬诐 诪讘注讬讗


Alternatively, you must say that an animal that resembles another is not subject to the halakhot of a firstborn, as it is written: 鈥淏ut the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are holy鈥 (Numbers 18:17). This indicates that the halakhot of the firstborn are not applicable unless the fathering animal is a bull and its firstborn is also a bull. This excludes an animal that resembles another species, rather than its father. Once it is established that an animal that resembles another is not subject to the halakhot of a firstborn, is it necessary for the Torah to state the same with regard to diverse kinds? Since it is evident that firstborn status does not apply to diverse kinds, Rava鈥檚 principle is not required here either.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 诇注谞讬谉 驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讻讚转谞谉 讗讬谉 驻讜讚讬谉 诇讗 讘注讙诇 讜诇讗 讘讞讬讛 讜诇讗 讘砖讞讜讟讛 讜诇讗 讘讟专讬驻讛 讜诇讗 讘讻诇讗讬诐 讜诇讗 讘讻讜讬


Rather, Rava鈥檚 principle was stated with regard to the redemption of a firstborn donkey, concerning which it is written: 鈥淎nd every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a seh鈥 (Exodus 13:13), as we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 12a): One may not redeem a firstborn donkey neither with a calf, nor with a non-domesticated animal, nor with a slaughtered animal, nor with a tereifa animal, nor with diverse kinds, i.e., a sheep-goat hybrid, nor with a koy. Rava鈥檚 principle is referring to the source for the prohibition against using an animal of diverse kinds for the redemption of a firstborn donkey.


讜诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚诪转讬专 讘讻诇讗讬诐 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪转讬专 讘讻诇讗讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 砖讛 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗


The Gemara asks: But what about according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with this ruling and permits the use of an animal of diverse kinds for the redemption of a firstborn donkey? As we learned in the same mishna: Rabbi Elazar permits diverse kinds for use in the redemption of a firstborn donkey because it is considered a seh. Accordingly, with regard to what halakha is Rava鈥檚 principle relevant?


讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 诇讟诪讗 砖谞讜诇讚 诪谉 讛讟讛讜专 讜注讬讘讜专讜 诪谉 讛讟诪讗 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讚讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诪砖讛 讻砖讘讬诐 讜砖讛 注讝讬诐 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讗讘讬讜 讻讘砖 讜讗诪讜 讻讘砖讛


Rabbi Elazar could have said to you: Rava鈥檚 principle was stated with regard to a non-kosher animal that was born from a kosher mother, whose impregnation was from a non-kosher animal. Rava is saying that this animal is not kosher. And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, although he would agree with this halakha, he derives this halakha (see Bekhorot 7a) from the phrase: 鈥淭he seh of sheep [kevasim], and the seh of goats [izzim]鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:4). The plural forms 鈥kevasim鈥 and 鈥izzim鈥 indicate that a lamb is not kosher unless both its father is a sheep and its mother is a ewe, and the same halakha applies to a kid.


讜讟讛讜专讛 诪讟诪讗讛 诪讬 诪讬注讘专讗 讗讬谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉


The Gemara asks with regard to the case under discussion: But can a kosher animal become impregnated by a non-kosher animal in the first place? Is it even possible for this to occur? Why did Rabbi Yehoshua and Rava have to find a biblical source to deem this offspring as non-kosher? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is possible. As we maintain elsewhere (Bekhorot 7a)


讚讗讬注讘专 诪拽诇讜讟 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉


that the mother animal became impregnated from an animal with non-cloven hooves that was born from a kosher mother and father. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the offspring resulting from this, which does not have cloven hooves, is not kosher. Since the animal鈥檚 father is not kosher according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the offspring is also not kosher, in accordance with Rava鈥檚 principle.


讘注讬 专讘讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 砖讜专 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讙谞讘 诪讬 驻讟专 讙谞讘 谞驻砖讬讛 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚转谞谉 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讬讘讬讗 讻讘砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗讜诪专 讬讘讬讗 转讜专 讗讜 讘谉 讬讜谞讛


Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, can the thief exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya? This is as we learned in a mishna (Mena岣t 107a): If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, he must bring a bull or a sheep as a burnt-offering to fulfill his vow. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may even bring a turtledove or a young pigeon as a burnt-offering.


诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖诐 注讜诇讛 拽讘讬诇 注讬诇讜讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛诪讜讘讞专 讘注讬谞讗 诇诪讬注讘讚


Rava elaborates: What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that he accepted upon himself to sacrifice an animal with the status of a burnt-offering, in which case any animal that fulfills this requirement will suffice? If so, the thief may compensate the owner with a sheep or bird, as the owner can sacrifice that animal as a burnt-offering. Or perhaps the owner can say to the thief: I want to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, which is by sacrificing a bull. Therefore, you must pay me back with a bull.


讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟 讙谞讘 驻讟专 注爪诪讜 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛


After he raised the dilemma, Rava himself subsequently resolved it: The thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.


专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 砖讜专 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讙谞讘讜 驻讟专 注爪诪讜 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讜讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛


Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, teaches this halakha explicitly, i.e., without the question-and-answer format: Rava says: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, the thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.


诪转谞讬壮 诪讻专讜 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪诪讗讛 砖讘讜 讗讜 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讘讜 砖讜转驻讜转 讛砖讜讞讟 讜谞转谞讘诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讛谞讜讞专 讜讛诪注拽专 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


MISHNA: If a thief sold a stolen animal in a partial fashion, e.g., except for one one-hundredth of it, which he kept for himself; or if he had a partnership in owning the animal before stealing it; or in the case of a thief who slaughtered the stolen animal and it became non-kosher meat in his hand because he slaughtered it improperly; or in the case of a thief who ripped open the animal rather than slaughtering it halakhically; or in the case of a thief who tore loose the gullet or windpipe of the animal as he slaughtered it, rendering the slaughter invalid, in all these cases he pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The fourfold or fivefold payment applies only if the animal is entirely sold or if it is slaughtered in accordance with the halakhic definition of animal slaughter.


讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪诪讗讛 砖讘讜 讗诪专 专讘 讞讜抓 诪讚讘专 讛谞讬转专 注诪讜 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讜诇讜讬 讗诪专 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讜讻谉 转谞讬讗 讘诪转谞讬转讗 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛


GEMARA: What does the mishna mean when it states that the thief sold the animal except for one one-hundredth of it? Which part of the animal must the thief keep for himself for him to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Rav says: The mishna means that he sold it except for some part of the animal that becomes permitted through its slaughter. This does not apply to horns or a sheep鈥檚 fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used. And Levi says: The mishna鈥檚 statement applies even if the thief sold the entire animal except for its fleece. And it is likewise taught in a baraita: The thief is exempt even if he sells the whole animal except for its fleece.


诪讬转讬讘讬 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪专讙诇讛 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讚讘专 讛诪注讻讘 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from a baraita: If the thief sold the whole animal except for its foreleg, or except for its hind leg, or except for its horn, or except for its fleece, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the thief sells the animal except for some part of it whose absence invalidates its slaughter, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜砖讗讬谞讜 诪注讻讘 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi continues: But if he leaves out from the sale a part of the animal whose absence does not invalidate the slaughter, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If an animal is missing one of its vital organs, e.g., its liver, one of its intestines, its gullet, or its windpipe, it is considered already dead and its slaughter at this stage would be invalid. For the thief to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment on the grounds of an incomplete sale, he must retain one of these organs for himself.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sells the whole animal except for its horn, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sells the whole animal except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讘砖诇诪讗 诇诇讜讬 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讻诪讗谉


The Gemara explains the objection from this baraita: Granted, according to the opinion of Levi this baraita does not present a difficulty, as his ruling is exactly like that of the first tanna. But according to the opinion of Rav it does present a difficulty, as in accordance with whose opinion does his ruling accord? None of the three opinions expressed in the baraita correlate with that of Rav.


讗诪专讬 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪讬讚讛 讜讞讜抓 诪专讙诇讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The Sages say in response: Rav says his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in another baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sold the entire animal except for its foreleg or except for its hind leg, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sold the entire animal except for its horn or except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讜讟讘讞讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜诪讻专讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉


The Gemara analyzes the four opinions of the tanna鈥檌m presented in these baraitot. With regard to what principle do they disagree? The first tanna holds that when the Torah states: 鈥淚f a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep鈥 (Exodus 21:37), the term 鈥渁nd slaughters it鈥 indicates that we require him to slaughter all of it for him to incur liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Likewise, the term 鈥渙r sells it鈥 teaches that we require him to sell all of it, not leaving any portion at all for himself, even the fleece.


