Today's Daf Yomi
October 7, 2016 | ה׳ בתשרי תשע״ז
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
Bava Metzia 11
The gemara brings different explanations as to what Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan are debating regarding a minor whether or not she can acquire through a chatzer or not. The mishna raises a case where an animal was running and ran into someone’s courtyard. He can acquire is by saying “my field acquired it” as long as the animal can’t run very fast (i.e. has a broken leg). Shmuel and others qualify the mishna and says it only works if the owner is standing nearby and that assumes that we are referring to an unprotected field (in a protected field one would not need to be standing by). The gemara attempts to bring a proof for this but rejects the proof. Rabbi Abba raises a question against this position from a mishna. Various explanations of the mishna are brought to resolve the contradiction.
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ילפינן מציאה מגט ומר סבר לא ילפינן מציאה מגט
we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce.
ואיבעית אימא בקטנה כולי עלמא לא פליגי דילפינן מציאה מגט והכא בקטן קא מיפלגי
And if you wish, say instead that with regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and she acquires an ownerless item that is found in her courtyard. And here they disagree with regard to whether a minor boy acquires an item that is placed in his courtyard.
מר סבר ילפינן קטן מקטנה ומר סבר לא ילפינן קטן מקטנה
One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that we derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl, as there should be no difference between them with regard to the halakhot of acquisition. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl; only a minor girl acquires items by means of her courtyard, as the Torah includes this mode of acquisition with regard to acquiring a bill of divorce.
ואיבעית אימא מר אמר חדא ומר אמר חדא ולא פליגי
And if you wish, say instead that there is no dispute here at all. Rather, one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, said one statement, that a minor girl is divorced by her husband placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Yannai, said another statement, that a minor boy or girl does not acquire an item that is found in his or her courtyard; and they do not disagree.
מתני׳ ראה אותן רצין אחר מציאה אחר צבי שבור אחר גוזלות שלא פרחו ואמר זכתה לי שדי זכתה לו היה צבי רץ כדרכו או שהיו גוזלות מפריחין ואמר זכתה לי שדי לא אמר כלום
MISHNA: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one’s courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.
גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא שעומד בצד שדהו
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field at the time of the acquisition, so that it has the halakhic status of a secured courtyard.
ותקני ליה שדהו דאמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But shouldn’t his field effect acquisition of the animal for him even without him standing next to it? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A person’s courtyard effects acquisition of property for him even without his knowledge.
הני מילי בחצר המשתמרת אבל חצר שאינה משתמרת אי עומד בצד שדהו אין אי לא לא
The Gemara answers: This statement applies only to a secured courtyard, where items remain in the courtyard without supervision. But with regard to an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf.
ומנא תימרא דחצר שאינה משתמרת אי עומד בצד שדהו אין אי לא לא
The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf?
דתניא היה עומד בעיר ואומר יודע אני שעומר שיש לי בשדה פועלים שכחוהו לא יהא שכחה יכול לא יהא שכחה תלמוד לומר ושכחת עמר בשדה בשדה ושכחת ולא בעיר
As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states: “When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow” (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: “And have forgotten” applies “in the field,” but not in the town.
הא גופא קשיא אמרת יכול לא יהא שכחה אלמא הוי שכחה ונסיב לה תלמודא בשדה ושכחת ולא בעיר אלמא לא הוי שכחה
The Gemara clarifies: This baraita itself is difficult. First you said that one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf, so apparently the tanna seeks to prove that it is considered a forgotten sheaf. And then the baraita adduces the derivation that the phrase “and have forgotten” applies only “in the field,” but not in the town, which apparently means that a sheaf forgotten by the owner while he is in the town is not considered a forgotten sheaf.
