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Today's Daf Yomi

October 7, 2016 | 讛壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Metzia 11

The gemara brings different explanations as to what Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan are debating regarding a minor whether or not she can acquire through a chatzer or not. 聽The mishna raises a case where an animal was running and ran into someone’s courtyard. 聽He can acquire is by saying “my field acquired it” as long as the animal can’t run very fast (i.e. has a broken leg). 聽Shmuel and others qualify the mishna and says it only works if the owner is standing nearby and that assumes that we are referring to an unprotected field (in a protected field one would not need to be standing by). 聽The gemara attempts to bring a proof for this but rejects the proof. 聽 Rabbi Abba raises a聽question against this position from a mishna. 聽Various explanations of the mishna are brought to聽resolve聽the contradiction.


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讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟

we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘拽讟谞讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟 讜讛讻讗 讘拽讟谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

And if you wish, say instead that with regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and she acquires an ownerless item that is found in her courtyard. And here they disagree with regard to whether a minor boy acquires an item that is placed in his courtyard.

诪专 住讘专 讬诇驻讬谞谉 拽讟谉 诪拽讟谞讛 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 拽讟谉 诪拽讟谞讛

One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that we derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl, as there should be no difference between them with regard to the halakhot of acquisition. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl; only a minor girl acquires items by means of her courtyard, as the Torah includes this mode of acquisition with regard to acquiring a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪专 讗诪专 讞讚讗 讜诪专 讗诪专 讞讚讗 讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

And if you wish, say instead that there is no dispute here at all. Rather, one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, said one statement, that a minor girl is divorced by her husband placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Yannai, said another statement, that a minor boy or girl does not acquire an item that is found in his or her courtyard; and they do not disagree.

诪转谞讬壮 专讗讛 讗讜转谉 专爪讬谉 讗讞专 诪爪讬讗讛 讗讞专 爪讘讬 砖讘讜专 讗讞专 讙讜讝诇讜转 砖诇讗 驻专讞讜 讜讗诪专 讝讻转讛 诇讬 砖讚讬 讝讻转讛 诇讜 讛讬讛 爪讘讬 专抓 讻讚专讻讜 讗讜 砖讛讬讜 讙讜讝诇讜转 诪驻专讬讞讬谉 讜讗诪专 讝讻转讛 诇讬 砖讚讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

MISHNA: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one鈥檚 courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field at the time of the acquisition, so that it has the halakhic status of a secured courtyard.

讜转拽谞讬 诇讬讛 砖讚讛讜 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But shouldn鈥檛 his field effect acquisition of the animal for him even without him standing next to it? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition of property for him even without his knowledge.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转 讗讘诇 讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讗讬 注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: This statement applies only to a secured courtyard, where items remain in the courtyard without supervision. But with regard to an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讗讬 注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf?

讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 注讜诪讚 讘注讬专 讜讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖注讜诪专 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘砖讚讛 驻讜注诇讬诐 砖讻讞讜讛讜 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜砖讻讞转 注诪专 讘砖讚讛 讘砖讚讛 讜砖讻讞转 讜诇讗 讘注讬专

As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淲hen you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: 鈥淎nd have forgotten鈥 applies 鈥渋n the field,鈥 but not in the town.

讛讗 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 讗诇诪讗 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 转诇诪讜讚讗 讘砖讚讛 讜砖讻讞转 讜诇讗 讘注讬专 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara clarifies: This baraita itself is difficult. First you said that one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf, so apparently the tanna seeks to prove that it is considered a forgotten sheaf. And then the baraita adduces the derivation that the phrase 鈥渁nd have forgotten鈥 applies only 鈥渋n the field,鈥 but not in the town, which apparently means that a sheaf forgotten by the owner while he is in the town is not considered a forgotten sheaf.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘砖讚讛 砖讻讜讞 诪注讬拽专讜 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讝讻讜专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讜讞 讗讬谉 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗讬 讙讘讛 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 讜讝讻转讛 诇讬讛

Rather, isn鈥檛 this what the tanna is saying: In a case where the owner is in the field, if the sheaf was forgotten at the outset, it is considered a forgotten sheaf; but if it was remembered at first and was ultimately forgotten, it does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf? What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that since he is standing in the field, beside the sheaf, his field is tantamount to his courtyard, and his courtyard effects acquisition of the sheaf for him once he remembers it.