讜专讘讬 住讘专 讜讟讘讞讜 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讬 讘讟讘讬讞讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讬讚讬 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讘讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讟讘讬讞讛


And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the term 鈥渁nd slaughters it鈥 is referring to parts of the animal that are affected by its slaughter, which serves to exclude parts of the animal that are not affected by its slaughter. When the Torah immediately adds the term 鈥渙r sells it,鈥 this indicates that selling is similar to slaughter. Consequently, if the sale excludes the animal鈥檚 fleece or horns, i.e., those parts that are not affected by slaughter, there is still fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 拽专谞讗 讚诇讗 诇诪讙讝讗 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讚诇诪讬讙讝 拽讬讬诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds, according to the first version of his opinion, that the animal鈥檚 horn, which is not meant to be cut off in the animal鈥檚 lifetime, is considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps that part for himself, and he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, fleece, which is meant to be cut off in the animal鈥檚 lifetime, is not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps it for himself, and therefore he must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 讬讚讬讜 讜专讙诇讬讜 讚爪专讬讻讬 讟讘讬讞讛 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 拽专谞讬讛 讜讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讚诇讗 爪专讬讻讬 讟讘讬讞讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专


And the other tanna of the school of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that the animal鈥檚 forelegs and hind legs, which require slaughter for them to be put to their usual use, i.e., for eating, are considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps one of them for himself, and consequently he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, its horns and its fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used, are not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps them for himself.


拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专


The Gemara asks: This presents a difficulty, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and another opinion presented in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara answers: The two rulings represent the reports of two tanna鈥檌m, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讙讜谞讘 讛拽讬讟注转 讜讗转 讛讞讬讙专转 讜讗转 讛住讜诪讗 讜讻谉 讛讙讜谞讘 讘讛诪转 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜转驻讬诐 砖讙谞讘讜 驻讟讜专讬诐 讜讛转谞讬讗 砖讜转驻讬谉 砖讙谞讘讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉


The Sages taught in a baraita: One who steals an animal that is missing a limb, or that is lame, or that is blind, and he subsequently sold it, and similarly, one who steals an animal belonging to several partners and he subsequently sold it, is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. But several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita to the contrary, that several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment?


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪讞讘讬专讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪注诇诪讗


The Gemara resolves the contradiction: Rav Na岣an said that this is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that he is exempt, it is referring to one partner who stole an animal from another partner. There, where the baraita states that he is liable, it is dealing with a partner, who, together with other thieves, stole an animal from someone else outside their group.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讬讻讜诇 砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜砖讜转驻讬诐 砖讙谞讘讜 讬讛讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讟讘讞讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗


Rava raised an objection to Rav Na岣an from another baraita: One might have thought that a partner who stole an animal from another partner and slaughtered it, and likewise partners who jointly stole an animal and one of them slaughtered it, should be liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淎nd slaughters it,鈥 which indicates that we require liability for slaughtering all of it, and in these cases it is not so. One who steals an animal that he partly owns is not liable for slaughtering his own portion. Likewise, when several partners steal an animal, the one who slaughters it is not liable for slaughtering the portions of his fellow thieves.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讟讘讞 诇讚注转 讞讘讬专讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讟讘讞 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讞讘讬专讜


Rather, Rav Na岣an said a different resolution of the contradiction: This is not difficult. Both baraitot are speaking of partners who together stole an animal from someone else. Here, where the baraita states that the thief is liable, it is referring to a partner who slaughtered the animal with the knowledge and consent of another partner. In such a case the one slaughtering is acting as the agent of the partner as well and is fully liable for the slaughter. There, where the baraita states that the thief is exempt, it is speaking of a partner who slaughtered the animal without the knowledge of another partner in the theft. Consequently, the one slaughtering is acting solely on his own and is not liable for the slaughter of his partner鈥檚 share, which is why he is exempt from any payment.


讘注讬 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讞讜抓 诪诪诇讗讻转讛 讞讜抓 诪注讜讘专讛 诪讛讜


Rabbi Yirmeya raises several dilemmas: If the thief sold the animal except for thirty days, i.e., the thief reserved the right to use the animal himself for thirty days before the sale takes effect, what is the halakha? If he sold it except for its work, i.e., he stipulated with the buyer that any work the animal performs would be for the thief鈥檚 own benefit and profit, what is the halakha? If he stole a pregnant animal and sold it except for its fetus, what is the halakha?


讗诇讬讘讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注讜讘专 讬专讱 讗诪讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 转讘注讬 诇讱 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 讘讛 讻讬 转讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讚注讜讘专 诇讗讜 讬专讱 讗诪讜 诪讗讬 诪讬诪专 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讞讜讘专 讘讛 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇诪驻专砖 诪讬谞讛 拽讗讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专


The Gemara elaborates on the last dilemma: According to the one who says that a fetus is considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, i.e., a part of its mother, you should not raise the dilemma, as it is clear that the thief, by retaining the fetus, has withheld part of the animal. When you should raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the one who says that a fetus is not considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, i.e., it has the status of an independent being. What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that since it is in fact attached to the mother, if the thief keeps the fetus for himself it is considered a significant withholding? Or perhaps, since it stands to become detached from the mother it is not considered a significant withholding?