אלא לאו הכי קאמר בשדה שכוח מעיקרו הוי שכחה זכור ולבסוף שכוח אין שכחה מאי טעמא דכיון דקאי גבה הויא ליה חצרו וזכתה ליה
Rather, isn’t this what the tanna is saying: In a case where the owner is in the field, if the sheaf was forgotten at the outset, it is considered a forgotten sheaf; but if it was remembered at first and was ultimately forgotten, it does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf? What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that since he is standing in the field, beside the sheaf, his field is tantamount to his courtyard, and his courtyard effects acquisition of the sheaf for him once he remembers it.
אבל בעיר אפילו זכור ולבסוף שכוח הויא שכחה מאי טעמא דליתיה גביה דלזכי ליה
But in a case where the owner is in the town, even if the sheaf was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is considered a forgotten sheaf and must be left for the poor. What is the reason for this? It is because the owner is not beside it, which is necessary for his courtyard to effect acquisition of the sheaf for him. Evidently, an item that is in a person’s courtyard is acquired by him only if he is standing next to the courtyard.
ממאי דלמא גזירת הכתוב היא דבשדה נהוי שכחה ובעיר לא נהוי שכחה
The Gemara rejects this proof: From where can it be proven that this is the reason? Perhaps the baraita should be understood in a different manner: It is a Torah edict that if the owner is in the field, it is considered a forgotten sheaf, but if the owner is in the town, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf and does not need to be left for the poor. Accordingly, the distinction would not be derived from the halakhot of acquisition.
אמר קרא לא תשוב לקחתו לרבות שכחת העיר
The Gemara responds that the verse states: “You shall not go back to take it” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Evidently, there is no fundamental difference between a town and the field with regard to the halakhot of forgotten sheaves; rather, the distinction is due to the fact that one cannot acquire a sheaf by means of his courtyard if he is not standing next to the courtyard.
האי מיבעי ליה ללאו
The Gemara challenges: This phrase is necessary to impose a prohibition upon one who takes his sheaf after he forgot it, instead of leaving it for the poor. It is therefore not superfluous and cannot be interpreted as including an additional case.
אם כן נימא קרא לא תקחנו מאי לא תשוב לרבות שכחת העיר
The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse serves only that purpose, let the verse say: You shall not take it. What is added by the phrase: “You shall not go back to take it”? It is written to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town.
ואכתי מיבעי ליה לכדתנן שלפניו אין שכחה שלאחריו יש שכחה שהוא בבל תשוב
The Gemara challenges: But the phrase “you shall not go back” is still necessary for that which we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 7:4): While a landowner collects the sheaves from his field, any sheaf that remains before him, as he has not reached it yet, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf, even if he has forgotten about its existence. Any sheaf that is already behind him has the status of a forgotten sheaf, as the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies.
זה הכלל כל שהוא בבל תשוב שכחה כל שאינו בבל תשוב אינו שכחה
This is the principle: Any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies, as one would need to retrace his steps in order to retrieve the sheaf, assumes the status of a forgotten sheaf; and any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, does not apply, i.e., a sheaf that one has yet to reach, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf. The phrase “You shall not go back” is apparently necessary to teach this halakha, and it cannot be interpreted as including a case where the owner is in the town.
אמר רב אשי אמר קרא יהיה לרבות שכחת העיר
Rav Ashi said that the inclusion of this case is derived from another phrase in the verse. The verse states: “It shall be” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Therefore, the Gemara’s initial interpretation of the baraita is accepted, leading to the conclusion that the distinction between a case where the owner is in the field and a case where he is in the town is due to the halakha that one’s courtyard can effect acquisition of property for him only if he is next to the courtyard, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel.
וכן אמר עולא והוא שעומד בצד שדהו וכן אמר רבה בר בר חנה והוא שעומד בצד שדהו
And Ulla also says that the acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana also says that the acquisition is effective specifically in a case where he is standing next to his field.