讗讘诇 讘注讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 讝讻讜专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讜讞 讛讜讬讗 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讙讘讬讛 讚诇讝讻讬 诇讬讛

But in a case where the owner is in the town, even if the sheaf was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is considered a forgotten sheaf and must be left for the poor. What is the reason for this? It is because the owner is not beside it, which is necessary for his courtyard to effect acquisition of the sheaf for him. Evidently, an item that is in a person鈥檚 courtyard is acquired by him only if he is standing next to the courtyard.

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讙讝讬专转 讛讻转讜讘 讛讬讗 讚讘砖讚讛 谞讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讜讘注讬专 诇讗 谞讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: From where can it be proven that this is the reason? Perhaps the baraita should be understood in a different manner: It is a Torah edict that if the owner is in the field, it is considered a forgotten sheaf, but if the owner is in the town, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf and does not need to be left for the poor. Accordingly, the distinction would not be derived from the halakhot of acquisition.

讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 转砖讜讘 诇拽讞转讜 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

The Gemara responds that the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not go back to take it鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Evidently, there is no fundamental difference between a town and the field with regard to the halakhot of forgotten sheaves; rather, the distinction is due to the fact that one cannot acquire a sheaf by means of his courtyard if he is not standing next to the courtyard.

讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诇讗讜

The Gemara challenges: This phrase is necessary to impose a prohibition upon one who takes his sheaf after he forgot it, instead of leaving it for the poor. It is therefore not superfluous and cannot be interpreted as including an additional case.

讗诐 讻谉 谞讬诪讗 拽专讗 诇讗 转拽讞谞讜 诪讗讬 诇讗 转砖讜讘 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse serves only that purpose, let the verse say: You shall not take it. What is added by the phrase: 鈥淵ou shall not go back to take it鈥? It is written to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town.

讜讗讻转讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞谉 砖诇驻谞讬讜 讗讬谉 砖讻讞讛 砖诇讗讞专讬讜 讬砖 砖讻讞讛 砖讛讜讗 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘

The Gemara challenges: But the phrase 鈥測ou shall not go back鈥 is still necessary for that which we learned in a mishna (Pe鈥檃 7:4): While a landowner collects the sheaves from his field, any sheaf that remains before him, as he has not reached it yet, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf, even if he has forgotten about its existence. Any sheaf that is already behind him has the status of a forgotten sheaf, as the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies.

讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘 砖讻讞讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 砖讻讞讛

This is the principle: Any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies, as one would need to retrace his steps in order to retrieve the sheaf, assumes the status of a forgotten sheaf; and any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, does not apply, i.e., a sheaf that one has yet to reach, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf. The phrase 鈥淵ou shall not go back鈥 is apparently necessary to teach this halakha, and it cannot be interpreted as including a case where the owner is in the town.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 拽专讗 讬讛讬讛 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

Rav Ashi said that the inclusion of this case is derived from another phrase in the verse. The verse states: 鈥淚t shall be鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Therefore, the Gemara鈥檚 initial interpretation of the baraita is accepted, leading to the conclusion that the distinction between a case where the owner is in the field and a case where he is in the town is due to the halakha that one鈥檚 courtyard can effect acquisition of property for him only if he is next to the courtyard, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜

And Ulla also says that the acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field. And Rabba bar bar 岣na also says that the acquisition is effective specifically in a case where he is standing next to his field.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇注讜诇讗 诪注砖讛 讘专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讝拽谞讬诐 砖讛讬讜 讘讗讬诐 讘住驻讬谞讛 讗诪专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 注讬砖讜专 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇诪讜讚 谞转讜谉 诇讬讛讜砖注

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from that which is taught in a mishna (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 5:9): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and other Elders, who were traveling on a ship. Since he remembered that he had not tithed the produce of his fields, Rabban Gamliel said to the others: One-tenth of my produce, which I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce, is given to Yehoshua ben 岣nanya, who is a Levite and is entitled to receive the first tithe,

讜诪拽讜诪讜 诪讜砖讻专 诇讜 讜注讬砖讜专 讗讞专 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇诪讜讚 谞转讜谉 诇注拽讬讘讗 讘谉 讬讜住祝 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讻讛 讘讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 讜诪拽讜诪讜 诪讜砖讻专 诇讜

and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man鈥檚 tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.