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗讜 讬专讱 讗诪讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚爪专讬讱 诇讗讬砖转专讜讬讬 讘讛讚讛 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讻诪讗谉 讚砖讬讬专 讘讙讜驻讛 讚诪讬 转讬拽讜


There are those who state a different analysis of this dilemma: Since a fetus is not considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, it is not considered a significant withholding, or perhaps, since it needs its mother to be rendered permitted for consumption through the mother鈥檚 slaughter, it is considered as though the thief has withheld a part of the mother鈥檚 body. The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.


讘注讬 专讘 驻驻讗 讙谞讘讛 拽讟注讛 讜诪讻专讛 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讚讙谞讘 讛讗 诇讗 讝讘讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讛 讚讝讘讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 转讬拽讜


Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one stole an animal, severed one of its limbs, and then sold it, what is the halakha? Do we say that the essential factor is that part of what he stole he has not sold, as the missing limb was not sold, and therefore he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Or perhaps the essential factor is that with regard to that which he sold he has not withheld any part for himself. Once again, the Gemara states that this dilemma shall stand unresolved.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讙谞讘 讜谞转谉 诇讗讞专 讜讟讘讞 讙谞讘 讜谞转谉 诇讗讞专 讜诪讻专


The Sages taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and gave it to another and that person slaughtered it for him, or if he stole an animal and gave it to another and that person sold it for him, the thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, as performing these actions through an agent is equivalent to performing them by oneself.


  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.聽

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

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Bava Kamma 78

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 78

讛讗 讙讘讬 拽讚砖讬诐 谞诪讬 谞讗诪专 砖讜专 讗讜 讻砖讘 砖讗讬谉 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讻诇讗讬诐 诪讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜谞专讘讬 诪讚住讬驻讗 诇诪注讟 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 诇诪注讟 讗讚专讘讛 诪讚专讬砖讗 诇专讘讜转 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 诇专讘讜转


The Gemara asks: But with regard to sacrificial animals it is also stated in the first part of the verse: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep鈥 (Leviticus 22:27), which are two animals from which you cannot produce diverse kinds. And accordingly, let us include an animal of diverse kinds as being fit for sacrifice on the altar on that account. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the latter clause of the verse: 鈥淥r a goat,鈥 serves to exclude a type of animal from being fit for sacrifice on the altar, it may be inferred that the first clause: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep,鈥 also serves to exclude a type of animal from being fit for sacrifice on the altar. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, one could equally argue that from the fact that the first clause of the verse serves to include a type of animal as being fit for sacrifice on the altar, the latter clause also serves to include a type of animal as being fit for sacrifice on the altar.


讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇诪注讟 讛讜讗 讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 转专讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬诪注讟 讻诇讗讬诐 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪注讜讟讬 谞讚诪讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇专讘讜转 转专讬 专讬讘讜讬讬 诇诪讛 讛砖转讗 讻诇讗讬诐 讗讬专讘讬 诇讬讛 谞讚诪讛 诪讘注讬讗


The Gemara rejects this argument: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that both expressions serve to exclude types of animals from being fit for sacrifice on the altar, this is why two exclusions were necessary: One exclusion is referring to diverse kinds and the other is referring to an animal that resembles another species, as even though an animal of diverse kinds is excluded, it was still necessary to exclude an animal that resembles another. But if you say that both phrases serve to include types of animals as being fit for sacrifice on the altar, why are two inclusions required? Now that an animal of diverse kinds has been included, in the first inclusion, is it necessary to say that an animal that resembles another is also included? There is more justification for including an animal that resembles another, whose parentage is entirely of one species, than for including an animal of diverse kinds.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讛 讘谞讛 讗讘 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 砖讛 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讛讻诇讗讬诐 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讗讬 诇拽讚砖讬诐 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 砖讜专 讗讜 讻砖讘 驻专讟 诇讻诇讗讬诐


The Gemara has established that when the Torah uses the word seh (Exodus 21:37) in the context of theft it does not serve to exclude animals of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: If so, what is meant by this statement that Rava says with regard to the verse: 鈥淭he ox, the seh of a sheep, and the seh of a goat鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this establishes a paradigm for other cases, teaching that wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves to exclude only an animal of diverse kinds. With regard to what halakha did Rava state this principle? If this principle is referring to the halakha concerning sacrificial animals, it is written explicitly with regard to them: 鈥淎 bull or a sheep鈥 (Leviticus 22:27), which, as taught in the aforementioned baraita, serves to exclude diverse kinds.