איתיביה רבי אבא לעולא מעשה ברבן גמליאל וזקנים שהיו באים בספינה אמר רבן גמליאל עישור שאני עתיד למוד נתון ליהושע
Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from that which is taught in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 5:9): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and other Elders, who were traveling on a ship. Since he remembered that he had not tithed the produce of his fields, Rabban Gamliel said to the others: One-tenth of my produce, which I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce, is given to Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who is a Levite and is entitled to receive the first tithe,
ומקומו מושכר לו ועישור אחר שאני עתיד למוד נתון לעקיבא בן יוסף כדי שיזכה בו לעניים ומקומו מושכר לו
and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man’s tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.
וכי רבי יהושע ורבי עקיבא בצד שדהו של רבן גמליאל היו עומדין
Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel’s field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
אמר ליה דמי האי מרבנן כדלא גמרי אינשי שמעתא
Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.
כי אתא לסורא אמר להו הכי אמר עולא והכי אותביתיה אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן רבן גמליאל מטלטלי אגב מקרקעי הקנה להם רבי זירא קבלה רבי אבא לא קבלה
When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba’s objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.
אמר רבא שפיר עביד דלא קבלה וכי לא היה להם סודר לקנות ממנו בחליפין אלא טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות ממנו בחליפין הכא נמי טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות על גבי קרקע
Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba’s explanation must be correct, and one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
ולא היא מתנות כהונה נתינה כתיבא בהו חליפין דרך מקח וממכר הוא מטלטלין אגב מקרקע נתינה אלימתא היא
The Gemara rejects Rava’s reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: “And have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow” (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion.
רב פפא אמר דעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני
Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.
ומנא תימרא דתנן ראה אותן רצין אחר המציאה כו׳ ואמר רבי ירמיה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא שרץ אחריהן ומגיען ובעי רבי ירמיה במתנה היאך קבלה מיניה רבי אבא בר כהנא אף על פי שרץ אחריהן ואין מגיען מאי טעמא לאו משום דדעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני
And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa’s explanation.
אמר ליה רב שימי לרב פפא הרי גט דדעת אחרת מקנה אותה ואמר עולא והוא שעומדת בצד ביתה או בצד חצרה שאני גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה
Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife’s house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one’s wife even against her will.
מתקיף לה רב ששת בריה דרב אידי ולאו קל וחומר הוא ומה גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה אי עומדת בצד ביתה ובצד חצרה אין אי לא לא מתנה דמדעתיה לא כל שכן
Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?
אלא אמר רב אשי
Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows:
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Bava Metzia 11
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
ילפינן מציאה מגט ומר סבר לא ילפינן מציאה מגט
we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce.
ואיבעית אימא בקטנה כולי עלמא לא פליגי דילפינן מציאה מגט והכא בקטן קא מיפלגי
And if you wish, say instead that with regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and she acquires an ownerless item that is found in her courtyard. And here they disagree with regard to whether a minor boy acquires an item that is placed in his courtyard.
מר סבר ילפינן קטן מקטנה ומר סבר לא ילפינן קטן מקטנה
One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that we derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl, as there should be no difference between them with regard to the halakhot of acquisition. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl; only a minor girl acquires items by means of her courtyard, as the Torah includes this mode of acquisition with regard to acquiring a bill of divorce.
ואיבעית אימא מר אמר חדא ומר אמר חדא ולא פליגי
And if you wish, say instead that there is no dispute here at all. Rather, one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, said one statement, that a minor girl is divorced by her husband placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Yannai, said another statement, that a minor boy or girl does not acquire an item that is found in his or her courtyard; and they do not disagree.
מתני׳ ראה אותן רצין אחר מציאה אחר צבי שבור אחר גוזלות שלא פרחו ואמר זכתה לי שדי זכתה לו היה צבי רץ כדרכו או שהיו גוזלות מפריחין ואמר זכתה לי שדי לא אמר כלום
MISHNA: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one’s courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.
גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא שעומד בצד שדהו
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field at the time of the acquisition, so that it has the halakhic status of a secured courtyard.