讜讻讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 砖诇 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讜 注讜诪讚讬谉

Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel鈥檚 field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚诪讬 讛讗讬 诪专讘谞谉 讻讚诇讗 讙诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 砖诪注转讗

Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.

讻讬 讗转讗 诇住讜专讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讻讬 讗讜转讘讬转讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讗讙讘 诪拽专拽注讬 讛拽谞讛 诇讛诐 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽讘诇讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 拽讘诇讛

When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖驻讬专 注讘讬讚 讚诇讗 拽讘诇讛 讜讻讬 诇讗 讛讬讛 诇讛诐 住讜讚专 诇拽谞讜转 诪诪谞讜 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诇拽谞讜转 诪诪谞讜 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诇拽谞讜转 注诇 讙讘讬 拽专拽注

Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation must be correct, and one鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

讜诇讗 讛讬讗 诪转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 谞转讬谞讛 讻转讬讘讗 讘讛讜 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讚专讱 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专 讛讜讗 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讙讘 诪拽专拽注 谞转讬谞讛 讗诇讬诪转讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara rejects Rava鈥檚 reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: 鈥淎nd have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla鈥檚 opinion.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转谉 砖讗谞讬

Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla鈥檚 opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞谉 专讗讛 讗讜转谉 专爪讬谉 讗讞专 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讻讜壮 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讜诪讙讬注谉 讜讘注讬 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 讛讬讗讱 拽讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 讻讛谞讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讜讗讬谉 诪讙讬注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转谉 砖讗谞讬

And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa鈥檚 explanation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 砖讬诪讬 诇专讘 驻驻讗 讛专讬 讙讟 讚讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转讛 讜讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讗讜 讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 砖讗谞讬 讙讟 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛

Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one鈥檚 wife even against her will.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讙讟 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗讬 注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讜讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗 诪转谞讛 讚诪讚注转讬讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬

Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Metzia 11

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 11

讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟

we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘拽讟谞讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪讙讟 讜讛讻讗 讘拽讟谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

And if you wish, say instead that with regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and she acquires an ownerless item that is found in her courtyard. And here they disagree with regard to whether a minor boy acquires an item that is placed in his courtyard.

诪专 住讘专 讬诇驻讬谞谉 拽讟谉 诪拽讟谞讛 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 拽讟谉 诪拽讟谞讛

One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that we derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl, as there should be no difference between them with regard to the halakhot of acquisition. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl; only a minor girl acquires items by means of her courtyard, as the Torah includes this mode of acquisition with regard to acquiring a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪专 讗诪专 讞讚讗 讜诪专 讗诪专 讞讚讗 讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

And if you wish, say instead that there is no dispute here at all. Rather, one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, said one statement, that a minor girl is divorced by her husband placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Yannai, said another statement, that a minor boy or girl does not acquire an item that is found in his or her courtyard; and they do not disagree.

诪转谞讬壮 专讗讛 讗讜转谉 专爪讬谉 讗讞专 诪爪讬讗讛 讗讞专 爪讘讬 砖讘讜专 讗讞专 讙讜讝诇讜转 砖诇讗 驻专讞讜 讜讗诪专 讝讻转讛 诇讬 砖讚讬 讝讻转讛 诇讜 讛讬讛 爪讘讬 专抓 讻讚专讻讜 讗讜 砖讛讬讜 讙讜讝诇讜转 诪驻专讬讞讬谉 讜讗诪专 讝讻转讛 诇讬 砖讚讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

MISHNA: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one鈥檚 courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field at the time of the acquisition, so that it has the halakhic status of a secured courtyard.

讜转拽谞讬 诇讬讛 砖讚讛讜 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But shouldn鈥檛 his field effect acquisition of the animal for him even without him standing next to it? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition of property for him even without his knowledge.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转 讗讘诇 讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讗讬 注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: This statement applies only to a secured courtyard, where items remain in the courtyard without supervision. But with regard to an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讗讬 注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf?

讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 注讜诪讚 讘注讬专 讜讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖注讜诪专 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘砖讚讛 驻讜注诇讬诐 砖讻讞讜讛讜 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜砖讻讞转 注诪专 讘砖讚讛 讘砖讚讛 讜砖讻讞转 讜诇讗 讘注讬专

As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淲hen you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: 鈥淎nd have forgotten鈥 applies 鈥渋n the field,鈥 but not in the town.

讛讗 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 砖讻讞讛 讗诇诪讗 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 转诇诪讜讚讗 讘砖讚讛 讜砖讻讞转 讜诇讗 讘注讬专 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara clarifies: This baraita itself is difficult. First you said that one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf, so apparently the tanna seeks to prove that it is considered a forgotten sheaf. And then the baraita adduces the derivation that the phrase 鈥渁nd have forgotten鈥 applies only 鈥渋n the field,鈥 but not in the town, which apparently means that a sheaf forgotten by the owner while he is in the town is not considered a forgotten sheaf.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘砖讚讛 砖讻讜讞 诪注讬拽专讜 讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讝讻讜专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讜讞 讗讬谉 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗讬 讙讘讛 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 讜讝讻转讛 诇讬讛

Rather, isn鈥檛 this what the tanna is saying: In a case where the owner is in the field, if the sheaf was forgotten at the outset, it is considered a forgotten sheaf; but if it was remembered at first and was ultimately forgotten, it does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf? What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that since he is standing in the field, beside the sheaf, his field is tantamount to his courtyard, and his courtyard effects acquisition of the sheaf for him once he remembers it.

讗讘诇 讘注讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 讝讻讜专 讜诇讘住讜祝 砖讻讜讞 讛讜讬讗 砖讻讞讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讙讘讬讛 讚诇讝讻讬 诇讬讛

But in a case where the owner is in the town, even if the sheaf was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is considered a forgotten sheaf and must be left for the poor. What is the reason for this? It is because the owner is not beside it, which is necessary for his courtyard to effect acquisition of the sheaf for him. Evidently, an item that is in a person鈥檚 courtyard is acquired by him only if he is standing next to the courtyard.

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讙讝讬专转 讛讻转讜讘 讛讬讗 讚讘砖讚讛 谞讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛 讜讘注讬专 诇讗 谞讛讜讬 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: From where can it be proven that this is the reason? Perhaps the baraita should be understood in a different manner: It is a Torah edict that if the owner is in the field, it is considered a forgotten sheaf, but if the owner is in the town, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf and does not need to be left for the poor. Accordingly, the distinction would not be derived from the halakhot of acquisition.

讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 转砖讜讘 诇拽讞转讜 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

The Gemara responds that the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not go back to take it鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Evidently, there is no fundamental difference between a town and the field with regard to the halakhot of forgotten sheaves; rather, the distinction is due to the fact that one cannot acquire a sheaf by means of his courtyard if he is not standing next to the courtyard.

讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诇讗讜

The Gemara challenges: This phrase is necessary to impose a prohibition upon one who takes his sheaf after he forgot it, instead of leaving it for the poor. It is therefore not superfluous and cannot be interpreted as including an additional case.

讗诐 讻谉 谞讬诪讗 拽专讗 诇讗 转拽讞谞讜 诪讗讬 诇讗 转砖讜讘 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse serves only that purpose, let the verse say: You shall not take it. What is added by the phrase: 鈥淵ou shall not go back to take it鈥? It is written to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town.

讜讗讻转讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞谉 砖诇驻谞讬讜 讗讬谉 砖讻讞讛 砖诇讗讞专讬讜 讬砖 砖讻讞讛 砖讛讜讗 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘

The Gemara challenges: But the phrase 鈥測ou shall not go back鈥 is still necessary for that which we learned in a mishna (Pe鈥檃 7:4): While a landowner collects the sheaves from his field, any sheaf that remains before him, as he has not reached it yet, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf, even if he has forgotten about its existence. Any sheaf that is already behind him has the status of a forgotten sheaf, as the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies.

讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘 砖讻讞讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讘诇 转砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 砖讻讞讛

This is the principle: Any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies, as one would need to retrace his steps in order to retrieve the sheaf, assumes the status of a forgotten sheaf; and any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, does not apply, i.e., a sheaf that one has yet to reach, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf. The phrase 鈥淵ou shall not go back鈥 is apparently necessary to teach this halakha, and it cannot be interpreted as including a case where the owner is in the town.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 拽专讗 讬讛讬讛 诇专讘讜转 砖讻讞转 讛注讬专

Rav Ashi said that the inclusion of this case is derived from another phrase in the verse. The verse states: 鈥淚t shall be鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Therefore, the Gemara鈥檚 initial interpretation of the baraita is accepted, leading to the conclusion that the distinction between a case where the owner is in the field and a case where he is in the town is due to the halakha that one鈥檚 courtyard can effect acquisition of property for him only if he is next to the courtyard, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜

And Ulla also says that the acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field. And Rabba bar bar 岣na also says that the acquisition is effective specifically in a case where he is standing next to his field.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇注讜诇讗 诪注砖讛 讘专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讝拽谞讬诐 砖讛讬讜 讘讗讬诐 讘住驻讬谞讛 讗诪专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 注讬砖讜专 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇诪讜讚 谞转讜谉 诇讬讛讜砖注

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from that which is taught in a mishna (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 5:9): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and other Elders, who were traveling on a ship. Since he remembered that he had not tithed the produce of his fields, Rabban Gamliel said to the others: One-tenth of my produce, which I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce, is given to Yehoshua ben 岣nanya, who is a Levite and is entitled to receive the first tithe,

讜诪拽讜诪讜 诪讜砖讻专 诇讜 讜注讬砖讜专 讗讞专 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇诪讜讚 谞转讜谉 诇注拽讬讘讗 讘谉 讬讜住祝 讻讚讬 砖讬讝讻讛 讘讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 讜诪拽讜诪讜 诪讜砖讻专 诇讜

and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man鈥檚 tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.

讜讻讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讘爪讚 砖讚讛讜 砖诇 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讜 注讜诪讚讬谉

Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel鈥檚 field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚诪讬 讛讗讬 诪专讘谞谉 讻讚诇讗 讙诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 砖诪注转讗

Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.

讻讬 讗转讗 诇住讜专讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讻讬 讗讜转讘讬转讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讟诇讟诇讬 讗讙讘 诪拽专拽注讬 讛拽谞讛 诇讛诐 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽讘诇讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 拽讘诇讛

When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖驻讬专 注讘讬讚 讚诇讗 拽讘诇讛 讜讻讬 诇讗 讛讬讛 诇讛诐 住讜讚专 诇拽谞讜转 诪诪谞讜 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诇拽谞讜转 诪诪谞讜 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讗讬谞讛 诪诪讜谉 诇拽谞讜转 注诇 讙讘讬 拽专拽注

Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation must be correct, and one鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

讜诇讗 讛讬讗 诪转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 谞转讬谞讛 讻转讬讘讗 讘讛讜 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讚专讱 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专 讛讜讗 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讙讘 诪拽专拽注 谞转讬谞讛 讗诇讬诪转讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara rejects Rava鈥檚 reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: 鈥淎nd have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla鈥檚 opinion.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转谉 砖讗谞讬

Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla鈥檚 opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞谉 专讗讛 讗讜转谉 专爪讬谉 讗讞专 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讻讜壮 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讜诪讙讬注谉 讜讘注讬 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 讛讬讗讱 拽讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 讻讛谞讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讜讗讬谉 诪讙讬注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转谉 砖讗谞讬

And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa鈥檚 explanation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 砖讬诪讬 诇专讘 驻驻讗 讛专讬 讙讟 讚讚注转 讗讞专转 诪拽谞讛 讗讜转讛 讜讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讗讜 讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 砖讗谞讬 讙讟 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛

Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one鈥檚 wife even against her will.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讙讟 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗讬 注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讜讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗 诪转谞讛 讚诪讚注转讬讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬

Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows:

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