讗讬 诇诪注砖专 转讞转 转讞转 讬诇讬祝 诪拽讚砖讬诐


If this principle is referring to the halakha concerning animal tithe, concerning which it is written: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock [tzon], any one that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32), this principle is not necessary either. The reason is that the exclusion of diverse kinds can be derived by means of a verbal analogy from the term 鈥渦nder鈥 in this verse, and the word 鈥渦nder鈥 in a verse that deals with sacrificial animals: 鈥淲hen a bull, or a sheep, or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother鈥 (Leviticus 22:27). This verbal analogy, from which many halakhot of animal tithe are derived, indicates that diverse kinds are not subject to animal tithe, just as they cannot be used for an offering.


讗讬 诇讘讻讜专 讛注讘专讛 讛注讘专讛 讬诇讬祝 诪诪注砖专


If this principle is referring to firstborn animals, concerning which it is written: 鈥淗owever, the firstborn among animals, which is born as a firstling to the Lord, no man shall sanctify it; whether it be ox or seh, it is the Lord鈥檚鈥 (Leviticus 27:26), it is not necessary in that context either. The reason is that this can be derived by a verbal analogy between the term passing, in the verse: 鈥淎nd you shall cause to pass to the Lord all that open the womb鈥 (Exodus 13:12), and the same term passing, from a verse concerning animal tithe: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock, any one that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32). This verbal analogy teaches that if the firstborn of a ewe or a she-goat is an animal of diverse kinds it is not considered a firstborn with regard to the halakhot of firstborn animals, which means that Rava鈥檚 principle is not necessary here.


讗讬 谞诪讬 谞讚诪讛 讗诪专转 诇讗 讚讻转讬讘 讗讱 讘讻讜专 砖讜专 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讛讜讗 砖讜专 讜讘讻讜专讜 砖讜专 讻诇讗讬诐 诪讘注讬讗


Alternatively, you must say that an animal that resembles another is not subject to the halakhot of a firstborn, as it is written: 鈥淏ut the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are holy鈥 (Numbers 18:17). This indicates that the halakhot of the firstborn are not applicable unless the fathering animal is a bull and its firstborn is also a bull. This excludes an animal that resembles another species, rather than its father. Once it is established that an animal that resembles another is not subject to the halakhot of a firstborn, is it necessary for the Torah to state the same with regard to diverse kinds? Since it is evident that firstborn status does not apply to diverse kinds, Rava鈥檚 principle is not required here either.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 诇注谞讬谉 驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讻讚转谞谉 讗讬谉 驻讜讚讬谉 诇讗 讘注讙诇 讜诇讗 讘讞讬讛 讜诇讗 讘砖讞讜讟讛 讜诇讗 讘讟专讬驻讛 讜诇讗 讘讻诇讗讬诐 讜诇讗 讘讻讜讬


Rather, Rava鈥檚 principle was stated with regard to the redemption of a firstborn donkey, concerning which it is written: 鈥淎nd every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a seh鈥 (Exodus 13:13), as we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 12a): One may not redeem a firstborn donkey neither with a calf, nor with a non-domesticated animal, nor with a slaughtered animal, nor with a tereifa animal, nor with diverse kinds, i.e., a sheep-goat hybrid, nor with a koy. Rava鈥檚 principle is referring to the source for the prohibition against using an animal of diverse kinds for the redemption of a firstborn donkey.


讜诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚诪转讬专 讘讻诇讗讬诐 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪转讬专 讘讻诇讗讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 砖讛 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗


The Gemara asks: But what about according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with this ruling and permits the use of an animal of diverse kinds for the redemption of a firstborn donkey? As we learned in the same mishna: Rabbi Elazar permits diverse kinds for use in the redemption of a firstborn donkey because it is considered a seh. Accordingly, with regard to what halakha is Rava鈥檚 principle relevant?


讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 诇讟诪讗 砖谞讜诇讚 诪谉 讛讟讛讜专 讜注讬讘讜专讜 诪谉 讛讟诪讗 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讚讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诪砖讛 讻砖讘讬诐 讜砖讛 注讝讬诐 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讗讘讬讜 讻讘砖 讜讗诪讜 讻讘砖讛


Rabbi Elazar could have said to you: Rava鈥檚 principle was stated with regard to a non-kosher animal that was born from a kosher mother, whose impregnation was from a non-kosher animal. Rava is saying that this animal is not kosher. And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, although he would agree with this halakha, he derives this halakha (see Bekhorot 7a) from the phrase: 鈥淭he seh of sheep [kevasim], and the seh of goats [izzim]鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:4). The plural forms 鈥kevasim鈥 and 鈥izzim鈥 indicate that a lamb is not kosher unless both its father is a sheep and its mother is a ewe, and the same halakha applies to a kid.


讜讟讛讜专讛 诪讟诪讗讛 诪讬 诪讬注讘专讗 讗讬谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉


The Gemara asks with regard to the case under discussion: But can a kosher animal become impregnated by a non-kosher animal in the first place? Is it even possible for this to occur? Why did Rabbi Yehoshua and Rava have to find a biblical source to deem this offspring as non-kosher? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is possible. As we maintain elsewhere (Bekhorot 7a)


讚讗讬注讘专 诪拽诇讜讟 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉


that the mother animal became impregnated from an animal with non-cloven hooves that was born from a kosher mother and father. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the offspring resulting from this, which does not have cloven hooves, is not kosher. Since the animal鈥檚 father is not kosher according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the offspring is also not kosher, in accordance with Rava鈥檚 principle.


讘注讬 专讘讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 砖讜专 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讙谞讘 诪讬 驻讟专 讙谞讘 谞驻砖讬讛 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚转谞谉 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讬讘讬讗 讻讘砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗讜诪专 讬讘讬讗 转讜专 讗讜 讘谉 讬讜谞讛


Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, can the thief exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya? This is as we learned in a mishna (Mena岣t 107a): If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, he must bring a bull or a sheep as a burnt-offering to fulfill his vow. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may even bring a turtledove or a young pigeon as a burnt-offering.


诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖诐 注讜诇讛 拽讘讬诇 注讬诇讜讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛诪讜讘讞专 讘注讬谞讗 诇诪讬注讘讚


Rava elaborates: What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that he accepted upon himself to sacrifice an animal with the status of a burnt-offering, in which case any animal that fulfills this requirement will suffice? If so, the thief may compensate the owner with a sheep or bird, as the owner can sacrifice that animal as a burnt-offering. Or perhaps the owner can say to the thief: I want to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, which is by sacrificing a bull. Therefore, you must pay me back with a bull.


讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟 讙谞讘 驻讟专 注爪诪讜 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛


After he raised the dilemma, Rava himself subsequently resolved it: The thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.


专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 注诇讬 注讜诇讛 讜讛驻专讬砖 砖讜专 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讙谞讘讜 驻讟专 注爪诪讜 讘讻讘砖 诇专讘谞谉 讜讘注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛


Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, teaches this halakha explicitly, i.e., without the question-and-answer format: Rava says: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burntoffering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, the thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.


诪转谞讬壮 诪讻专讜 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪诪讗讛 砖讘讜 讗讜 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 讘讜 砖讜转驻讜转 讛砖讜讞讟 讜谞转谞讘诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讛谞讜讞专 讜讛诪注拽专 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


MISHNA: If a thief sold a stolen animal in a partial fashion, e.g., except for one one-hundredth of it, which he kept for himself; or if he had a partnership in owning the animal before stealing it; or in the case of a thief who slaughtered the stolen animal and it became non-kosher meat in his hand because he slaughtered it improperly; or in the case of a thief who ripped open the animal rather than slaughtering it halakhically; or in the case of a thief who tore loose the gullet or windpipe of the animal as he slaughtered it, rendering the slaughter invalid, in all these cases he pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The fourfold or fivefold payment applies only if the animal is entirely sold or if it is slaughtered in accordance with the halakhic definition of animal slaughter.


讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪诪讗讛 砖讘讜 讗诪专 专讘 讞讜抓 诪讚讘专 讛谞讬转专 注诪讜 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讜诇讜讬 讗诪专 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讜讻谉 转谞讬讗 讘诪转谞讬转讗 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛


GEMARA: What does the mishna mean when it states that the thief sold the animal except for one one-hundredth of it? Which part of the animal must the thief keep for himself for him to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Rav says: The mishna means that he sold it except for some part of the animal that becomes permitted through its slaughter. This does not apply to horns or a sheep鈥檚 fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used. And Levi says: The mishna鈥檚 statement applies even if the thief sold the entire animal except for its fleece. And it is likewise taught in a baraita: The thief is exempt even if he sells the whole animal except for its fleece.