ותקני ליה שדהו דאמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But shouldn’t his field effect acquisition of the animal for him even without him standing next to it? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A person’s courtyard effects acquisition of property for him even without his knowledge.
הני מילי בחצר המשתמרת אבל חצר שאינה משתמרת אי עומד בצד שדהו אין אי לא לא
The Gemara answers: This statement applies only to a secured courtyard, where items remain in the courtyard without supervision. But with regard to an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf.
ומנא תימרא דחצר שאינה משתמרת אי עומד בצד שדהו אין אי לא לא
The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf?
דתניא היה עומד בעיר ואומר יודע אני שעומר שיש לי בשדה פועלים שכחוהו לא יהא שכחה יכול לא יהא שכחה תלמוד לומר ושכחת עמר בשדה בשדה ושכחת ולא בעיר
As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states: “When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow” (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: “And have forgotten” applies “in the field,” but not in the town.
הא גופא קשיא אמרת יכול לא יהא שכחה אלמא הוי שכחה ונסיב לה תלמודא בשדה ושכחת ולא בעיר אלמא לא הוי שכחה
The Gemara clarifies: This baraita itself is difficult. First you said that one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf, so apparently the tanna seeks to prove that it is considered a forgotten sheaf. And then the baraita adduces the derivation that the phrase “and have forgotten” applies only “in the field,” but not in the town, which apparently means that a sheaf forgotten by the owner while he is in the town is not considered a forgotten sheaf.
אלא לאו הכי קאמר בשדה שכוח מעיקרו הוי שכחה זכור ולבסוף שכוח אין שכחה מאי טעמא דכיון דקאי גבה הויא ליה חצרו וזכתה ליה
Rather, isn’t this what the tanna is saying: In a case where the owner is in the field, if the sheaf was forgotten at the outset, it is considered a forgotten sheaf; but if it was remembered at first and was ultimately forgotten, it does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf? What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that since he is standing in the field, beside the sheaf, his field is tantamount to his courtyard, and his courtyard effects acquisition of the sheaf for him once he remembers it.
אבל בעיר אפילו זכור ולבסוף שכוח הויא שכחה מאי טעמא דליתיה גביה דלזכי ליה
But in a case where the owner is in the town, even if the sheaf was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is considered a forgotten sheaf and must be left for the poor. What is the reason for this? It is because the owner is not beside it, which is necessary for his courtyard to effect acquisition of the sheaf for him. Evidently, an item that is in a person’s courtyard is acquired by him only if he is standing next to the courtyard.
ממאי דלמא גזירת הכתוב היא דבשדה נהוי שכחה ובעיר לא נהוי שכחה
The Gemara rejects this proof: From where can it be proven that this is the reason? Perhaps the baraita should be understood in a different manner: It is a Torah edict that if the owner is in the field, it is considered a forgotten sheaf, but if the owner is in the town, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf and does not need to be left for the poor. Accordingly, the distinction would not be derived from the halakhot of acquisition.
אמר קרא לא תשוב לקחתו לרבות שכחת העיר
The Gemara responds that the verse states: “You shall not go back to take it” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Evidently, there is no fundamental difference between a town and the field with regard to the halakhot of forgotten sheaves; rather, the distinction is due to the fact that one cannot acquire a sheaf by means of his courtyard if he is not standing next to the courtyard.
האי מיבעי ליה ללאו
The Gemara challenges: This phrase is necessary to impose a prohibition upon one who takes his sheaf after he forgot it, instead of leaving it for the poor. It is therefore not superfluous and cannot be interpreted as including an additional case.
אם כן נימא קרא לא תקחנו מאי לא תשוב לרבות שכחת העיר
The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse serves only that purpose, let the verse say: You shall not take it. What is added by the phrase: “You shall not go back to take it”? It is written to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town.