诪讬转讬讘讬 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪讬讚讛 讞讜抓 诪专讙诇讛 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讚讘专 讛诪注讻讘 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from a baraita: If the thief sold the whole animal except for its foreleg, or except for its hind leg, or except for its horn, or except for its fleece, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the thief sells the animal except for some part of it whose absence invalidates its slaughter, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜砖讗讬谞讜 诪注讻讘 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi continues: But if he leaves out from the sale a part of the animal whose absence does not invalidate the slaughter, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If an animal is missing one of its vital organs, e.g., its liver, one of its intestines, its gullet, or its windpipe, it is considered already dead and its slaughter at this stage would be invalid. For the thief to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment on the grounds of an incomplete sale, he must retain one of these organs for himself.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sells the whole animal except for its horn, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sells the whole animal except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讘砖诇诪讗 诇诇讜讬 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讻诪讗谉


The Gemara explains the objection from this baraita: Granted, according to the opinion of Levi this baraita does not present a difficulty, as his ruling is exactly like that of the first tanna. But according to the opinion of Rav it does present a difficulty, as in accordance with whose opinion does his ruling accord? None of the three opinions expressed in the baraita correlate with that of Rav.


讗诪专讬 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪讬讚讛 讜讞讜抓 诪专讙诇讛 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讞讜抓 诪拽专谞讛 讞讜抓 诪讙讬讝讜转讬讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


The Sages say in response: Rav says his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in another baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sold the entire animal except for its foreleg or except for its hind leg, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sold the entire animal except for its horn or except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讜讟讘讞讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜诪讻专讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉


The Gemara analyzes the four opinions of the tanna鈥檌m presented in these baraitot. With regard to what principle do they disagree? The first tanna holds that when the Torah states: 鈥淚f a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep鈥 (Exodus 21:37), the term 鈥渁nd slaughters it鈥 indicates that we require him to slaughter all of it for him to incur liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Likewise, the term 鈥渙r sells it鈥 teaches that we require him to sell all of it, not leaving any portion at all for himself, even the fleece.


讜专讘讬 住讘专 讜讟讘讞讜 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讬 讘讟讘讬讞讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讬讚讬 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讘讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讟讘讬讞讛


And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the term 鈥渁nd slaughters it鈥 is referring to parts of the animal that are affected by its slaughter, which serves to exclude parts of the animal that are not affected by its slaughter. When the Torah immediately adds the term 鈥渙r sells it,鈥 this indicates that selling is similar to slaughter. Consequently, if the sale excludes the animal鈥檚 fleece or horns, i.e., those parts that are not affected by slaughter, there is still fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 拽专谞讗 讚诇讗 诇诪讙讝讗 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讚诇诪讬讙讝 拽讬讬诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛


And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds, according to the first version of his opinion, that the animal鈥檚 horn, which is not meant to be cut off in the animal鈥檚 lifetime, is considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps that part for himself, and he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, fleece, which is meant to be cut off in the animal鈥檚 lifetime, is not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps it for himself, and therefore he must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.


讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 讬讚讬讜 讜专讙诇讬讜 讚爪专讬讻讬 讟讘讬讞讛 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 拽专谞讬讛 讜讙讬讝讜转讬讛 讚诇讗 爪专讬讻讬 讟讘讬讞讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专


And the other tanna of the school of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that the animal鈥檚 forelegs and hind legs, which require slaughter for them to be put to their usual use, i.e., for eating, are considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps one of them for himself, and consequently he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, its horns and its fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used, are not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps them for himself.


拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专


The Gemara asks: This presents a difficulty, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and another opinion presented in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara answers: The two rulings represent the reports of two tanna鈥檌m, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讙讜谞讘 讛拽讬讟注转 讜讗转 讛讞讬讙专转 讜讗转 讛住讜诪讗 讜讻谉 讛讙讜谞讘 讘讛诪转 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜转驻讬诐 砖讙谞讘讜 驻讟讜专讬诐 讜讛转谞讬讗 砖讜转驻讬谉 砖讙谞讘讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉


The Sages taught in a baraita: One who steals an animal that is missing a limb, or that is lame, or that is blind, and he subsequently sold it, and similarly, one who steals an animal belonging to several partners and he subsequently sold it, is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. But several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita to the contrary, that several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment?


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪讞讘讬专讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪注诇诪讗


The Gemara resolves the contradiction: Rav Na岣an said that this is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that he is exempt, it is referring to one partner who stole an animal from another partner. There, where the baraita states that he is liable, it is dealing with a partner, who, together with other thieves, stole an animal from someone else outside their group.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讬讻讜诇 砖讜转祝 砖讙谞讘 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜砖讜转驻讬诐 砖讙谞讘讜 讬讛讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讟讘讞讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗


Rava raised an objection to Rav Na岣an from another baraita: One might have thought that a partner who stole an animal from another partner and slaughtered it, and likewise partners who jointly stole an animal and one of them slaughtered it, should be liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淎nd slaughters it,鈥 which indicates that we require liability for slaughtering all of it, and in these cases it is not so. One who steals an animal that he partly owns is not liable for slaughtering his own portion. Likewise, when several partners steal an animal, the one who slaughters it is not liable for slaughtering the portions of his fellow thieves.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讟讘讞 诇讚注转 讞讘讬专讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转祝 砖讟讘讞 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讞讘讬专讜


Rather, Rav Na岣an said a different resolution of the contradiction: This is not difficult. Both baraitot are speaking of partners who together stole an animal from someone else. Here, where the baraita states that the thief is liable, it is referring to a partner who slaughtered the animal with the knowledge and consent of another partner. In such a case the one slaughtering is acting as the agent of the partner as well and is fully liable for the slaughter. There, where the baraita states that the thief is exempt, it is speaking of a partner who slaughtered the animal without the knowledge of another partner in the theft. Consequently, the one slaughtering is acting solely on his own and is not liable for the slaughter of his partner鈥檚 share, which is why he is exempt from any payment.


讘注讬 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讻专讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讞讜抓 诪诪诇讗讻转讛 讞讜抓 诪注讜讘专讛 诪讛讜


Rabbi Yirmeya raises several dilemmas: If the thief sold the animal except for thirty days, i.e., the thief reserved the right to use the animal himself for thirty days before the sale takes effect, what is the halakha? If he sold it except for its work, i.e., he stipulated with the buyer that any work the animal performs would be for the thief鈥檚 own benefit and profit, what is the halakha? If he stole a pregnant animal and sold it except for its fetus, what is the halakha?


讗诇讬讘讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注讜讘专 讬专讱 讗诪讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 转讘注讬 诇讱 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 讘讛 讻讬 转讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讚注讜讘专 诇讗讜 讬专讱 讗诪讜 诪讗讬 诪讬诪专 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讞讜讘专 讘讛 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇诪驻专砖 诪讬谞讛 拽讗讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专


The Gemara elaborates on the last dilemma: According to the one who says that a fetus is considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, i.e., a part of its mother, you should not raise the dilemma, as it is clear that the thief, by retaining the fetus, has withheld part of the animal. When you should raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the one who says that a fetus is not considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, i.e., it has the status of an independent being. What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that since it is in fact attached to the mother, if the thief keeps the fetus for himself it is considered a significant withholding? Or perhaps, since it stands to become detached from the mother it is not considered a significant withholding?


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗讜 讬专讱 讗诪讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚爪专讬讱 诇讗讬砖转专讜讬讬 讘讛讚讛 讘砖讞讬讟讛 讻诪讗谉 讚砖讬讬专 讘讙讜驻讛 讚诪讬 转讬拽讜


There are those who state a different analysis of this dilemma: Since a fetus is not considered as its mother鈥檚 thigh, it is not considered a significant withholding, or perhaps, since it needs its mother to be rendered permitted for consumption through the mother鈥檚 slaughter, it is considered as though the thief has withheld a part of the mother鈥檚 body. The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.


讘注讬 专讘 驻驻讗 讙谞讘讛 拽讟注讛 讜诪讻专讛 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讚讙谞讘 讛讗 诇讗 讝讘讬谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讛 讚讝讘讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 转讬拽讜


Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one stole an animal, severed one of its limbs, and then sold it, what is the halakha? Do we say that the essential factor is that part of what he stole he has not sold, as the missing limb was not sold, and therefore he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Or perhaps the essential factor is that with regard to that which he sold he has not withheld any part for himself. Once again, the Gemara states that this dilemma shall stand unresolved.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讙谞讘 讜谞转谉 诇讗讞专 讜讟讘讞 讙谞讘 讜谞转谉 诇讗讞专 讜诪讻专


The Sages taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and gave it to another and that person slaughtered it for him, or if he stole an animal and gave it to another and that person sold it for him, the thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, as performing these actions through an agent is equivalent to performing them by oneself.


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