ואכתי מיבעי ליה לכדתנן שלפניו אין שכחה שלאחריו יש שכחה שהוא בבל תשוב
The Gemara challenges: But the phrase “you shall not go back” is still necessary for that which we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 7:4): While a landowner collects the sheaves from his field, any sheaf that remains before him, as he has not reached it yet, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf, even if he has forgotten about its existence. Any sheaf that is already behind him has the status of a forgotten sheaf, as the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies.
זה הכלל כל שהוא בבל תשוב שכחה כל שאינו בבל תשוב אינו שכחה
This is the principle: Any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies, as one would need to retrace his steps in order to retrieve the sheaf, assumes the status of a forgotten sheaf; and any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, does not apply, i.e., a sheaf that one has yet to reach, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf. The phrase “You shall not go back” is apparently necessary to teach this halakha, and it cannot be interpreted as including a case where the owner is in the town.
אמר רב אשי אמר קרא יהיה לרבות שכחת העיר
Rav Ashi said that the inclusion of this case is derived from another phrase in the verse. The verse states: “It shall be” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Therefore, the Gemara’s initial interpretation of the baraita is accepted, leading to the conclusion that the distinction between a case where the owner is in the field and a case where he is in the town is due to the halakha that one’s courtyard can effect acquisition of property for him only if he is next to the courtyard, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel.
וכן אמר עולא והוא שעומד בצד שדהו וכן אמר רבה בר בר חנה והוא שעומד בצד שדהו
And Ulla also says that the acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana also says that the acquisition is effective specifically in a case where he is standing next to his field.
איתיביה רבי אבא לעולא מעשה ברבן גמליאל וזקנים שהיו באים בספינה אמר רבן גמליאל עישור שאני עתיד למוד נתון ליהושע
Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from that which is taught in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 5:9): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and other Elders, who were traveling on a ship. Since he remembered that he had not tithed the produce of his fields, Rabban Gamliel said to the others: One-tenth of my produce, which I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce, is given to Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who is a Levite and is entitled to receive the first tithe,
ומקומו מושכר לו ועישור אחר שאני עתיד למוד נתון לעקיבא בן יוסף כדי שיזכה בו לעניים ומקומו מושכר לו
and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man’s tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.
וכי רבי יהושע ורבי עקיבא בצד שדהו של רבן גמליאל היו עומדין
Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel’s field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
אמר ליה דמי האי מרבנן כדלא גמרי אינשי שמעתא
Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.
כי אתא לסורא אמר להו הכי אמר עולא והכי אותביתיה אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן רבן גמליאל מטלטלי אגב מקרקעי הקנה להם רבי זירא קבלה רבי אבא לא קבלה
When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba’s objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.
אמר רבא שפיר עביד דלא קבלה וכי לא היה להם סודר לקנות ממנו בחליפין אלא טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות ממנו בחליפין הכא נמי טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות על גבי קרקע
Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba’s explanation must be correct, and one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
ולא היא מתנות כהונה נתינה כתיבא בהו חליפין דרך מקח וממכר הוא מטלטלין אגב מקרקע נתינה אלימתא היא
The Gemara rejects Rava’s reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: “And have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow” (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion.
רב פפא אמר דעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני
Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.
ומנא תימרא דתנן ראה אותן רצין אחר המציאה כו׳ ואמר רבי ירמיה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא שרץ אחריהן ומגיען ובעי רבי ירמיה במתנה היאך קבלה מיניה רבי אבא בר כהנא אף על פי שרץ אחריהן ואין מגיען מאי טעמא לאו משום דדעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני
And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa’s explanation.
אמר ליה רב שימי לרב פפא הרי גט דדעת אחרת מקנה אותה ואמר עולא והוא שעומדת בצד ביתה או בצד חצרה שאני גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה
Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife’s house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one’s wife even against her will.
מתקיף לה רב ששת בריה דרב אידי ולאו קל וחומר הוא ומה גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה אי עומדת בצד ביתה ובצד חצרה אין אי לא לא מתנה דמדעתיה לא כל שכן
Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?
אלא אמר רב אשי
Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows:
